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Abstract 
It is common for modem engineering systems to feature dependency relationships between its 
components. The existence of these dependencies render the fault tree analysis (FT A) and its 
efficient implementation, the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) approach, inappropriate in 
predicting the system failure probability. Whilst the Markov method provides an alternative 
means of analysis of systems of this nature, it is susceptible to state space explosion problems 
for large, or even moderate sized systems. 
Within this thesis, a process is proposed to improve the applicability of the Markov analysis. 
With this process, the smallest independent sections (modules) which contain each 
dependency type are identified in a fault tree and analysed by the most efficient method. Thus, 
BDD and the Markov analysis are applied in a combined way to improve the analysis 
efficiency. The BDD method is applied to modules which contain no dependency, and the 
Markov analysis applied to modules in which dependencies exist. 
Different types of dependency which can arise in an engineering system assessment are 
identified. Algorithms for establishing a Markov model have also been developed for each 
type of dependency. 
Three types of system are investigated in this thesis in the context of dependency modelling: 
the continuously-operating system, the active-on-demand system and the phased-mission 
system. Different quantification techniques have been developed for each type of system to 
obtain the system failure probability and other useful predictive measures. 
Investigation is also carried out into the use of BDD in assessing non-repairable systems 
involving dependencies. General processes have been established to enable the quantification. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to Risk and Reliability Assessment 
History has witnessed many disastrous accidents due to the failure of industrial systems, such as 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986, the explosion on the Piper Alpha oil 
platform in 1988 and the Concorde disaster in Paris in 2000. In order to manage the safety of 
such systems, it is now common practice that the probability of system failure is quantified. It is 
always more effective to carry out the process of evaluating the system failure probability at the 
design stage when design changes can be made most effectively. 
Significant advances have been made since the Second World War in the system failure 
assessment. Methods have been developed to enable the evaluation of the probability or 
frequency by which a specific hazardous event could occur. The Risk [1], or 'expected loss' ofa 
specific incident, denoted by 'R', is defined as the product of the consequences of the event, C, 
and the probability or frequency of the event occurrence, P, as in equation 1.1 
R=CxP 1.1 
Usually the consequences of an event are measured by the number of resulting fatalities and 
indicate the severity of the undesired event. The risk can therefore be reduced by either 
alleviating the consequences of the incident or reducing the associated incident probability or 
frequency. A risk assessment carried out at the system design stage can achieve both of these 
two aspects by identifying the potential improvements in the design. 
With the risk of a specific event calculated according to equation 1.1, a three-zone approach is 
defined by the Health and Safety Executive to define the acceptable level of risk. As is illustrated 
in figure 1.1, the highest zone (High Frequency, High Consequence) represents unacceptable risk 
level, whilst the lowest zone (Low Frequency, Low Consequence) represents negligible risk 
levels which are considered to be acceptable. The intermediate zone is defined as 'ALARP' 
region [2] (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). In this case, the risk must be reduced to as low 
as possible. 
Frequency 
Unacceptable 
Acceptable 
Consequence 
Figure 1.I The three-zone risk 
To determine the risk level for a specific event, a quantified risk assessment is required. It is 
carried out in four basic stages: 
I). Identification of potential safety hazards. 
2). Estimation ofthe consequences of each hazard. 
3). Estimation of the probability of occurrence of each hazard. 
4). Comparison of the results of the analysis against the acceptability criteria. 
The estimation of the consequences of a hazardous event is very much industry-dependent. In 
contrast, assessment techniques applied to investigate the probability or frequency of the event 
occurrence are generic and thus implemented across many different industries. Methods which 
have been frequently used include Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [3], Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) [3], Reliability Block Diagram [3], Binary Decision Diagram (BOO) [4] and the 
Markov Analysis [5]. 
1.2 General Concepts in System Failure Quantification 
When predicting the reliability performance of a system, the quantification is carried out using 
appropriate techniques by drawing on component failure probabilities. Two parameters are 
frequently used as the measure ofthe system performance: Availability and Reliability. 
• Availability 
Availability is a relevant and appropriate measure for systems which can be repaired and thus 
are tolerant of failures. It is defined as: 
2 
The fraction of the total time that a system (or component) is able to perform its required 
function. 
Regarding a specified time point t, this parameter can also be interpreted as: 
The probability that a system (or component) is working at time t. 
The complement of Availability is Unavailability, which is obtained in: 
Unavailability = 1 - Availability 
The unavailability of a system or component represents the probability that the system or 
component is failed at time t, usually denoted by Qsys(t) and qc(t) respectively. 
• Reliability 
The reliability measure is concerned with the system performance over a continuous period 
of time, and is defined as: 
The probability that a system (or component) will operate without failure for a stated 
period of time under specified conditions. 
Correspondingly, the probability that a system or component fails to function successfully 
over a stated period of time under specified conditions is defined as the Unreliability, 
denoted by F(t), where: 
Unreliability = 1 - Reliability 
The Reliability is a more relevant measure for systems where failures cannot be tolerated 
and thus it is vital that the system should function successfully for a specified time duration. 
For systems or components which are non-repairable, if it is working at time t, then it must 
have worked without any failure over the time duration [0, t). In this case, the unreliability 
during [0, t) is equal to the unavailability at time t. 
An important parameter which is required to obtain the unavailability or unreliability of a system 
or component is its hazard rate or conditional failure rate, het). This parameter indicates the 
3 
frequency of transition from a working state to a failed state of a component or system, and is 
defined as: 
The probability that a component or system fails in the interval [t, t+dt} given that it has not 
failed in [0, t}. 
It is generally considered that for components the hazard rate can be modelled by a 'reliability 
bath-tub curve' [3], illustrated in figure 1.2. 
Hazard 
rate h(t) 
Burn- in Useful-life Wear out 
Figure 1.2 Reliability bath-tub curve 
Time t 
During the first phase in figure 1.2, the hazard rate reduces as the weak components are 
eliminated. During the final phase, the hazard rate increases as the components start to wear out. 
During the second phase, the hazard rate remains approximately constant, and the reliability 
assessment is typically performed on components which are considered to be in this phase. With 
the constant hazard or conditional failure rate A, the reliability of a non-repairable system can be 
expressed in equation 1.2: 
1.2 
Further component and system quantification techniques are presented in [3]. 
1.3 System Reliability Modelling 
Some of the most commonly used methods are discussed in the following sections. 
1.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
The concept of fault tree was first introduced by H.A. Watson in the 1960' s. In the risk and 
reliability assessment, the fault tree establishes a deductive analysis using a 'what can cause this' 
approach. A fault tree diagram provides a visual representation of the combination of component 
failure events resulting in the occurrence of a specific system failure mode. 
4 
In a fault tree diagram, the particular system failure mode of concern is termed 'top event', 
which is the starting point of the fault tree development. A top-down approach is carried out 
from the top event to investigate the root causes. The development is not completed until 
component failure events (basic events) have been identified to define the causes of al\ the 
intermediate events. Through the logic operators which link al\ the component failures (AND, 
OR, NOT), the fault tree analysis is able to produce different combinations of component failure 
events which may lead to the occurrence ofthe top event. 
The quantitative analysis of a fault tree is based on Kinetic Tree Theory, which was developed in 
the early 1970's by Vesely [6]. This technique enables the calculation of the time-dependent 
probability and frequency of the top event occurrence, and contributions to the system failure, 
known as importance measures of component failures [3] can also be produced. The main 
disadvantage of the fault tree analysis is that the fault tree quantification can become 
computational\y demanding and even intractable for large fault trees. To tackle this problem, 
approximations have been developed. 
1.3.2 Binary Decision Diagram 
The use of the binary decision diagram (BDD) as a means fo evaluating the top event probability 
ofa fault tree was developed by Rauzy [4]. A binary decision diagram is a directed acyclic graph 
in which each node corresponds to a basic event in the fault tree. The BDD is constructed from 
the fault tree based on a particular basic event ordering. 
Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed on a BDD and exact solutions can be 
obtained without the need for approximations. However, one disadvantage with the BDD method 
is that the chosen variable ordering influences the size of the resulting BDD. The wrong choice 
of ordering scheme can result in a large BDD and thus increased analysis time. 
1.4 System Dependency Modelling 
Many systems feature a high level of inter-dependence between components. Some types of the 
inter-dependence between the components wiII introduce statistical dependency during the 
quantification process. In this case, the fault tree analysis and BDD technique are no longer 
appropriate means of analysis as they are based on the assumption of the independence between 
component failures in the system. Techniques such as dynamic fault tree analysis and the 
Markov method can be used to implement the quantification of systems which involve 
dependency relationships. 
5 
1.4.1 The Markov Method 
The Markov analysis is based on a state-space approach. It analyses the reliability and 
availability of a system by determining the probability that a system resides in each possible state 
at a specified time point t. Component failures and repairs introduce transitions between states 
which occur at specified constant rates in the modeL As the behaviour of each component in the 
system can be tracked in the Markov model, the Markov analysis is able to take into account the 
dependency relationships between components during the quantification process. 
One big disadvantage of the Markov method is that the model size can grow exponentially with 
the number of components in the system, thus rendering it intractable for large or even medium-
sized systems. 
1.4.2 Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis (DFTA) 
Dynamic fault tree was developed by J.B. Dugan [7, 8] to overcome the limitation of 
conventional fault tree analysis. By introducing new types of gate structures, such as the 
Functional-dependency Gate (FDEP), Cold-Spare Gate (CSP), Warm-spare Gate (WSP), 
Sequence-enforcing Gate (SEQ) and Demand-dependency Gate (DDEP), the dynamic fault tree 
is able to embrace, in its own structure, some types of dependency relationship as well as 
represent the system failure logic appearing in a conventional fault tree. 
The quantitative dynamic fault tree analysis is carried out by converting sections below 
independent gates to a BDD and sections below dependency gates to a Markov model. By 
containing the dependencies under the particular dependency gates, the dynamic fault tree 
technique alleviates, to some extent, the model size problem which restricts the applicability of 
the Markov method. However, disadvantages also come with the dynamic fault tree analysis. 
When repeated basic events are included in different dependency gate structures, they will be 
repeatedly accounted for during the quantification process. Also, as it is very difficult to 
establish a dependency structure for some types of dependency, the number of dependency 
relationships which the dynamic fault tree is able to represent are limited. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The aim of this research is to consider analytical techniques for the efficient representation and 
generic solution of systems which involve dependency relationships. A range of different types 
of dependency relationships are investigated in detail. Three distinct types of system will be 
examined - continuously-operating systems, active-on-demand systems and phased-mission 
6 
systems. The focus is placed upon the development of appropriate quantification techniques for 
each type of system. Also attempts have been made in this research to solve non-repairable 
systems involving dependencies using the BDD approach. The specific objectives are listed as 
follows: 
• IdentifY typical types of dependency in all types of systems. 
• Establish a generic mechanism to represent different types of dependency. 
• Establish an algorithm for developing a Markov model for each type of dependency 
relationship. 
• Improve the efficiency of the dependency modelling by applying the Markov method 
only to the smallest independent fault tree sections where dependences are self-contained. 
• Consider the appropriate quantification technique for each type of system. 
• Investigate how the BDD technique can be applied to non-repairable systems involving 
dependency relationships 
7 
Chapter 2. Overview of Conventional Reliability Assessment Techniques 
2.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Since its conception in the 1960s, fault tree analysis has been widely used in the safety and 
reliability assessment of engineering systems. Its deductive feature helps provide a clear picture 
of the causal relationships between combinations of component failures and a specific system 
failure mode. Compared with other assessment methodologies, fault tree analysis features an 
articulate and organized documentation of the failure logic. 
2.1.2 Definition of the Fault Tree structure 
A fault tree is a structure by which a particular system failure mode can be expressed in terms of 
combinations of component failure modes and operator actions [3]. The system failure mode to 
be considered is termed the 'top event' (TE). The construction of a fault tree is carried out in a 
deductive or backward way. That is, the system failure mode (TE) is broken down or developed 
into subsystem failures, which are in turn further developed into lower resolution events or 
failures. This process is continued until no further development can take place and the limit of 
resolution is encountered [9]. The development of the fault tree features two types of elements: 
'events' and 'gates'. In figure 2.1 and 2.2 below, different types of gates and events are 
illustrated. 
~ ~ 
AND gate: output event occurs if all input events 
occur simultaneously (number of inputs>=2) 
OR gate: output event occurs ifat least one of the 
input events occurs (number of inputs>=2) 
k-out-of-n gate (voting gate): output event occurs 
if at least k out of the n input events occur 
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Priority AND gate: output event occurs if all input 
events occur in the order from left to right 
NOT gate: output event occurs if the input event 
does not occur 
Figure 2.1 Gate types and corresponding symbols 
Top/Intermediate event: to be further developed by 
a logic gate 
Basic event: usually representing a specific failure 
mode of the basic component 
House event: either occurring or not 
Figure 2.2 Event symbols 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a fault tree to demonstrate how the events and gates are connected to each 
other to present the fault tree structure. In a system analysis each of the text boxes which are at 
the gate outputs would have a full text description of the events they represent. 
Figure 2.3 Example fault tree 
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2.1.3 Qualitative FTA 
A specific system failure (TE) can be caused in different ways. Each unique way is a system 
failure mode and will involve the failure of individual components or combinations of 
components. Therefore to analyse a system and to eliminate the most likely causes of failure will 
first require that each failure mode is identified. Here the concept ofthe cut-set will be defined to 
represent the system failure modes. 
A cut-set is a collection of basic events such that if they all occur the top event also 
occurs. 
For most industrial engineering systems, there exist a very large number of cut sets each of 
which can consist of many component failure events. To work out all the cut-sets will be time-
consuming and may actually be impractical. Therefore, in FT A, people are only interested in lists 
of component failure modes which are both necessary and sufficient to produce system failure. 
And this idea is embodied in the concept of a minimal cut-set, which is a cut set such that if any 
basic event is removed from the set the top event will not occur, i.e. a minimal cut set is the 
smallest combination of component failures, which if they all occur will cause the top event to 
occur. 
Any fault tree will represent a finite number of minimal cut sets which are unique for the specific 
top event. And two fault trees drawn using different approaches are logically equivalent if they 
produce identical minimal cut-sets. The minimal cut set expression for the top event, TE, can be 
written in the form: 
2.1 
where Kj, i=l, ... ,n, are the minimal cut sets and '+' represents logical OR relationship 
betweenKj. 
Each minimal cut set consists of a combination of component failures and a k-component cut set 
can be expressed as Kj=X\.X2 .... Xk, where Xj are basic component failures in the system and '.' 
represents logical AND. It should be noted that if the NOT gate is included in the fault tree, the 
concept of 'cut set' will be represented by another term 'implicant' [3], and correspondingly, 
minimal sets of implicants are called prime implicants. 
To work out all the minimal cuts is the focus of the qualitative fault tree analysis. This process is 
carried out by employing the relevant Laws of Boolean Algebra. Since the basic gate types in 
fault trees, such as the OR gate, the AND gate and the NOT gate, combine events in exactly the 
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same way as the Boolean operations of 'union', 'intersection', and 'complementation', there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between Boolean algebraic expressions and the fault tree structure. 
2.1.3.1 Relevant Boolean Laws of Algebra 
Distributive Laws: 
A+(B.C)=(A+B).(A+C) 
A.(B+C)=(A.B)+(A.C) 
Idempotent Laws: 
A+A=A 
A.A=A 
Absorption Laws: 
A+(A.B)=A 
A.(A+B)=A 
Complementation: 
A=I-A 
A.A=O 
(A)=A 
De Morgans Law: 
(A+B)=A.B 
(A.B)=A+B 
2.1.3.2 Two ways of Obtaining Minimal Cut Sets 
The fault tree in figure 2.3 is used here to illustrate the two approaches of calculating the 
minimal cut sets . 
• 'Top-down' Approach: 
With this method, the qualitative analysis will begin with the top event, and develop further 
by substituting in the Boolean events appearing lower down in the fault tree and simplifying 
according to Boolean rules until the expression remaining includes only basic events. Then a 
group of minimal cut sets will be obtained. Take for instance the fault tree in figure 2.3: 
T=GI.G2 
=(G3+A).(C+G4) 
=G3.C+G3.G4+A.C+A.G4 
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=(B+C).C+(B+C).(A.B)+A.C+A.(A.B) 
=C+(A.B+A.B.C)+A.C+A.A.B 
=C+A.B+A.C+A.B 
=C+A.B 
Therefore the minimal cut sets of the fault tree in figure 2.3 are {C} and {A.B} . 
• 'Bottom-up' Approach: 
The bottom-up method uses the same substitution, expansion, and reduction methods as the 
'top-down' approach. The difference from the 'top-down' approach is that the Boolean 
operations commence at the base of the fault tree, i.e. the basic events, and work towards the 
top event. Equations containing only basic failures are successively substituted into each 
gate. And finally the minimal cut sets will be evaluated. 
Of the minimal cut sets, the one-component minimal cut-sets (first-order minimal cut sets) 
represent single failures, while two-component minimal cut sets (second order) represent double 
failures which together will cause the top event to occur. In general, the lower-order cut sets 
contribute most to system failure and effort should be concentrated on the elimination of these in 
order to improve system performance. 
2.1.4 Quautitative FTA 
Fault tree quantification will result in predictions of the system performance in terms of 
component level performance data (probability of failure or frequency of failure). These system 
performance indicators usually include the following items: 
(a) top event probability (unavailability or unreliability); 
(b) top event unconditional failure intensity; 
(c) top event failure rate; 
(d) expected number of top event occurrences in a specified time period; 
(e) total system downtime in a specified time period. 
Since the fault tree quantification is based on the parameters at component level, the following 
section will give a brief introduction to the reliability characteristics of basic components in the 
system. 
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2.1.4.1 Reliability Models for Component Failures 
In engineering systems basic components will feature types of failure which will have different 
models. Three different types of failure models will be discussed here: fixed, revealed and 
dormant, which have different inherent and functional characteristics. 
• Fixed Failure Model 
Basic components which are incorporated in the 'fixed' failure model category are 
parameterised with a constant unavailability (probability of failure) and unconditional 
failure intensity, which are usually represented by qi and Wi. 
• Revealed Failure Model 
With this model 'revealed' means the failure of the basic component will be immediately 
detected and identified and repair will be carried out on the component straight away. In 
terms of components faIling in this category, a constant conditional failure rate (A.) and a 
conditional repair rate (u) will be assigned accordingly. The unavailability and 
unconditional failure intensity of the component will be derived from the following 
equations [3]: 
• Dormant Failure Model 
q(t) 
A.[ 1-e -().+u)t] 
A.+1> 
w(t)= A..[I-q(t)] 
2.2 
2.3 
The 'dormant' failure model means that the failure of the component is not evident and 
will not be identified right after it occurs. In reality, most protective/safety system 
features such a failure mode. With regard to the basic component of this category, 
constant unrevealed failure rate (A.), Mean Time To Repair (t) and scheduled inspection 
interval (9) will be assigned. Any failure which occurs between two inspections will 
remain dormant and unattended till the next inspection. And the average unavailability of 
the basic component can be approximated by the following equation: 
9 
qAV=A..( '2+'1:) 2.4 
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2.1.4.2 Top Event Probability 
The Top event probability, also referred to as the system unavailability, provides the likelihood 
that the system is residing in a state defined by the top event at any specific point of time. 
Usually the top event probability is denoted by Qsys(t). 
The general method of calculating Qsys(t) 
This general approach utilizes the minimal cut sets derived from the previous qualitative 
analysis. The underlying algorithm is that if a fault tree has nc minimal cut sets Kj, i=l, 2, 
... , nc, then the top event exists when at least one minimal cut set exists. Translated into 
the logic function, the algorithm can be represented by: 
TE=K/+K2+'" +Knc 
ne 
=UK, 
1=1 
ne 
Therefore: QSys(t)=P(UKi ) 
;=1 
By applying the Inclusion-exclusion expansion: 
ne ne i-I 
QSys(t)=LP(Ki )- L LP(Ki nKj)+ ... +(-I)ne-'p(K/nK'2n ... nK'nc) 2.5 
j_1 1'",2 )=1 
where P(Kj) is the probability of the existence of the minimal cut set Kj. 
Take for example the fault tree in figure 2.3, by applying the equation 2.4 to the two 
minimal cut sets {C} and {A.B}, the system unavailability would be obtained as: 
Qsys(t)=P(Kl)+P(K2)-P(K1.K2) 
=P(C)+P(A.B)-P(A.B.C} 
=qc(t)+qA(t).qB(t)- qA(t).qB(t).qc(t) 
For moderate-sized systems, calculating each term in the inclusion-exclusion expansion 
in equation 2.4 could be very time-consuming and for large systems, could be an 
intractable task. Since the first term is numerically more significant than the second one, 
the second one more significant than the third and so on, truncation and approximation 
techniques can be employed to simply the process of calculating the system 
unavailability. 
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Approximation of system unavailability 
I). Upper and lower bounds for system unavailability 
In equation 2.5, truncation from the second term will give a lower bound of the 
system unavailability and the truncation from the first term will give an upper bound 
of the top event probability. 
ne ne i-I ne 
LP(K,) -L LP(KJ"\Kj ) ~ Qsys(t) ~ LP(K,) 2.6 
1=1 ;:::1 
lower bound exact upper bound 
The upper bound used here is know as the Rare Event Approximation since it would 
be very close to the exact system unavailability if the component failure events are 
rare. 
2). Minimal cut set upper bound 
Another more accurate upper bound for top event unavailability is the minimal cut set 
upper bound. This upper bound is derived from: 
since: 
P(system failure) = P(at least 1 minimal cut set occurs) 
=I-P(no minimal cut set exists) 
ne 
P(no minimal cut set exists) 2: IT P(minimal cut set i does not occur) 
;=1 
(equality achieved when no basic event appears in more than one minimal cut set) 
Therefore: 
i.e. 
n 
P(system failure):::; 1-IT P(minimal cut set i does not occur), 
;=1 
ne 
Qs (t):::; 1- IT [1-P(Kj)] 
;=1 
For the system unavailability it shows that: 
ne ne 
Qs (t):::; 1- IT [1-P(Kj}]:::; L P(Kj) 
1=1 1=1 
exact minimal cut set rare event 
upper bound approximation 
2.7 
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2.1.4.3 Top Event Freqnency 
The system unconditional failure intensity, which is denoted by wsys(t), is defined as the 
probability that the top event occurs per unit time at I given the system was working at 1=0. 
Therefore wsys(t)dl stands for the probability that the top event occurs during the time interval [I, 
I+d/) given that it did not exist at 1=0. 
The procedure to calculate the top event frequency is the same as that to calculate the system 
unavailability. First component failure parameters will be calculated. The minimal cut set 
parameters will then be obtained and finally the top event frequency will be derived based on the 
minimal cut set parameters. The following section illustrates the detailed process of calculating 
the unconditional failure intensity of the minimal cut set. 
2.1.4.3.1 Unconditional Failure Intensity of Minimal Cut Set 
The unconditional failure intensity of minimal cut set, denoted by wc(t), is the probability that 
the minimal cut set occurs per unit time at I. Correspondingly, wc(t)dl represents the probability 
that the minimal cut set occurs during the time interval [I, I+d/). This definition implies that the 
minimal cut set does not exist at time I. Therefore under the assumption that during a very short 
time interval dl only one component in the minimal cut set will fail, the minimal cut set 
frequency can be expressed by equation 2.8 below: 
n n 
Wc = :L{W,(/)I1Q/t)} 2.8 
;=1 J"'i 
1:1 
where Wi(t) represents the frequency of basic event i included in the minimal cut set, Oi(t) 
represents the probability of failure of basic event j at time I, and n is the number of 
events in the minimal cut set. 
Since Wi(t) implies that at time I basic event i does not exist, equation 2.8 ensures that at time t 
minimal cut set does not exist. Take for instance the fault tree in figure 2.3, the frequency of its 
two minimal cut sets can be calculated as follows: 
Minimal cut set I: {C} 
wc, (t) = wc(t) 
Minimal cut set 2: {A, B} 
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2.1.4.3.2 Calculation of Top Event Frequency 
The definition of top event frequency implies that no minimal cut set can exist at time t, and 
during the time interval [t, t+dt) at least one minimal cut set Ci must occur. The corresponding 
numerical expression can be written as: 
"e 
wsys(t)dt = P[A UC, ] 2.9 
;=1 
"e 
where A is the event that no minimal cut set exists at time t and U C, is the event that one 
;::1 
or more minimal cut sets Ci occur during the interval [t, t+dt). 
Since P(A)= 1-P( A ), equation 2.9 can also be written as: 
ne _ ne 
wsys(t)dt = P[UC, ]- P[ A UC, ] 2.10 
Let J.1i represent the event that the ith minimal cut set does not exist at time t. So: 
"e _ 
A = Up, 
;=1 
Denote the two terms on the right hand side of equation 2.10 by w;;, (t)dt and w ;~; (t)dt 
respectively, so equation 2.10 can be written as: 
Wsys(t)dt = w;;, (t)dt - w;~; (t)dt 2.11 
where w;;, (t)dt represents the contribution to system failure from the occurrence of at 
least one minimal cut set and w;~; (t)dt represents the contribution of minimal cut sets 
occurring while other minimal cut sets already exist which should be deducted from the 
first term. 
Then each of these two terms can be further developed separately. Expanding the first term will 
give the following series expression: 
ne 
wSys(l)(t)dt = P[UG] 2.12 
;::1 
ne ne i-I 
= LP(G) - L LP(GrlC;) + ... +(-1) "e- I P[ClrlC2rl ... rlC"J 
;=1 ;=2 j=1 
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ne 
where LP(C,) is the sum of the probabilities that minimal cut set i occurs during It, 
;:1 
t+dt). All other terms involve the simultaneous occurrence of two or more minimal cut 
sets which results from the repeated basic events contained in more than one minimal cut 
set. 
The second term in equation 2.11 has a more involved expansion: 
_ ne 
wSys(2)(t)dt = P[ A U Ci] 
;",1 
ne ne ;_1 
= L P(CnA) -L L P(C/,Cl' A )+ ... 
;=1 ;=2 j=l 
2.13 
and each term in equation 2.13 can be further expanded by expanding the element A . 
Take for example the fault tree in figure 2.3, with the two minimal cut sets {C} and {A, B}, the 
top event frequency is calculated as follows: 
2.1.4.3.3 
wsys(t)dt = w~;, (t)dt - w~;~ (t)dt 
w~;, (t)dt = w Cl (t)dt + w Cl (t)dt - P[Cl(\C2] 
= w Cl (t)dt + w Cl (t)dt 
W sys(2\t)dt = P(CI, A) + P(C2, A) - P(CI, C2, A) 
P(C2,,u,) + P(C2,,u2) - P(C2,,u, ,,u2) - 0 
= W Cl (t)dtqCl (t) + w Cl (t)dtqc
l 
(t) 
Approximation for the System Unconditional Failure Intensity 
As with the calculation of the top event probability, to calculate each term of the expanded 
version of equation 2.1 0 could tum out to be intractable for large systems. Therefore 
approximation is applied in order that an acceptably accurate top event frequency will be 
produced using less computational resources. 
By approximating the second term in equation 2.11 by zero, the upper bound for wsys(t) can be 
obtained: 
w s." (t)dt = w~;, (t)dt 
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ne 
=P[Uc) 2.14 
;=1 
By applying the rare event approximation technique, one upper bound can be expressed as in 
equation 2.15: 
ne ne 
wsM'X(t)dt=P[UC):>: Z::Wc,(t)dt 2.15 
i=1 ;=1 
Alternatively another upper bound for top event frequency can be derived: 
ne ne 
W SM'X (t):>: 2::;Wc,(t) I1[I-Qc/t)) 2.16 
i=l j=i 
I:#j 
In equation 2.16 the term on the right hand side represents that the top event occurs during [t, 
t+dt) due, in turn, to the occurrence of minimal cut set Cj. All other minimal cut sets have not 
occurred at that time. The equality will hold if all minimal cut sets are independent from each 
other. 
2.1.4.3.4 Expected Number of System Failures 
The expected number of system failures, i.e. the expected number of top event occurrences, 
during time tl, Wsys(O, tl), is obtained by integrating the system unconditional failure intensity 
over the time interval [0, tl): 
tI 
Wsys(O, tl) = Jw,y,(t)dt 2.17 
o 
The expected number of system failures is an upper bound for the system unreliability F(t). 
When system failure is rare, this approximation is a close upper bound [3). 
2.1.4.4 Importance Measures 
The importance measure is another very useful piece of information which can be extracted from 
a system reliability assessment. The importance analysis will identify weak areas of the system 
and signify the role each component plays in producing system failure. Importance measures will 
also provide useful information for maintenance and diagnosis purposes. 
Importance measures can be categorized in two ways: 
(a) Deterministic 
(b) Probabilistic 
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2.1.4.4.1 Deterministic Measures 
Deterministic measures assess the importance of a component to the system operation without 
considering the components probability of failure. 
The structural measure of importance is one of the deterministic measures, defined for a 
component i as: 
number of critical system states for component i 
Ii 
total number of states for the (n -I) remaining components 2.18 
where the critical system state for component i refers to a state for the remaining 
components such that the failure of component i causes the system to go from a working 
to a failed state. 
2.1.4.4.2 Probabilistic Measures 
In contrast with the deterministic measure, probabilistic importance measures take into account 
the component failure likelihood. 
Birnbaum 's Measure of Importance 
This importance measure is also known as the criticality function. The criticality function 
for a component i is denoted by Gj(q) and is defined as the probability that the system is 
in a critical state for component i. Therefore it is the sum of the probabilities of 
occurrence of the critical system states for component i [I]. 
There exist two expressions for this importance measure: 
I). Gj(q) = Q(l j, q) - Q(Oj, q) 2.19 
where: 
Q(l j , q) is the probability of system failure given component i is failed, i.e. the failure 
probability of component i is set as I. 
Q(Oj, q) is the probability of system failure given component i is working, i.e. the failure 
probability of component i is set as O. 
This equation gives the probability that the system fails only if component i fails. 
2). Gj(q) = oQ(q) 
oq, 
This expression is actually the same as the one given in 2.19 as: 
2.20 
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8Q(q) = Q(1"q)-Q(Oi,q) 2.21 
8qi 1-0 
The definition of Bimbaum's measure of importance has formed the basis for many other 
probabilistic importance measures. 
Criticality Measure of Importance 
This importance measure is defined as the probability that the system is in a critical state 
for component i, and i has failed (weighted by the system unavailability): 
ri= G,(q(t»q,(t) 
Q,y, (q(t» 2.22 
The criticality measure of importance implies the situation where component i fails at the 
point of time and the combination of other component states forms the critical state for 
component i, and in such a system state, the system fails. The critical state here means 
that if component i gets repaired at that time, the system will also go back to working 
state because the failure or working of the system at that time is totally determined by the 
state of component i. Therefore, a practical interpretation of the criticality measure is that 
when it is known the system is failed at time t, it gives the probability that the system will 
be restored by repair only component i. That is, this importance measure provides useful 
information to the maintenance engineer when the system is failed at time t, about which 
component should be attended first to reduce the system down-time to as shortest as 
possible. 
Fussell- Vesely Measure of Importance 
This measure is defined as the probability of the union of the minimal cut sets containing 
component i given that the system has failed: 
ri= P(Ukliec. Ck ) 
Q,y, (q(t» 2.23 
This importance measure is numerically very similar to the criticality measure of 
importance and also provides the assessment of the contribution of the failure of 
component i to the system failure. 
Fussell-Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
Different from other probabilistic importance measures discussed above, this measure 
provides the ranking system for minimal' cut sets rather than the individual basic 
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components. This measure is defined as the probability of occurrence of minimal cut set i 
given that the system has failed: 
I
j
= P(C;) 
Q,y, (q(t» 
2.1.5 Summary of Fault Tree Analysis 
2.24 
Fault tree analysis provides an excellent means to represent the failure logic of a specific system 
failure mode. Its diagrammatic form helps greatly to articulate and communicate the analysis. 
The quantification performed on the fault tree structure provides a range of system reliability 
parameters which are essential in the process of design and safety evaluation. 
However, for large fault trees, the analysis can be very time-consuming and require considerable 
computing power. To overcome this weakness, approximation techniques are introduced which 
simplify the quantification process at the expense of accuracy. Much research has been carried 
out to find more efficient and accurate analysis tools, of which Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) 
is very powerful and popular. 
2.2 Binary Decision Diagram - BDD 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The very early application of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) can be found in Lee's work 
[10] in which the BDD was used to represent switching circuits. Its use in reliability assessment 
was predominantly prompted by Rauzy [4] and later the BDD has proven to be a more efficient 
and accurate technique for performing fault tree analysis [11, 12]. 
The BDD approach draws on the fault tree structure, although it does not analyse the fault tree 
directly. The application of the BDD method requires the conversion of the fault tree structure to 
a binary decision diagram, which represents the same system failure logic. As the BDD is a more 
explicit representation of the Boolean equation, it is much better suited to mathematical analysis 
than the fault tree structure. Capable of performing both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the 
BDD can work out the system reliability solutions very efficiently without having to sacrifice the 
accuracy of the results. 
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2.2.2 Properties of BDD 
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph composed of terminal and non-terminal vertices (also called 
nodes) connected by branches. The non-terminal vertices encode the basic events of the fault tree 
and the terminal vertices correspond to the final state of the system. Non-terminal vertices have 
two outgoing branches. By convention, the left-hand branch is a 'I' branch, corresponding to the 
occurrence of the basic event (i.e. the component has failed); the right-hand branch is a '0' 
branch corresponding to the basic event non-occurrence (i.e. the component is working). 
Terminal vertices have a value of either' I' or '0', corresponding to top event occurrence (i.e. the 
system failure) and non-occurrence (i.e. the system works) respectively. 
Below is an example BDD to illustrate the basic structure of binary decision diagram: 
Root vertex 
Figure 2.4 Example BDD 
In this binary decision diagram, by following the paths from the root vertex leading to the 
terminal node '1', we can get the cut sets representing the combinations of component failures 
which result in the system failure: 
1. {a, b} 
2. {a, c} 
Since in this case these cut sets cannot be simplified, they represent the minimal cut sets. It 
should be noted that only when the BDD is in its minimal form [4Jran the qualitative analysis 
always produce the corresponding minimal cut sets. 
2.2.3 Formation ofBDD 
The process of forming a BDD is essentially to convert the fault tree to a corresponding BDD. 
The first stage of this conversion process is to establish a proper variable ordering for the 
collection of basic events included in the fault tree. By determining the order in which the 
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variables, i.e. basic event nodes, appear in the BOO, the ordering can have a crucial effect on the 
size of the resulting BOO and thus the complexity of the calculation required for its construction 
and solution. 
Take for instance the BOO in figure 2.4, it can be identified from the structure of this BOO that 
the variable ordering between the three basic events is a < b < c. If the ordering is changed to b < 
a < c, the resulted BOO will be established as shown in figure 2.5. The difference in the size of 
resulting BOO for this trivial example is not large. However for large systems this effect 
becomes very much more influential. 
I o 
Figure 2.5 Example BOO of different ordering 
There exist different schemes for solving the variable ordering problem [13-18]. Each 
approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. There is not such a thing as 'the best for all'. 
The structural features of the fault tree which is to be converted has to be fully understood so 
that the more appropriate ordering scheme can be chosen. 
2.2.3.1 Construction of EDD 
2.2.3.1.1 Construction of EDD Using Structure Function 
This method of forming the BOO uses the structure function of the corresponding fault tree. 
Once the variable ordering has been determined, values of' I' and '0' will be substituted into the 
structure function according to the ordering to replace the basic event which represents each 
node in the BOO. The fault tree in figure 2.3 is used here to illustrate this process. With the two 
minimal cut sets {C} and {A, B}, the structure function of the fault tree is: 
<p = 1- (l-xc)(l-xAxB) 
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The variable ordering is chosen as A < C < B. The ordering means that during the process of the 
BDD construction, event' A' will be considered first, then event 'C' and finally event 'B' until 
the BDD has been fully established. The resulting BDD with each node accompanied with the 
corresponding structure function is shown in figure 2.6: 
1- (l-xc)(1-xAXB) 
1 
Figure 2.6 BDD construction using structure function 
The cut sets this BDD gives are {A.C}, {A.B} and {C}. As the BDD is not in its minimal form, 
it includes cut set {A.C} which should be deleted to obtain the minimal cut sets. 
2.2.3.1.2 Construction of BDD Using If-Then-Else 
This method ofBDD construction was developed by Rauzy [4] and proceeds by applying the if-
then-else (ite) structure to each gate in the fault tree. The ite structure is expressed as ite(XI, n, 
12), where Xl is the Boolean variable, i.e. the basic event node in the BDD, and nand 12 are 
logic functions. This structure means that the state of Xl will be examined and if Xl fails, look 
into function n, else look into 12. Correspondingly in the BDD, n is connected to the node 
encoding 'Xl' by its' I' branch and 12 connected by its '0' branch. This is illustrated in figure 
2.7. 
o 
Figure 2.7 ite structure in BDD 
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By referring to the chosen variable ordering, the following procedure can be carried out to 
construct the BDD using ite method: 
• Each basic event Xi is assigned the ite structure ite(Xi, 1,0). 
• For each gate (starting in a bottom-up progression of the fault tree), Let J = ite(X, fl, f2) 
and H = ite(Y, gl, g2), then: 
If X < Y (i.e. variable X appears prior to Y in the ordering) 
J <op> H = ite(X, fl <op>H, f2<op>H). 
• If X = Y, then: J <op> H = ite(X, fl<op>gl, f2<op>g2) 
Where <op> represents the logic operator corresponding to the gate type in the fault tree, 
and the following simplification can be implemented according to the value of the logic 
operator <op>: 
If <op>= '+': I <op>H= 1; O<op>H=H 
If <op> = '.': l<op>H = H; O<op>H = 0 
It can be seen that an advantage of the ite method is that the ite structure of each gate and basic 
event can be determined in advance and once an ite structure has been calculated, it can be 
stored for later reference so the process does not need to be repeated. Such a characteristic not 
only reduces the computer memory requirement but also increases the calculation efficiency. 
The procedure described above can be demonstrated by applying the ite method to the fault tree 
in figure 2.3: 
The chosen variable ordering is A < C < B, by translating each gate of the fault tree into the ite 
structure in the bottom-up way, we can finally get the ite structure for the top event: 
G3=C+B 
= ite(C, 1,0) + ite(B, 1,0) 
= ite(C, I, ite(B, 1, 0» 
G4=A.B 
= ite(A, 1, 0) . ite(B, 1,0) 
= ite(A, ite(B, 1, 0), 0) 
G1 =A+G3 
= ite(A, 1,0) + ite(C, 1, ite(B, I, 0» 
= ite(A, 1, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0))) 
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G2=C+G4 
= ite(C, 1,0) + ite(A, ite(B, 1,0),0) 
= ite(A, ite(C, 1, 0) + ite(B, 1,0), ite(C, 1, 0» 
= ite(A, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0», ite(C, 1,0» 
TE=Gl.G2 
= ite(A, 1, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0»). ite(A, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0», ite(C, 1,0» 
= ite(A, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0», ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1, O».ite(C, 1,0» 
= ite(A, ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0», ite(C, 1,0» 
The next step is to construct the BDD according to the ite structure calculated for the top event 
of the fault tree. From the ite structure basic event' A' is the first variable to be considered and 
so forms the root node of the corresponding BDD. Its left branch and right branch will be 
constructed respectively according to the 'then' and 'else' term included in the corresponding ite 
structure. For example, the first variable to be considered for the left branch of node 'A' is basic 
event 'c' as shown in the ite(C, 1, ite(B, 1,0». Such a process will be repeated till each path of 
the BDD reaches the terminal node. The resulting BDD is shown in figure 2.8. 
1 o 
Figure 2.8 BDD construction using ite method 
2.2.4 Quantitative Analysis of Binary Decision Diagram 
2.2.4.1 Top Event Probability/System Unavailability Qsys{t) 
The underlying algorithm of constructing a BDD determines that the structure function for the 
top event can be expressed through the ite (if-then-else) structure as: 
f(x) = ite(xj, fI, f2) 
=Xj.ft(xI, X2, ... , Xj.I, 1, Xj+I, ... , xn)+ x, .f2(xI, X2, ... , Xj.I, 0, Xj+I, ... , xn) 2.25 
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where: Xj is the pivoting variable; 
f1 and f2 are Boolean functions with Xj =1 and Xj =0 respectively 
Let f(x) represent the root vertex of the BDD which encodes the basic event Xi, then the 
expectation value of fl:x) is actually the top event probability. To evaluate the probability of the 
top event represented by fl:x), the expectation value of f1 and fz needs to be worked out. 
Interestingly, f1 and f2 which are encoded as two discrete nodes in the BDD can be expressed in 
the same way as fl:x) through the decomposition of the' l' branch and '0' branch respectively. 
Such decomposition process could be repeatedly applied until the ite structure of each non-
terminal vertex in the BDD is decided. In this way, the expectation value of fl:x) can then be 
decided by summing the probabilities of all paths through the BDD. Each path represents a 
combination of working and failed components that leads to system failure. 
Equation 2.25 can be transformed into equation 2.26 to get the 'probability value' of each node 
in the BDD. The 'probability value' of the root vertex of the BDD is equivalent to the top event 
probability, i.e. system unavailability. For any other node in the BDD it is simply used for the 
calculation purpose and has no physical significance. For any BDD node, F = ite(xj, J, K), the 
probability value is given by: 
P[F] = qj(t).P[J] + (l-qj(t».P[K] 2.26 
where P[ J] is the probability value of the node on the' 1 ' branch of F 
P[K] is the probability value of the node on the '0' branch ofF 
Equation 2.26 is applied to the BDD in a bottom-up manner. The probability value of terminal 
'1' and '0' vertices are simply 1 and 0 respectively. The values are then worked up through the 
BDD until the top event probability is obtained. Take for instance the BDD in figure 2.8: 
NndeF2 
1 
I 
NndeFl 
o 
NodeF3 
Figure 2.9 Illustration of quantification on BDD in figure 2.8 
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Q,y,(t} = P[FI] 
= qA(t}.P[F2] + (I-qA(t)).P[F3] 
= qA(t). {qc(t}.1 + (I-qc(t}}.P[F4]) + (I-qA(t)). {qc(t).l + (l-qc(t}}.O} 
= qc(t} + qA(t}.(I-qc(t}}. {qs(t}.I + (I-qs(t}}.O} 
= qc(t} + (I-qc(t}}.qA(t}.qs(t) 
In the application of equation 2.26, because the expectation value of the tenninal node '0' is set 
as 0, the process of carrying out the calculation is actually equivalent to summing the 
probabilities of all the paths which lead to the occurrence of the top event, i.e. the tenninal node 
'1'. For example, in the BDD in figure 2.8, there exist 3 paths which end with the terminal node 
'1'. The top event probability can then be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of these 3 
paths: 
Q,y,(t} = qA(t}.qC(t} + qA(t}.[1-qc(t}].qs(t} + [I-qA(t}].qc(t} 
= qc(t} + [I-qc(t}].qA(t}.qs(t} 
2.2.4.2 Unconditional System Failure Intensity wsys(t} 
For the calculation ofw,y,(t}, the criticality function for each component is calculated and used in 
equation 2.27. The original definition of the criticality function is given in section 2.1.4.4.2. 
W,y,(t} = I Gj(q(t)).Wj(t} 2.27 
where Gj(q(t}} is the criticality function for component i 
Wj(t} is the component unconditional failure intensity 
The method of calculating the criticality function in the BDD will be discussed in the later 
section 2.2.4.4. 
2.2.4.3 Unconditional System Repair Intensity vsysCt} 
The unconditional system repair intensity, V,y,(t) is obtained from BDD by referring to the same 
underlying algorithm. The only difference here is the 'repair criticality function', GR;(q(t)}, is 
required. By referring to the definition of the criticality function represented in equation 2.19, 
repair criticality function for component i can be given by: 
GR;(q(t}} = (I-Q(Oj, q(t))) - (I-Q(I;, q(t)}} 2.28 
where: I-Q(Oj, q(t}} - the probability of system working with the failure probability of 
component i being 0; 
I-Q(I;, q(t}} - the probability of system working with the failure probability of 
component i being 1 
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By simplifying the right-hand side of the equation 2.28, it can be concluded that the repair 
criticality function is equivalent to the criticality function. 
On investigation of the term 'critical state' in the definition of the criticality function, it can be 
seen that, regarding one particular component, the system is on the brink of state change, 
whether its current state is working or failed. If the emphasis is placed on the failure process, the 
criticality function will be interpreted as the probability that the system will fail due to the failure 
of component i. However, if it is the repair process that is being examined, the criticality 
function is equivalent to the probability that the system will be restored due to the repair of 
component i. 
The system unconditional repair intensity can be given by: 
vsys(t) = L: Gi(q(t)).Vi(t) 
where Gi(q(t» is the criticality function for component i 
Vi(t) is the component unconditional repair intensity 
2.2.4.4 Criticality Function of Each Basic Event 
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Since the criticality function, Gi(q(t», is required in the calculation of both system unconditional 
failure intensity and repair intensity, it is important to work out an efficient method of evaluating 
the criticality function for each component in the BDD. 
The criticality function is calculated from the BDD by considering the probabilities of the path 
sections in the BDD up to and after the relevant nodes representing the indication variable for 
component i. For instance, as shown in figure 2.1 0, the basic event Xi occurs at two intermediate 
nodes in the BDD: 
FI 
I 0 
Figure 2.1 0 BDD section containing event Xi 
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Q(li' q(t» and Q(Oi, q(t» can be calculated for Xi by: 
Q(I;, q(t» = 2>rx, (q(t».po~, (q(t») + Z(q(t» 
Q(Oi, q(t» = 2>rx, (q(t».po~, (q(t») + Z(q(t» 
where: prx, (q(t» - the probability of the path section from the root vertex to the node Xi 
(set to 1 for the root vertex). 
po~, (q(t» - the probability value of the node beneath the '1' branch of a node 
encoding event Xi 
po~ (q(t» - the probability value of the node beneath the '0' branch of a node , 
encoding event Xi 
Z(q(t» - the probability of paths from the root vertex to the terminal' I ' node 
that do not go through a node encoding Xi 
n - the number of nodes encoding Xi in the BDD 
2.30 
2.31 
By substituting equation 2.30 and 2.31 into equation 2.19, the criticality function for each event 
can then be expressed as: 
Gi(q(t» = Lprx, (q(t».[po~, (q(t»-po~, (q(t»] 2.32 
n 
The summation implies that the algorithm must calculate pr x (q), pOx' (q) and po~ (q) for each , , , 
node which encodes Xi. 
The values of pr[F], po'[F] and poo[F] (known collectively as the 'path probabilities') are 
calculated during one depth-first pass of the BDD, which explores the structure beneath the' I' 
branch of any node before returning to consider the '0' branch. Starting with the root vertex, 
values of pr[F] are evaluated and assigned to each node as the branches are descended. Once the 
foot of a branch is reached, the procedure continues by working back up through the BDD 
calculating values ofpo'[F] and poo[F] for each of the nodes. 
It must be noted that in the BDD one node may be reached by more than one path due to sub-
node sharing. In this case, its value of pr[F] needs to include the probabilities of all the possible 
path sections from the root vertex to that node. To enable such a summation in the depth-first 
process, a label must be assigned to each node in the BDD to record and indicate if the node has 
been visited before. If the node has not been visited, its value of pr[F] will be established as the 
equivalent of the probability of the path which links the root vertex to the node in question. If the 
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node has been visited, the value of pr[F] will be updated by adding the probability of the path 
currently being traced. 
For instance, as shown in figure 2.11, the node encoding x, can be reached by two paths: 
Path a 
Figure 2.11 BOO section reachable by two different paths 
In the depth-first pass, node F 1 will be reached first via path a and the value of pr. will be 
assigned to pr[Fl]. And by following the' l' branch ofFl, pr[F2] can be obtained as q,.pr •. Node 
F 1 will then be reached via path b for the second time. Since F 1 has been visited before, the 
value ofpr[Fl] then will be updated to (pr.+prb). When node F2 is visited again, the final value 
ofpr[F2] will be q,.(pr.+ prb). 
Let Fl and F2 be the nodes which are respectively under the branch' l' and branch '0' of node F, 
then po'[F] and poo[F] actually refer to the probability value of node Fl and F2, i.e. P[FI] and 
P[F2]. In this way, the calculation of the probability value P[F] of each node and the path 
probabilities pr[F], po'[F] and poo[F] can then be performed in one first depth-first pass through 
the BOO. 
After the values of the three terms pr[F], po'[F] and poo[F] of all the nodes in the BOO have 
been evaluated, another depth-first pass is carried out to calculate the criticality function for each 
event according to equation 2.32 by identifying all the nodes which represent each of the basic 
events. 
2.4.4.5 Worked example 
An example is given here to illustrate the whole process of obtaining the top event probability 
and the criticality function for each event. Take for instance the fault tree in figure 2.3, with 
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variable ordering A < B < C, the corresponding BDD wi1\ be constructed as shown in figure 
2.12: 
Figure 2.12 BDD representation of the fault tree in figure 2. 
pr[Fl] = 1; 
Top event probability = P[Fl]; 
P[FI] r[F2] pr[Fl].qA qA 
F2 visited 
lPo'[FI] = P[F2]; 
IPr[F3] = qA.(l-qB} + (l-qA}.pr[Fl] 
= l-qA.qB 
lPoo[FI] = P[F3]; 
IP[FI] = qA.po'[FI] + (l-qA}.poo[Fl] 
= qA.qB + qA.(l-qS}.qc + (l-qA}.qc 
= qA.qS + qc - qA.qB.qC 
po'[F2] I' ,
pr[F3] = pr[F2].(1-qs) = qA.(l-qS} 
F3 visited 
poo[F2] = P[F3]; 
P[F2] = qB.1 + (l-qB}.P[F3] 
= qB + (l-qB}.qc 
Criticality function for basic event A: 
GA(q(t)} = pr[Fl].(po'[Fl]- poo[Fl]) 
= \.( qB + (l - qB}.qC - qc) 
= qB.(1-qc) 
po'[F3] 1; 
poo[F3] = 0; 
P[F3] = qc.1 + (l-qc}.O = qc 
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Criticality function for basic event B: 
GB(q(t» = pr[F2].(pol[F2]- poo[F2]) 
= qA.(1 - qc) 
Criticality function for basic event C: 
Gc(q(t» = pr[F3].(pol[F3]- poo[F3]) 
= 1- qA.qB 
2.2.5 Summary of Binary Decision Diagram 
The major advantage of the BDD lies in that it provides both an efficient and an accurate means 
of analysing the system failure probability, without the need for the approximations previously 
used in the conventional methods of Kinetic Tree Theory. This explains the increasing popularity 
and wide use ofBDD in the system reliability assessment. 
However, BDD is not perfect. The difficulty with this technique is that it requires a variable 
ordering during the process of converting the fault tree to the BDD. Although many variable 
ordering schemes have been developed and become increasingly mature in their application, the 
difficulty still exists in constructing the BDDs for some large and complex fault trees. Apart 
from selecting the most appropriate ordering scheme by identifying the unique feature of the 
fault tree structure, another effective solution to this problem is to simplify and to modularise the 
fault tree before the conversion is implemented. This process will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3. System Dependency Modelling Techniques 
System dependency modelling refers to the process of analysing and evaluating the reliability of 
a system in which an inter-dependence between the basic components exists in terms of their 
failure or/and repair. In reality, many complex engineering systems feature this type of 
dependent relationship between components. 
Some types of dependency relationship arise due to the fact that the reliability characteristics of 
one component will affect those of another component. A typical example of this type of 
dependency can be identified wherever cold or warm standby redundancy [5] is employed. 
Depending on the state of the duty component, the failure rate of the standby component will 
vary. It will experience a higher failure rate when called upon to function than when inactive in 
standby. Another type of dependency occurs in systems for which the Priority AND gate will be 
involved in the corresponding fault tree structure. Different from the normal AND gate, the 
Priority AND gate gives rise to a dependency relationship between basic events grouped under it 
and requires a specific order oftheir occurrences to cause its output. A more detailed description 
and illustration of each type of dependency can be found in chapter 4. 
As far as the systems are concerned which feature such a dependency property, some techniques, 
such as fault tree analysis and the binary decision diagram method, would be inadequate because 
the quantification algorithms assume that the basic events occur independently. These techniques 
are not able to take into account the dependencies. The consequence of ignoring or being unable 
to identify the dependency in the system would result in the incorrect system reliability 
prediction. Therefore an appropriate modelling technique is required in order to solve the 
problems resulting from the dependency during the process of evaluating system risk and 
reliability. Such method is the Markov method. 
3.1 Markov Method 
3.1.1 Basic Elements of Markov Models 
Each Markov model is composed of two basic elements: 
A set of states; 
A set of transitions between the states; 
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The Markov model operates in the following way: the system is envisioned as being in one of the 
states at all times throughout the time period of interest. The system can be in only one state at a 
time, and from time to time it makes a transition from one state to another state by following one 
of the set of inter-state transitions. Depending on how the transitions can occur regarding the 
time domain, a general categorization can be implemented to distinguish two different types of 
Markov models. If the transitions can occur at any real-valued time, the model is called a 
Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). Decided by the inherent probabilistic characteristic 
embedded in the process of system risk assessment, it is the Continuous Time Markov Chain that 
will be applied in the analysis. Unless specifically noted, all the Markov models discussed in this 
thesis refer to the Continuous Time Markov Chain. 
As far as the CTMC is concerned, another element is required to make a complete and 
meaningful Markov model apart from the two elements mentioned above. This third element is 
the series of transition rates, each of which corresponds to every specific transition and governs 
the length of the time that elapses before the system moves from the originating state to the 
target state of the transition, i.e. the state holding time. 
When Markov models are used in the process of evaluating the system risk and reliability, the 
states frequently represent every possible combination of the status of each component, working 
or failed. Each state will then determine the system status such as whether the system is 
operational, failed, undergoing recovery or repair, operating in a degraded mode, having 
experienced some specific sequence of events, etc. The set of transitions then define where it is 
possible to go directly from one state to another. And the transition rate, assigned to each 
transition, decides how long the system can reside in one state before it transfers into another 
one. 
Figure 3.1 and figure 3.2 illustrates Markov models for a single component featuring the 
Revealed and Dormant failure model respectively. 
State 1 ~State2 
~ 
v 
Figure 3.1 Markov model for the revealed-failure component 
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State 1 C::0rk~ 
State 3 
Figure 3.2 Markov model for the dormant-failure component 
In figure 3.1, this Markov model is composed of two states which represent the situations where 
the component is functioning normally and failed undergoing repair respectively. These two 
states, state I and state 2, are linked by the two transitions which represent the failure and repair 
process. These two transitions are then labelled by the corresponding transition rates, the 
component's conditional failure rate')., and conditional repair rate v. 
As can be noticed, the big difference in the Markov model shown in figure 3.2 is the introduction 
of state 3 and the transition from state 2 to state 3 represented by the dotted line. Such a 
difference results from the unique characteristic of the dormant-failure model that the component 
features. As is described in chapter 2, the failure of the components of this specific type will not 
be detected, thus will not be considered for repair, until the failure is detected on inspection. It 
means that the failed component will dwell in state 2 during the operational phase and transfer to 
state 3 as soon as it is discovered when the inspection on the component is carried out. Unlike 
the transitions from state I to state 2 and state 3 to state I to which a transition rate can be 
assigned, the transition from state 2 to state 3 is compulsory at a set time point. That is, at the 
time the inspection is performed, the transition from state 2 to state 3 will occur while at other 
times this transition is not allowed to occur. 
3.1.2 Markov Property - the Underlying Assumption 
Markov property is the fundamental underlying assumption for the solution of all the Markovian 
models. In the most general discrete-state stochastic process, the probability of arriving in a state 
j by a certain time I depends on conditional probabilities which are associated with sequences of 
states (paths) through which the stochastic process passes on its way to state j. What's more, it 
also depends on the times la < 11 < t2 < ... < tn < I at which the process arrives at those 
intermediate states. A complete accounting for all possible paths and all possible combinations 
of times would be very complex and is usually not feasible. The problem of evaluating all of the 
state probabilities in the resulting stochastic process generally is not tractable. 
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To overcome this problem and ensure most of the Markov models to be solvable, the Markov 
property has been established which allows a simplification both in the defining of the stochastic 
process (i.e. the specification of the conditional probabilities) and in the evaluation of the state 
probabilities by assuming that the probability of arriving in a state J by the time t is dependent 
only on the state immediately preceding state J 0 n the transition path instead of on the entire 
path. That is, the future behaviour of the Markov model is determined only by the present state 
and not by how the process has arrived in the present state. 
The Markov property assumption is concisely represented by the following equation: 
P[X, = J] = P[X, = J I XtO = k, Xtl = m, ... , Xtn = i] 
= P[X, = J I Xtn = i] 3.1 
where k, m, i,J represent different system states in the Markov model; 
P[X, = J] refers to the probability that the system resides in state) at time t 
3.1.3 Different Types of CTMC 
In the category of the CTMC, there exist 3 different types of Markov models, each of which has 
unique characteristics. In the following part of this section, these 3 types of Markov model will 
be defined, explained, and compared with each other using the single-component system. 
3.1.3.1 Homogeneous CTMC 
Homogeneous CTMC is the simplest and most commonly used Markov model in analysing and 
evaluating systems which involve the inter-dependence between basic components. 
In this type of CTMC, the 'Markov' property, which has been discussed in the pervious section, 
will always hold. Other important properties of the homogeneous CTMC are that the state 
holding times are e xponentially distributed and the rates 0 f the transitions between states a re 
constant. These properties altogether lead to the fourth property, which is that the time to the 
next transition is not influenced by the time already spent in the state. This means that, regardless 
of whether the system has just entered state i or has been in state i for some time already, the 
probability that the next transition will occur at or before some time t units into the future 
remains the same [5]. This property is called 'memoryless property' [19]. The Markov model 
shown in figure 3.1 is a typical homogeneous CTMC with the component's conditional failure 
rate A and conditional repair rate v both being constant. 
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3.1.3.2 Non-homogeneous CTMC 
A non-homogeneous CTMC can be obtained by easing the restriction on one of the properties 
characterized by the homogeneous Markov models, which is the 'constant transition rate' 
feature. In the non-homogeneous Markov models, the rates of the transitions between the system 
states are not necessarily constant. Instead, the transition rates can be functions of time measured 
by the 'global clock', which starts to count as the system begins to function for a period of time 
and refers to the elapsed mission time. 
Apart from this difference, the other properties of homogeneous CTMC still hold for the non-
homogeneous Markov models. The Markov property is still valid in the non-homogeneous 
CTMC, which prescribes that the selection of the transition to the next state depends only on the 
present state the system is in and not on the previous transition path that has led the system to be 
in the present state. As far as the state holding times are concerned, they also do not depend on 
previous or future transitions [5]. The probability that the system transfers from state i to statej 
per unit time at t, i.e. the probability that the system transfers from state i to state j during the 
period of time [t, t+tunil), is determined by the elapsed system mission time as the transition rate 
between state i and statej can be any function of the 'global time', i.e. the elapsed mission time. 
In real engineering systems, non-homogeneous Markov models are likely to be established when 
the failure rate of some components may tend to either increase or decrease as the system 
proceeds to function. 
3.1.3.3 Semi-Markov Model 
The behaviour of the semi-Markov model is the same as the other two discussed above in that 
the selection of the transition to the next state does not depend on the previous transition path 
that brought the system to the present state. However, it differs from the other two types of 
CTMC in that when the system enters a new state, as the consequence of the generally 
distributed state holding times, the inter-state transition rates can be functions of time as 
measured by 'local clock' [5]. This refers to how long the system has been residing in the 
specific state. Such a model is called a homogeneous semi-Markov process. When the theory of 
homogeneous semi-Markov models are further generalized to allow the state holding times to 
depend also on the time when the state was entered and on the number of transitions preceding 
when the state was entered [20], a new model type will be obtained, called the non-homogeneous 
semi-Markov process. Approximation techniques are used to solve the semi-Markov models [5]. 
39 
3.1.3.4 Comparison between 3 Types of CTMCs 
As can be concluded from the previous sections, homogeneous Markov models are the simplest 
and lowest on the scale of modelling power because it requires the system to fulfil the 
assumption of the constant inter-state transition rates. Non-homogeneous Markov models are 
more complex as it allows the transition rates to be non-constant by accepting the transition rates 
being the functions of global time. Therefore, non-homogeneous CTMCs are able to model more 
complex system behaviours than can be accommodated by homogeneous models. Semi-Markov 
models are similar to non-homogeneous CTMCs in that they also feature non-constant transition 
rates. The most significant difference here lies in that in semi-Markov models the inter-state 
transition rates a re functions 0 f state-specific local time instead 0 f t he sy stem global mission 
time, as was the case for non-homogeneous CTMCs. Usually semi-Markov models will be 
generated when detailed fault/error handling has to be reflected in the resulting Markov model 
because the rates of the transitions which represent the fault handling processes often depend on 
the time elapsed since the fault occurred and handling/recovery commenced rather than on the 
elapsed mission time [5]. 
Semi-Markov models might be considered to be more sophisticated than non-homogeneous 
CTMCs since they are able to model system behaviour which is in some senses more complex. 
However, it does not mean that semi-Markov models are an encompassing generalization of non-
homogeneous CTMCs because there are still some system behavioural characteristics that non-
homogeneous CTMCs can model whereas semi-Markov models cannot. The example of the type 
of model which does encompass both non-homogeneous and semi-Markov models is one which 
has inter-state transition rates being functions of global time and local time both within the same 
model. This type of model is non-Markovian and is very difficult to solve numerically in a direct 
way, thus requiring more flexible evaluation techniques like simulation [5]. 
3.1.4 Additional Issues concerning the Markov Method 
3.1.4.1 Model Generation and Validation 
It is generally difficult to construct and validate Markov models, especially for systems which 
involve complex dependency relationships. 
Usually an analyst is faced with two options for producing the Markov model of a system. The 
most basic way is to draw the model by hand directly from the system. This is potentially an 
error-prone method and is practical only for very small systems of which the resulting Markov 
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model should contain no more than 50 states. The next best option is to write a customised 
computer program to generate the Markov model directly from the information about the system. 
This may also be a troublesome method because of the difficulty in debugging the program and 
ensuring the resulting model correctly embraces the system behavioural characteristics. Besides, 
to generate a Markov model directly from the system description does not help the analyst to 
gain an insight into the system failure logic. To overcome the shortcomings of the above two 
approaches, generalized reliability analysis programs have been developed during the last two 
decades. One method for automatically generating a Markov model is to automatically convert a 
model ofa different type into an equivalent Markov model. One example of the programs using 
this method is the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) program [21], which is now 
part of the HiRel (Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor, HARP, Integrated Reliability) 
program [22]. HARP converts a dynamic fault tree model into an equivalent Markov model [23]. 
Such an approach provides an advantage if the alternate model type offers a more concise 
representation of the system failure logic. A second method for automatically generating a 
Markov model is to use a specialized computer programming language for describing transition 
criteria [5]. This approach is used by the ASSIST (Abstract Semi-Markov Specification Interface 
to the SURE Tool) program, which uses a rule-oriented language to automatically generate input 
files for the SURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluation) program [24]. 
3.1.4.2 Model Size 
The Markov method analyses the system at the basic component level by considering all possible 
system states in terms of different combinations of component state. It has a high level of 
flexibility and is able to embrace most of the types of dependency involved in the system. 
However, the Markov method has an inherent weakness which may render the method 
inapplicable to large-scale systems. This weakness refers to the model size problem. The number 
of system states contained in the resulting Markov model will increase exponentially as the 
number of components in the system grows. That is, a system composed of n components which 
just 'work' or 'fail' in theory will result in a Markov model with a maximum of2" system states. 
To address the model size problem, several techniques have been developed to reduce the 
number of system states in the Markov model. The following sections give a detailed illustration 
of how these techniques are applied. 
3.1.4.2.1 State Reduction Technique - State Lumping 
State lumping [25] is a technique which, in most cases, can effectively reduce the total number 
of states in the Markov model by combining some states in the model into one composite state. 
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Take a system composed of 3 identical components to illustrate how the lumping process is 
carried out. 
.................................................................. ~ 
.................... 
.................................................................................................. ~ 
.................................................................................................. ~ 
.....................................................•..........•................................. ~ 
Figure 3.3 Illustration of state lumping process 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Assume these are non-repairable components. In figure 3.3, on the left-hand side is the original 
Markov model of the example system which contains 8 system states as numbered. Each state 
represents a state of the 3 components with '0' representing the component is working and '1' 
representing the component is failed. In contrast, on the right-hand side of figure 3.3 is the 
reduced Markov model after the lumping process which contains only 4 system states, half of the 
original model size. With the state lumping technique, states are created by considering only the 
number of working and failed components. 
State lumping has to be carried out carefully depending on the form of the model, the meaning of 
the states, and system behaviour of interest that must be represented in the model. For example, 
as for the above example system, if what the analyst is concerned about is not only the number of 
operating components but also the detailed accounting of each operational configuration, the 
lumping would be inappropriate because the resulting reduced model is not able to provide the 
required information. What's more, close attention must be paid with regard to which states can 
be lumped together. During the lumping process, states which are to be combined into one must 
meet certain requirements [25]. For example, these states must have common properties which in 
some sense reflect the same system configuration. Consider the left-hand model in figure 3.3, 
states 2, 3 and 4 all represent the system configuration that 2 components are working while 1 is 
failed and they all have the same outgoing transition rate '\, which is determined by the same 
conditional failure rate of the 3 components. 
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3.1.4.2.2 State Reduction Technique - State Truncation 
State truncation is an approximation technique capable of reducing the number of states in the 
Markov model [5]. When this technique is applied, a limit for the number of component failures 
represented by system states is decided before the model construction is started. Then during the 
process of constructing the corresponding Markov model, states which represent configurations 
with a larger number of component failures than the predetermined limit are lumped into one 
aggregate state. In general, the aggregate state contains both states which represent the system 
working and states which represent the system failed. Therefore, the approximated system 
unavailability/unreliability can be obtained through a bounded interval which is generated by 
assuming that the aggregate state represents first only failure states and then only operational 
states in turn. The first assumption results in an underestimated system availability/reliability 
because it fails to take into account the probability of the operational states included in the 
aggregate state, while the second assumption results in an overestimated system 
availability/reliability because it fails to filter the failure states in the aggregate one. An equation 
illustration of this approximation technique is: 
where: 
Rtrunc(t) is the truncated system reliability obtained by assuming the aggregate 
state includes only failure states. 
3.2 
PT(t) is the aggregate ofthe probabilities of states included in the aggregate state. 
The relationship between Rtrunc(t), Rreal(t) and PT(t) is explored in an-state Markov model. 
Assume that the truncation is carried out on system states where k or more component failures 
occur, and ofthe n system states, state 1 - state m feature (k-l) or less component failures, while 
state (m+ 1) - state n meet the condition for the truncation. When the truncation is implemented, 
state (m + 1) - state n form the aggregate state, leaving the truncated Markov model containing 
(m+ 1) system states. Then Rtrunc(t), Rreal(t) and PT(t) can be expressed as: 
Rtrunc(t) = IPi(t) (iE(l, m)) 
where Pi(t) refers to the probability of system state i at t, in which the system is working. 
Rreal(t) = IPi(t) + IPit) (jE(m+l, n)) 
where Pit) refers to the probability of system state j at t, in which the system is working 
Pr(t) = LPs(t) (s=m+ 1 - n) = LPit) (jE(m+ 1, n)) + IP/t) (IE(m+ I, n), z,"j), 
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wherej+l = n-m, and PAt) refers to the probability of system I at t, in which the system is failed. 
Therefore, Rreal(t) can be expressed in terms of Rtrunc(t) and PT(t) as follows: 
Rreal(t) = Rtrunc(t)+ IP/t) 
Rrea{t) = Rtrunc(t)+(PT(t)-LPJ(t» 
By assuming that the aggregate state includes only failed system states, the lower bound of 
approximated Rreal(t) is then obtained with IPj{t) equal to O. Alternatively, by assuming that the 
aggregate state includes only working system states, the upper bound of approximated Rreal(t) 
can be worked out as illustrated in equation 3.2 with IP1(t) equal to O. 
As can be concluded from equation 3.2, the smaller the interval, i.e. PT(t) is, the more effective 
the truncation technique will be. Since in the Markov model, the probability passes through the 
inter-state transitions from the initial state which contain no component failures to states which 
includes more and more component failures, it implies that the state truncation is most effective 
for systems for which the mission time is relatively short and failure rates of components are 
very small because in this type of system, through the mission time, PT(t) will be negligible. 
3.1.5 Summary of the Markov Method 
3.1.5.1 Advantages of the Markov Method 
• The component-level investigation enables the Markov model to reflect the repair scheme in 
a natural way. 
• It makes it possible to include the faultlerror handling and recovery at a detailed level. 
• The Markov method is able to model most types of dependency embedded in the system, like 
the standby spares and sequential dependency. 
3.1.5.2 Disadvantages ofthe Markov Method 
• The Markov property assumption which is fundamental to the application of this method may 
not hold for some systems. 
• The construction and validation of the Markov model can be very difficult for some complex 
systems. 
• The model size can always be a big problem for large-scale systems even if the state 
reduction techniques are available. 
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Therefore, the analyst must carefully balance the advantages and disadvantages of the Markov 
method against the behavioural characteristics of the system in order to ensure that it is 
appropriate to apply the Markov modelling technique to the system risk and reliability 
assessment. 
3.2 Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis 
As has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the conventional fault tree analysis 
method is inadequate as far as the evaluation of systems which involve inter-dependency 
between components is concerned. 
To overcome this limitation, the Dynamic fault tree [7, 8, 26-33] has been developed, based on 
the original fault tree structure, to enable the representation of some types of dependency in the 
system. That is, the dynamic fault tree is not only able of representing the system failure logic 
but also able to exhibit, in its own structure, types of dependency included in the system. The 
dependency representation is realized by adding new types of gates to the original fault tree 
structure. 
3.2.1 Dynamic Fault Tree Gates 
Apart from the usual OR, AND and NOT gates, new types of gate have been introduced which 
are able to represent the particular types of dependency to generate the dynamic fault tree 
structure. Four types of 'dependency' gates will be described in detail in this section. 
3.2.1.1 Functional-dependency Gate (FDEP) 
The key to the existence of the functional dependency is the trigger event whose occurrence 
causes other functionally-dependent components to become inaccessible or unusable. That is, 
when the trigger event has occurred, these functionally-dependent components are disabled, and 
from the function point of view, these components are effectively failed. The structure of the 
functional·dependency gate (FDEP) is shown in figure 3.4. 
Trigger event 
Non-dependent output 
FDEP 
n 
Dependent events 
Figure 3.4 Structure of functional-dependency gate 
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where 
the trigger event can be either a basic event representing a basic component 
failure or the output of another gate in the tree. 
dependent events are basic events which represent the failure of the components 
which are functionally-dependent on the trigger event. 
the non-dependent output confonns to the status of the trigger event 
When the functional dependency exists in the system, it will affect the generation of the Markov 
model in the way that when a state is generated in which the trigger event has occurred, all the 
corresponding dependent events are regarded as having occurred. However, it must be noted that 
only in a non-repairable system can this case be true. When the system is repairable during its 
mission time, the occurrence of the dependent events still needs to be taken into account while 
the trigger event has occurred, because the repair of the dependent events will have influence on 
the system repair intensity and the system failure probability as well. 
Functional dependency can be found in many systems. One example could be the 
communication between the components in the computer system. The components communicate 
with each other through some network interface elements, where the failure of the network 
elements isolates the connected components. Therefore, as far as the communication failure is 
concerned, the failure of the network element is the trigger event and the connected components 
are the dependent events. 
In the above example, it can be noted that the event 'communication failure' can also be 
represented by an 'OR' gate. Assume the system is composed of two components A and B, 
which are connected through the network element, the communication failure between A and B 
can be expressed by the fault tree in figure 3.5: 
Network 
Communication 
failure 
Component 
A failure 
Component 
B failure 
Figure 3.5 Conventional fault tree structure ofFDEP gate 
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The transfonnation of the FDEP gate into an 'OR' gate indicates that the functional dependency 
is actually not a statistical dependency, therefore the mere existence of the functional 
dependency in the system does not require the use of the Markov method during the analysis 
process. Rather, the system can be analysed and evaluated using the conventional fault tree 
method. However, it is still useful to identify the functional dependency when the trigger event 
and dependent events are included in a Markov model due to the existence ofother types of 
statistical dependency as the functional dependency will help to delete the impossible inter-state 
transitions. 
3.2.1.2 Cold-spare Gate (CSP) 
The cold-spare gate is structured to embrace one of the standby dependency modes, cold standby 
dependency. Standby dependency consists of three different modes, cold spare, warm spare and 
hot spare, distinguished by the failure rate featured by the standby inactive component. In the 
cold spare mode, the standby component is characterized by a zero conditional failure rate, 
which means the component will never fail when it is residing in the inactive standby status. 
Alternatively, in the hot spare mode, it is assumed that whatever state the component dwells in, 
working or standby, the component failure is governed by the same conditional failure rate. 
Warm spare mode lies in between the cold spare and hot spare as the standby component 
features a non-zero conditional failure rate which is smaller than the nonnal active failure rate. A 
donnancy factor, which is associated with the standby component, has been introduced to 
distinguish the three different modes. This donnancy factor, denoted by a E [0, I], is a 
multiplicative factor to the active failure rate to produce the spare failure rate [8], i.e. As=aA. So 
when a is 0, the spare is a cold spare; when a is I, the spare is a hot spare; and when a lies in 
between 0 and I, i.e. O<a<l, the spare is a warm spare. 
Conventional fault tree techniques can't be u sed to model systems which contain cold spares 
because of the dependency it introduces. As is shown in figure 3.10, the CSP gate is composed 
of one primary input and one or more alternate inputs. All inputs are basic events. The primary 
input refers to the failure of the duty component which is initially powered on, and the alternate 
input(s) represent the components that are used as replacements and will be activated when the 
primary input occurs. The CSP gate has one output which becomes true after all the input events 
occur. 
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CSP 
Primary active unit nth alternative unit 
I sI alternative unit 
2nd alternative unit 
Figure 3.6 Structure of cold-spare gate (CSP) 
The CSP gate can be used in the case of pooled spares, where spare components are shared 
between active units. Then the basic event representing the cold spare forms inputs to more than 
one CSP gate. The spare is available only to one of the CSP gates, depending on which of the 
primary units fails first. There might also be a priority or order in which the spares are used, 
which can be reflected through the order of the alternative units from left to right in the CSP gate 
structure. The CSP gate can also interact with the functional dependency gate to reflect the 
relationship between the components in the system. 
The warm-spare gate (WSP) can also be introduced to model systems where warm spares are 
used. The structure of the WSP gate is exactly the same as the CSP gate. When CSP gate or WSP 
gate is converted to a Markov chain, the special feature of cold spare or warm spare can then be 
taken into account. 
3.2.1.3 Sequence-enforcing Gate 
The sequence-enforcing gate, as is shown in figure 3.7, is introduced to represent the situation 
where the input events are constrained to occur in the left-to-right order as they appear under the 
SEQ gate. 
SEQ 
n 
Figure 3.7 Structure. of sequence-enforcing gate 
It must be noted that the SEQ gate is different from the Priority-AND gate which is used to 
represent sequential dependency. The input events under the Priority-AND gate can occur in any 
order, but only when they occur in the specified left-to-right order can the output of the Priority-
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AND gate become true. However, the input events under the SEQ gate can occur only in the 
specified order. 
During the process of generating the Markov model from a dynamic fault tree which contains a 
SEQ gate, any state which represent the different order of occurrence of the events under the 
SEQ gate will never be produced. The sequence-enforcing gate can be used where pooled cold 
spares are included in the system. 
3.2.1.4 Demand-dependency Gate (DDEP) 
The demand-dependency results from the unique characteristic of most safety/protection systems 
which are incorporated in safety-critical systems to prevent specific undesirable or disastrous 
consequences. Generally speaking, the operation of safety/protection systems can be divided into 
two phases: standby/inactive and functioning/active. For most time of its life, the 
safety/protection system dwells in the inactive state, and during these inactive periods, the 
system will be tested and maintained at regular intervals. The safety/protection system will 
respond and activate when a demand arises. Usually such a demand refers to a specific 
undesirable initiating event which, if not suppressed successfully, could lead to severe or even 
catastrophic consequences. In most cases, in order to mitigate the specific initiating event, the 
safety/protection system is required to function successfully through a minimum period of time, 
and during this functioning period, no maintenance is possible. 
Demand dependency exists in most safety/protection systems and arises when the system 
transfers from the standby mode to the active mode. Take for example the fire sprinkler systems 
installed in many buildings, when the intensity of the smoke reaches a certain level, it will be 
detected and trigger the water sprinklers to put out the fire. In this simple example system, the 
pump is the main part whose functionality will be controlled by the smoke sensor. If the smoke 
sensor has failed before the smoke intensifies, the pump will not be started and no water will 
come out of the sprinkler. Therefore, the demand dependency exists between the demand 
components (the pump) and the support system (the smoke sensor) which is supposed to detect 
the demand or to start the protection system. The demand-dependency gate is the dynamic fault 
tree construct which has been introduced to represent and model the demand-dependency. The 
structure of the demand-dependency gate is shown in figure 3.8. When the input represents the 
failure of the support subsystem, a fault tree diagram will be used to model its failure. 
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(DDEP) 
Dependent comp onent can not 
demand respond to 
Support component or system 
is unavailable on demand 
Figure 3.8 The structure of the demand-dependency (DDEP) gate 
A computer-controlled sprinkler system (see Figure 3.9) is used here to illustrate the advantages 
of the DDEP construct in analysing the safety/protection systems. 
As is shown in figure 3.9, this system is composed of three sensors, two pumps and one 
controller. Each pump has a support stream composed of valves and filters. 
1----l:Support stream 1 
ater tank 
Support stream 2 
._.-._._._. 
{~ntrolle~ I 
Figure 3.9 Computer-controlled sprinkler system 
The sensors send signals to the controller, and when the temperature readings at two of the 
sensors are above the threshold, the controller activates the pump. And in order to start, the pump 
requires the support stream (valves and filters) to be operational. Pump 1 is the duty pump which 
will be activated first, and pump 2 is the cold spare and will be started by the controller when 
pump 1 fails. The controller will start pump 2 when the temperature reading at the sensors keeps 
rising due to the failure of pump 1. 
If the demand dependency is not considered and neither the distinction between the system 
standby and active phases, the failure of the sprinkler system can be represented by the following 
dynamic fault tree structure shown in figure 3.10. 
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Support stream 1 
ailure cause pump 
1 failure 
FDEP 
ump 2 is activated 
if pump 1 fails 
CSP 
Support stream 2 
failure cause pump 
failure 
FDEP 
Figure 3.10 Dynamic fault tree for sprinkler system ignoring 2-phase feature 
In figure 3.10, it can be seen that functional dependency gates (FDEP) are used to capture the 
dependency of the pumps on their support streams. However, the disadvantage of ignoring the 
standby/active feature in the analysis can be revealed when the system goes through a thorough 
examination. 
In this sprinkler system, consider the valves and filters. These passive components can fail when 
they get blocked when the system dwells in the inactive state. It is assumed, however, when the 
system starts, i.e. when there is water flowing through them, they will not get blocked, i.e. they 
won't fail. 
Therefore, the dynamic fault tree structure in figure 3.1 0 does not embrace the failure 
characteristics discussed above as it groups all component/subsystem failures under the top event 
without identifYing the different operational features of these components during the system 
standby and functioning mode. This problem can be tackled by introducing the demand-
dependency gate. 
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Pump 2 is activated i pump 1 failure pump 2 failure controller 
Sensor 
system 
failure 
pump 1 fails on demand on demand 
CSP 
Figure 3.11 Dynamic fault tree structure for sprinkler system using DDEP 
In the dynamic fault tree in figure 3.1!, it can be seen that only the basic event representing the 
controller failure and the CSP gate are directly related to the top event. Other events, like the 
failure of the sensor system and the support streams contribute to the occurrence of the top event 
through the DDEP gates, which are able to reflect the different effects of the sensors and the 
support streams on the failure of the system in the standby and active phases. It also indicates 
that during the system functioning period, only the controller, pump! and pump2 need to be 
taken into account with regard to whether the system is able to operate for the required length of 
time. 
3.2.2 Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Method 
By introducing the dependency gates, the dynamic fault tree structure enables the representation 
of several types of dependency in the system. Accordingly, the quantification method which is 
based on the dynamic fault tree construct differs from the conventional quantitative fault tree 
analysis. The Markov method will be applied to the sections of the dynamic fault tree which are 
headed by the dependency gates. In this way, the limitation of the Markov method caused by the 
model size problem will be eased. 
In the following section, an example system is used to illustrate how the dynamic fault tree 
analysis can be combined with the Markov method. 
3.2.2.1 Example System Description 
The example system used here is a water deluge system as is shown in figure 3.12. The features 
of this system are typical of water spray protection systems used on many different off-shore 
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platfonns. This water deluge system is composed of three subsystems: pump system, computer 
control system and pressure sensing system. Four pumps, two electrical pumps EPl and EP2 and 
two diesel pumps DPl and DP2, are used to provide the water demand to the ringmain, which 
transports the water to the take-off points around the platfonn to protect against the hazards 
posed by hydrocarbon fires and explosions. When the system resides in the standby mode, the 
ringmain pressure is maintained by a jockey pump. When the take-off valves open, and water is 
delivered to the spray nozzles, the ringmain pressure drops. The pressure sensoring system 
constantly monitors the ringmain pressure and transmits this to the computer controlling system 
by three pressure sensors: PSl- PS3. When two of the three transmitters indicate a low ringmain 
pressure, main pumps are activated. Two pumps are required to function to ensure the water can 
be delivered at the required rate to satisfy demand. The four pumps will be started in the order of 
EPl, EP2, DPl, and DP2. That is, EPl and EP2 are the default duty pumps, while DPl and DP2 
provide warm redundancy shared by EP! and EP2. When either EP! or EP2 fails, the ringmain 
pressure drops. The change will be transmitted by the sensors to the computer system which will 
start DP! or DP2 accordingly. The features on each pump stream are identical. Because the 
water supply is direct from the sea, a filter is fitted on each stream. Isolation valves are located 
on either side of the pump. A pressure relief valve provides protection for the pump, and a test 
valve on each line enables individual pumps to be tested without fully activating the deluge 
system. Electric power supply and diesel supply are respectively connected to EP!, EP2 and 
DPl, DP2. 
Pressure relief 
Isolation valve 
lectric 1----' 
ower 
omputer control 
system 
Isolation valve 
Test 
valve ...----{PSl 
I 
Water ringkain 
J , ..... PS2 
; i 
! I 
PS3 }-t-+--' 
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::i::::::::::::1 
Figure 3.12 Diagram representation of the water deluge system 
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3.2.2.2 Construction of Dynamic Fault Tree 
The construction of a rational and correct dynamic fault tree must start with the identification of 
the various dependency relationships between the components in the system. Firstly, in the pump 
subsystem, the warm spare dependency exists between EPl and DP1, DP2 and also between EP2 
and DP1, DP2. This means that two warm spare dependency gates (WSP) are needed in the 
dynamic fault tree structure which share the same two standby alternatives DPl and DP2. 
Secondly, functional dependency exists between the electric power supply and two electrical 
pumps EPl and EP2 and also between the diesel supply and two diesel pumps DPl and DP2. It 
is self-evident that when the electric power supply fails, the two electrical pumps are unable to 
operate. It is the same case with the diesel supply and diesel pumps. Finally, the demand 
dependency (DDEP) is involved when the system undergoes the transition from the standby 
mode to the active mode. In this system, the demand dependency lies in various aspects. For 
example, demand dependency exists between each pump and its support stream consisting of 
filters and valves. If the stream fails, the pump can't start. Also the demand dependency exists 
between the pumps and the computer controlling system and the pressure sensors. Either the 
failure of the computer control system or the failure of the pressure sensor system will cause the 
failure to start the relevant pumps. What's more, similar to the sprinkler system discussed in 
section 3.2.1.4, each pump stream can fail only when the pump is not started. 
Interestingly, functional dependency and demand dependency are similar to each other in that 
they both are introduced to represent the situation where the successful operation of one 
component depends on the state of other components. However, the difference between these 
two types of dependency lies in that the demand dependency does not exist through the whole 
operation of the dependency component, and it occurs only when the transition takes place. 
When the transition has been completed, the demand dependency no longer exists between the 
support components and the dependent component. For example, the computer control system is 
required to be working in order to start the pump, while after the pump has been started, the 
failure of the control system would have no effect on the operation of the pump. In contrast, the 
electric power supply is the prerequisite of the operation of the electrical pump. The pump needs 
the electric power to get started and also it needs the electric power to keep it running. That is, 
the functional dependency exists all the time between the support components and the dependent 
component. 
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After having identified the different types of dependency existing in the system, the dynamic 
fault tree can be established according to the system failure logic. Figure 3.13 shows the dynamic 
fault tree structure for the failure of the water deluge system . 
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Figure 3.13 Dynamic fault tree for water deluge system failure 
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The fault trees for sensor system failure and pump stream failure are shown in figure 3.14(1) and 
figure 3.14(2) respectively. 
Figure 3.14(1) Fault tree for 
pressure sensor system 
Figure 3.14(2) Fault tree for pump stream failure 
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3.2.2.3 Quautitative Analysis 
The safety/protection systems can have two different failure modes with regard to its expected 
function. The first is the system fails to respond to demand in the first place. The second is the 
system fails to operate for the required period of time, i.e. it fails during running. 
Correspondingly, the first failure mode is concerned about the system unavailability, while the 
second failure mode is considered in relation with the system unreliability. Both of the 
parameters are very useful when the assessment is carried out on the safety/protection system. 
3.2.2.3.1 Calculation of System Unavailability 
In this water deluge system, that the system is unavailable on demand is caused by the failure to 
start 2 out of the 4 pumps. That is, when 3 out of 4 pumps have failed at the time the demand 
arises, the system fails to react. Let events EPISF, EP2SF, DPISF and DP2SF respectively 
represent the failures to start of the 4 pumps. Then the system unavailability can be represented 
by the following combination of the occurrences ofthese events: 
EPISF.EP2SF.DPISF OR 
EPISF.EP2SF.DP2SF OR 
EPISF.DPISF.DP2SF OR 
EP2SF.DP 1 SF .DP2SF 
For each of the events, its logic can be derived from the dynamic fault tree structure shown in 
figure 3.18. For example, the occurrence of the event EPISF can be traced through the 3 
dependency gates and 1 functional dependency gate in figure 3.18. That is, either the control 
system failure (CTR), or the sensor system failure (PSS), or the pump stream failure (PSM) or 
the electric power supply failure (EPS) can result in the occurrence of the event EPISF. Since 
the redundancy features a warm spare feature, the occurrence of the event EP 1 SF can also be 
ascribed to the standby failure of pump 1 (EPIS). This means the event EPISF can be 
represented in the following way: 
EPISF = CTR + PSS + PSM + EPS + EPIS 
The events PSS and PSM on the right-hand side of the equation can be replaced respectively by 
combinations of basic events obtained from figure 3.14(1) and figure 3.14(2). 
The same algorithm can be applied to events EP2SF, DPISF and DP2SF. Finally the failure 
logic of the system unavailability can be represented in the form of minimal cut sets, therefore 
conventional quantitative FT A or binary decision diagram methods can be employed to work out 
the system unavailability. 
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3.2.2.3.2 Calculation of System Un reliability 
Due to the existence of the wann spare dependency during the system functioning period, the 
Markov method has to be used to investigate the system unreliability which is the primary 
concern during the period of time the system is running. 
As has been mentioned ins ection 3 .1, t he application 0 f t he M arkov method is implemented 
through the correctly established Markov model. As one of the key elements of the Markov 
model is the system state which represents a specific combination of the state of basic events, the 
first thing is to decide which basic events need to be included in the Markov model from the 
preceding unavailability analysis. This can be done by considering which basic events still 
matter with regard to the system active operation. As can be concluded from the example of the 
sprinkler system in section 3.2.1.4, the pump streams don't need to be taken into account as they 
are unlikely to fail during the system functioning period. The four pumps, as they assume the 
crucial function, have to be included in the model. Accordingly, the electric power supply and 
the diesel supply which determine whether the pumps are able to operate are also included. 
Pressure sensors and control system also have to be included as they determine if the standby 
pumps is required if the duty pumps fail during running. 
When it has been established which basic events need to be included in the analysis, the process 
of developing the corresponding Markov model can start. Usually, the construction of a Markov 
model starts with an initial state. For many continuously operating systems, the CTMC has an 
initial state probability of 1 in which all the components are set as working. However, it can be a 
different case for safety/protection systems. In this water deluge system, due to the redundancy 
feature, the system can start in various different configurations with different initial probabilities. 
Therefore, to ensure that the Markov analysis is right, the initial states and the initial state 
probabilities (ISP) have to be established. By referring to the system description, one can derive 
the series of initial states in which the system can be activated. For a better understanding, we 
look at the system in the form of2 subsystems. One subsystem is composed of 4 pumps (EPs and 
DPs), the electric power supply (EPS) and the diesel supply (DPS). The other is composed of the 
computer control system (CTR) and pressure sensor system (PSS). 
Table 3.1 gives a list of initial states in which the first subsystem can start in order that the whole 
system activates successfully. 
Initial slales EP DP EPS DPS 
I 2 working 2 slandby working working 
2 2 working 2 slandbv working failed 
3 2 working I standby working working 
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1 failed 
4 2 working 1 standby working failed 
1 failed 
5 2 working 2 failed working working 
6 2 working 2 failed working failed 
7 1 working 1 working working working 
1 failed 1 standby 
8 1 working 1 working working working 
1 failed 1 failed 
9 2 failed 2 working working working 
10 2 failed 2 working failed working 
.. Table 3.1 Imtlal states for pump subsystem 
Now look at the other subsystem. Table 3.2 gives the initial states for the control subsystem 
which enable the system to respond to the demand. 
Initial states ComjlUter control system Pressure sensors 
1 working 3 working 
2 working 2 workinJh 1 failed 
.. Table 3.2 Imtlal states for the controllmg subsystem 
Each initial state given in table 3.1 can be combined with each of the initial states in table 3.2 to 
form a complete list of initial states for the whole system, which means the system can start in 
any of 20 initial states. The initial probabilities of the 20 states can then be obtained according to 
the combinations of the component states represented by each initial state. 
With the initial states established, the whole Markov model can be generated by developing new 
system states from the initial states. As the size of a Markov model consisting of 6 basic events 
can be relatively big, the following figure provides part of the Markov model for the water 
deluge system only for illustration purpose. 
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__ -=~ __ =-__ ~State I 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
S 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
(2w. 2w. f. w. w. 3w) 
State 
EP,DP, EPS, DPS, CTR,PS 
(2w. 2s. w. f. w. 3w) 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
(Jwlf. 2s. w. f. w. 3w) 
AcTR 
PS 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
Iwlf.lwlf.w.w. w. 3w 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS,CTR,PS 
(2w. Islf. w. w. f. 3w) 
(2w. 2s. w. w. w. 3w) 
te4 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
(2w. Islf. w. w. w. 3w) 
DP 
EP,DP, EPS, DPS,CTR,PS 
(2w. 2f. w. w. w. 3w) 
Sta 
E~DP,EPS,DPS,CTR,PS 
2f. 2w. w. w. w. 3w) 
6 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
(2w. 2s. w. w. w. 2wlf) 
tate 5 
EP, DP, EPS, DPS, CTR, PS 
Iwlf. Islf. w. w. f. 3w 
Figure 3.15 Part of the Markov model for the water deluge system during the functioning period 
In this Markov model, several state transitions reflect the existence of the functional dependency 
and demand dependency. For example, during the transition from state 1 to state 2, the failure of 
the electric power supply renders both of the electrical pumps unusable, therefore the two diesel 
pumps are activated. During the transition from state 3 to state 7, although the pressure sensors 
detect the pressure drop in the ringmain caused by the failure of one of the electrical pumps, the 
control system can't start the backup diesel pump because of the diesel supply failure. Demand 
dependency occurs during the transition from state 11 to state 12. The failure of one of the 
electrical pumps causes the ringmain pressure to drop, but due to the failure of the computer 
control system, the backup diesel pump is not activated. State 7 and state 12 represent the 
situation where the system fails during the functioning. As there is no maintenance available 
when the system is functioning, these two states are self-absorbing. 
When the process of developing the Markov model is completed, the quantitative Markov 
analysis can be carried out on the model to arrive at the required system reliability parameters. 
The quantitative Markov analysis will be described and illustrated in detail in Chapter 7. 
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3.2.3 Summary of Dyuamic Fault Tree Technique 
3.2.3.1 Advantages of Dynamic Fault Tree Technique 
• The dynamic fault tree technique enables the explicit representation of the dependency 
relationship between the components in the system. 
• The newly introduced dependency gate structures not only reflect the dependency 
relationship between the components but also indicate how they are linked with each other. 
• As all dependent components are grouped under the dependency gates, irrelevant 
independent components would be filtered out and won't be included in the resulting Markov 
model, which reduces the model size. 
3.2.3.2 Disadvantages of the dynamic fault tree technique 
• The dynamic fault tree technique is unable to deal with the case where repeated basic events 
are included under dependency gates. With the Markov method applied to the sections which 
are led by the dependency gates, the dependency caused by the repeated occurrence of the 
basic events somewhere else in the fault tree will undermine the rationality of the analysis 
and result in incorrect system reliability prediction 
• The number of types of dependency that the dynamic fault tree is able to embrace might be 
limited because it might be very difficult to establish a dependency gate structure for some 
types of dependency existing in the system. 
• The dynamic fault tree analysis will require a lot of manual work. Due to the structure of the 
dynamic fault tree, a lot of manual analysis is required prior to the quantification to 
determine respectively which component failures need to be investigated for the evaluation 
of system unavailability and system unreliability of active-on-demand systems. 
The above weaknesses could severely restrict the application of the dynamic fault tree method. 
An alternative solution will be brought forward in the following chapters to address these 
problems. 
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Chapter 4. Different Types of Dependency in the Systems 
In the previous chapter, several types of dependency have been introduced, like functional 
dependency, cold/warm spare dependency, sequence-enforcing dependency and demand 
dependency. In real systems there exist other types of dependency than have so far have been 
discussed. In this chapter, the main types of dependency which are frequently encountered in 
many engineering systems will be examined in a systematic way. A new way of representing the 
dependency relationships in the system, other than dependency gate structures, is introduced to 
overcome one of the limitations of the dynamic fault tree technique. The structures of data input 
for the system failure logic and component failure information are also demonstrated. 
4.1 Types of Dependency 
4.1.1 Maintenance Dependency 
Maintenance dependency rises from the situation where one maintenance engineer or team of 
engineers has to take responsibility for a group of components usually of the same or similar 
type. In this case when one component has failed and is under repair, components from the same 
group which fail subsequently have to go into a queue waiting for repair until the engineer has 
restored the first component. It may be that some failures are more critical than others and so are 
given higher priority by the maintenance team. Either way the queuing means that the failure of 
one component affects the repair times and therefore the probability of failure of other 
components. Finally, the influence of the maintenance dependency affects the whole system, 
resulting in different system reliability prediction from those produced where no dependencies 
are encountered. In real engineering systems, the maintenance dependency is common. 
4.1.2 Standby Dependency 
In most safety-critical systems, redundancy or diversity is a very popular design strategy and 
used frequently to reduce the chance of system failure. Redundancy in the design can be 
achieved by the use of standby systems, where the failure of the primary system activates the 
standby to take over the primary system duty. That the standby component or system can reside 
in different states determined by the primary duty component or system is the root cause of 
standby dependency. As is mentioned in chapter 3, if the redundancy design is embraced in the 
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system in the fonn of a cold or wann spare, it implies that the likelihood of the standby 
component failure increases as it experiences the operational load due to the failure of the 
primary operating component. Such a difference represents a dependency relationship between 
the standby component failure probability and the operating component status (working or failed) 
[8,29]. Therefore failure to take into account the standby dependency will produce incorrect 
system unavailability and failure intensity. 
4.1.3 Sequential Dependency 
Sequential dependency refers to the situation where a certain event will take place only when its 
causes occur in a specific sequence. Different from other fonns of dependency, sequential 
dependency is the only type which can be represented in the conventional fault tree structure. 
The' Priority AND gate' [3], as is shown in figure 2.1, is used in the conventional fault tree 
structure to represent the sequential dependency. With the priority AND gate, only when input 
events occur in the order from left to right, will the output event occur. 
4.1.4 Sequence-enforcing Dependency 
As has been discussed in chapter 3, sequence-enforcing dependency [7, 8] exists between the 
basic events which are constrained to occur in a specific order to contribute to system failure. 
Such a restriction might result from the different nature of the components' function or from the 
different nature of the component's failure mode. The difference between the sequence-enforcing 
dependency and the sequential dependency has been expounded in chapter 3. 
The conventional assessment techniques are unable to take into account the sequence-enforcing 
dependency because the whole assessment process does not include a mechanism which can 
reflect the strict order. Failure to account for the sequence-enforcing dependency will result in 
inaccurate system failure intensity. The following example considers this in more detail. 
Consider the situation where system failure will only result if the two basic events A and B occur 
in the order of A then B. With the conventional assessment method, the unconditional system 
failure intensity is given by: 
Wsys(t) = qA(t).WB(t) + qB(t).WA(t) 
However, it is obvious that the tenn 'qB(t).WA(t)' should not be included on the right hand side of 
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the above equation as event B is not' allowed' to occur prior to event A. 
With the dynamic fault tree approach, the sequence-enforcing dependency is represented by the 
sequence-enforcing gate as is shown in figure 3.12. In the dynamic fault tree, the 
sequence-enforcing gate is defined as a gate of AND logic. However, in some cases, intermediate 
gate types may be required to represent the sequence-enforcing dependency relationship for the 
system failure logic. The logic relationship between the basic events in such circumstances may 
be too complex, for a mere AND logic gate to cover. 
4.1.5 Secondary-failure Dependency 
Secondary failure dependency exists in the system when the same component failure mode can 
be caused by either the primary failure of this component or a secondary failure. Primary failure 
refers to the failure of the component operating under the expected operating condition. It might 
result from the poor quality of the component or wear and tear related to the component itself. 
Alternatively, the secondary failure is due to the failure of other components in the system which 
then result in the component under examination operating in a way which it was not designed to. 
Frequently, the secondary failure will result in a change in the working environment of the 
primary component, which will cause the primary component to fail. 
In the fault tree structure, the secondary-failure dependency can be represented through an OR 
gate with primary failure, secondary failure and sometimes command faults as input [34] (see 
figure 4.1 below). 
State-oC-component fault 
~ 
Primary Secondary Component 
component failure component failure command fault 
Figure 4.1 Fault tree structure for secondary-failure dependency 
The secondary failure dependency mainly affects the repair process related to the failure of the 
primary component. When the primary failure causes the component failure, the repair process is 
performed as usual to rectify the fault, as the primary component will be examined and restored. 
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However, when the secondary failure occurs, the repair needs to be carried out not only on the 
components which has contributed to the secondary failure but also on the primary component 
which also fails as a consequence of the secondary failure. In the conventional assessment 
methods, the repair of the primary component won't be included in the process to rectify the 
system when the secondary failure occurs. Frequently the repair of the primary component can 
take much longer than the secondary components, therefore to neglect the secondary-failure 
dependency can lead to an underestimation of the system unavailability [35]. 
Figure 4.2 gives an example tank system, in which the tank rupture can result from both primary 
failure and secondary failure. 
Output valve 
TANK 
Pump 
Figure 4.2 Example tank system 
Pressure 
valve 
Relief 
In this system, the pressure relief valve acts as a safety valve, which will open to prevent the 
possible rupture when the pump surge happens and results in an abnonmally high tank pressure. 
For illustrative purposes, the analysis of this tank system will be focused on the safety aspect, 
and the top event is defined as 'Tank ruptures'. The corresponding fault tree is shown in figure 
4.3. 
Tank ruptures in normal 
working environment 
Tank ruptures due to 
abnormal high pressure 
Abnormal 
Figure 4.3 Fault tree for the example tank system 64 
As is shown in figure 4.3, with regard to the top event of 'tank rupture', the basic event TRP 
represents the primary failure, meanwhile the gate event 'Tank ruptures due to abnormal high 
pressure' represents the secondary failure which leads to the same consequence as the primary 
failure, the tank rupture. The significance of identifying and taking into account the 
secondary-failure dependency in this system is substantial. When the secondary failure occurs, 
repair needs to be implemented on the tank itself as well as on the pump and the pressure relief 
valve. Since the time that it takes to restore the tank following its rupture is much longer than to 
repair the pump and the relief valve, failure to account for the secondary-failure dependency may 
result in an overestimation of the system availability. 
4.1.6 Initiator-enabler Dependency 
In this section, 'initiator' and 'enabler' respectively refers to the initiating event and enabling 
event. A good understanding of this type of dependency has to start with the definitions of these 
different types of events. As defined in [3] and [36], initiating events: 
perturb system variables and place a demand on control/protective systems to respond, 
whilst enabling events: 
represent the failure of inactive control/protective systems which permit initiating events to 
cause the system failure state. 
The requirement to distinguish between initiating and enabling events and the initiator-enabler 
dependency usually occurs in the analysis of safety systems. The initiating event is the event 
which the safety system is designed to mitigate, and the occurrence of the initiating event usually 
results in the safety system being activated. Enabling events represent the failure of the 
components which compose the safety system. The failure of the safety system is a general 
enabling event which produces the conditions under which the initiating event can cause a 
hazard. 
The prerequisite for accounting for the initiator-enabler dependency in the system analysis is to 
identify the initiating events and enabling events in the system. For a complex system, this may 
prove to be a confusing and difficult'task. A feature of the enabling event, which can distinguish 
it from initiating events, is that the occurrence of the enabling events alone can never bring about 
the system hazard. 
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Take for example the tank system in section 4.1.5. To give a better illustration, the system is 
amended by enhancing its safety measures. As is shown in figure 4.4, three pressure sensors 
(PS!, PS2, PS3) are incorporated into the tank to monitor the tank pressure level. All these 
sensors provide an input to a computer controller which can control the pump. The pump is 
tripped on a 2-out-of-3 voting system for the pressure sensors. The pressure relief valve acts as 
the first-line safety measure. In the event of a high pressure, if the pressure relief valve fails 
stuck, the pump control sub-system works to prevent the explosion. As long as 2 sensors report 
the abnormal high pressure in the tank, the controller will switch off the pump. 
Punjp 
1 
TANK 
PS2 
...-'t-.....lL, ........................................... ...1 
Pressure 
valve 
Figure 4.4 Amended tank system 
Relief 
Assume the analysis is centered on the tank over-pressurization, the corresponding fault tree is 
then developed as is shown in figure 4.5. 
Tank ruptures due to 
abnormal high pressure 
ressure relief valve fails Slue 
Figure 4.5 Fault tree for tank over-pressurization 66 
According to the defmition of initiating and enabling events, in this system, the abnonnal pump 
surge PSi s an initiating event. All the safety m easures are aimed to prevent this event from 
developing into the tank rupture. The failure of the safety measures is the general enabling event 
which consists of individual enabling events representing the failure of individual safety 
components. Assume the pump surge occurs prior to any other event, the over-pressurization in 
the tank will cause the pressure relief valve to open to reduce the tank pressure. In this case, the 
top event will not occur. However, if the pressure relief valve fails stuck before the pump surge, 
the controller system fonns the last protection. If the controller system has also failed by the time 
the pump surge happens, the top event occurs, i.e. the tank ruptures due to the 
over-pressurization. If the controller system is working nonnally when the pump surge happens, 
the controller will stop the pump on receiving the high pressure signal from the sensors, and the 
top event will not occur. 
From the above analysis ofthe tank system, two interesting points can be identified with regard 
to the initiator-enabler dependency. Firstly, it is the order of the occurrence of the initiating and 
enabling events which is important. Only when the enabling event occurs first, can the 
occurrence of the initiating event lead to the specific consequence, usually represented by the top 
event. Alternatively, if the initiating event occurs first, the corresponding safety function will 
mitigate the initiating event or mitigate its undesired effect so that the top event will not occur. 
As such, the initiator-enabler dependency is similar to the sequential dependency as it also 
imposes a certain occurrence order. What makes it distinct from the sequential dependency is 
that when there exist more than one enabling event to protect against the certain initiating event, 
usually there is no restriction on the occurrence order of these enabling events. If a system, 
which involves the initiator-enabler dependency, is processed with the conventional assessment 
methods, the system failure intensity will be, to some extent, overestimated. 
Secondly, the analysis of the tank system identifies two different characteristics featured by 
different enabling events. The enabling event PRS falls into the first category. It can be noted 
that once the pressure relief valve has opened due to the high pressure, it is unlikely to get stuck 
until the pressure is brought down to the nonnal level and the relief valve closes. That is, if the 
initiating event PS occurs first, the enabling event PRS will not occur until the initiating event is 
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solved. Some basic events, which represent the same failure mode of valves, can be grouped into 
this category. For example, many pump systems will involve the use of different types of valves, 
like isolation valves and check valves. These valves may contribute to the system failure by 
sticking closed. But usually when the system is activated and there is fluid circulating through 
them, the valves will not consequently close against the pressure. The valves and filters in the 
sprinkler system in section 3.2.1.4 are examples which fit this case. 
The second category of enabling events is different in that the enabling events can still occur 
after the occurrence of the initiating event, but their occurrence then will not have any effect on 
the top event. For example, the basic events eTR, PS IF, PS2F and PS3F in figure 4.5 can still 
occur after the initiating event happens. Most sensors and controllers which are fitted in the 
system as safety measures belong to this category. Although the subsequent occurrence of the 
enabling events fulfills the AND logic which mirrors the failure logic of the top event, it must be 
noted that due to the existence of the initiator-enabler dependency, the top event will not occur. 
The necessity of distinguishing the two different types of enabling events mainly exists during 
the process of developing the corresponding Markov model and will be explored and illustrated 
in detail in Chapter 6. 
In most systems, all enabling events represent dormant failures. It means that the component 
failure represented by these enabling events will be inspected and maintained at certain regular 
intervals. A n initiating event often represents a revealed failure. In most cases, the top event 
represents an undesired hazardous consequence, its occurrence will often be discovered 
immediately. In the tank system discussed above, if the enabling events occurred (undetected) 
during their inspection interval, a subsequent pump surge will result in the tank rupture and 
consequently reveal the failure of these safety components. In this way, the initiator-enabler 
dependency, for non-catastrophic top event, also has an influence on the down time of some 
enabling components in the system as their occurrence is revealed. 
4.1.7 Revealing Dependency 
Revealing dependency exists in systems, where combined component failures, which include 
dormant failures, lead to the occurrence of the certain event which will be discovered instantly 
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and in retum reveal the relevant dormant failures. In this respect, revealing dependency is similar 
to the initiator-enabler dependency. However, unlike the initiator-enabler dependency, the 
revealing dependency has nothing to do with the restriction on the occurrence order of events. 
In the fault tree structure, the revealing dependency is always related to an intermediate event 
which represents a self-revealing occurrence. Usually this intermediate event is further 
developed by the AND gate under which dormant failures are involved. 
4.1.8 Test Dependency 
In many systems, some component failures will be in a dormant mode. To reduce the time these 
components reside in the failed state they are tested or inspected at interval, regular maintenance 
is carried out as appropriate. However, in some systems, such regular inspection is not only 
implemented on individual components but also on sub-systems which assume a relatively 
independent function in the whole system. The inspection of the sub-system is carried out by 
testing if the sub-system can fulfill the required function. If the test fails, the maintenance team 
will identifY and repair the failed components. The inspection interval for the sub-system can 
either be same as or different from the inspection interval for its components. When there is a 
difference, a dependency exists as the inspection on the sub-system will reveal the dormant 
failures of some components and thus change their actual downtime. Different from the types of 
dependency which have been discussed so far, test dependency does not give rise to statistical 
dependency between component failures. The influence of test dependency lies in the failure 
probability of each individual component, and does not result in the inter-dependence between 
component failures. In spite of the non-statistical dependent characteristic, test dependency still 
needs to be identified and specified in the analysis in order that accurate system reliability 
measures are obtained. 
4.1.9 Functioual Dependency 
Functional dependency [7, 8] has been described and illustrated in detail in chapter 3. Although 
the word 'dependency' is used here, the functional dependency does not refer to the real 
dependency relationship since it entails no statistical dependency but just reflects the functional 
dependency relationship between some components in the system. However, this doesn't 
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necessarily mean that functional dependency doesn't need to be explicitly identified. Instead, in 
some cases, functional dependency does need to be identified and explicitly accounted for during 
the analysis. 
Take an electric pump system for example, in which pump 1 is set as the duty pump and pump 2 
serves as the cold standby. The system failure logic can be expressed as 'pump 1 fails' AND 
('pump 2 fails to activate' OR 'pump 2 fails following the activation'). Due to the existence of 
the cold-standby dependency, the Markov model has to be established to carry out the analysis. 
Two situations are considered, with regard to the functional dependency existing between the 
electric power supply and the pumps. In the first situation, the two pumps are powered by 
different electric supplies. When the electric supply to pump 1 fails, pump 2 needs to be 
activated, despite that pump I itself is still functional. In this case, if the functional dependency 
between the electric supply and pump I hadn't been specified, the need to activate pump 2 would 
be overlooked, thus the resulting Markov model would be incorrect. In contrast, in the situation 
where the two pumps share the same electric power supply, the mere failure of the electric 
supply is sufficient to bring the system to fail. Therefore, there is no need to specify the 
functional dependency in the second situation. The analyst needs to decide according to the 
system configuration characteristics whether a particular functional dependency relationship 
needs to be specified. 
4.1.10 Switching Dependency 
As with the functional dependency, the switching dependency [7, 8] is identified and introduced 
with the dynamic fault tree method as the 'demand dependency' in chapter 3. Switching 
dependency is related to active-on-demand systems or active-on-demand components. It 
identifies that the activation of some component is dependent on the state of other components. 
See section 3.2.1.4. 
Strictly speaking, as another form of functional dependency, switching dependency involves no 
statistical dependency. It just reflects the functional dependency relationship between the support 
components and the demand component at the point of time when the demand rises. Similar to 
the functional dependency, if a particular switching dependency relationship needs to specified in 
70 
the analysis depends on the system configurations. Usually in most standby systems, a controller 
sub-system is included in the system to activate the standby component when required. If the 
controller sub-system has failed by the time the demand for the activation rises, the standby 
component can't be switched in. Such a relationship between the standby component and the 
controller sub-system can b e identified a sas witching dependency. However, if t he sy stem is 
investigated as a whole from a different perspective, the failure of the duty component can be 
regarded as an initiating event, while the failure of the control system to activate the standby 
component can be defined as the corresponding enabling event. When the control system fails 
prior tot he duty component, the failure 0 f t he duty component would immediately bring the 
system to fail. In this case, the switching dependency existing between the control system and 
the standby component wouldn't need to be explicitly accounted for in the analysis as the impact 
ofthis particular switching dependency relationship can be fully reflected by the initiator-enabler 
dependency. However, in the reliability analysis of systems in which the system configuration is 
complicated such that it is very difficult to fully reflect impact of the switching dependency 
relationship through other types of statistical dependency, the switching dependency will need to 
be explicitly specified to ensure that the correct Markov model be established. 
4.2 The Representation of Dependency Relationships 
In chapter 3, the dynamic fault tree approach provides a way to represent some types of 
dependency by introducing additional g ate structures, such as functional dependency (FDEP), 
cold-spare or warm-spare dependency (CSPIWSP), sequential dependency (SEQ) and demand 
dependency (DDEP). However, this way of representation is appropriate for analysis of a limited 
number of types of dependency. A new method is proposed here to establish a systematic 
framework for the representation of all types of dependency. 
The dependency information is provided to the software to predict system reliability. The 
framework is realized through the dependency file which together with the fault tree structure 
file and basic event file will be input to and stored in the computer program as the data source for 
the analysis. The dependency file takes the form where each record represents one specific 
dependency relationship. The structure of the dependency file is illustrated in table 4.1. 
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Dependency Dependency Number 1 Number 2 List 1 List 2 
group number type 
.. .. . . .. .. .. 
Table 4.1 Structure of the dependency file 
The first two fields in table 4.1 provide the same kind of infonnation for different dependency 
relationships. The 'dependency g roup number' is an integer number assigned to each specific 
dependency relationship to distinguish it from others. The 'dependency type' gives which type of 
dependency this specific relationship belongs to. This piece of infonnation is required for the 
effective and proper development of the Markov model in the later stage of the analysis. The 
infonnation that is contained in other 4 fields in table 4.1 varies according to the type of the 
dependency relationship. The following sections will describe in detail what infonnation is 
included in each field in view of the different types of dependency . 
• Maintenance Dependency 
The code 'mtnc' is entered to stand for the maintenance dependency and is input in the field 
'Dependency type'. The events to which the maintenance dependency applies include only basic 
events which represent the failures of system components. To make the infonnation complete, 
the fields 'Number l' and "List l' respectively give the number of basic events and the name of 
the basic events involved in this dependency relationship. Field 'Number 2' indicates how many 
repair engineers or teams are available for the m aintenance of the components represented in 
'List 1'. Obviously, the value of field 'Number 2' is less than that of field 'Number l' for 
maintenance dependency, 
It should be noted that if the difference between the value of field 'Number 2' and field 'Number 
l' is no less than 2, it means that in some system states there would be more than one component 
queuing for repair. It is possible that the priority issue will arise with regard to the order in which 
these components will be repaired. In this case, the maintenance team usually will predetennine 
the repair priority of each component which is involved in the same maintenance group, in view 
of the criticality and functional significance of each component. The order of the priority is 
reflected by the order that the corresponding basic events are listed in 'List 1'. The component 
which appears earlier in 'List l' has a higher repair priority. And field 'List 2' is not applicable 
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here. Alternatively, the 'First Come First Serve (FCFS), principle can be applied to the repair 
involving maintenance dependency. When this is the case, field 'List 2' will contain the string of 
characters 'FCFS' to indicate which repair policy has been taken with regard to this maintenance 
dependency . 
• Standby Dependency 
In view of the different modes the standby system can take, there are 2 categories of standby 
dependency. The first category is represented by the code 'sdbyl' which indicates that the duty 
component and the standby component don't alternate with each other. More exactly, in the case 
where the standby component is started due to the failure of the duty component, once the duty 
component is restored, it will be immediately returned to function while the standby component 
will then resume the standby state. The second category of standby dependency is encoded as 
'sdby2'. In contrast to the first mode, the preset duty component and the standby component 
alternate with each other working as th,e primary component. That is, when the working 
component fails, the standby component will take over and work as the duty component. When 
the original working component has been repaired, it will be put into standby mode and will only 
enter service again when the currently working component, i.e. the original standby component, 
fails. 'sdbyl' and 'sdby2' are values that will be entered into the field 'Dependency type' with 
regard to the standby dependency. 
There exist two types of element in the standby dependency, the duty component(s) which are 
always set to function when the system is started, and the standby components. Field 'Number l' 
and 'Number 2' respectively represent the numbers of the duty components and standby 
components. Correspondingly, 'List l' and 'List 2' give the name of the basic events which 
respectively relate to the failure of duty components and standby components. In theory, the 
relationship between the value of 'Number l' and 'Number 2' can be 1 -1, 1- n, m -1 and m-
n, where m is the number of pre-deterrnined duty components and n is the number of 
pre-deterrnined standby components. In the last two cases, it is usually called 'pooled spare' . 
• Sequential Dependency 
The code 'sq' is used to represent the 'Dependency type' for the sequential dependency. In the 
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fault tree structure, sequential dependency can be identified through the Priority AND gate. Field 
'Number I ' provides the number of the immediate descendants under the Priority AND gate. 
These immediate descendants can include both basic events and intermediate, gate, events. Field 
'List l' holds the name of the intermediate event which features the Priority AND logic. Field 
'List 2' gives the names of the immediate descendants under the Priority AND gate. These events 
are listed in 'List 2' according to the required order of occurrence. 
The sequential dependency relationship can be input in two ways. It can be entered as a record in 
the dependency file or it will be automatically added to the dependency file by the analysis 
software when Priority AND gates occur in the corresponding fault tree structure . 
• Sequence-enforcing Dependency 
For the sequence-enforcing dependency, the value of the field 'Dependency type' is set as 'sqef'. 
As is evident, the sequence-enforcing dependency c an only involve basic events. These basic 
events don't have to be grouped under one gate and might be distributed throughout the fault tree. 
For the sequence-enforcing dependency, field 'Number I' indicates the number of basic events 
involved, and field 'List I' gives the names of these basic events in the order that they are 
obliged to occur one after another . 
• Secondary-failure Dependency 
For secondary-failure dependency, the value of the field 'Dependency type' is predetermined as 
'scnf'. Since this dependency relationship concerns the primary failure and secondary failure, 
both of which are single events, field 'Number I' and field 'Number 2' both automatically take 
the default value' I'. Field 'List I' gives the name of the event which represents the primary 
failure of the component in question. According to the definition, it can only be a basic event that 
relates to the primary failure. Correspondingly, field 'List 2' gives the name of the event which 
represents causes of the secondary failure. The event which relates to the secondary failure can 
be either a basic event or an intermediate event. 
With the existence of the secondary-failure dependency, the repair policy must be clarified. 
Whether it is the primary failure or the secondary failure which occurs, the failure is revealed by 
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the failed state of the primary component. When the component failure is discovered, a problem 
rises as to what has caused the component failure. If the secondary failure is self-revealing, the 
maintenance team will know it is a secondary failure and the primary component and secondary 
components can come under repair at the same time. However, if the secondary failure is a 
donnant failure mode, an inspection will be conducted on the secondary components to decide 
the cause of the component failure as the repair is carried out on the primary component. The 
purpose of such an inspection is to avoid the situation where the system fails again due to the 
unrevealed secondary failure after the primary component has been repaired and put back into 
function. In this sense, secondary-failure dependency may have an overlap with the revealing 
dependency. When the secondary components feature a donnant failure mode and the primary 
component failure is self-revealing, the specific repair policy implies that the revealing 
dependency exists under the secondary-failure event. 
• Initiator-enabler Dependency 
In tenns of the initiator-enabler dependency, the abbreviation 'ie' is used as the predetennined 
value for 'Dependency type'. Similar to secondary failure dependency, the main elements in the 
initiator-enabler dependency are the iriitiating event and enabling event. Field "List I' and field 
"List 2' respectively give the names of the corresponding initiating event and enabling event. 
Both of the two events can either be basic events or intennediate events. For example, in the 
original tank system shown in figure 4.2, the basic event 'PRS' is the single enabling event. 
Whereas, in the amended tank system in figure 4.6, the intennediate event 'safety measures fail' 
in the fault tree in figure 4.7 refers to the general enabling event against the initiating event 'PS'. 
In the same way, the initiating event can be an intennediate event. For example, in the tank 
system, if the event 'Pump surge' is developed in more detail to its root causes, it will be 
developed as an intennediate gate event. 
When the enabling event occurs first and the initiating event follows, the specific undesired 
event will consequently take place. In this case, the repair will be conducted on all failed 
components at the same time. By contrast, the maintenance team may have 2 options when the 
initiating event occurs prior to enabling event. The first option is that whilst the initiating event is 
being repaired, inspection will be carried out on components which relate to the corresponding 
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enabling events and if any failure is identified, repair will be implemented. This repair policy is 
aimed to reduce the top event failure intensity by bringing down the failure probability of the 
enabling event. The second option is that the maintenance team will only restore the initiating 
event and do nothing about the enabling events. The maintenance team may select which of the 
different options in view of the system characteristics. The value of the field 'Number l' is set as 
'1' or '2' according to the selected repair policy. 
• Revealing Dependency 
With regard to the revealing dependency, the value of the field 'Dependency type' is set as 'revl'. 
The most important element in the revealing dependency is the specific intermediate gate event, 
whose occurrence will lead to revealing the dormant failure of some components under it. Field 
'List l' gives the name of this intermediate event. Field 'Number l' is designed to indicate the 
number of the dormant basic events under this intermediate event and 'List 2' is used to hold the 
names ofthese dormant basic events. 
• Test Dependency 
The identification label of the field 'Dependency type' for the test dependency is simply 'test'. 
Since the test dependency is mainly concerning a group of components which compose an 
independent sub-system or sub-function, the information required is focused on these 
components. Field 'Number l' indicates how many components are included in the same test 
group. Field 'List l' gives the names of the basic events which represent the individual 
component failures. Field 'Number 2' gives the inspection interval of the sub-system consisting 
of the listed components. 
• Functional Dependency 
When a particular functional dependency relationship needs to be explicitly accounted for in the 
analysis, it is also included as a record in the dependency file. The abbreviate 'func' is entered in 
the field 'Dependency type'. With respect to the functional dependency, two factors need to be 
considered. The first one is the functionally controlling component or sub-system, and the 
second one is the functionally dependent component(s). Regarding the functional dependency, 
each dependency relationship centers around the control system and includes only one 
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functionally controlling component or subsystem. Therefore, field 'Number l' has the default 
value' 1', and field 'List l' gives the name of the event which corresponds to the failure of the 
functionally controlling component or subsystem. This event can be either a basic event or an 
intermediate event. In contrast, there may exist in the system more than one component which is 
functionally dependent on the same component or subsystem. Field 'Number 2' gives the 
information of how many components are dependent on this controlling component. And field 
'List 2' gives the names of the basic events which represent the failure of the functionally 
dependent components . 
• Switching Dependency 
Similar to functional dependency, switching dependency will only be included in the dependency 
file when the analysis requires its explicit representation. For switching dependency, the field 
'Dependency type' is entered with 'swch'. The structure of the switching dependency takes the 
same definition as that of the functional dependency. That is, field 'Number l' is assigned the 
default value' 1'. Field "List l' gives the name of the event which represents the failure of the 
supporting component or subsystem. Field 'Number 2' indicates the number of the 
active-on-demand components of which the activation is dependent on the corresponding 
supporting component. And field "List 2' gives the names of the basic events which represent the 
failure of the dependent active-on-demand components. 
4.3 The Representation of System Failure Logic 
The system reliability analysis is based on the knowledge of the system failure logic, which is 
usually represented in a fault tree structure. To enable the analysis to proceed, the' fault tree 
structure file' is established which contains the system failure logic. 
As has been defined in Chapter 2, a fault tree is a structure which is composed of two elements: 
events and gates. In a fault tree there exist three types of events: top event, intermediate event 
and basic event. Gates are used to connect these events in a structure which will represent the 
system failure logic. As a structure, gates form the framework of the fault tree. The fault tree 
structure file is actually a specification which is centered around each gate in the fault tree. Table 
4.2 displays the structure ofthe fault tree file. 
77 
Gate name Gate logic Number of Number of List of List of 
immediate gate immediate immediate gate immediate 
descendants basic event descendants basic event 
descendants descendants 
.. .. .. .. .. . . 
Table 4.2 The structure of fault tree file 
Each record in the fault tree file holds the information of each specific g ate in the fault tree. 
'Gate name' is a list of characters which is assigned to distinguish the specific gate from others. 
Usually 'gate name' refers to the name of the event (top event or intermediate event) to which 
the corresponding gate is attached to develop the deeper causes. The field 'gate logic' reflects 
how the immediate descendants under the gate contribute to the occurrence of the output event. 
The value of 'gate logic' usually include AND, OR, VOTE and Priority AND. In non-coherent 
fault trees [37, 38], it may also include the NOT logic, which has not been considered to this 
point. The third and forth fields respectively give the number of immediate gate descendants and 
basic event descendants under the specific gate. The value of these two fields can range from 0 to 
a limited integer. The fifth and sixth fields respectively hold the names of the intermediate events 
and basic events which form the immediate descendants of the specific gate. 
4.4 The Representation of Component Failure and Repair Parameters 
In order for the quantification process to proceed and produce accurate system reliability 
measures, accurate and comprehensive component failure and repair data are required. In the 
fault tree structure representing the system failure logic, the basic event is used to represent the 
failure of a system component in a certain mode. Corresponding to the fault tree structure file, a 
'basic event file' is established, in which each record provides information of the reliability 
characteristics for a system component. 
The structure of the basic event file is shown in table 4.3. It must be noted that the information 
required in the basic event file may vary in view of different characteristics of different systems. 
The structure shown in table 4.3 is applied to typical continuously-operating systems. A different 
structure of basic event file for safety/protection systems, which is characterized by the 
active-on-demand feature, will be described in Chapter 9. 
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Name of Failure model Reliability Enabler Number of List of 
basic event parameters dependency dependency 
groups groups 
involved in 
.. I q,w .. .. .. 
2 A., v 
3 A.,'t,e 
where: q - constant failure probability; w - constant unconditional failure intensity; A. - constant 
conditional failure rate; v - constant conditional repair rate; 't - mean time to repair; and e -
inspection interval 
Table 4.3 The structure of basic event file 
The 'name of basic event' is an identity label which distinguishes the basic event. The 'failure 
model', as has been described in chapter 2, defines which reliability parameters are applicable. 
The value of the field 'failure model' ranges from 1 to 3, respectively standing for the fixed, 
revealed and dormant failure model of the corresponding basic component. Correspondingly, the 
contents of the field 'reliability parameters' varies according to the different failure model, as is 
indicated in table 4.3. The field 'enabler' is used when the initiator-enabler dependency exists in 
the system, and the modeling process needs to identify which basic events are enabling events. 
The value of 'enabler' ranges from 0 to 2. When it equals 0, it means the basic event is not an 
enabling event. When it equals I, it means the basic event is an enabling event and it features the 
characteristic that once the corresponding initiating event has occurred, it can never occur. When 
the value is 2, it means the basic event is an enabling event and it can still occur after the 
initiating event occurs. This different characteristic of the enabling event was discussed in 
section 4.1.6. The fifth field indicates if the basic event is involved in any dependency 
relationship in the system. A value is 0 means the basic event is not explicitly included in any 
dependency group. When the value is greater than 0, the sixth field gives the list of the numbers 
of the dependency groups in which the basic event is explicitly included. It should be noted that 
if a basic event is included in a functional dependency or switching dependency group, the group 
number won't be included due to that these two types of dependency involve no statistical 
dependency. 
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Chapter 5. A New Method for Solving Dynamic Fault lrees with Dependencies 
5.1 Overview 
As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the Markov method offers a better alternative to 
other methods with regard to the assessment of systems which include dependency relationships 
between components. However, the Markov method lacks the ability to present and document 
the system failure logic, which is possible in other reliability assessment methods such as fault 
tree analysis. Therefore an issue arises with regard to how to combine these two different 
approaches in order to retain the best features of both. The Dynamic fault tree method provides a 
means to link the fault tree analysis with the Markov method. However, its applicability is 
significantly weakened due to that it can only take a limited number of dependency types into 
account and may result in a large Markov model for complex systems. 
To overcome these problems, a new approach is proposed here aimed to provide an all-around 
solution to the assessment of systems which contain dependency relationships. This solution is 
not only able to combine the fault tree analysis and the Markov method but also able to improve 
the efficiency of the analysis by generating the smallest possible Markov model for each 
dependency relationship in the system. 
The solution is based on the development of analysis software. System information, including 
the system failure logic, component reliability parameters and dependency relationships existing 
between system components, is passed to the software through the input of the fault tree 
structure file, basic event file and dependency file. After acquiring the basic system information, 
the analysis software will implement pre-processing on the fault tree structure to obtain a 
simplified and modularized fault tree structure which is reported in the results. Among the 
resulting modules, those which include the dependency relationship between the basic events 
will be represented in their most concise form. These modules will be modeled using Markov 
models generated according to the specific dependency relationship(s) included. Then the 
quantification process starts, conventional fault tree assessment methods are applied to modules 
which involve no dependency relationship. In this way, the conventional fault tree analysis (FTA) 
and the Markov method are integrated naturally during the analysis process. The strengths of the 
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fault tree approach are supplemented by the ability of the Markov method to address the 
dependency problem. Each stage of this approach will be described and illustrated in detail in 
this chapter and following chapters. 
5.2 Pre-processing of Fault Tree Structure - the Identification of the Smallest Independent 
Fault Tree Modules for Fault Trees Containing Dependencies 
It is one of the weaknesses of the Markov method that the model size can become very large, 
growing exponentially with the number of components. The dynamic fault tree approach to some 
extent provides the means to overcome the problem, but is limited as it can't ensure the complete 
independence of the resulting models. In the solution presented here, the fault tree is 
preprocessed to identify the smallest independent modules which contain dependency 
relationships. The whole process can be broken down into the following stages [39]: 
1) Re-organize the dependency information 
2) Fault tree simplification 
3) Form the dependency information 
4) Combination of dependent events 
5) Modularization 
6) Update the dependency information 
7) Re-modularize for each dependency relationship 
Each ofthe stages will be explained and illustrated in detail separately in the following sections. 
For a better understanding, an example fault tree is introduced to illustrate how the preprocessing 
is implemented and generates the desired result. As is shown in figure 5.1, the example fault tree 
contains 27 gates and 24 basic events, of which 10 are repeated basic events and appear in the 
fault tree more than once. To make this example more typical and representative, four types of 
dependency are assumed to be involved in this fault tree. Maintenance dependency exists 
between basic events 5 and 8, and between basic events 18, 19 and 20. Sequential dependency 
exists between basic events 18, 19 and 20. Initiator-enabler dependency exists under gate G 17. 
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Figure 5.1 The Example Fault Tree 
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Corresponding to these dependency relationships, the dependency file for the example fault tree 
is established as is shown in table 5.1 below: 
Dependency Dependency Numberl Number 2 List 1 List 2 
group number type 
1 mtnc 2 1 5 and 8 
2 mine 3 1 18,19 and 20 
3 sq 3 Gl4 18,19 and 20 
4 ie G18 15 
Table 5.1 Dependency file for the example fault tree 
5.2.1 Re-organize the Dependency Information 
In terms of the first 8 types of dependency described in Chapter 4 which involve statistical 
dependency, some concern only basic events, such as maintenance dependency, standby 
dependency, sequence-enforcing dependency and test dependency. Whereas, other types of 
dependency relationship involve the intermediate gate events such as sequential dependency and 
revealing dependency. Initiator-enabler and secondary-failure dependency are both likely to 
include intermediate gate events too. These intermediate events are listed in the dependency file 
as part of the dependency relationships. Therefore the investigation needs to be carried out to 
decide if these intermediate events should be replaced in the dependency file with their own 
basic event descendants to more effectively represent the corresponding dependency relationship. 
The following is the general principle regarding this issue. 
In terms of the initiator-enabler dependency, if the initiating event refers to an intermediate event, 
there is no need to expand it into a list of the basic events under it, since the initiating event is 
usually self-revealing and can be an independent section in the fault tree structure. Alternatively, 
when the enabling event appearing in the dependency file is represented by an intermediate event, 
it is necessary to investigate all its basic event descendants. As this gate is expanded into the 
cause events, those intermediate descendants can be retained in the list if they contain no basic 
events whose failure is a dormant failure. The reason for this is that these intermediate 
descendants could be the gate event which heads an independent module itself since it won't be 
involved in a dependency relationship due to its repair. 
The secondary-failure dependency is treated in a similar manner to the initiator-enabler 
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dependency, as the secondary-failure event might also be represented by an intermediate gate 
event in the fault tree. When this is the case, there exists the need to replace the original 
secondary-failure event in the dependency file with all its basic event descendants. The reason 
for this is that the specified repair policy may result in the revealing dependency under the 
secondary-failure event (See section 4.2). Again in this process, those intermediate gate 
descendants under the secondary-failure event can be retained in the list ifthey contain no basic 
events whose failure is dormant and can be considered as a separate module. 
In terms of the sequential dependency, if there exists an intermediate event under the Priority 
AND gate, it shall be retained as it may form an independent module in the fault tree. 
When considering the revealing dependency, no change is necessary if one of more of the 
dormant failures included in 'List 2' in the corresponding dependency file is the immediate 
descendant of the intermediate gate event specified in 'List 1'. If this is not the case, then it is 
possible that during the modularizing process the basic events shown in 'List 2' will all be 
included in a separate module which doesn't contain the specific intermediate gate event 
displayed in 'List 1'. In this case, there would be no way to account for the corresponding 
revealing dependency in the later stage of the analysis as the dormant failures have been 
separated from the self-revealing intermediate gate event. Therefore, when the self-revealing 
intermediate gate event includes none of the dormant-failure basic events as its immediate 
descendant, its immediate descendants should be added to 'List 2' so that these dormant failures 
will be included in the same module as the specific intermediate event during the modularization 
process. 
All that has been discussed above gives only one reason for the re-organization of the 
dependency file. As can be seen from table 5.1, there may exist overlap between different 
dependency relationships, and the same event may appear in more than one record in the 
dependency file. In this case, to ensure that all the events which share a dependency relationship 
with the event repeated in several dependency categories will be included in the same module, 
the records that overlap with each other should be combined. The resulting record no longer 
represents a single dependency relationship, therefore the original dependency group number is 
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no longer an appropriate identity tag. Consequently, a 'dependency serial number' is allocated to 
distinguish the group of dependent events. 
Take for example the dependency file in table 5.1, the re-organization will produce the new form 
of dependency information as is shown in table 5.2. 
Dependency serial number Dependency group involved Events involved 
I I 5 and 8 
2 2,3 18,19and20 
3 4 Gl8 and 15 
Table 5.2 Re-organized dependency information 
From the re-organized dependency information, it can be established which events need to be 
included in the same module so that the corresponding dependency relationships can be taken 
into account during the analysis. 
5.2.2 Fault Tree Simplification 
Simplification of the fault tree structure is aimed at reducing the fault tree to its most concise 
form without changing the logic function it represents. The simplification stage is based on the 
reduction technique which is used in the Faunet code [40]. This provides a good framework to 
reduce the fault tree to its minimal form. This method consists of four stages: 
Contraction: subsequent gates of the same type are contracted to form a single gate. This 
structures the fault tree as an alternating sequence of AND gates and OR gates. 
Extraction: this looks for structures of the type illustrated in figure 5.2 and converts them as 
illustrated. The effect is to identify the common factor. 
-
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Figure 5.2 Example of extraction 
Factorisation: pairs of (independent) events that always occur together in the same gate type 
are identified and combined to form a single complex event. 
To enhance the effectiveness of the simplification process an additional operation has been 
applied. 
Elimination: this process uses the Boolean laws of absorption: 
a+(a.b)=a 
a.(a+b)=a 
These laws correspond to the fault tree structures shown in Figure 5.3 below and can 
therefore be simply reduced to a single event 'a'. 
o 
-+ 
Figure 5.3 Example of elimination 
The absorption law can be extended to fault tree structures containing events that are 
repeated over any number of levels of a fault tree branch. This can be illustrated by the two 
examples shown in Figure 5.4: 
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The extended use of absorption law requires the definitions of primary and secondary gates. 
A primary gate is the gate at which the repeated variable is first encountered as an input. A 
secondary gate is a gate, below the primary gate, at which a second occurrence of the event 
appears as an input. In the two examples shown in figure 5.4, Gl is the primary gate. And 
G4 and G3 are respectively secondary gates which are the descendants of the primary gate 
and contain repeated event 'a'. The algorithm is that when the primary and secondary gates 
are of different types, the secondary gate can be eliminated from the fault tree, while if the 
primary and secondary gates are of the same type, the repeated event under the secondary 
gate can be eliminated. 
Figure 5.4 Extended elimination 
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When the absorption results in gates that have only one input, these gates are replaced in the 
fault tree structure by their single input. 
It should be noted that during the simplification process, exceptions may apply to obtain a better 
result. When a gate structure appears in the fault tree more than once, this gate structure should 
be skipped as the Contraction is carried out throughout the fault tree, because it might make an 
independent module and to contract it may be counter-productive and undermine the purpose of 
the simplification. Also, intermediate gate events, which are directly involved in the dependency 
relationships, should be kept intact during the simplification process. Besides, attention should 
be paid to repeated gate structures in the fault tree. The Elimination and Extraction operation 
may change the input of the repeated gate at a certain location in the fault tree, while the gate of 
the same name appearing somewhere else in the fault tree maintains the original structure. In this 
case, a different gate name should be assigned to the modified structure to distinguish it from the 
original one. 
Considering the example fault tree in figure 5.1, the simplification process will result in the 
minimal form shown in figure 5.5. The reductions include the contractions between Gland G2, 
G8 and G9, plus G20 and G23; eliminations of event 2 under G12, plus G24 under G22; 
extraction of event 10 out of G25 and G26; and finally factorisation of event 22 AND 23, plus 
event 2 I OR 24. To distinguish factors from other elements in the fault tree, these factors are 
named from 3001 onwards. 
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Figure 5.5 Simplified fault tree structure 
ID 16 
21 24 
Since fault tree sections which feature interdependent events will be analysed with the Markov 
method at the later stage, the factorisation process ignores those interdependent components to 
avoid the need for re-expansion. Therefore complex factors are formed of only independent 
event types. 
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5.2.3 Form the Dependency Information 
This step allocates the dependency serial numbers which each gate in the fault tree is dependent 
upon. The information forms the basis for the implementation of the next combination step. The 
dependency of each gate is defined by a list of all the dependency serial numbers to which basic 
events below it in the fault tree structure belong. 
This step is conducted by traversing the fault tree to decide the dependency serial number that 
each gate features. This process is illustrated with a simple example (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 Example for forming dependency information 
Assume that after the re-organisation of dependency information, events a and b bear 
dependency serial number 1, and event c, d and e belong to dependency serial number 2. 
Therefore the dependency of G 1 is the dependency serial of its immediate descendants, i.e., 
serial I, since both of its input events a and b feature in dependency serial 1. Similarly, the 
dependency of G2 is serial 2. And finally the dependencies of GO is identified as serial numbers 
I and 2 because G 1 has dependency serial I and both G2 and event e are characterized by 
dependency serial 2. 
Therefore, according to this algorithm, by referring to table 5.2, the dependency serial 
information of each gate in the simplified fault tree in figure 5.5 is summarized in table 5.3. 
Gate GO GI G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 GIO 
Dependency serials 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 
-
1,2,3, 1,2 I 
- - -
Gate Gll G13 Gl4 Gl5 Gl6 Gl7 Gl8 G20 
Dependency serials 
- -
2 
-
3 3 3 3 
Table 5.3 Gate dependency serials 
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It should be noted that since G 18 represents the general initiating event in dependency group 4, it 
features the dependency serial number 3 itself in the way like dependent basic events. 
5.2.4 Combination of Dependent Events 
The purpose of this step is to restructure the fault tree in a way which will separate those events 
with the same dependency serial into separate branches. Using the information generated in the 
previous phase, each gate will be examined in turn, additional gates of the same logic type as the 
gate being investigated, are added where necessary to group the input events (immediate 
descendants) of the same dependency serial. The reason for implementing the 'combination' 
phase is that the resulting new gates (numbered from 20001 upwards) are leading to a fault tree 
structure with the smallest independent sub-trees for each dependency. 
For the example in figure 5.6, the application of the. Combination will result in a new fault tree 
structure as shown in figure 5.7. G2 and basic event e, both of which feature dependency serial 2, 
are grouped under the new gate 20001, which consequently also bears dependency serial 2. 
Figure 5.7 Restructured fault tree after the combination 
Similarly, when applied to the fault tree in figure 5.5, the 'combination' step will produce the 
restructured fault tree shown in figure 5.8 with new gates 20001 and 20002. 
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Figure 5.8. Combination 
92 
5.2.5 Modularisation 
The task of this phase is defined as to identify modules in the fault tree. A module of a fault tree 
is a sub-tree that is completely independent from the rest of the tree. After the modularisation, 
each module will be replaced with a super-event in the original fault tree structure. The 
super-event has the same reliability characteristics as the fault tree section which it has replaced 
and is determined using Markov theory or fault tree theory depending on whether the 
corresponding module contains dependent basic events or not. 
The algorithm developed by Rauzy and Dutuit [41] provides an efficient means to identify the 
modules, which mainly requires two depth-first traversals of the fault tree. The first performs a 
step-by-step traversal recording for each gate· and event, the step number at which the first, 
second, and final visits to each node were made. It also records the number of appearances in the 
traversal which will be used in a later stage. In this first traversal, it must be noted that the graph 
under a vertex is never traversed twice [42]. Therefore when gates appear more than once in the 
tree, only its first appearance will be traversed completely, after this, its appearances elsewhere 
in the tree will be treated like a basic event. 
In order to ensure that dependent basic events featuring the same dependency serial will end up 
in the same module, they are treated as a single basic event with the same label during the first 
traversal. All events in the same dependency group will be replaced with an id that characterizes 
the particular dependency serial. For example, in the fault tree in figure 5.7, both a and b will be 
replaced by label 10001, and c, d and e by I 0002 (dependency event numbering starts at 10001). 
The principal of the algorithm for modularisation is that if any descendant of a gate has a first 
visit step number smaller than the first visit step number of the gate, then it must also occur 
beneath another gate. Similarly, if any descendant has a last visit number greater than the second 
visit number of the gate, then again it must occur elsewhere in the tree. Therefore a gate can be 
identified as heading a module only if: 
• the first visit to each descendant is after the first visit to the gate and 
• the last visit to each descendant is before the second visit to the gate 
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Then the second pass through the fault tree assesses these conditions. The maximum (Max) of 
the last visits and the minimum (Min) of the first visits of all the descendants (any gates and 
events appearing below that gate in the tree) for each gate will be obtained based on the result of 
the first traversal. 
Therefore, based on the fault tree in figure 5.8, the two traversals will provide the information 
given in tables 5.4 - 5.7. 
Visit Gate! Visit Gate! Visit Gate! Visit Gate! Visit Gate! Visit Gate! 
number event number Event Number event number event number Event number event 
I GO 12 G7 23 G13 34 G14 45 G17 56 Gl 
2 20001 J3 G8 24 G11 35 18(10002) 46 GI8(10003) 57 G20 
3 Gl 14 GI0 25 2 36 19(10002) 47 13 58 G17 
4 G3 15 3 26 G8 37 20(10002) 48 14 59 10 
5 9 16 4 27 12 38 G14 49 GI8(10003) 60 16 
6 10 17 GI0 28 G7 39 G5 50 15(10003) 61 G20 
7 G3 18 G11 29 5(10001) 40 G15 51 G17 62 20001 
8 G4 19 1 30 6 41 6 52 10 63 3002 
9 G5 20 G13 31 G6 42 11 53 G16 64 GO 
10 20002 21 4 32 8(10001) 43 G15 54 G4 
JJ G6 22 7 33 20002 44 G16 55 3001 
.. Table 5.4 VISit number for each event m the first traversal (referrmg to Figure 5.8) 
Event 9 10 3 4 1 7 
Visit 1 5 6 15 16 19 22 
Visit 2 5 52 15 21 19 22 
Last visit 5 59 15 21 19 22 
No. of visits 1 3 1 2 1 1 
Event 2 12 10001 6 10002 11 
Visit 1 25 27 29 30 35 42 
Visit 2 25 27 32 41 36 42 
Last visit 25 27 32 41 37 42 
No. of visits 1 1 2 2 3 1 
Event 10003 13 14 3001 16 3002 
Visit 1 46 47 48 55 60 63 
Visit 2 50 47 48 55 60 63 
Last visit 50 47 48 55 60 63 
No. of visits 2 1 1 1 1 1 
.. Note: when establishing the event VISit table, G 18 IS treated as the dependent basic event with id 
10003. 
Table 5.5 Event visit table (referring to Figure 5.8) 
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Gate GO 20001 Gl G3 G4 GS 20002 G6 G7 G8 
Visit I 1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Visit 2 64 62 56 7 54 39 33 31 28 26 
Last visit 64 62 56 7 54 39 33 31 28 26 
No. of visits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gate GIO Gll Gl3 G14 GlS G16 G17 G18 G20 
Visit I 14 18 20 34 40 44 45 46 57 
Visit 2 17 24 23 38 43 53 51 49 61 
Last visit 17 24 23 38 43 53 58 49 61 
No. of visits 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
.. Table 5.6 Gate VISit table (referrmg to Figure 5.8) 
Gate GO 20001 Gl G3 G4 GS 20002 G6 G7 G8 
Min 2 3 4 5 6 10 11 12 13 14 
Max 63 61 59 59 59 41 41 41 27 25 
Gate GIO Gll G13 G14 G1S G16 G17 G18 G20 
Min 15 16 16 35 30 6 46 47 6 
Max 21 23 22 37 42 59 50 48 60 
Table 5.7 Information from 2nd traversal 
According to the conditions for a module, the gates marked in table 5.7 such as GO, 20002, G7, 
G8, G14, G 17 and G18, are identified as heading the modules. To distinguish these modules 
from other events in the fault tree, these modules are assigned a unique id starting from 6001 
onwards. Their structure is shown in figure 5.9. 
T 
I 
Module 6001 
Figure 5.9 Modules identified - Module 6001 
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5.2.6 Update the Dependency Information 
By this stage, independent sub-trees have been identified. However, with the aim to find the 
smallest modules which contain dependent basic events, the task has not been accomplished yet. 
To attain the aim, two points must be made clear: the first is which modules contain which 
dependency serial; and the second is whether these modules are the smallest one. This step is 
designed to provide the information required to answer these two questions. 
Slightly different from step 3, dependency information is updated establishing not only which 
dependency serials each gate contains but also its mutual dependency serials. The mutual 
dependency serial of a gate is a list of dependency serials which all of its immediate descendants 
feature. 
Take module 6002 in figure 5.9 for example, it can be determined that gate 05 contains 
dependency serial I and since only one of its two input events features dependency serial I, it 
has no mutual dependency serial. It is a different case for gate 20002: since both of its input 
events, gate 06 and event 8 features dependency serial I, gate 20002 bears dependency serial 
number 1 as its mutual dependency serial. 
Accordingly, table 5.8 below gives the dependency serial information of each of the modules 
shown in figure 5.9. 
Gate GO 20001 Gl G3 G4 G5 20002 G6 G7 G8 
Dependencies contained a 1 1 a 1 1 1 1 a a 
~utualdependency a a a a a - 1 - a a 
Gate GI0 Gll G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G20 
Dependencies contained a a a 2' a a 3 a a 
~utual dependency a a a 2 a a 3 a a 
Notes: 
1. '-' means each of the immediate descendants of the gate contains different dependency. 
Therefore there is no mutual dependency for the gate. 
2. Shaded gates are the top nodes of each module displayed in figure 5.9. 
Table 5.8 Dependency information (referring to Figure 5.9) 
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5.2.7 Re-modularise for Each Dependency Relationship 
The previous step has identified which module( s) contain interdependent events. This step 
determines whether a certain module is already the smallest module for a given dependency, or if 
not, to further identify the smallest independent sub-tree for the given dependency relationship(s) 
from within a module. 
Firstly, it has to be determined whether a certain module is already the smallest one for the given 
dependency. This is accomplished by using the dependency information provided by the 
preceding step. If any module contains a given dependency serial number and its mutual 
dependency also includes this given dependency serial, it can be concluded that this module is 
already the smallest module and does not need further processing. 
If the module does not satisfy this condition, the search for the smallest module of the given 
dependency serial continues. 
Accordingly, in terms of the 7 modules in figure 5.9, judging from the dependency information 
in table 5.11, it can be concluded that module 6005 led by 014 and module 6006 led by 017 are 
already the smallest modules for dependency serial numbers 2 and 3 respectively. 
After it has been decided that a certain module may not be the smallest one for a given 
dependency, the search continues within the module to find out the smallest independent sub-tree 
for the given dependency. This process can be generalized by the following steps: 
a) Traverse the module from its top event, always following the gate which contains the given 
dependency and recording the path, until the gate is encountered whose mutual dependency also 
includes the given dependency. 
For example, regarding module 6002 in figure 5.9, for dependency serial 1, the path will be: 
20001,01,04,05,20002. Oate 20002 is the first gate encountered in this path whose mutual 
dependency includes dependency serial 1. 
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b) The gate identified in step (a) as having the correct mutual dependency serial would be 
leading the smallest independent sub-tree for the given dependency serial if it had been identified 
as a module. The fact that it is not a module indicates that some of its descendants must have 
occurred elsewhere in the module. Therefore, in this step, those preventing elements have to be 
identified which lie outside the fault tree section headed by the gate with the specified mutual 
dependency serial. 
Those descendants which are preventing elements need to be identified. One solution is to see 
whether the number of appearances of any descendant under this gate is the same as the number 
of appearances of the specific descendant in the whole module. If it is different, that descendant 
is the preventing element. 
For example, event 6 is the preventing element under gate 20002 because event 6 occurs only 
once under gate 20002 but occurs twice in module 6002 (see table 5.5). 
c) After the preventing elements have been detected, the next thing is to identify a new module 
which includes those preventing elements. The way of doing this can be illustrated by the 
specific example of module 6002. 
First some information should be listed: 
The Path downwards to the mutual dependency event is: 
20001, Gl, G4, as. 20002 
The potential module: 20002 
Preventing element: event 6 with another occurrence at location 41 in table 5.4. 
From event 6 at location 41 the tree is traversed upwards and its antecedents listed: 
Event 6, G 15, G4 
The search stops at G4 because G4 is the first gate which also appears in the descending Path for 
gate 20002. It indicates that G5 and G 15 are both immediate descendants of G4 and that G 15 
contains the preventing element event 6. So the potential module is now updated to include the 
combination of G5 and G 15. 
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In the new potential module, no preventing elements have been detected, therefore the 
combination of G5 and G 15 is the new module labelled 6008 which is smallest for dependency 
serial 1. See figure 5.1 O. 
If the new potential module contains any preventing elements, the procedures are repeatedly 
applied until a new module is identified. 
d) If a module includes more than one dependency serial, these dependency serials shall be dealt 
with one after another in the same way. 
Having progressed through the 7 stages, modules 6005, 6006, 6007 and 6008 are identified as 
the smallest modules for dependency serials 2, 3, 4, and 1 respectively. These four modules will 
be handled with the Markov method in the later stage of analysis which will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
16 
9 10 
Modified module 6002 
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Module 6008 
Figure 5.10 New modules identified 
5.3 Discussion 
The algorithm presented in this chapter will enable the efficient analysis of fault trees which 
contain dependent basic events. The method will allow the fault tree to be modularised into 
independent sections. Analysis of the sections will be by the Binary Decision Diagram (BD D) 
method or Markov method depending upon the existence of dependent events or not within the 
section. The key element in terms of the efficiency of this approach is to reduce the sections 
analysed using Markov method to the minimum possible size (number of basic events). 
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Chapter 6. The Generation of Markov Models 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the new solution to the assessment of systems 
which contain dependency relationships integrates the Markov method into conventional fault 
tree analysis. In the solution, the Markov method is applied to modules in which dependency 
relationships are involved. 
The application of the Markov method is realized through the generation of a Markov model 
which represents the characteristics of the particular dependency relationships included in the 
module. The manual development of the Markov models, due to their size, can be error-prone. In 
the analysis method presented, the Markov models need to be generated automatically to avoid 
this pitfall. This chapter establishes the algorithm for developing the Markov model for each type 
of dependency relationship by examining their unique characteristics. 
As is defined in chapter 3, a complete Markov model is composed of three elements: a list of 
system states, the transitions between these states and the corresponding transition rate. All these 
3 elements will be considered during the model generation process. Usually the state transition is 
caused by the change in the state (failure or repair) of basic (component) events included in the 
system. The corresponding transition rate is the failure rate or repair rate of the relevant 
component. A basic assumption of the analysis method is that only one transition is possible in 
an infinitesimally small element of time. 
During the model generation process, some operational details of the system need to be 
considered a s they may have influence on the transitions between system states. At least two 
general system characteristics have to be clarified before the development of the Markov model. 
First, it has to be made clear if the system will be continuously operating or active-on-demand. 
Different assessment approaches are applied accordingly to assess different types of system. The 
development of the Markov model will also differ. Secondly, the analyst must be clear if it is 
possible to carry out maintenance during the system operational phase. This will not only affect 
the transitions between system states but also decide which types of dependency relationship 
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need to be accounted for. For example, if maintenance is not possible, the dependency 
relationships need not be considered which involve the repair process. In this chapter, the model 
generation is examined with regard to continuously operating systems for which maintenance is 
possible. 
6.2 The Generation of Markov Models for Different Types of Dependency Relationship 
6.2.1 Model Generation for the Maintenance Dependency 
The process for generation of a Markov model, where components have a maintenance 
dependency, will be illustrated using an example. Module 6005 in figure 5.9 is used for this 
purpose. Assume there exists only a maintenance dependency between the basic events 18, 19, 
and 20. The following part of this section will look into the process of developing the Markov 
model where failure events are either revealed or dormant. 
Each system state included in the Markov model represents a combination of possible states for 
the components included in the system or module. In terms of the basic events in the original 
fault tree structure, two potential states can be identified: one represents the basic event has 
occurred, and the other represents the basic event has not occurred. Usually these two states 
correspond to the failed state and working state of each component. When the component has 
failed, further division is necessary to distinguish if this occurrence is revealed or not. Therefore, 
during the process of model generation, integers '0', '1' and '3' are introduced to represent the 
three states of the component: 'working', 'failed revealed' and 'failed dormant' respectively. For 
components whose failure is revealed, only the first two states are relevant. 
In view of the maintenance dependency, another state has to be identified which represents that 
the component is waiting for correction due to the temporary unavailability of the repair resource. 
When a basic event is tagged with the state '1', it means its failure of the corresponding 
components has been revealed and the component is under repair. In contrast, integer '2' is 
introduced to signify the 'queuing-for-repair' state of the basic event. It should be noted that only 
when the occurrence of the component failure has been noticed, can it join the queue for the 
repair. 
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• Model Generation with Revealed Failures 
Usually the development of a Markov model requires an initial system state to be established 
first. In most cases, for continuously running systems, the initial system state is configured with 
each component working normally. That is, in the initial system state, no basic events have 
occurred. With the initial state established, the M arkov model can be gradually developed by 
systematically considering the transitions that make each component's state change. The 
algorithm is that the process starts from the initial state and investigates how each component 
state can change. A new state is generated for each possible transition. If this state is different 
from all currently existing states, it will be added to the list of system states in the Markov model. 
When each state in the Markov model has been considered, and all possible transitions from 
these states result in another state which is already included in the model, the Markov model is 
complete. 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 below displays all the system states and the transitions between these states 
included in the Markov model for module 6005 in figure 5.9, which are established according to 
the algorithm presented above. It is assumed that only the maintenance dependency is involved 
and all components in the module have revealed failures. 
I~ Basic events included state Module state State . number 18 19 20 
I 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 I 0 
5 I 2 0 0 
6 I 0 2 0 
7 2 1 0 0 
8 0 1 2 0 
9 2 0 I 0 
10 0 2 I 0 
11 I 2 2 I 
12 2 I 2 1 
13 2 2 1 1 
Table 6.1 Markov model states (refemng to module 6005 III figure 5.9) 
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From State To State Transition Rate From State To State Transition Rate 
I 2 AI8 6 4 VI8 
I 3 A19 6 11 A19 
I 4 A,. 7 2 V19 
2 I VI8 7 12 A,. 
2 5 A19 8 12 AIS 
2 6 A,. 8 4 VI' 
3 7 AIS 9 13 AI, 
3 I VI' 9 2 V,o 
3 8 A,. 10 13 AIS 
4 9 AI8 10 3 V,. 
4 10 AI, 11 8 VIS 
4 I V,. 12 6 VI' 
5 3 VIS 13 5 V,o 
5 11 A,. 
Table 6.2 State transitions in the Markov model in table 6.1 
In table 6.1, 'module state' indicates if the top event of the module occurs (1) or not (0) given the 
specific combination of the basic event states. It can be noted that since only 1 repair engineer is 
responsible for maintaining and repairing the 3 basic components (see table 5.3 in chapter 5), the 
subsequent component failures will not be corrected immediately and have to go into the queue 
for repair. This characteristic can be reflected in the transitions from state 2 to state 5 and 6, and 
from state 3 to state 7 and 8 etc. When the repair engineer becomes available by completing the 
repair of a failed component, they will then start working on the failed components which are 
queuing for repair. When there is more than one queuing component, the engineer then has to 
choose one from the queuing list according to the predetermined repair priority. For example, 
when the module is residing in state 1 I, the repair of the failed component 18 means the repair 
engineer can now commence working on components 19 or 20. since component 19 has been 
assigned a higher level of repair priority, it will come under repair prior to component 20. This 
leads to the transition from state 11 to state 8. Transitions from state 12 to state 6 and from state 
13 to state 5, also mirror the same kind of situation. 
By integrating the information provided in table 6.1 and 6.2 and translating it into a graphic 
presentation, the Markov model for module 6005 regarding the maintenance dependency is 
shown in figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 The graphic Markov model for module 6005 (referring to figure 5.9) 
In figure 6.1, each circle represents a state listed in table 6.1. The arrows between the circles 
stand for the transitions between states which are displayed in table 6.2. The symbol attached to 
each arrow refers to the rate of each transition which is decided by the corresponding conditional 
failure or repair rate. 
If the components whose failure is represented by basic events 18, 19 and 20 are all of the same 
type of component and feature exactly the same reliability parameters, in this case, the 
conditional failure rate, A., and conditional repair rate, v, the state lumping technique introduced 
in chapter 3 can be applied here to reduce the size of the Markov model. Figure 6.2 below gives 
the reduced Markov model where the number of components in each of the possible states is 
used to define system states. 'W' means the component is working normally, 'F' means the 
component is failed revealed and under repair, and 'Q' means the component is queuing for 
repair. 
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Figure 6.2 Reduced Markov model (referring to figure 6.1) 
It can be noted that each state in figure 6.2 is actually a reflection of the states in each column in 
figure 6.1. By identifying and combining states which represent the same system characteristics, 
the state lumping technique can effectively reduce the size of the resulting model. However, as 
has been mentioned in chapter 3, only when a series of conditions are fulfilled, can the state 
lumping be applied. For example, module 6008 in figure 5.1 0 also includes the maintenance 
dependency which exists between basic event 5 and 8. In this case, even if the corresponding 
components are of exactly the same type and characterized by the same reliability parameters, 
the state lumping technique is inapplicable to form the Markov model. The main reason is that, 
as can seen from the fault tree structure of module 6008 in figure 5.10, basic events 5 and 8 have 
different contributions with respect to the top event. More importantly, without being able to 
identify which specific basic event (5 or 8) has occurred in the Markov model, it is not possible 
to correctly determine if the top event has occurred or not. In contrast, in module 6005, since all 
of the 3 basic events are immediate descendants of the top event, they provide the same 
contribution to the system structure. Also in this case, with the same reliability parameters, the 
repair priority is only a nominal guide which helps the engineer choose the next component for 
repair, and has nothing to do with the component criticality . 
• Model Generation with Dormant Failures 
Now consider the circumstances where all the basic events 18, 19 and 20 in module 6005 have 
an unrevealed dormant failure mode. This means that at the time a component fails, the failure is 
unrevealed and will be discovered only when the regular inspection of the component is carried 
out. Assuming that the basic events 18, 19 and 20 all feature the same reliability parameters, the 
resulting reduced Markov model is established as follows in figure 6.3 where the state 'FU' 
means the component is failed but unrevealed: 
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Figure 6.3 The reduced Markov model with dormant failures (referring to module 6005 in figure 
5.9) 
In figure 6.3, it can be noted that some state transitions are symbolized by the dotted arrow 
instead of a solid-line arrow. These dotted arrows represent the state transitions which are caused 
by the inspection which reveals the dormant failure(s). Unlike other state transitions which are 
caused by component failure or repair and occur at a certain rate, the occurrence of these 
inspection transitions are mandatory and instantaneous at the specific points of time. If the 
system is residing in one of the states from which the dotted arrow reaches out, the transitions 
represented by the dotted arrow will not occur until the inspection is conducted. 
In this particular example, because it is assumed that the 3 basic events all have same reliability 
parameters and feature the same inspection interval, the dormant failures will be revealed 
together. This can be seen from the transitions 3~6, 4~ 1 0 and 9~ 1 o. When the dormant failure 
is revealed, if the repair resource is available, the failed component will come under repair 
immediately, if there is no spare repair resource, the component will have to go into the queue 
for repair. When more than one dormant failure is revealed together, the repair resource will be 
assigned to the components according to their repair priority. 
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In many cases, different components which can fail in a dormant mode will have different 
inspection intervals. In these circumstances, inspections may coincide and multi pie dormant 
component failures will be revealed together, but at other points of time only one or a fraction of 
the dormant failures are discovered. In this case, the problem rises as to how the different 
situations are represented through the state transitions in the Markov model. The following 
example is used to demonstrate how this can be achieved. 
Assume that in module 6005, basic event 18 features a 2-month inspection interval, whilst basic 
events 19 and 20 are respectively assigned the 3-month and 4-month inspection interval. In the 
model generation process consider the development of a state in which the three basic events are 
all tagged with the state code '3', i.e. 'failed unrevealed'. Figure 6.4 and table 6.3 provide an 
insight into how the state transitions can occur in a different way depending on time. 
State 2 18,19, 20 .................................................................. . 
..•. 
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Figure 6.4 State transitions with multiple dormant failures (referring to module 6005 in figure 
5.9) 
State transitions Points oftime for occurrence (months) 
State 1 --> State 2 T=2k, T*3kor4k 
State 1 --> State 3 T= 3k, T*2k or4k 
State 1 --> State 4 T=4k, T*3k 
State 1 --> State 5 T=6k, T*4k 
State 1 --> State 6 T= 12k 
Table 6.3 Time conditions for state transitions (referring to figure 6.4) 
k E {1,2,3,4 .... } 
For example, if currently the mission time that has elapsed is 18 months, this corresponds to an 
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inspection point for components 18 and 19 whose failure will be discovered resulting in the 
transition from state 1 to state 5. If the current time is 20 months, components 18 and 20 will be 
tested and the transition from state 1 to state 4 will occur. In the same way, different time 
conditions can obtained for transitions from state 2 in figure 6.4. See table 6.4: 
State transitions Points of time for occurrence (months) 
State 2 ~ State 4 T~ 4k, L. 3k 
State 2 ~ State 5 T~3k, L.4k 
State 2 ~ State 6 T~ 12k 
Table 6.4 Time conditions for transitions from state 2 (referring to figure 6.4) 
A systematic approach has been developed to ensure that each possible state transition will be 
considered when there exists more than one dormant failure. This approach is applied through 
the following steps: 
a. Calculate the common multiple e, of the inspection interval of the basic events which in the current 
state are tagged with the state code' 3' 
b. Consider the fIrst basic event with the current state '3': Start with its inspection interval ei• Establish 
the possible state transitions when T ~ ei, 2ei, 3e" ... till T reaches the e,. At each of the points of 
time, make the new state of the basic event to be revealed, i.e. 'I'. Meantime record the time 
condition for each transition. 
c. Consider the next basic event with state '3'. Repeat step b until every basic event with state '3' has 
been examined. Points of time which have been considered with the previous basic events will be 
skipped. 
Figure 6.5 Algorithm of establishing state transitions with multiple dormant failures 
The application of the approach described in figure 6.5 is illustrated using the same example as 
illustrated in figure 6.4. Considering transitions from state 1 in figure 6.4, and referring to the 
algorithm presented in figure 6.5, the process of establishing the transitions and their 
corresponding time conditions, shown in figure 6.4 and table 6.3, can be represented by the flow 
chart in figure 6.6: 
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I ee = 12 months I 
Look at basic event 18 
~ Look at basic event 19 
r- Look at basic event 20 
IT = 2: state 1 -> 2 
combin 
~_ ':: j ~ ~\ll1(t 1. ~ j 
T= 3: state 1 -> 3 
.e-' r-= 6: state 1 -> 5 
T=6: skip >c 
T_ ,::ll~~\ll1e-1.~j 
T= 10: state 1->2 
IT = 9: state 1 -> 3 
rr = 12: skip 
rr = 12: state 1 -> 6 
ombine 
r-= 4: skip 
r-= 8: skip 
rr= 12: skip 
I Finished I 
Figure 6.6 Illustration of the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 
In figure 6.6, it can be seen that when T = 10, the same state transition occurs as when T = 2. It is 
the same case between T = 4 and T = 8, and between T = 3 and T = 9. In this case, the time 
conditions T = 10, T = 8 and T = 9 can be omitted. Therefore, the final list of time conditions will 
be as displayed in table 6.5 below: 
Time conditions State transitions 
T=2 State 1 ~ State 2 
T=3 State 1 ~ State 3 
T=4 State 1 ~ State 4 
T=6 State 1 ~ State 5 
T= 12 State 1 ~ State 6 
Table 6.5 Time conditions for state transitions (referring to figure 6.6) 
For example, if the current time elapsed is 18 months, the biggest number in the time condition 
list which can divide 18 evenly is T = 6, which combines the state transitions for T = 2 and T = 3. 
The corresponding state transition which will occur is from state 1 to state 5. The algorithm 
generalized in figure 6.5 leads to the same result as is manifest in figure 6.4. 
III 
So far this section has illustrated the whole process of developing the Markov model which 
involves maintenance dependency for small specific example. This process has been generalized 
to account for any number of components of all revealedlunrevealed failure in figure 6.7. 
~stablish _ markov('mtnc ') 
{ 
establish _ initials( events); f* all events are set as non-occurred in the initial state *f 
while(initial state ... last system state) 
{while(flIst event ... last event) 
{if(current event state = 0) 
{if(failure model is revealed) 
{if(repair is available) 
} 
} 
new event state = 1; 
else 
new event state = 2; 
else 
new event state = 3; 
else 
{if( current event state = I) 
new event state = 0; 
else 
{if( current event state = 3) 
apply the algorithm proposed in figure 6.5; 
else ; '* when the component is queuing for repair, it is unlikely to change its state until the repair resourc 
becomes available *f 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
if (the newly created state produced by the state change ofthe specific event has existed) 
else 
{add the new state into the state list; 
decide the module state in the current system state; 
} 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.7 The algoritlun for the generation of the Markov model involving maintenance 
dependency 
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6.2.2. Model Generation for Standby Dependency 
The use of redundancy in design to enhance reliability is common in many engineering systems. 
This approach is aimed to enhance the system's ability to tolerate some key component failures 
and to ensure its continuous operation. In most cases, the standby component or subsystem is 
accompanied by a support subsystem which detects the need to activate the standby subsystem 
and to implement the activation. Therefore, according to the definition in chapter 4, it can be 
concluded that the existence of the support subsystem results in a switching dependency between 
the standby component and the support components. In most standby systems, the standby 
dependency exists together with the switching dependency. An additional complication for 
standby systems is that the existence of the switching dependency also introduces the 
initiator-enabler dependency. The water tank system in figure 6.8 provides a good example. 
Water Output 
source 
1 .......... 1 ...................... , I . 
. Controller ~ ..................................................................................................... ..l 
Figure 6.8 Simplified water tank system 
The water tank system shown in figure 6.8 is a storage facility which provides water to other 
parts of a process. The level in the water tank has to be maintained at a certain height to ensure 
the system can function normally. To monitor the water level, a level sensor is fitted to the tank. 
Pump 1 and pump 2 transport water to the tank. When the system is started, pump 1 is set as the 
duty pump and pump 2 acts as the standby backup. In the event that pump 1 fails, the level 
monitor in the tank will detect the drop in the water level and send a signal to the controller 
which will accordingly switch on pump 2. Since pump 1 is set as the main duty pump, once 
repaired it will be put back into function immediately. 
Assume the assessment focuses on 'insufficient water supply from the tank', then the 
corresponding fault tree can be drawn up as is shown in figure 6.9 below: 
1\3 
Insufficient water supply 
from the tank 
GO 
Figure 6.9 Fault tree structure for water tank system (referring to figure 6.8) 
It can be seen that in this system, the standby dependency exists between basic events P I and P2. 
Pump 2 also features the switching dependency on the controller and level sensor. Now we will 
look into how the initiator-enabler dependency occurs in the system. 
Assume that pump I fails while other components are still working normally. Pump 2 will then 
start to continue the water supply to the tank. In the event that the controller fails after it activates 
pump 2, then the basic events which exist incl ude PI and C. From the failure logic given in the 
fault tree structure in figure 6.9, the top event should have occurred in this case. However, in 
reality, since pump 2 has been successfully activated, the top event does not occur. Alternatively, 
if the controller fails prior to pump I, then the subsequent failure of pump I will not result in the 
activation of pump 2 due to the unavailability of the controller. In this case, the top event occurs, 
as indicated by the failure logic presented by the fault tree structure in figure 6.9, PI AND C. 
These two different cases indicate that the AND logic of gate GO in the fault tree in figure 6.9 is 
not sufficient to totally prescribe the conditions of the system failure. Instead, the 
initiator-enabler dependency has to be introduced here to reflect the requirement on the specific 
occurrence order of basic events C, M and PI. 
However, another problem rises when the basic events come under examination. Each 
component may have different failure modes and each basic event should represent only one 
failure mode of the specific component. Correspondingly, the reliability parameters of each basic 
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event are established for only one failure mode of the component. In the water tank system in 
figure 6.8, pump 2 may have two different failure modes: one is the dynamic failure which refers 
to the failure of pump 2 while it is running; the other is the static failure representing the failure 
of pump 2 when it is residing in the standby state. These two failure modes should be 
characterized by different reliability parameters and represented by two different basic events. 
However, in the fault tree structure in figure 6.9, only one basic event is used to represent the 
failure of pump 2. 
To resolve this problem, one option is to distinguish between the different failure modes of pump 
2 by introducing another basic event. The fault tree structure then becomes that shown in figure 
6.10: 
No sufficient water 
supply from the tank 
00 
standby system fails to react 
02 
Figure 6.1 0 Amended fault tree structure for the water tank system 
In this fault tree, basic events 'P2' and 'P2S' represent the dynamic and static failure of pump 2 
respectively. This approach has two advantages. 
Firstly, the different failure modes of pump 2 don't have to be mixed together. The characteristics 
relevant to each failure mode can be clearly distinguished through the information provided in 
the basic event file. For example, the basic event 'P2S' will be identified as an enabling event, as 
will basic events 'c' and 'M'. Gate G2 is the general enabling event against the initiating event 
'PI' . 
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Secondly, the new fault tree structure provides a more accurate representation of the system 
failure. It reflects the different phases of system operation. The analyst can tell directly from the 
fault tree structure if the standby is a cold-spare or not. When the basic event 'P2S' is not 
included in the fault tree, it indicates that pump 2 will not fail in standby and therefore it is a cold 
spare. 
With regard to the new fault tree structure, the corresponding dependency information and the 
basic event information is given in table 6.6 and table 6.7. 
Dependency group number Dependency type Number I Number 2 List I List 2 
I sdbyl I I PI P2 
2 swch I I 02 P2 
3 ie 2 - PI 02 
Table 6.6 Dependency information for the water tank system (referring to figure 6.10) 
Name of Basic Failure Reliability Numbers of dependency List of dependency 
Enabler 
event model parameters groups involved in groups 
PI 2 APh VPI 0 2 I and 3 
P2 2 AP2, VP2 0 2 I and 2 
P2S 3 A..~2 ' 'tP2, 9P2 1 0 -
C 3 "",tc,9c 2 0 -
M 3 AM, 'fM, eM 2 0 -
Note: Switching dependency is only specified and included in the dependency information for 
illustration purpose. It doesn't need to be specified since it is fully reflected through the ie 
dependency. 
Table 6.7 Basic event information (referring to figure 6.10) 
In table 6.7, since basic event 'P2S' represents the static failure of pump 2, it is characterized by 
a dormant failure model and also features a different failure rate, A~2' from that of basic event 
'P2', /cP2. 
Markov analysis is used for the reliability prediction of the system. Due to the large size of the 
corresponding Markov model, part of the Markov model developed for the water tank system 
based on the fault tree structure in figure 6.1 0 is shown in figure 6.11 to illustrate key system 
states and transitions. 
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State 1 
PI: 0 
P2: -I 
c:o 
s:o 
State 6 
\-__ =-___ -+/ P2: 0 
State 3 PI: 0 
P2: -I 
AC c: 3 
S:O 
P2S:0 
PI: I 
P2: -I 
t---:-----.j c: 0 
APl S:O 
APl 
P2: -I 
C:O 
S: I 
C: 3 
S:O 
P2S:0 
State 9 
P2: -I 
c: I 
S:O 
P2S:0 
State 8 
Figure 6.11 Part of the Markov model developed on the fault tree in figure 6.10 
State 7 
In the Markov model in figure 6.11, a new basic event state code '-I' is introduced to represent 
the standby state (in this case applied to pump 2). The basic event P2 has a state change from '-I' 
to '0' when pump 2 is activated. The inactive failure of the standby component is reflected 
through the change of the state from '0' to 'I' or '3' ('failed revealed' or 'failed unrevealed') for 
the basic event which represents the failure of the component in standby. For example, in figure 
6.11, the state change from '-1' to '0' of basic event 'P2' is caused by the failure of pump 1 as 
represented by the state transition from state I to state 2 for basic event PI. The switching 
dependency existing between G I and 'P2' is reflected through the state transitions from state 3 to 
state 8, from state 4 to state 9 and from state 5 to state ID. For instance, in state 3, the 
functionally controlling event G 1 has occurred, under this circumstance, the failure of pump 1 
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won't activate pump 2 because the pump 2 has been rendered inaccessible by the failure of the 
controller. Also the initiator-enabler dependency can be identified in these transitions. The 
occurrence of the initiating event 'PI' following the occurrence of the enabling events causes the 
top event which consequently reveals the dormant component failures, such as the controller, the 
sensor and the standby pump 2. The initiator-enabler dependency is also evident in state 6 and 
state 7 in figure 6.11. When the system is residing in either of these two states, the failure logic 
presented in the fault tree structure in figure 6.10, will indicate that the system will be failed. 
However, due to the identification of the initiator-enabler dependency, it can be concluded that 
the system has not caused the top event since the enabling event has occurred after the initiator. 
This approach presented and illustrated above can also apply to the situation where pump I and 
pump 2 alternate as the duty pump on the condition that pump I and pump 2 feature exactly the 
same failure and repair characteristics, in which case it won't make any difference to the system 
reliability measures whether the two pumps rotate with each other or not. 
However, when pump I and pump 2 rotate with each other as the duty pump with different 
failure and repair parameters, the approach presented above would be inadequate. The problem 
lies in modeling the change in the role of each pump. In this case, both pumps can fail in standby 
or when functioning. The pump failure can either be an initiating event or an enabling event with 
respect to each other, depending on which pump is currently working and which pump is serving 
as the standby. To obtain accurate system reliability measures, the fault tree structure must be 
able to capture the dynamic feature in the analysis brought about by the rotation between the two 
pumps as well as to correctly reflect the system failure logic. This carmot be achieved by simply 
distinguishing the different failure modes (standby/active) of the key components. 
To overcome the inadequacy of the first approach, a second method is proposed here based on a 
different fault tree structure to tackle the rotating standby characteristic. In this method, the 
system failure is investigated in two different situations. The first situation occurs when the 
system operates with pump I set as the duty pump, and then fails according to the failure logic 
presented in the fault tree shown in figure 6.1 O. The other situation is where the system operates 
with pump 2 set as the duty pump, and then fails according to the failure logic presented in figure 
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6.10 with the role of pump 1 and pump 2 swapped. These two situations are exclusive to each 
other and will never overlap. Figure 6.12 illustrates how the two system modes alternate with 
each other. 
Pump 2 working as the Pump 1 working as the Pump 2 working as the 
standby pump standby pump standby pump 
o 82 (} 86 
\ ~ I J I " '----~~---I :--v---: :----v- : 
Pump 1 working as: ~ump 2 working as fhe rump I working as 
, , , 
the duty pump : duty pump: : the duty pump 
Pump 1 Pump 1 Pump 2 Pump 2 
fails repaired fails repaired 
and put and put 
back as back as 
standby standby \ _____ ~---~A~-~~----A--""v_-----'1 
System operates in 
mode 1 
System operates in 
mode 2 
System operates in 
mode 1 
Figure 6.12 Alternation between two different system modes 
Time 
In figure 6.12, in system mode 1, the failure of pump 1 causes pump 2 to activate. Whilst pump 1 
is going under repair, pump 2 fulfills the role of a standby pump and ensures the system's 
continuous operation. Once pump 1 gets repaired, it is put into the standby position which swaps 
of the role of the two pumps. From this moment, pump 2 is prompted to a duty pump with pump 
1 serving as a standby and the system switches to mode 2. The same process applies when the 
system is operating in mode 2. With the failure and the subsequent repair of pump 2, the system 
switches back into mode 1. The system operates in either mode 1 or mode 2 but never in both. 
According to such a characteristic, a new gate type 'Switching gate' is introduced to represent 
the alternating feature between its. Figure 6.13 illustrates how the switching gate fits into the 
fault tree structure. 
Figure 6.13 Switching gate structure 
In figure 6.13, the n input events represent the system failure in n different modes in which the 
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system can operate. These modes alternate with each other but never co-exist. The output event 
occurs when one of the input events occurs. 
With the introduction of the switching gate, the fault tree structure is constructed as in figure 
6.14 to represent the failure of the system, shown in figure 6.1 0, which features the rotating 
wann-spare dependency. 
No sufficient water 
supply from the tank 
Pump 1 fails 
functioning 
Standby function 
fails in mode 1 
Standby function fails 
to react in mode 1 
Pump 2 fails 
functioning 
Sensor 
fails 
Controller Pump 2 fails 
fails in standby 
o 
Pump 2 fails 
functioning 
Standby function 
fails in mode 2 
Standby function fails 
to react in mode 2 
Pump 1 fails 
functioning 
Sensor 
fails 
Controller Pump 1 fails 
fails in standby 
Figure 6.14 The fault tree structure for rotating-standby dependency 
The corresponding dependency relationships existing between the basic events included in the 
fault tree in figure 6.14 are displayed in table 6.8. 
Dependency group number Dependency type Number I Number 2 List I List 2 Relevant in input 
I SdbyI I I PI P2 I 
2 SdbyI I I P2 PI 2 
3 ie 2 - PI 05 I 
4 ie 2 - P2 06 2 
Table 6.8 Dependency relatIOnships m rotatmg standby systems 
In table 6.8, the rotating standby dependency is broken down into two non-rotating dependency 
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relationships between pump I and pump 2 corresponding to the two different system modes. The 
initiator-enabler dependency relationships are also identified in both system modes which 
determines if the dependency exists between any basic events in a specific system mode. 
The Markov model is then established based on the fault tree shown in figure 6.14. To enable the 
model to correctly represent the system behavior, it is necessary to keep track of the alternation 
between the system modes during the process of developing the Markov model. Due to the size 
of the resulting Markov model, only part of the model, which displays typical model features, is 
shown in figure 6.15. 
State PI:O PI:I 2 PI:I 7 
P2S:0 
API 
P2S:0 P2S:0 
C:O C:O PI :-1 3 C:3 
S:O S:O P2S:- S:O 
P2:-1 P2:0 C:O P2:0 
PIS:- S:O PIS:-
P2:0 
PI:O 
P2S:- 4 
State C:O 
S:O 
Apl 
P2:1 
PIS:O 
Figure 6.15 Part of the Markov model for the rotating standby system 
The section of the Markov model shown in figure 6.15, highlights the alternation between the 
two different system modes. The system starts in mode I with pump P I operational (basic event 
PIS is inapplicable). The system switches to mode 2 when pump I fails and is subsequently 
repaired and put back to the system as a standby. The transition from state I to state 2 represents 
the failure of PI and the transition from state 2 to state 3 represents its repair and the transition of 
the system to mode 2. As a rule for the development of the Markov model, the system mode 
changes when the current duty pump gets repaired following its failure. For example, in state 4, 
the system is functioning in mode 2. According to the dependency file shown in table 6.8, the 
duty pump in mode 2 is pump 2. Consequently, the repair of pump 2 in state 4 results in the shift 
121 
of the system mode, illustrated by the state transition from state 4 to state 1. The necessity to 
distinguish the different system modes in the process of developing the Markov model can be 
highlighted by the transition from state 2 to state 7. With mode I identified as the system 
operating mode, the failure of the controller can be identified as an enabling event following the 
occurrence of the initiating event P I and therefore will not lead to the fault tree top event. 
Knowledge of the current system operating mode is required to determine the correct 
dependency relationships between the basic events and determine if the system is failed or not in 
state 7. Transitions from state 5 to state I and from state 6 to state I occur due to the repair of 
pump 1 and pump 2 at the same time. Their transition rates would be determined separately as 
discussed in section 6.3. 
In addition to the switching dependency which usually accompanies the standby dependency, the 
functional dependency is also frequently found in systems featuring the standby dependency. For 
example, again consider the water tank system shown in figure 6.9. Assume pump 1 and pump 2 
are both electrical pumps with electric supplies I and 2 respectively. A functional dependency 
exists between power supply I and pump I and between power supply 2 and pump 2. The way in 
which the functional dependency interacts with the standby dependency can be illustrated by the 
Markov model shown in figure 6.16, where ESl and ES2 represent the failure of power supply 1 
and 2 respectively: 
State 1 
PI: 0 
P2: -I 
ESI: 0 
ES2:0 
C: 0 
S:O 
ApS] 
State 4 
PI: 0 
P2:0 
ESI: I 
ES2: 0 
C:3 
S:O 
StateS PI:I 
P2: -I 
ESI:O 
API ES2: 0 
C: I 
S:O 
Figure 6.16 Illustration of interaction between functional and standby dependency 122 
In figure 6.16, the transition from state 1 to state 2 is caused by the failure of power supply 1. 
Although the standby dependency exists directly between pump 1 and pump 2, due to the 
functional dependency between power supply 1 and pump 1, the failure of power supply 1 
renders pump 1 unusable, which consequently leads to the activation of pump 2. The difference 
between the switching dependency and t he functional dependency i s a Iso illustrated in figure 
6.16. The switching dependency will affect the accessibility or usability of a component only 
when it is residing in the standby state, whereas the functional dependency works on the 
dependent component whatever state it resides in. F or example, 0 nly when the state 0 fb asic 
event 'P2' is '-1', can the failure of the controller render pump 2 inaccessible. In contrast, from 
state 2 to state 4, when the state of 'P2' is '0', i.e. pump 2 has been activated, the failure of the 
controller has no effect at all on the functioning of pump 2. As with the electric supply to pump 2, 
the failure of ES2 will immediately render pump 2 unusable whether pump 2 is in the standby 
state or working. 
A general algorithm is presented in figure 6 .17 for t he generation 0 f a M arkov model which 
involves the standby dependency together with the switching and functional dependency. 
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~stablish _ model(' sdby I' or 'sdby2') 
{ 
*f 
} 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
(if(the system is failed in this state) 
} 
(repair all revealed failures at one time; 
if(the created state is new) 
add to the list of existing states; 
record the state transition and decide the transition rate; 
} 
else 
(while(the first event ... the last event) 
(change=O; f* variable used to indicate ifany change has been made to the current state *f 
if(the current event is a basic event & relevant in the current system state) 
(switch(the current state of this basic event) 
(case 0: 
set the new state as I or 3; f* depending on the failure model: dormant or revealed *f 
if(the duty component fails or becomes unusable or inaccessible) f* functional dependency *f 
(if(the standby component is available, accessible and usable) f* functional dependency & switching dependenc 
set the state of the corresponding basic event as 0; 
} 
change= 1; break; 
case I: 
setthe new state as ~O'; 
if(is the duty pump in the current system mode) 
set the new state as '-1 '; 
change= 1; break; 
case 3: 
the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
change= 1; break; 
} 
} 
if( change== 1) 
(decide the module state of the created system state; f* with regard to initiator-enabler dependency, refer to 
the algorithm presented in figure 6.23 *f 
} 
} 
} 
if(the newly created system state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.17 The algorithm of generating Markov model involving standby dependency 
6.2.3 Model Generation for the Sequential Dependency 
The sequential dependency needs to be identified and addressed when generating a Markov 
model for systems whose failure depends on the specific order of occurrence of certain events. 
The development of a Markov model for modules which contain a sequential dependency 
requires the order of the occurrence of each relevant event to be identified. Module 6005 in 
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figure 5.9 is again used as the example. To illustrate the model development, the maintenance 
dependency included in this module is ignored and only the sequential dependency is considered. 
The corresponding Markov model is shown in figure 6.18. 
Figure 6.18 Markov model for sequential dependency (referring to module 6005 in figure 5.9) 
With regard to the model generation for the sequential dependency, several points are worth 
noting. First, the labels used to identify the state of the basic event include the position in the 
order of failure of the basic event. When the basic event has not occurred, its order is set as '0'. 
For example, in figure 6.18, in the initial state - state 1, the state of all basic events is indicated 
as '0 - 0'. While in state 2, basic event 18 has occurred and is the first failure event, therefore the 
state '1 - l' is used to represent its current state, failed and occurred first. 
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Secondly, when a state is generated from one of the existing states, it needs to be decided if this 
state is a new state or one already existing in the Markov model. To perfonn this process, a 
comparison needs to be made between the combination of the basic event states of the newly 
created state and that of those already in the Markov model. The occurrence order in addition to 
the component states need to taken into account in the comparison. 
Thirdly, when repair is possible extra attention should be paid to the state transitions caused by 
the repair. Take for instance state 13 in figure 6.18, when basic event 19 undergoes repair and 
returns to state' 0 - 0', the basic event 1 8 which 0 riginally 0 ccurred immediately after basic 
event 19 will now become the first of the failed events. Therefore, the order label of basic event 
18 should be changed to '1'. In the same way, basic event 20 becomes the second failure event 
and its order label should consequently be reduced to '2'. This leads to the state transition from 
state 13 to state 6. Finally, when deciding which states will cause the occurrence of the Priority 
AND gate event, the order of occurrence of the basic events must be tested. 
The general algorithm for the development of the Markov model which involves the sequential 
dependency is given in figure 6.19. 
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Fstablish _ markov('sq') 
{ 
} 
establish the initial system state; f* all basic events non-occurred with 0 occurrence order *f 
while(the initial state 00' the last system state) 
{while(the first basic event 00. the last event) 
{if(the current state = 0) 
{the new state = I or 3; f* depending on the failure model *f 
make the occurrence order equal (I+maximum of current state); 
} 
else 
{if(the current state = 1) 
{the new state = 0; 
make the new occurrence order = 0; 
reduce the occurrence order of other basic events which is larger than the current one by 1; 
} 
else 
apply the algorithm in figure 6.5; 
} 
if (the newly created state has not existed) 
{add the new state into the state list; 
decide the module state in the new system state; 
} 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
} 
} 
Figure 6.19 The algorithm for the development of Markov model involving sequential 
dependency 
6.2.4 Model Generation for the Sequence-Enforcing Dependency 
The existence of the sequence-enforcing dependency, different from the sequential dependency, 
does not allow the relevant events to occur in orders other than the one specified. For example, 
assume that a module contains three basic events a, b and c between which the 
sequence-enforcing dependency exists. lfthe top event of the module occurs only when all of the 
three events occur in the order a, b then c, then figure 6.20 displays the Markov model of this 
module assuming the repair is not possible. 
State I State 2 State 3 State 4 
A, a, b, C 
(I, 1, I) 
Figure 6.20 Markov model for sequence-enforcing dependency (repair unavailable) 
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It can be seen in figure 6.20 that when the system is residing in state 1, neither basic event b nor 
basic event c can occur since basic event a has not occurred. In the same way, in state 2, basic 
event c is not allowed to occur because basic event b has not occurred. 
In most cases, the sequence-enforcing dependency doesn't exist on its own, it is usually involved 
as a by-product of other types of dependency. For example, when the cold-standby dependency 
is a feature of a system, the standby component will never fail unless the duty component has 
failed, which is a form of sequence-enforcing dependency. 
6.2.5 Model Generation for Secondary-Failure Dependency 
To illustrate this particular dependency relationship, assume the secondary-failure dependency 
relationship exists in a module which contains three basic events a, b and c, and that the module 
failure is represented by the fault tree structure shown in figure 6.21. In this example, basic event 
a represents the primary failure, while gate G 1 represents the secondary failure. 
Figure 6.21 Fault tree structure for the example module 
Assume also that basic event a represents a revealed failure, whereas basic events b and c are 
dormant failure events and are inspected at the same inspection interval S. Figure 6.22 below 
gives the Markov model of this module based on the repair policy presented in section 4.2 and 
the assumption that no component failures will occur after the primary failure is revealed. 
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Figure 6.22 Markov model for the module containing secondary-failure dependency 
The key points to establishing the Markov model which can correctly embrace the secondary 
failure dependency are summarized as follows: 
• When the secondary failure event occurs, it leads to the failure of the primary component. 
Under this circumstance, the primary failure event should in effect be regarded as having 
occurred, and its repair accounted for to rectify the situation. In figure 6.22, transitions from state 
3 and state 4 to state 7 and from state 6 and state 9 to state 7 both reflect such a feature . 
• The repair process involving secondary-failure dependency needs extra attention. When the 
failure of the primary component occurs and gets revealed, inspection will be carried out 
immediately on the secondary components, which reveal any dormant failures of secondary 
components if they exist. Transitions from state 3 to states 5 and 7 and from state 4 to states 7 
and 8 both represent this process. Repair will be conducted on all revealed failures at the same 
time, and the system will be restored to the initial state when all the repair processes are finished. 
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In this case, the corresponding transition rate resulting from multiple component repairs IS 
determined in the way as discussed in section 6.3. 
The general algorithm of establishing the Markov model which includes the secondary failure 
dependency is given in figure 6.23. 
~stablish _ markov('scnf') 
{ 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial sate ... the last system state) 
{if{the primary failure is revealed) f* the primary failure event has current state of' l' *f 
{if(the general secondary failure event has occurred in the current state.) 
{record the transition from the current state to the initial state; 
decide the transition rate accordingly; f* apply the algorithm presented in the second point *f 
} 
else 
{set the new state of the primary failure event as '0'; 
} 
} 
set the new state of secondary components with dorrnantfailures as 'I '; f* the current state is '3' *f 
if{the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition rate; f* the conditional repair rate of the primary failure event *f 
else 
{while(the ftrst event ... the last event) 
{if(the current state = 0) 
} 
} 
new state = I or 3; f* depend on the failure model *f 
if(secondary failure occurs in the reSUlting system state) 
set the new state of the primary failure event as '1' or '3'; f* depend on the failure model *f 
else 
if(the current state = 1) 
new state = 0; 
else 
the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition rate; 
Figure 6.23 The algorithm for the generation of the Markov model involving secondary-failure 
dependency 
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6.2.6 Model Generation for Initiator-Enabler Dependency 
In section 6.2.2 the initiator-enabler dependency was discussed in relation to the standby 
dependency. In this section, it will be examined in more detail using an example system to 
illustrate the modeling principle. Consider the tank system shown in figure 4.6. To make the 
illustration simpler, whilst representing the relevant features, the failure of the sensing system 
which consists of three sensors will be represented by one basic event PSF. Accordingly the fault 
tree which represents causes of the over-pressurization of the tank is shown in figure 6.24. 
Tank ruptures due to 
abnormal high pressure 
GO 
Pressure relie Controller system 
fails 
G2 
Figure 6.24 Fault tree structure for the example system (referring to figure 4.6) 
In this system, the initiator-enabler dependency exists between the initiating event PS and the 
general enabling event, gate G 1. PRS, CTR and PSF are three enabling events featuring different 
reliability characteristics. Based on the fault tree structure in figure 6.24 and the dependency 
relationship between the basic events, the Markov model established for the top event is 
displayed in table 6.9 (model states) and table 6.10 (state transitions) since the model is too large 
to represent clearly in diagrammatic form. Assume repair policy 1 (see section 4.2) is adopted 
and basic events PRS, CTR and PSF are dormant failures with a common inspection interval 9. 
State PS PRS CTR PSF Module state State PS PRS CTR PSF Module state 
1 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 3 I 0 -2 
2 I 0 0 0 -I 29 0 0 1 3 0 
3 0 3 0 0 0 30 0 0 I 1 0 
4 0 0 3 0 0 31 0 3 0 I -2 
5 0 0 0 3 0 32 0 0 3 I 0 
131 
6 1 0 3 0 -1 33 1 0 1 3 -1 
7 1 0 0 3 -1 34 1 0 1 1 -1 
8 1 3 0 0 -1 35 1 0 3 1 -1 
9 0 1 0 0 0 36 1 1 3 0 -1 
10 0 3 3 0 -2 37 1 1 0 3 -1 
11 0 3 0 3 -2 38 1 1 1 0 -1 
12 0 0 1 0 0 39 1 3 3 3 -1 
13 0 0 3 3 0 40 1 1 0 1 -1 
14 0 0 0 1 0 41 0 1 3 3 -2 
15 1 0 1 0 -1 42 1 1 1 3 1 
16 1 0 3 3 -1 43 0 1 1 3 -2 
17 1 0 0 1 -1 44 1 1 1 1 1 
18 1 1 0 0 -1 45 0 1 1 1 -2 
19 1 3 3 0 -1 46 1 1 3 1 1 
20 1 3 0 3 -1 47 0 1 3 1 -2 
21 0 1 3 0 -2 48 0 3 1 3 -2 
22 0 1 0 3 -2 49 0 3 1 1 -2 
23 1 1 1 0 1 50 0 3 3 1 -2 
24 0 1 1 0 -2 51 1 1 3 3 -1 
25 0 3 3 3 -2 52 1 1 1 3 -1 
26 1 1 0 1 1 53 1 1 1 1 -1 
27 0 1 0 1 -2 54 1 1 3 1 -1 
Table 6.9 System states in the Markov model for the tank system (referring to figure 6.21) 
From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition 
rate rate rate rate 
1 2 ApS 28 24 0-9 28 3 VcrR 41 13 VpRS 
1 3 APRS 14 17 ApS 28 48 ApSF 41 45 0-9 
1 4 AnR 14 31 ApRS 29 33 ApS 42 5 • 
1 5 APSF 14 32 Acr. 29 48 APRS 42 44 0-9 
2 1 Vps 14 1 VpSF 29 5 VcrR 43 44 Aps 
2 6 AnR 15 12 Vps 29 12 0-9 43 29 VpRS 
2 7 ApSF 15 2 VCTR 30 34 Aps 43 22 VcrR 
3 8 Aps 15 33 APSF 30 49 APRS 43 45 0-9 
3 9 0-9 16 30 30 14 44 1 • Vps VcrR 
3 10 AnR 16 34 0-9 30 12 VPSF 45 44 Aps 
3 11 APSF 17 14 Vps 31 26 Aps 45 30 VpRS 
4 6 ApS 17 35 Acr. 31 27 0-9 45 27 VcrR 
4 10 APRS 17 2 VpSF 31 50 ACTR 45 24 VPSF 
4 12 0-9 18 9 31 2 46 4 • Vps VPSF 
4 13 APSF 18 2 VPRS 32 35 Aps 46 44 0-9 
5 7 Aps 18 36 Acr. 32 50 ApRS 47 44 APS 
5 11 ApRS 18 37 APSF 32 30 0-9 47 . 32 VpRS 
• Transitions result from multiple component repairs, thus the transition rates are determined according to section 6.3 
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5 13 AcrR 19 24 Vps 32 4 VpSF 47 45 0-9 
5 14 0-9 19 38 0-9 33 30 Vps 47 21 VpSF 
6 12 Vps 19 39 APSF 33 7 VCTR 48 44 Aps 
6 15 0-9 20 27 VPS 33 34 0-9 48 45 0-9 
6 16 APSF 20 40 0-9 34 30 VPS 48 II VCTR 
7 14 Vps 20 39 AcrR 34 17 VCTR 49 44 Aps 
7 16 AcrR 21 23 Aps 34 15 VpSF 49 45 0-9 
7 17 0-9 21 4 VpRS 35 30 Vps 49 31 VcrR 
8 9 VPS 21 24 0-9 35 34 0-9 49 28 VPSF 
8 18 0-9 21 41 ApSF 3S 6 VPSF 50 44 Aps 
8 19 AcrR 22 26 Aps 36 24 VPS 50 45 0-9 
8 20 APSF 22 5 VpRS 36 6 VpRS 50 10 VpSF 
9 18 Aps 22 41 AcrR 36 38 0-9 51 45 Vps 
9 1 VpRS 22 27 0-9 36 51 ApSF 51 16 VpRS 
9 21 ACTR 23 1 • 37 27 VPS 51 53 0-9 
9 22 ApsF 23 42 APSF 37 7 VPRS 52 45 Vps 
10 23 Aps 24 23 Aps 37 51 AcrR 52 33 VpRS 
10 24 0-9 24 12 VpRS 37 40 0-9 52 37 VcrR 
10 25 APSF 24 9 VcrR 38 24 VPS 52 53 0-9 
II 26 Aps 24 43 ApSF 38 15 VpRS 53 45 Vps 
II 27 0-9 25 44 Aps 38 18 VCTR 53 34 VpRS 
II 25 AcrR 25 45 0-9 38 52 Apsp 53 40 VcrR 
12 15 Aps 26 1 • 39 45 VPS 53 38 VpSF 
12 28 ApRS 26 46 AcrR 39 53 0-9 54 45 Vps 
12 1 VcrR 27 26 Aps 40 27 VPS 54 35 VpRS 
12 29 ApSF 27 14 VpRS 40 17 VpRS 54 53 0-9 
13 16 Aps 27 47 AcrR 40 54 AcrR 54 36 VpSF 
13 25 ApRS 27 9 VPSF 40 18 VPSF 
13 30 0-9 28 23 Aps 41 44 Aps 
Table 6.10 State transitions III the Markov model (referring to table 6.10) 
In this Markov model, it can be noted that considering only the combination of the component 
states, state 38 and state 23 represent the same system state. However, this is without considering 
the event sequence. In state 38, the pump surge occurs prior to the failure of the protection 
features and has consequently been shut down, therefore preventing the top event. In state 23, 
due to the earlier failure of the safety measures, the pump surge will cause over-pressurization in 
the tank. It is the same situation between states 40 and 26, states 52 and 42, states 54 and 46, and 
states 53 and 44. The question is then how to distinguish between these two different situations 
which yield the same component states. Here the system/module state has to be taken into 
account as the crucial criterion for determining if the two system states are same. It can be 
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noticed in table 6.9 that '-I' and '-2' are used, along with '0' and 'I', to represent the system 
state. In terms of the top event, '-I' and '-2' both indicate that the top event has not occurred. 
However, they both have more implications than '0'. 
Module state '-I' and module state '-2' are introduced to indicate the different order of 
occurrence between the initiating event and enabling event. State '-I' refers to the situation 
where the initiating event occurs prior to the general enabling event. Take for instance the 
transition from state 3 to state 8 in table 6.10, because in state 3 the enabling event 'G I' has not 
occurred, the occurrence of the initiating event 'PS', which leads to this transition, has taken 
place prior to the enabling event. 
Alternatively, the module state '-2' stands for the situation where the enabling event occurs prior 
to the initiating event. For example, in state lOin table 6.9, the occurrence of the basic event 
'PRS' and 'CTR' result in the occurrence of the enabling event 'GI'. Since the initiating event 
has not occurred in this state, the module state of state 10 is set as '-2'. When the initiating event 
'PS' occurs in state 10, the transition to state 23 takes place. Since this transition meets the 
requirement on the occurrence order of the initiating and enabling events, the top event has 
occurred in state 23. The principle of determining the module state in a certain system state can 
be expressed in the flow chart in figure 6.25 below: 
134 
NO 
NO 
YES 
odule state of the new state =-1 
NO 
odule state of the new state = 1 
enabling event occurs 
odule state of the new state = 0 
ES 
odule state ofthe new state = -2 
Figure 6.25 Algorithm of deciding the module state with the initiator-enabler dependency 
NO 
It can also be noticed that the dormant failures in state 9 are revealed after the transition to state 
23 as the occurrence of the top event makes the maintenance team aware of the occurrence of the 
enabling events. In addition, since the repair policy 1 is implemented in the system, the 
correction of the initiating event will be accompanied by the discovery of the dormant failures 
among the enabling events. For example, in the transition from state 16 to state 30, after the 
pump surge has been rectified, inspection is carried out on the components related to the 
enabling events, and consequently reveals the dormant failure of the controller and pressure 
sensor. Otherwise, if repair policy 2, with which only initiating events are rectified when it 
occurs prior to the enabling event, is to be practiced, the transition should take place from state 
16 to state 13. The general algorithm of developing the Markov model for the system which 
contains the initiator-enabler dependency is established in figure 6.26 as follows: 
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Fstablish _ markov('ie') 
{ 
} 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
{if(the top event occurs in the current system state) f* the module state is 'I' *f 
{repair all revealed failures; f* set the new state of relevant basic events as '0' *f 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
while(the fIrst event ... the last event) 
} 
{if(the current state is '0') 
set the new state as '1' or '3'; f* depending on the failure model *f 
if(the current state is '3') 
the algorithm presented in fIgure 6.5 applies; 
if(there is any change to the current state) 
} 
} 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states with module state = 1; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
else 
{while(the fIrst event ... the last event) 
{if(the current state = 0) 
set the new state as '1' or '3'; f* depending on the failure model * f 
else 
} 
} 
if(the current state = 1) 
set the new state as '0'; 
if(the event is the initiating event and the repair policy is '1 ') 
reveal all dormant failures of enabling events; f* set the new state of relevant events as '1' *f 
else 
the algorithm presented in fIgure 6.5 applies; 
decide the module state of the newly created state; f* apply the algorithm in fIgure 6.22 *f 
if( the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.26 Algorithm for the generation of Markov model involving initiator-enabler 
dependency 
6.2.7 Model Generation for Revealing Dependency 
In this section, an example system is used to illustrate the process for developing the Markov 
model for situations which involve the revealing dependency. This example system is composed 
of components a, b and c, and the system failure logic can be expressed as a.(b+c). Since the 
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system failure is self-revealing whilst the failure of each of the three components are unrevealed 
or dormant, the revealing dependency exists under the top event between the three basic events. 
The corresponding Markov model for this system is shown in figure 6.27 below: 
Figure 6.27 The Markov model involving the revealing dependency 
In figure 6.27, the revealing dependency existing between the basic events a, b and c is reflected 
through the transitions from state 2 to state 6 and 7, from state 3 to state 6, from state 4 to state 7 
and etc. In these transitions, the occurrence of the top event reveals the dormant component 
failures. For this dependency relationship, the specific repair policy needs to be clarified in order 
to construct the Markov model. In the example, the repair policy is that when the top event 
occurs, all revealed failures will be repaired at the same time and inspection will be carried out 
on other components to identify any dormant failures. The system is not made operational until 
all revealed failures have been cleared. This repair policy explains the transition from state 11 to 
state 1 0 and state 12 to state 8. 
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The algorithm of developing the Markov model for the revealing dependency relationship is 
presented in figure 6.28 below: 
Establish _ markov('revl') 
( 
} 
establish the initial state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
(if(the top event occurs in the current state) f* the module state of the current state is 'I' *f 
(repair all revealed failures; f* set the new state of relevant basic events as '0' *f 
} 
reveal all dormant failures; f* set the new state of relevant basic events as 'I' *f 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
while(the fIrst event ... the last event) 
(if(the current state is '0') 
set the new state as 'I' or '3'; f* depending on the failure model *f 
if(the current state is '3') 
the algorithm presented in fIgure 6.5 applies; 
if(there is any change to the current state) 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states with module state = 1; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
} 
} 
else 
(while(the fIrst event ... the last event) 
(if(the current state = 0) 
set the new state as 'I' or '3'; f* depending on the failure model *f 
else 
} 
} 
if(the current state = 1) 
set the new state as '0'; 
else 
the algorithm presented in fIgure 6.5 applies; 
decide the module state of the newly created state; 
if(the top event occurs in the newly created state) 
reveal all dormant failures in the newly created state; f* set the state of relevant events as '1' *f 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.28 Algorithm for the development of Markov model involving the revealing 
dependency 
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6.2.8 Model Generation for Test Dependency 
The test dependency exists in the systems where there exists the discrepancy between the 
common inspection interval for a group of components and the inspection interval for individual 
components. Test dependency does not give rise to the statistical dependency as it neither results 
in the interaction between component failures nor changes the way that component failures 
contribute to the system failure. It is, however, necessary to identify test dependency existing in 
the system to obtain accurate system reliability measures as test dependency ha~ an influence on 
the component failure probability. 
Since test dependency does not involve the statistical dependency, its sole existence will not 
require the use of the Markov method. Instead, it can be tackled using a straightforward 
numerical solution presented through equation 7.16. However, when components involved in test 
dependency are also included in a type of statistical dependency relationship, the Markov model 
generation must account for the existence of the test dependency. 
An example is used here to illustrate how the test dependency will affect the generation of the 
Markov model. Consider a system whose failure is caused by the failure of both components 
labeled a and b. Assume the test interval of the components a and b are respectively 2 and 3 
months, and the test interval for the system is 5 months. Figure 6.29 below gives the Markov 
model of this system. 
State 4 
va 
...................... ,",. 
vb:----\ 
Figure 6.29 The Markov model for the example system including revealing dependency 
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The time conditions for the state transitions caused by the discovery of the dormant failures are 
listed in table 6.11. 
State transition Time condition (months) 
State 2 ~ State 4 T=2k 
State 3 ~ State 6 T=3k 
State 5 ~ State 7 T=2k 
State 5 ~ State 8 T= 6korT= 5k 
State 5 ~ State 9 T=3k 
State 7 ~ State 8 T= 3k orT= 5k 
State 9 ~ State 8 T=2korT=5k 
. . .. Table 6.11 Time conditions for state transItions In figure 6.26 
Time conditions listed in table 6.11 are established by following the algorithm presented in 
figure 6.5 in section 6.2.1 with one exception. It can be seen that for the time condition T = 5k, 
transitions from state 5, 7 and 9 to state 8 can take place. The reason for this lies in the existence 
of the test dependency. Since in state 5, 7 and 9 the top event occurs, when the elapsed mission 
time equals 5k months, the test of the system will reveal the dormant failures in these states. By 
adding the time condition T=5k to the original list oftime conditions of the state transitions for 
which the source state means the occurrence of the top event, the Markov model will be 
produced for the test dependency with a complete set of state transitions and corresponding 
transition rate. 
The general algorithm of developing the Markov model for test dependency is displayed in 
figure 6.30 as follows: 
establish _ markov('test') 
{ 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
{while(the first event ... the last event) 
{if(the current state = 0) 
set the new state = '1' or '3'; 
f* depending on the failure model *f 
else 
if(the current state = 1) 
set the new state = '0'; } 
} 
} 
else 
the algorithm applies presented in figure 6.5; 
if(the top event occurs in the current system 
state) 
add the time condition T = k9",,"m; 
if(the newly created system state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the state transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.30 Algorithm for the generation of the Markov model involving test dependency 
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6.3 Transition Rate of Multiple-repair Transitions 
In the reliability assessment using the Markov method, it is assumed that during a very short 
period of time, only one component failure or repair would occur. This means that the rate of the 
transition resulting from the specific component failure or repair can be directly determined by 
the corresponding component conditional failure or repair rate. However, in the evaluation of 
systems which contain some types of dependency, situations may arise where multiple 
component failures have to be rectified at the same time to bring the system back to its normal 
function mode. For example, in the Markov model in figure 6.15, when the system is residing in 
state 5 or state 6, it is required to repair both pump 1 and pump 2 to bring the system back to 
state 1. This is also reflected in the transitions from state 5 and state 7 to state 1 in the Markov 
model in figure 6.22, some state transitions as shown in table 6.10 with respect to the 
initiator-enabler dependency, such as state 42 to state 5, state 44 to state 1, state 46 to state 4 and 
etc .. In this case, an investigation needs to be carried out to find an appropriate way to determine 
the transition rate for multiple repairs. 
The Markov method used in this thesis is a homogeneous CTMC (see section 3.1.3.1) based on 
the exponential distribution of component failure and repair times. It is impossible to define a 
constant repair rate for multiple component repairs which is made up of repair rates of the 
individual components and can be directly applied in the Markov analysis, as the repair times of 
multiple component repairs will not be characterized by an exponential distribution. Therefore, 
an appropriate way to so lve the m ultiple-repair transition rate is through approximation. Two 
approximation techniques are discussed as follows: 
6.3.1 Approximation through Comparison 
Consider the situation where n component failures need to be rectified at the same time with the 
conditional repair rate of each individual component being u}, U2, ... , Un. Then the mean time to 
repair for each individual component 'J can be obtained as the inverse of the corresponding 
conditional repair rate, i.e. ..!.... Considering from the practical perspective, the mean time to 
Vj 
repair these n components would be determined by the component repair which takes the longest 
time. That is: 
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6.1 
where To represents the mean time to repair the n components at the same time. 
The transition rate for the n component repairs at the same time can then be determined as ..!.., 
T-
n 
I.e. 1 . It can be concluded that the greater the difference between T:j (j= 1, 2, ... n), 
max(r1, 1"2"." 1'n) 
the smaller the deviation would be produced through this approximation method. 
6.3.2 Approximation from Real System Data 
Another approximation method is to produce the approximated value based on real system data. 
In the process of developing the Markov model, when the system is residing in a state in which 
multiple component repairs need to be carried out at the same time, the process could inform the 
analyst on which specific component failures need to be rectified at the same time and ask the 
analyst to assign a particular rate for these multiple repairs. The analyst could derive the data 
from previous records if the same situation has arisen before. Alternatively, the analyst could 
seek advice from repair engineers who could give an estimation based on experience. The 
validity of this approximation method is mainly dependent on the quality of the system 
maintenance records and the expertise of repair engineers. 
6.4 Model Generation for Multiple Dependency Relationships 
In the analysis of engineering systems, several types of dependency relationship may be involved 
in the same model. With regard to multiple dependency relationships, there are two cases. One is 
that a certain type of dependency will always involve another type of dependency relationship. 
For example, in most systems which involve initiator-enabler dependency, enabling events 
usually represent dormant component failures whose occurrence, followed by the initiating event, 
will lead to the occurrence of a self-revealing e vent, which consequently reveals the dormant 
failures. Therefore, the revealing dependency exists between the self-revealing event and 
enabling events. Similarly, in systems where there exists the secondary-failure dependency and 
the primary failure event features a revealed failure mode, the revealing dependency can be 
identified between the primary failure event and the dormant secondary component failures 
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which contribute to the occurrence of the primary failure. That is, the revealing dependency is 
the by-product 0 f initiator-enabler and secondary-failure dependency relationships and always 
exists when the latter two types of dependency occur in a system. In this case where the 
existence of one type of dependency will automatically give rise to another, only the primary 
type of dependency relationship needs to be identified and specified. No extra attention is 
required with respect to the secondary dependency relationship since it has been taken into 
account in the algorithm for the model generation for the primary dependency relationship. 
The other situation is where several dependency relationships exist in the system at the same 
time. For example, the maintenance dependency and test dependency can occur together with 
any other type of dependency. Also the sequential-failure dependency can exist within the 
initiator-enabler dependency. In this case with the top-level event of the sequential failures being 
either the initiating event or the general enabling event. Other examples include the Sequential 
failure dependency existing along with the secondary-failure dependency when sequential failure 
events contribute to the causes of the secondary failure. Also the initiator-enabler dependency 
and standby dependency can occur together when the standby is a warm-spare. To ignore any 
type of dependency will lead to the development of an incorrect model. In this case, the 
algorithms for the model generation for each type of dependency involved need to be integrated. 
For each combination of different types of dependency relationships, a unique algorithm is 
required for the model generation. It is impossible to go through every possible combination of 
different dependency relationships. Several typical combinations of dependency types are 
investigated to illustrate how the algorithms for each individual type of dependency can be 
integrated to establish the correct Markov model. 
6.4.1 Maintenance Dependency and Initiator-Enabler Dependency 
When the maintenance dependency and the initiator-enabler dependency occur together in a 
system, the algorithm for the model generation for maintenance dependency will be integrated 
into the algorithm for the initiator-enabler dependency. Apart from the introduction of state code 
'2' to indicate that the component is queuing for repair, the existence of the maintenance 
dependency will also influence the transition rate from states where multiple failures need to be 
rectified. For example, assume that the maintenance dependency exists between basic events 
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PRS, CTR and PSF in the fault tree shown in figure 6.22. In the Markov model displayed in table 
6.9 and 6.1 0, it can be seen that the system is failed in state 26. Without the maintenance 
dependency between the pressure relief valve and the pressure sensing system, the system will be 
restored to state I from state 26 with an expected mean time to repair which is the maximum of 
the repair times for the three failed components if the first approximation method in section 6.3 
is applied. However, with the maintenance dependency between basic events PRS, CTR and PSF, 
the pressure relief valve and the sensing system have to be repaired one after the other, while at 
the same time the repair is conducted on the pump. Therefore, in this case, if the first 
approximation method still applies, the mean time to restore the system back to state 1 is the 
longer of the mean time to repair of the pump and the total of the mean times to repair of the 
pressure relief valve and the sensing system. That is, with maintenance dependency between 
PRS and PSF, the rate for the transition from state 26 to state 1 should be expressed as 
[ ( 1 ) ] . The same principle applies when multiple repairs are carried out where 
max 'r pS' 1" PRS + 1" PSF 
the maintenance dependency is involved if the comparison approximation is adopted. On the 
other hand, if the second approximation method (see section 6.3.2) applies, the maintenance 
dependency should also be accounted for and reflected in the estimation given by repair 
engineers. Figure 6.31 illustrates the general algorithm for the model generation where the 
maintenance dependency is involved in the initiator-enabler dependency relationship. 
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~stablish_markov('ie' & 'mtnc') 
( 
} 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
(if(the top event occurs in the current system state) f* the module state is 'I' *f 
( 
} 
} 
repair all revealed failures; f* set the new state of relevant basic events as '0' *f 
record the transition and the transition rate; f* rate decided by taking into account mtnc dep. *f 
while(the first event ... the last event) 
(switch(the current sate) 
} 
( case '0': 
} 
if( dormant failure model): set new state =3; 
else: set new state = I; 
if(mtnc dep involved & no repair available): set new state = 2; 
case '3': the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
if(there is any change to the current state) 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states with module state = I; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
else 
(while(the first event ... the last event) 
(switch( current state) 
( case '0': 
} 
} 
if(dormant failure model): set new state =3; 
else: set new state = I; 
if(mtnc dep involved & no repair available): set new state = 2; 
case' I': set the new state as '0'; 
if(the event is the initiating event and the repair policy is 'I ') 
reveal all dormant failures of enabling events; f* set the new state of relevant events as 'I' *f 
case '3': the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
decide the module state of the newly created state; f* apply the algorithm in figure 6.22 *f 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.31 The algorithm for model generation for i-e dependency mixed with mtnc dependency 
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6.4.2 Sequential Dependency and Initiator-Enabler Dependency 
The sequential dependency can be relevant in a system which also features the initiator-enabler 
dependency relationship. The dependency on a sequence of events can contribute to the cause of 
either the initiating event or the enabling event. When events combined in the form of the 
sequential dependency contribute to causes of the initiating event, they can usually be dealt with 
in an individual module, thus separating the sequential dependency relationship from the 
initiator-enabler dependency and allowing both to be modeled separately. In this section, the 
main focus is placed on the situation where sequential failure events feature a dormant failure 
and are included as part of the general enabling event. In this case, the sequential failure events 
can no longer be dealt with in an independent module. Instead, they have to be investigated in 
the same model with the initiating event and other enabling events. That is, the sequential failure 
dependency has to be accounted for in the same model as the initiating-enabling dependency. 
During the process of developing the Markov model which take into account both of the two 
dependency relationships, the order of occurrence of sequential failure events needs to be taken 
into consideration when deciding whether the enabling event has occurred. The algorithm for the 
model generation where sequential dependency and initiator-enabler dependency exist along 
with each other is displayed in figure 6.32. 
146 
~stablish_ markov('ie' & 'sq') 
{ 
} 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial state ... the last system state) 
{if(the top event occurs in the current system state) f* the module state is 'I' *f 
} 
{ repair all revealed failures; f* set the new state of relevant basic events as '0' *f 
} 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
while(the first event ... the last event) 
{ switch(the current sate) 
{ case '0': 
} 
set new state = I or 3; f* depending on failure model * f
if(involved in sequential dep.): decide the order of occurrence. 
case '3': the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
if(there is any change to the current state) 
if(the newly created state has not existed): add to the list of system states with module state = I; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
else 
{ while(the first event ... the last event) 
{ switch( current state) 
} 
} 
{ case '0': 
} 
set new state = 1 or 3; f* depending on failure model *f 
if(involved in sequential dep.): decide the order of occurrence. 
case' 1 ': set the new state as '0'; 
if(the event is the initiating event and the repair policy is '1 '): reveal all dormant failures of enabling 
events; f* set the new state of relevant events as '1' *f 
if(involved in sequential dep.): set the order of occurrence as 0, and modify the order of 
occurrence of other sequential failure events. 
case '3': the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
decide the module state of the newly created state; f* apply the algorithm in figure 6.22 & take into accoun 
of sequential dep. * f
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition and the transition rate; 
Figure 6.32 The algorithm for model generation for i-e dependency mixed with sq dependency 
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6.4.3 Initiator-Enabler Dependency and Secondary-Failure Dependency 
The initiator-enabler dependency can occur in a system together with the secondary-failure 
dependency when component failures featuring in the initiator-enabler dependency contribute to 
the causes of the secondary failure. In this case, all relevant component failures will have to be 
investigated in the same model in order to obtain the accurate system reliability parameters. The 
- fault tree structure shown in figure 4.3 provides an example where initiator-enabler dependency 
is embedded in the secondary failure dependency relationship. The existence of the 
initiator-enabler dependency prescribes that the order of occurrence of the initiating event and 
enabling event should be taken into account when deciding if a secondary failure has occurred. 
Figure 6.33 displays the algorithm for the model generation where the secondary failure 
dependency has to be solved together with the initiator-enabler dependency. 
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( 
stablish_markov('scnf' & 'ie') 
establish the initial system state; 
while(the initial sate ... the last system state) 
(if(the primary failure is revealed) f* the primary failure event has current state of '1' *f 
{if(the general secondary failure event has occurred in the current state.) 
{ record the transition from the current state to the initial state; 
decide the transition rate accordingly; f* apply the algorithm presented in the second point *f 
} 
else 
( set the new state ofthe primary failure event as '0'; 
} 
} 
else 
set the new state of secondary components with dormant failures as '1 '; f* the current state is '3' *f 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition rate; f* the conditional repair rate of the primary failure event *f 
(while(the first event ... the last event) 
(if(the current state ~ 0) 
new state ~ 1 or 3; 1* depend on the failure model *f 
if(secondary failure occurs in the resulting system state) f* i-e dep. needs to be taken into account *f 
set the new state of the primary failure event as 'I' or '3'; f* depend on the failure model *f 
} 
} 
} 
else 
if(the current state ~ 1) 
new state ~ 0; 
else 
the algorithm presented in figure 6.5 applies; 
if(the newly created state has not existed) 
add to the list of system states; 
record the transition rate; 
Figure 6.33 The algorithm for model generation where i-e dependency exists along with the 
secondary-failure dependency 
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Chapter 7. Quantitative Analysis with the Combined Application of FfA and Markov 
Method 
For continuously-running systems a reliability assessment will predict the system failure 
probability and the system unconditional failure intensity at certain points of time over the 
lifetime of the system. Considering the transient failure characteristics of the components of 
which the system is composed, the system reliability measures are also a function of the elapsed 
mission time. System reliability predictions are obtained using numerical methods which 
progress the solution in small increments of time, dt. The length of dt is specified by the analyst 
considering the system life span and the components' failure and repair characteristics. If dt is 
too small, it may require too much computational resources for complete system life assessment 
and reduce the analysis efficiency. However, the accuracy will increase if small values of dt are 
selected. The analyst has to consider the value of dt carefully to reach a compromise between 
accuracy and computational efficiency. 
For systems with dependencies, the overall system assessment will be based on the combined 
application of the fault tree and Markov methods. This requires the solution of the modularized 
fault tree structures which are independent from each other. The way to achieve modularization 
has been described in chapter 5 as the pre-processing stage of the solution. Following the 
modularization the conventional fault tree analysis approach and Markov method can then be 
applied respectively to modules involving no dependency relationship and those containing 
inter-dependent events. 
The following sections wiIllook into how the quantitative analysis is carried out in the modules 
using different techniques and how the results of each module can be fed back into the overall 
fault tree structure to obtain the final top event probability and failure intensity. During the 
analysis process, the criticality function and the criticality measure of importance for each basic 
event will also be calculated. 
7.1 Quantitative Analysis of Modules Involving a Dependency Relationship 
A correct Markov model is required in order to conduct the analysis of modules which feature 
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some fonn of dependency. Chapter 6 has described how to establish the corresponding Markov 
model for modules accounting for the specific dependency relationships they contain. The 
Markov model is then quantified to obtain relevant module reliability parameters. 
7.1.1 Module Failure Probability QM(t) 
The Markov model consists of numerous system states with interaction between each other 
through the state transitions. The Markov model provides the exhaustive list of all possible states 
in which the system may reside. During the period of time that the system is working, the system 
can experience different states at different times. Analysis gives the probability of the system 
being present in any specific state at any point of time. At any point of time, the total of the 
probabilities of the system residing in all of the system states is equal to 1. System states can be 
split into two categories: those states in which the system functions nonnally; and states in which 
the specific system failure mode represented by the top event occurs. Therefore, the system 
failure probability or the top event probability can be obtained by summing up the probabilities 
of all the system states belonging to the second category; Alternatively, the probability of the 
system functioning is equal to the total of the probabilities of system states which are of the first 
category. 
Consider a general Markov model consisting of n system states, of which states 1 - k are 
working system states and states (k+ 1) - n are failed system states. Qlt) is the probability of 
system residing in state i at time t. aij is used to denote the rate of transition from state i to statej. 
Therefore, P(system in state j at (t+dt) I system in state i at time t) = aij.dt. The module failure 
probability, QM(t), can then be expressed by the following equation: 
n 
QM(t) = l: Q;(t) 7.1 
io:::k+l 
Consider the probability that the module is residing in state i at time t+dt. Two situations should 
be taken into account: one is the module was residing in other state, j, at time t and during the 
time interval dt the relevant state transitions occur which lead the module to state i; the other 
situation is where the module was residing in state i at time t and during the interval dt it remains 
in state i. Therefore: 
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Qi(t+dt) = L P(module in statej at t and makes a transition to state i in 
} 
the next dt) + P(system in state i at t and remains in state i 
after dt) 
• n 
= LQ/t).aji.dt+Qlt).[l- Laij.dt] 
/==1 j",l 
IF.; #j 
Rearranging gives: 
n n Qi(t+dt)-Q,(t) = 
dt LQ/t).aji - Qi(t).L aij 
Asdt~O: 
Qi(t+dt)-Q,(t) 
dt 
• 
j:::::l 
j~i 
dQ,(t) 
~ 
dt 
;=1 
;$j 
Define aii as - Lay' equation 7.3 can be expressed as: 
;=1 
i*-j 
dQ,(t) 
dt 
• 
LQj(t).aji fori=1,2, ... ,n 
J-I 
In matrix form, equation 7.4 can be expressed as: 
[dQI , dQ, , ... , dQ.] = [Ql(t), Q2(t), ... , Qn(t)][A] 
dt dt dt 
The matrix [A] in equation 7.5 is called the state transition matrix with elements: 
aij = transition rate from state i to state j 
• 
ajj=- Laij 
;=1 
;$j 
7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
The rate matrix [A] can be formulated directly from the Markov model using the following rules: 
- the dimensions of the matrix are equal to the number of states in the model; 
- all rows sum up to zero; 
- an off-diagonal element in row i column j represents the transition rate l from state i to 
statej; 
- a diagonal element in row i column i is the transition rate out of state i (always negative). 
I When the transition occurs due to multiple component repairs, the transition rate is detennined through 
approximation as discussed in section 6.3. 
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There exist two types of solutions to a Markov model. One is the steady-state solution, and the 
other is the transient solution [3] . 
• The Steady-State Solution 
When the system has arrived in its 'steady-state', the probabilities of being in any of the states 
will not be change with time. These steady-state probabilities do not depend on the initial state 
from which the system starts. At steady-state: 
As t ~ 00, dQ,(t) ~ 0 
dt 
Therefore, according to equation 7.4: 
n 
IQ/t).all = 0 for i = 1,2, ... , n 
}=I 
These equations are not independent and so an additional equation is needed to formulate a 
solution. The extra equation is: 
n 
IQ,(t)= I 
1=1 
The steady-state solution of being in each state, i, to the Markov model can then be obtained by: 
0 
ail al2 a/,n.! I 
an! an2 an,n-l 0 
Qloo) = 
all al2 al,n-l I 
1 
a',n.! 1 
an,n'! 1 
From equation 7.1, the module failure probability can be given by: 
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al1 al,n.1 0 
akl ak,n~l 0 
ak+l,l ak+l,n·1 1 
anI an2 an,n-! 1 
QM(OO ) 
al1 al2 al,n.1 1 
an,n.1 1 
• The Transient Solution 
The transient solution is aimed to provide the probability of system residing in any of the states 
at any specific point of time t by progressing from the initial system state in very small time 
steps, dt. 
n 
Replacing - 2>ij with aii in equation 7.2 gives: 
;=1 
i'l"J 
n 
Qi(t+dt) = I Qj (t).a ji .dt + Qlt).[1+aii.dt] (i = 1,2, ... , n) 
j=l 
j;t.; 
7.6 
Equation 7.6 gives a scheme where the state probabilities can be evaluated at discrete time points 
given the step length dt and the initial state probability Qi(O), i = 1, 2, ... , n 
The transition probability matrix [P] is then established so that the equation 7.6 can be applied to 
all system states in the matrix form. The probability matrix [P] is a square nxn matrix with 
elements: 
pij = aij.dt, for #j; and pii=l +aii.dt 
Therefore, starting from time t = 0, the state probabilities at discrete time points with constant 
interval dt can be obtained as: 
[QI(dt), Q2(dt), ... , Qn(dt)] = [QI(O), Q2(0), ... , Qn(O)].[P] 
[QI(2dt), Q2(2dt), ... , Qn(2dt)] = [QI(dt), Q2(dt), ... , Qn(dt)].[P] 
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[QJ(mdt), Q2(mdt), ... , Qn(mdt)] = [QJ«m-l)dt), Q2«m-l)dt), ... , Qn«m-l)dt)].[P] 
Accordingly, the module failure probability at any specific point of time kdt can then be obtained 
through equation 7.1. 
When donnant faiIure(s) are involved in the Markov model, extra attention should be paid to the 
state transitions forced by the inspection(s). Assume in a Markov model, the transition from state 
i to state j occurs due to the revealing of a donnant failure by the inspection at the regular 
interval e. Consider a specific point oftime kdt: 
If kdt = e, 2e, ... , me 
Q'j{kdt) = Q;(kdt) + Q;(kdt) 
Q'i(kdt) = 0 
where Q'(kdt) represents the updated state probability at the point in time immediately 
following the inspection. 
7.1.2 Module Unconditional Failure Intensity WM(t) 
The definition of the module unconditional failure intensity, WM(t), is the rate of failure of the 
module at time t. The word 'unconditional' here is aimed to emphasize the difference from the 
module conditional failure rate A.M, which refers to the rate that the module fails at time t given 
the module is working at time t. For the module to fail at time t, two conditions must be both 
fulfilled. The first is that the module is residing in a working state at time t; and the second is that 
the module then fails at that time t. Using the general Markov model in section 7.1.1, the module 
unconditional failure intensity can be expressed as: 
k n 
WM(t)= LQ.(t).( Laij(t» 7.7 
;=1 j=k+1 
where state i is the working system state and aij(t) is the rate of the transition from state i to 
state j in which the module is failed. 
7.1.3 Module Unconditional Repair Intensity VM(t) 
Following a similar argument to the unconditional failure intensity, the module unconditional 
repair intensity, VM(t), is the rate that the module gets restored at time t. It is given in the 
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following equation: 
n k 
VM(t) = LQ;(t) ·(Laij(t» 7.8 
i=k+l j:1 
where state i is the failed system state and ay{t) is the rate of the transition from state i to 
state j in which the module is working. 
7.1.4 Module Conditional Failure Rate AM(t) 
The module conditional failure rate, AM(t), is the rate of module failure given the module is 
working at time t. The module conditional failure rate is therefore given by: 
AM(t) = 
the probability that the module is working at time t 
the rate that the module fails at time t 
= 7.9 
7.1.5 Module Conditional Repair Rate VM(t) 
Similar to the module conditional failure rate, the module conditional repair rate is also actually 
a value based on all failed system states. The definition of the module conditional repair rate is 
the rate that the module gets repaired at time t given the module is failed at time t. The module 
mean conditional repair rate can be expressed as: 
VM(t) = 
the probability that the module is failed at time t 
the rate that the module gets repaired at time t 
= VM(I) 
QM(I) 
7.1.6 Criticality Information of the Basic Events 
- Criticality Function G,{ q) 
7.10 
The criticality function is an importance measure which in its own might be used to rank the 
contribution of the basic events to the system failure. The definition of the criticality function can 
be found in section 2.1.4.4.2. The way to calculate the criticality function for each basic event in 
the Markov model is to explore different system states in the model. Consider a Markov model 
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which includes m basic events and consists of n system states. Since each system state represents 
a unique combination 0 f t he states 0 f the basic events, the system states which represent the 
critical state for any specific basic event i can be easily found. For example, if the system 
transfers from state j, a working state, to state k, a failed state due to the occurrence of the basic 
event i, then the combination of the states of other components in state j or k forms the critical 
state for basic event i. However, the criticaIity function for basic event i is not simply the total of 
the probabilities of the critical system states for this component. The critical state for basic event 
i only concerns the combination of the states of the other (m-I) basic events, the probability of 
basic event i has to be filtered out from the critical system states to obtain the correct criticality 
function. 
There are two ways to achieves this. One can be given by: 
7.11 
where state j is the system state in which the combination of the states of other (m-I) basic 
events forms the critical state for basic event i and the basic event i has not occurred 
The other method of calculating the criticality function is given by: 
G;(q(t)) = LQ/I)+ LQk(l) 7.12 
j k 
where state j has the same definition as in equation 7.11 and state k represents the system 
state in which the states of all the basic events are exactly the same as in state j except that 
the basic event i is failed2• 
The second method is more efficient than the first because the first calculation method requires 
the failure probability of basic event i to be calculated before G;(q(t)) can be obtained, and if 
basic event i is involved in any dependency relationship, the calculation could be difficult. In the 
2 Land L represents the sum of probabilities of the states which have the properties as are specified for state 
j k 
j and k. 
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second method Q;(t) and Qit) can be easily obtained since the probability of each system state 
has been worked out to calculate the module failure probability. Therefore, equation 7.12 has 
been employed in this work to calculate the criticaIity function for each basic event in the 
Markov model. 
Criticality Measure of Importance Ii 
The definition of this measure together with the formula to calculate it has been introduced in the 
section 2.1.4.4.2. However, the formula applies when component failures are independent and so 
it is inappropriate to apply the formula to calculating the criticality measure of the basic event in 
the Markov models developed. Therefore, the way to calculate the criticality measure of basic 
event i in the Markov model is to carry out the calculation looking at the contribution of the 
individual states. System states which conform to the definition of the criticality measure must 
fulfiII three conditions. The first is that in these system states the top event occurs; the second is 
that in these system states the combination of the states of other components form the critical 
state for basic event i; and the third is that in these states the component i is failed. 
Then weighted by the module failure probability, the criticaIity measure of basic event i is given 
by: 
LQ/t) 
Ii(t) = -,1 __ 
QM(t) 
where state j refers to the system state which fulfiIIs the three conditions listed above. 
7.13 
Criticality measure must be distinguished from the FusseII-Veseley measure of importance given 
in equation 2.23 in chapter 2. When gauged by the state probabilities in the Markov model, the 
FusseII-Veseley measure can be given by: 
7.14 
where state k refers to the system state in which both the system and the component i is 
failed. 
By adding up the probability of state k, it cancels the effect of component failures which are not 
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included in the minimal cut sets for the system failure, because among the collection of state k, 
there must exist two states corresponding to each other, in one of which the component which is 
not included in the minimal cut sets is working, while in the other it is failed. 
It can be noticed that the difference between the criticality measure and Fussell-Veseley measure 
lies in that for the Fussell-Veseley measure, the states don't have to meet the second condition 
with regard to the criticality measure. That is, system states which are referred to for the 
calculation of the criticality measure of importance are part of the states which are used to obtain 
the Fussell-Veseley measure. 
7.2 Quantitative Analysis for Modules Containing no Dependencies 
With regard to the fault tree modules whose basic events are all independent, conventional 
techniques will be sufficient. As has been introduced in chapter 2, these techniques include the 
conventional fault tree analysis method which utilises the Kinetic Tree Theory (KTT) and also 
the binary decision diagram (BDD) approach. Compared with the KTT analysis, the BDD has 
proven to provide a more accurate and efficient solution [11, 12] and has been employed in this 
work to tackle the modules which include no dependency relationships. 
7.2.1 Conversion of Fault Tree Structure to BDD 
Binary decision diagram is generated through the conversion from the fault tree structure. As has 
been mentioned in chapter 2, there exist different mechanisms for the conversion. The basic 
events need to be placed in an ordering for the conversion process and the ordering mechanism is 
selected in view of the specific characteristics of each fault tree. The selection of the ordering 
mechanism forms another interesting research subject, which is however beyond the scope of the 
current research project. For convenience one method has been used for all fault trees. This is the 
modified top-down left-right mechanism. The 'top-down left-right' has been shown to give 
reasonable results for a large class of fault trees, which makes it an appropriate general choice. 
The fault tree structure can be viewed as a 'tower' structure consisting of different levels. The 
top event is the highest level at the top of the tower. The 'top-down' means that the basic events 
at a higher level should have the higher rank in the ordering. The 'left-right' means that at the 
same level, the rank of the basic events in the ordering will progress from the left to the right of 
the fault tree. The exception tot his is that t he basic events which have t he larger number 0 f 
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appearances at the same level should have the higher rank in the ordering. This latter condition 
incorporated in the ordering scheme produces the 'modified top-down left-right' process. An 
example fault tree is introduced in figure 7.4 to illustrate how the conversion is implemented by 
applying the modified top-down left-right approach. 
-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'- Level 0 
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate 
-._ ............... 
Level! 
event I event 2 event 2 
G2 G2 
Intermediate Intermediate .................. Level 2 
event 3 event 3 
-'_.-._._._._._.-. Level3 
Figure 7.4 The example fault tree for illustration of conversion to BDD 
Event e appears twice in the fault tree, while all other events only once. According the top-down 
left-right approach, the variable ordering for the example fault tree in figure 7.4 is 
a>b>c>f.>e>d>g. Presented below in figure 7.5 is the algorithm of establishing the corresponding 
BDD according to the pre-determined variable ordering based on the given fault tree structure: 
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Start from the first basic event in the ordering list; establish a new node 
for it as the root node for the BOO; set the new node as the current node 
consider the situation where the basic event in the current node occurs 
and update the combination of the known basic event states 
Add a new node for this 
YE 
Add the terminal node 'I' to the left 
branch of the current node. 
Consider the situation where the basic event in the current node does not 
occur and update the combination of the known basic event states 
an Not Decide 
basic event to the left 
branch of the current node; 
set the new node as the 
current node 
Pick the next basic event from 
L-------.I the ordering whose state counts 
regarding the module state 
Pick the next basic event from 
Can Not Decide ~.2.=-=~==:.:...,~ the ordering whose state counts 
regarding the module state 
s 
Add a new node for this 
dd the terminal node '0' to the right branch of the current node. 
basic event to the right 
l~======~~~~~~~~~ ____________ JbranCh of the current node; set the new node as the 
current node 
Figure 7.5 The algorithm of establishing the BDD according to the given variable ordering 
7.2.2 Quantitative Analysis Using BDD Method 
The quantitative analysis based on the BOO has been described in detail in chapter 2, and 
therefore won't be repeated in this section. 
One thing that needs attention is the calculation of the probability of the basic event in the BOO 
which features the dormant failure model. The average failure probability of the dormant basic 
event given by formula 2.4 in chapter 2 is no longer applicable, as the reliability analysis is time 
dependent. The reliability parameters of the components should also be the function of the 
elapsed mission time. Consider the failure probability of the dormant-failure component at time t. 
Assume that n inspections on the component have already taken place by time t. Therefore, the 
failure probability of the component at t is equivalent to its unreliability during the period of [ne, 
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t]. Therefore, the failure probability of the donnant-failure component at time t is given by: 
qi(t) = I _e-A(t-n8) 7.15 
where e is the inspection interval of the component i and the nth inspection is the last 
inspection carried out by time t. 
This decides that the failure probability of a donnant-failure component as the function of time 
will take the pattern shown in figure 7.6. 
Failure Probability (q) 
3e (n-l)e ne (n+l)e Time 
Figure 7.6 The pattern of failure probability of dormant-failure components 
According to the principle presented in equation 7.15, test dependency (see section 4.1.8) can be 
examined from a similar perspective. The effect that the test dependency has on the component 
failure probability can be accounted for by addressing the failure probabilities of the relevant 
components in the way represented in equation 7.16: 
q;(t) = 1 _e-A(t-m""(n,8,,n,8m)) 7.16 
where: 
t - the actual elapsed mission time; 
ei - the individual inspection interval for component I; 
em - the common inspection interval for the group of components; 
max(n1ei , n2em) - means the component failure probability is considered from the point 
the most recent inspection (whether an individual or a common inspection) takes place 
7.3 System Quantitative Analysis 
7.3.1 System Reliability Parameters 
The previous sections have illustrated how the module quantification can be realized where 
162 
dependencies exist or not. This section looks at how the module parameters can then be used in 
the process of calculating the reliability measures of the whole system. Among all the modules in 
the fault tree structure, the 'top' module is the module which is headed by the top event of the 
original fault tree structure. 
The quantification process is implemented in a bottom-up marmer, starting from modules which 
are located at the lowest level in the fault tree, i.e. the modules which contain no other modules, 
up to the top module. If there exist dependency relationships in the top module, the 
quantification will be carried out as is illustrated in section 7.1 using the established Markov 
model. 0 therwise, ab inary decision diagram will be constructed tor epresent the top module 
failure function and quantified. In most cases, the top module will include other modules in it as 
descendants. These modules will be treated as super events in the top module during the 
quantification process and may also form the parent module for other modules. If the parent 
module is solved by the Markov method, the conditional failure rate and repair rate of its 
descendant module(s) will be referred to when establishing the rate matrix for the parent module. 
Similarly, when the parent module is handled using the binary decision diagram, the failure 
probability of the descendant modules will be included in the calculation of the reliability 
parameters of the parent module. In this way, the reliability parameters of the descendant 
modules will be fed back into the quantification of the parent module. It should be noted that 
since the module conditional failure rate and repair rate vary as mission time elapses, the Markov 
model which includes descendant module(s) no longer feature constant-rate transitions and 
therefore is actually a non-homogeneous model (see Chapter 3). 
7.3.2 Basic Event Criticality 
The previous sections introduced how the importance measures of each basic event, such as the 
criticality function Gi(q) and the criticality measure of importance Ij, can be obtained relative to 
the module top event. This section will look at how the importance measures of the basic events 
included in the modules can be calculated relative to the overall system failure. 
First consider a top module Mo and its descendant module M], neither of which contains a 
dependency relationship. Basic event i is included in module M/. Assume that two binary 
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decision diagrams have been established as are shown in figure 7.7 to facilitate the quantification 
of modules Mo and Ml respectively. 
~ ... ~ 
o 
Module Mo Module MJ 
Figure 7.7 BDDs for example fault tree structure 
These two BDDs can be merged to produce one BDD for the top module which includes the 
basic events originally included in the BDD of module Ml. This is implemented by taking the 
BDD of the top module and replacing the node which represents the descendant module with its 
whole BDD structure. In the new combined BDD, the node which, in Mo, was originally 
connected to the left branch of the node representing Ml, is now linked to the branch in the BDD 
ofMl which terminates with a terminal node' 1'; and the node which was originally connected to 
the right branch of the node representing Ml, is now linked to the branch in the BDD of module 
Mlwhich terminates with a terminal node '0'. Therefore, the form of the new BDD is as shown 
in figure 7.S: 
~ ... ~ 
Figure 7.S Incorporated BDD(referring to figure 7.6) 
In the combined BDD, the criticality function of basic event i can then be directly obtained 
according to the algorithm presented in chapter 2. 
However, a problem rises when one or both of the parent module and descendent module 
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contains a dependency relationship and has to be solved with the Markov method. In this case, 
the BDD incorporation approach is no longer applicable, and an alternative procedure must be 
followed as demonstrated below. 
Consider a parent module Mj and the descendant module Mk immediately included in module MJ• 
Basic event i is included in module Mk. Gi/M (q(t»and GM IM (q(t» denote the criticality 
, , J 
function of basic event i relative to module Mk and the criticality function of module Mk relative 
to module Mj respectively. The solution will address Gi/M (q(t» , i.e. the criticality function of J 
basic event i relative to module Mj . 
The criticality function for basic event i is defined in equation 2.20, G,{q) = 
= 8QMJ (q) X 8QM, (q) 
8QM. (q) 8q, 
8Q(q) . Therefore: 
8qj 
7.17 
Equation 7.17 is obtained by considering the influence of basic event i on the failure probability 
of module Mj through the intermediate module Mk. As basic event i is not directly contained in 
module MJ> its influence on the failure probability of module Mj is investigated by breaking it 
down into the influence of basic event i on the failure probability of module Mk, i.e. 8QM.(Q) 
8q, 
and the influence of module Mk on the failure probability of module Mj , i.e. 
Equation 7.17 can also be obtained by looking at the criticality function given by equation 2.19, 
Gi/M (q)=QM (1,) -QM (0;), where QM (1;) refers to the conditional failure probability of I J j ) 
module Mj , given component i is failed; and QM (0;) represents the conditional failure 
J 
165 
probability of module Mj. given component i is working. 
Let MjF, MkF respectively denote the failure of module Mj and Mk, and iF denote the failure of 
component i, Mk W and iW respectively denote that module Mk and component i is working. The 
two terms in the right-hand of equation 2.19 are investigated respectively as follows: 
P(Module M j is failed AND component i is failed) QM/l ,) = --'---~'------------­
P( component i is failed) 
= P(MjF AND iF) 
P(iF) 
by taking into account the state of module M k: 
by considering the effect of component i on module Mj through module Mk: 
1 = P(M iF I M kF)P(MkF I iF)P(iF) + P(M iF I MkW)P(MkW I iF)P(iF) 
QMj ( ,) P(iF) 
= P(MjF I MkF)P(MkF I iF) + P(MjF I M,W)P(MkW I iF) 
= QM (1M )XQM (1,)+QM (OM )x[l-QM (1,.)] J 4: 4" J 4: 4: 
= P(Module Mi is failed AND component i is working) 
P( component i is working) 
= P(MjF AND iW) 
P(iW) 
by taking into account the state of module Mk: 
by considering the effect of component i on module MJ through module Mk: 
P(MjF I MkF)P(M,F I iW)P(iW)+P(MiF I MkW)P(MkW I iW)P(iW) 
P(iW) 
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Therefore: 
={QM (IM )XQM (1;)+QM (OM )x[I-QM (1;)])-
J k k J k k 
Assume (k+l) modulesMo - Mk, where module Mo is the top module and module Mj is the 
immediate descendant of module Mj -J (j = 1, 2, ... , k). Basic event i is included in module Mn (1 
~ n ~ k). The criticality function of basic event i relative to the top module can then be given by: 
n 
G/lM, (q(t)) = G/lM, (q(t)) x IT GMpIMp-, (q(t)) 7.18 
p=l 
Equation 7.18 can be interpreted as the 'chain rule' of the criticality function and reflects the 
'transferability' of the basic event criticality function in the multi-level modularized fault tree 
structure. 
The 'transferability' of the criticality function also applies to the criticality measure of 
importance 0 fthe basic event. Equation 2 .22 given in chapter 2 illustrates how to 0 btain the 
criticality measure of importance by drawing on the criticality function. The criticality measure 
of basic event i included in the immediate descendant module Mk relative to the parent module 
Mj can be obtained as follows: 
I = GVM;(q)Xq,(t) 
ilM, QMJ(t) 
= GilM,(q) xGM,JM/q)xq,(t) 
QMJ(t) 
= GiIM,(q) xGM,IM/q)xq,(t)xQM,(t) 
QM/t) x QM, (t) 
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= GilM,(q) xq,(t) x 
QM,(t) 
GM, IMJ(q)X QM, (t) 
QM/t) 
7.19 
Therefore, the criticality measure of the basic event relative to the top module can be obtained 
using the same process as for the criticality function: 
n 
ri/Mo = rUMII' x nIMpIMp-1 
p=t 
where Mo, Mn and Mp has the same meaning as in equation 7.18. 
7.20 
Using equations 7.18 and 7.20, the criticality function and criticality measure of the basic event 
included in descendant modules relative to the top module can be acquired in an accurate and 
efficient way. 
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Chapter 8. Dependency Modelling of Continuously-Operating Systems 
8.1 Introduction 
All aspects of system dependency modelling are combined together in this chapter to form an 
overview of the whole process. Two types of systems are considered in the thesis separately. In 
this chapter, the focus is placed upon the dependency modelling in the reliability assessment of 
continuously-operating systems. The process of developing the software to perform the 
assessment is also described. An example system is used to illustrate the software application. 
8.2 The Dependency Modelling Process for Continuously-Running Systems 
In the assessment of continuously-operating systems, the general process of dependency 
modelling is illustrated by the flow chart in figure 8.1. 
f - - --
o 
o 
Construct the fault tree structure to 
represent the system failure logic 
Identify dependency relationships 
existin in the s stem --, L-~~~U4~~~L-~ 
Acquire the component failure dat 
o 
----., L-______ ~--------~ 
Pre-process the fault tree structure 
Implement quantification to obtain 
the s stem reliabili rediction 
Figure 8.1 The general process of assessing the reliability of continuously-running systems 
involving dependency modelling 
The following section will describe how each step is realized and linked to each other in the 
software development. 
8.3 The Software Development 
The software was developed using the C programming language. The software is structured in a 
framework which consists of 4 blocks: data input, pre-processing, quantification, and data 
output. These blocks are described separately in the following sections. 
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8.3.1 Data Input 
The assessment of any system has to start with the representation of the causes of system failure. 
The 'data input' process is designed to provide the software with all the system information 
required to perform the evaluation of the system's availability and reliability. The basic system 
information includes the system failure logic, the components' reliability parameters and the 
dependency relationships. This can be represented using three different data files. In terms of the 
fault tree structure file, each different gate event in the fault tree is regarded as a different record 
in the file. For each record, the information specifies the name of the gate event (which consists 
of no more than 20 characters), the type of the gate (which include 'OR', 'AND', 'Priority AND' 
and 'Voting' respectively encoded as '+', '*', '&' and 'v' in the input), the number of the 
immediate gate event descendants, the number of immediate basic event descendants, the list of 
the names of the immediate gate event descendants and the list of the names of the immediate 
basic event descendants. When the gate type is 'Voting', additional information is required to 
specify the minimum number of occurrences of its immediate descendants to cause the gate 
event output. Dependency information is accomplished by generating two dependency files. One 
is the so-called 'normal dependency' file which includes the dependency relationships discussed 
in sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.7, i.e. those which result in the statistical dependency during the 
evaluation process and the test dependency. The other dependency file is the 'functional 
dependency' file which only contain functional and switching dependencies. The dependency 
groups included in these two files share the same numbering system. For different types of 
dependency relationship, the information that the analyst provides will vary, as has been 
illustrated in detail in section 4.2. The advantage of distinguishing the functional and switching 
dependencies from other types of dependency is to enable the analyst to gain a clearer 
understanding of the different characteristics of the distinct types of dependency. 
Corresponding to the third step in figure 8.1 is the provision of the basic event file, each record 
in the file represents a unique basic event in the corresponding fault tree structure. The basic 
event file contains the name of the basic event, the failure model (' I' for fixed, '2' for revealed 
and '3' for dormant), the corresponding reliability parameters relevant to each failure model (see 
chapter 2), and other dependency features. In terms of the dependency features, a code is given 
to define if a basic event is an enabling event or not. A value of '0' means that the basic event is 
not an enabling event, and an input of 'I' or '2' means the basic event is an enabling event and 
indicates respectively that the enabling event is unlikely or still likely to occur after the initiating 
event has occurred. The number of dependency groups in which this basic event is involved is 
also specified. When the input is '0', it means this basic event is independent and is not involved 
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in any dependency relationship in the system. It must be noted that the dependency group 
numbers included in the basic event file can only come from the 'normal' dependency file. 
8.3.2 Pre-processing 
The principle underlying the pre-processing procedure has been described and illustrated ID 
chapter 5. Through this process, the data provided to the software in the form of the three input 
files will be examined and refined to make the quantification process more efficient. The pre-
processing can be broken down into the steps shown in figure 8.2. 
Proof-reading of the 1 Form basic event, and .1 Establish the binary diagram 
input files 1 . 1 dependency information list representation of the original fault 
tree structure 
+ Identify the smallest modules 
for each dependency 1 Simplification of the I. 1 Re-organization of dependency 
relationship l fault tree structure I information 
Figure 8.2 Procedures included in the pre-processing stage 
The aim of the 'proof-reading' is to ensure that the fault tree structure file, the basic event file 
and the dependency files are correctly related and consistent with each other. Also error checking 
within the fault tree structure file is carried out, aimed to ensure that gate events which have the 
exactly same input events and appear more than once in the fault tree are assigned the same 
name. This process is implemented in a bottom-up manner, starting from based events in the 
fault tree. 
In the second procedure, the data contained in the basic event file and dependency files is 
extracted and re-organized into the required different structures so that they can be processed by 
the program more efficiently. Each record in the basic event file is represented by a 'Structure' (a 
special data structure embedded in C programming language), and all the structures are linked 
one by one to form the basic event list. Numerical labels, starting from 1, are assigned to each 
basic event. The dependency files are then processed in the same way. A single dependency 
information list is established using information from both the normal dependency and the 
functional dependency files. Any basic events involved in the dependency files are identified 
using their numerical labels. 
In the third step, the fault tree structure file is examined. A binary diagram is employed to 
represent the fault tree structure given in the file. In the binary tree structure, each node 
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represents an intermediate gate event or a basic event in the fault tree. In the process of 
establishing the binary fault tree, numerical labels (in the software, the numbering starts from 
10000) are assigned to each different intermediate gate event. In addition to the numerical label 
of the gate event, each node contains the logic and two branches. The left branch is linked to the 
node representing its first immediate descendant and the right branch is linked to the node 
representing its sibling event under the same parent gate. When the node represents a basic 
event, both of its left branch and its logic are null since there is no input event to it. When the 
node represents an intermediate gate event, the logic refers to the type of its gate l • The right 
branch of the top event is null. Take for instance the fault tree in figure 5.6 in chapter 5, its 
corresponding binary tree structure is shown in figure 8.3. 
G\ 
Logic = 2 
Logic = 0 
Figure 8.3 Binary tree representation of the fault tree in figure 5.6 
In the forth step, the re-organization of the dependency relationships is carried out using the 
established dependency information list. The aim is to establish the dependency serial list. This 
is done by first forming a temporary dependent event list in which each entry corresponds to a 
dependency group from the 'normal' type of dependency. In the dependent event list, each entry 
contains only the dependency group number and the list of events involved represented by their 
numerical labels. The dependency type doesn't need including. During the process of 
establishing the dependent event list, the intermediate gate events included in the corresponding 
dependency group may need to be replaced by its basic event descendants according to the 
principles given in section 5.2.1 depending on the dependency type. When the construction of 
the dependent event list is completed, the dependency serial list is established accordingly as is 
illustrated in section 5.2.1. Each entry in the dependency serial list includes the assigned serial 
I The 'AND'logic is encoded 'I', the 'OR' logic is encoded as '2', the 'Priority AND'logic is encoded as '3', and 
the 'Voting' logic is encoded as the value of(4+number of votes). 
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number, the group number of the dependency groups involved and the list of all the relevant 
events represented by their numerical labels. During the process of establishing the temporary 
dependent event list, the test dependency is not taken into account since the test dependency does 
not result in the statistical dependency and therefore does not require the use of the Markov 
method. This means that the basic events which are involved in the test dependency relationship 
do not need to be included in the same fault tree section in the analysis. 
In the fifth step, the fault tree simplification is carried out. The simplification operations are 
conducted on the established binary fault tree structure according to the algorithm illustrated in 
chapter 5. With the exceptions discussed in section 5.2.2, contraction, extraction, elimination and 
factorisation are carried out on the binary tree structure in a left-right depth-first manner, 
generating a simplified binary fault tree structure. During the factorisation process, each factor is 
assigned with a numerical label (starting from 3001) to distinguish it from other events in the 
fault tree. A factor list is generated in which each entry represents a factor containing the factor 
ID label and the list of the basic events included in the factor. Those basic events which are 
grouped as factors are substituted with new node marked with the corresponding factor ID label 
in the binary tree structure. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 contain the algorithms underlying the different 
functions during the simplification process. 
rrhe root node of the binary fault tree structure: {FTND "ftwk, "ftwkl; 
FTND ~ R{id. logic, "Iptr, "rptr} if(parent->logic<3) 
{ftwk~arent->logic; 
implify Jaultree(R) while(ftwk!~O) 
{contract_ fauItree(R); {ftwk 1 ~parent->Iptr; 
eliminate_ events(R); whiIe(ftwkl!~O) 
extract_ events(R); {if(ftwkl !~ftwk && ftwkl is a gate) 
factorise _ events(R); search under ftwkl in a top-down manner to see 
} if the same event as pointed by ftwk exists under 
ftwkl; 
ontract_faultree(FTND ·parent) if(repeated event exists) 
{ {if(the logic of the secondary gate is the same as the primary gate) 
FTND "ftwk; delete the repeated event under ftwkl; 
ftwk ~ parent->Iptr; else j* opposite logic */ 
while(ftwk!~O) delete the secondary gate; 
{if(ftwk->id represents a gate id) if(eliminate leaves the gate with only one input) 
contract_ fauItree( ftwk); delete the gate; 
ftwk~ftwk->rptr; contractJaultree(parent of the deleted gate); 
} } 
if(parent->Iogic < 3) ftwk 1 ~ftwk l->rptr; 
{ ftwk ~ Base->Iptr; } 
whiIe(ftwk!~O) ftwk~ftwk->rptr; 
{if(ftwk->id represents a gate id) } 
{if(fiwk->Iogic = parent->Iogic) ftwk=parent->Iogic; 
add descendants offtwk to parent; while(ftwk!~O) 
delete the gate pointed by ftwk; {if(ftwk points at a gate) 
} eliminate_events(ftwk); 
ftwk~ftwk->rptr; ftwk~ftwk->rptr; 
} } 
} } 
} } 
eliminate events(FTND *parent) 
FIgure 8.4 AlgOrIthm underlYIng the contractIng and elImInatIng operatIOn In the 
simplification process 
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extract_events(FTND *parent) factorise _ events(FTND *parent) 
{ 
FTND *ftwk, *ftwk I; 
ftwk=parent->Iptr; 
while(ftwk!=O) 
{ if(ftwk->id is a gate id) 
) 
extract_ events( ftwk); 
ftwk=ftwk->rptr; 
if(parent->logic<3) 
{ ftwk=parent->Iptr; 
while(ftwk!=O) 
{ if(ftwk->id is a gate id && ftwk->logic<3) 
{ ftwk I =ftwk ->rptr; 
while(ftwkl !=O) 
{if(ftwkl->id is a gate id && ftwkl->Iogic 
== ftwk->Iogic) 
compare the immediate descendants of ftwk 
and ftwkl; 
if(there is any repeated event) 
{ add a new fault tree node with the assigned id 
with the same logic as ftwk and ftwkl; put the 
repeated event(s) and the event pointed by 
'parent' as the immediate descendants of the new 
node; put the new node in the position of the 
event pointed by 'parent' in the fault tree 
structure; 
) 
ftwkl =ftwkl->rptr; 
) 
) 
ftwk=ftwk->rptr; 
{ 
FTND *ftwk, *ftwkl; 
ftwk=parent->Iptr; 
while(ftwk!=O) 
{ if(ftwk->id is a gate id) 
extract_ events(ftwk); 
ftwk=ftwk->rptr; 
} 
if(parent->logic<3) 
{ ftwk=parent->Iptr; 
while(ftwk!=O) 
{if(ftwk->id is a independent basic event or 
a formed factor) 
{ftwkl =ftwk->rtpr; 
while(ftwkl!=O) 
{if(ftwkl->id is a independent basic event or a 
formed factor) 
if(ftwkl->id always appears together with ftwk-
>id under the same logic) 
record ftwkl->id and delete ftwkl; 
ftwkl =ftwkl->rtpr; 
) 
put ftwk->id and the recorded id together to form a 
factor; assign the factor id; replace event pointed by 
ftwk with the factor; 
) 
ftwk=ftwk->rptr; 
) 
) 
) 
Figure 8.5 Algorithm underlying the extracting and factorising operation in the simplification 
process 
Finally, to carry out the sixth step in figure 8.2, a gate dependency serial list is established. In 
this process, the binary fault tree structure is traversed in a left-right depth-first manner so that 
the dependency serial numbers encountered under each intermediate gate event are identified and 
recorded. The gate dependency list is referred to for the combination process as is described in 
section 5.2.4. The combination operation is carried out directly on the binary fault tree structure 
by introducing new nodes which represent the intermediate events added to group the events 
together with same dependency serial numbers. 
Following the above steps, the modularization is conducted on the binary fault tree structure. The 
two left-right depth-first traversals through the binary fault tree structure provide both the 
absolute and relative positions of the intermediate gate and basic events in the fault tree. 
According to the principle of deciding if an intermediate gate event is leading a module based on 
the relative positions of its descendants in the fault tree, modules can be identified. Numerical 
labels are allocated to each module (starting from 6001) such that modules can be distinguished 
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from basic events, intennediate events and factors. A module list is fonned in which each entry 
represents the identified module. A link is established between each entry in the module list and 
the corresponding module fault tree structure contained in the original binary fault tree, in the 
mean time, new nodes which represent the modules are introduced into the binary fault tree to 
replace the modules' fault tree structures. 
In the modularized binary tree structure, a left-right depth-first traverse is implemented to update 
the information contained in the established gate dependency list. Modules and factors will be 
treated as basic events in the traversal. The traversal extends into each module through the link 
contained in each entry in the module list. In this process, the dependency serial numbers mutual 
to all the immediate gate descendants of the intennediate event are also recorded in the gate 
dependency list. Modules which contain dependency relationships are identified through the 
infonnation in the gate dependency list. Re-modularization is carried out on the fault tree 
structures of modules which contain dependencies according to the algorithm in section 5.2.7. 
8.3.3 Quantification 
8.3.3.1 Preparation 
The gate dependency list tells which modules contain dependencies and which don't. In the 
preparation stage, the binary decision diagrams and the Markov models are established for 
modules which contain no dependency and modules which do involve dependency relationships 
respectively . 
• Binary Decision Diagrams Development 
A binary decision diagram is required for each factor and module involving no dependency serial 
numbers. Each node in the binary decision diagram represents a basic event or a complex event 
(module or factor). 
For each factor, the binary decision diagram is established in a straightforward way. When the 
basic events included in the factor are grouped with the OR logic, the binary decision diagram is 
constructed by linking each basic event through their right branches and connecting the terminal 
node' I' to the left branch of each basic event. On the opposite, if the basic event contained in 
the factor are grouped with the AND logic, the binary decision diagram is constructed by linking 
each basic event through their left branches and connecting the tenninal node '0' to the right 
branch of each basic event. 
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For the process of establishing the BDD for modules, a modified top-down ordering mechanism 
is employed to establish the order in which the basic/complex events in the module should be 
considered. Figure 8.6 presents the algorithm of establishing the binary decision diagram based 
on the pre-determined event ordering. 
build_module_bdd(the ordering list & the module fault tree structure) 
{ 
establish empty stack; 
establish_bdd(the ordering list, the module fault tree structure & the stack); 
-~---------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
establish_bdd(the ordering list, the module fault tree structure & the stack) 
{ 
current event = pick_event(the ordering list & the stack); 
put the current event in the stack; 
add new node in the bdd representing the current event; 
consider the situation when the event occurs: 
if(the module state can not be decided according to the states of the events in the stack) 
mark the left branch of the current node; 
establish_bdd(the ordering list & the stack); 
else 
add the terminal node with value' I ' to the left branch of the current node; 
consider the situation when the event does not occurs: 
if(the module state can not be decided according to the states of the events in the stack) 
mark the right branch of the current node; 
establish_bdd(the ordering list & the stack); 
else 
add the terminal node with value '0' to the right branch of the current node; 
if(the current event is the bottom one in the stack) 
link the corresponding module to the established bdd; 
else 
link the current node to the marked branch; 
take the event out of the stack; 
pick_event(the ordering list & the stack) 
{ 
fine the event in the ordering list which follows the event at the top of the stack; 
while(the current event ... the last event in the ordering list) 
{ 
if(the state of the event in question is relevant regarding the module state based on the 
current states of the events in the stack) 
pick the event; break; 
Figure 8.6 The algorithm of establishing the BDD for modules 
• Markov Model Development 
The Markov model is established for each fault tree module which contains dependencies 
according to the type of dependency involved in the module. When the test dependency is 
included in the modules which also contain other 'normal' statistical types of dependency, the 
algorithm presented in figure 6.28 should be referred to during the process of generating the 
Markov model. In the software, the development of the Markov model is realized by establishing 
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a list of system states and a list of state transitions which are both linked to the corresponding 
module in the module list. If the resulting Markov model contains n system states. Then in 
theory, this will result in an nxn rate matrix which is sparse in nature. In the software, to save the 
memory space and to improve the computing efficiency, the rate matrix is simplified such that 
only non-zero entries are stored. The simplified rate matrix is composed of n rows. The first 
element of each row represents the source state from which the transition takes place. Other 
elements in each row represent the destination states which the transitions take the system to 
from the source states and give the corresponding transition rate. When the transition is caused 
by the failure or repair of a complex event (a factor or a module), the rate is set as '-1' in the first 
place. These elements will be different from the constant failure or repair rates of components, 
the complex event features a variable failure or repair rate as the function of time. The n rows are 
connected through a list which links the first element of each row. The structure of the simplified 
rate matrix is illustrated in figure 8.7. Each rate matrix is linked to the corresponding module in 
the established module list. 
destination state: j 
r .. 
destination state: i 
r .. 
destination state: j 
r . 
...... ~destination state: k h ..... . 
I fik I 
. ..... -jdestination state: m r ..... . 
rIm 
.. .... ~destination state: k h ...... 
. I Trok ! 
Figure 8.7 The structure of the simplified rate matrix for the Markov model 
8.3.3.2 The Quantification Process 
For continuously-operating systems, the availability and reliability assessment is carried out over 
a specified period oftime T. In the software, the analyst will be asked to input the total period of 
time T that the evaluation will cover. Also the analyst will be asked to specify the length of d! 
(the time increment) by which the quantification process will progress. 
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During the quantification process, each module and factor will be investigated to obtain the 
factor/module unavailability, the factor/module unconditional failure and repair intensity, and 
also the factor/module conditional failure and repair rates. The criticality function of each basic 
event is also calculated as a function of the mission time. The quantification process starts in the 
top module in the modularized fault tree structure. The algorithm presented in figure 8.8 
indicates how the quantification is implemented using both the BOO and the Markov method. 
During the quantification of the modules which contain no dependencies, extra attention should 
be paid to components which are involved in test dependency, as equation 7.16 should be applied 
to calculating the component failure probability. 
The process given in the algorithm presented above delivers the reliability parameters as a 
function of time for the top module. By implementing the procedure given in the algorithm 
presented in figure 8.9, the criticality function of each component with respect to the top event is 
obtained. 
8.3.4 Output 
When the quantification process is finished, two files will be generated as the final products from 
the assessment. One file is the 'system prediction file' which includes the system unavailability, 
system unconditional failure intensity and expected number of failures ( ( W,y, (t)dt ) as functions 
of time. The analyst will be asked to input the time interval at which the system reliability 
parameters are saved in the file. The other file is the 'importance measure file' which holds the 
criticality function of each basic event in the system as the function of time. The analyst can also 
decide the time interval between each record in the file. 
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Quantify_system(the factor list, the module list, T, dt) 
{ 
establish the criticality function list for each factor and module; 
record the ID of the immediate parent factor/module of each event in the criticalily function list; 
for(count = = 0; count*dt<=T; count++) 
quantify_module(the top module, the factor list, the module list, count, dt); 
qu~~lify ~modiiie(ih-e-current-modiiie~ the facior, -tiie module -list,-t\'e -basic event-Ifst,-count~ di) - - - - - - - - - - - - --
{ 
establish array param[5] with T'=count*dt for the module; 
if(the module contains no dependency) 
quantify_bdd(the current module, the factor list, the module list, the basic event list, count, dt); 
else 
quantify_markov(the current module, the factor list, the module list, the basic event list, count, dt); 
quantify_bdd(current module, the module list, the basic event list, count, dt) 
{ 
} 
root vertex F = ite(x;, J, K) of the BDD is linked to the module; 
param[O] = calcyrobvalue(F, count, dt); /* the module/factor unavailability*/ 
calc_criticality_bdd(F, criticality function list, count, dt); 
while(each basic/complex event i included in the current module) 
param[l] = param[l] + G,{q(T'»*w,(T'); /* the module/factor unconditional failure intensity */ 
param[2] = G,{q(T'))*v,{T'); /* the module/factor unconditional repair intensity *f 
param[3] = param[I]/(I-param[O]); /* the module/factor conditional failure rate *f 
param[4] = param[2]/param[0]; f* the module/factor conditional repair rate */ 
.. _-------------------------.------------- ------------------------------------------Root vertex F = ite(x;, J, K) 
calc yrobvalue(F) 
{ 
if(x, represents a factor) 
quantify jactor(x,); 
if(x, represents a module) 
quantify _ module(x,); 
Consider 'I' branch: 
if(J=I) 
po'[F]= I; 
else 
{ if(visited[J] = I) 
temp = pr[J]; 
else 
temp =0; 
pr[J] = q;.pr[F] 
po'[F] = calcyrobvalue(J); } 
pr[J] = pr[J] + temp; 
} 
Consider '0' branch: 
if(K=O) 
poo[F] = 0; 
else 
{ if(visited[K] = I) 
temp = pr[K]; 
else 
} 
temp =0; 
pr[K] = (l-q;).pr[F] 
poo[F] = calcyrobvalue(K); 
pr[K] = pr[K] + temp; 
P[F] = q;.po'[F] + (l-q;).poo[F]; 
retum(P[F]); 
calc_criticality_bdd(F(x" J, K), criticality function list, count, dt) 
{ 
if(J is not a terminal node) 
calc _ criticality _ bdd(J, criticality function list); 
if(K is not a terminal node) 
calc _ criticality _ bdd(K, criticality function list); 
if( event x, has not been visited) 
Gi(q(T'» = pr[F]*(P[J]- P[K]); 
else 
Gi(q(T'» = Gi(q(T'» + pr[F]*(P[J]- P[K]); 
Figure 8.8a Algorithm for quantification of continuously-operating systems using BDD 
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~uantify_markov(the current module, the module list, the basic event list, count, dt) 
( 
{ 
if( count = 0) 
set the value of the initial state probabilities; 
/* Q,(O)=I, Q,(O) = Q,(O) = ...... = Q"(O) =0 */ 
else 
( establish temporary state probability list temp; 
while(the first state ...... the last state in the system state list) 
( temp[i] = 0; 
} 
while(the first row ...... the last row in the rate matrix) 
( if(the transition is caused by a factor x;) 
quantify Jactor(x;); 
if(the transition is caused by a module x;) 
quantify _ module( x;); 
if(the row number is the state number) 
temp[i] = temp[i] + Q,{{count-l)*dt)*(l- Ir/dt); 
else 
temp[i] = temp[i] + IQ/(count-l)*dt)*rj/dt; 
Q,{count*dt) = temp[i]; 
while(the first state ...... the last state in the system state list) 
{ if(the module is failed in the current state) 
param[O] = param[O] + Q;( count*dt); 
adjust the state probabilities if the inspection is expected to occur at T=count*dt; 
while(the first row ...... the last row in the rate matrix) 
{ while(the first element ....... the last element in the row) 
} 
{ if(the transition brings the system from working to failed state) 
param[l] = param[l] + Q,{count*dt)*rij; /* the module unconditional failure intensity */ 
if(the transition brings the system from failed to working state) 
param[2] = param[2] + Q,{count*dt)*rij; /* the module unconditional repair intensity */ 
param[3] = param[I]/(I-param[O]); /* the module conditional failure rate */ 
param[4] = param[2]/param[0]; /* the module conditional repair rate */ 
calc_criticality_markov(the current module, the criticality function list, count, dt); 
alc_criticality_markov(the current module, the criticality function list, count, d!) 
while(the first basic/complex event ....... the last one in the criticality function list) 
{ while(the first row ...... the last row in the rate matrix) 
{ while(the first element. ..... the last element in the row) 
( 
if(the transition brings the system from working to failed state & the transition is 
caused by the occurrence of the event under investigation) 
G;(q(T') = G;(q(T'» + Q;(T') + Q,{T'); 
/* state i is the source state & statej is the destination state of the transition; */ 
Figure 8.8b Algorithm for quantification of continuously-operating systems using Markov 
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generalize _ criticality(the criticality function list) 
{ 
while(the first basic/complex event. ..... the last one in the list) 
{ 
while(the event's immediate parent is not the top module) 
{ 
look for the event's immediate parent in the list; 
replace the event's original G,(q(t» with the multiple of Gi(q(t) and the 
criticality function of its immediate parent event; 
replace the event's original immediate parent with its immediate grandparent; 
Figure S.9 The algorithm of calculating the criticality function in relation to the top event 
8.4 Application to an Example Fault Tree 
The fault tree shown in figure 5.1 represents the failure of a continuously-operating system. 
Dependency relationships exist in the system including a maintenance dependency between basic 
events e5 and eS, and between eiS, el9 and e20; a sequential dependency, as is indicated by the 
'Priority AND' gate, under gate GI4 between basic events eIS, e19 and e20; an initiator-enabler 
dependency between G18 and eIS, of which G1S represents the general initiating event and basic 
event e 15 is the enabling event; and a test dependency between basic events el, e4 and e7 with a 
common inspection interval of 4 months. The following section describes how the software is 
applied to the example fault tree to predict the system reliability. 
8.4.1 System Information Input 
• Fault Tree Structure File 
For the fault tree shown in figure 5.1, the corresponding fault tree structure file has the form 
shown in table S.l. 
Name Logic Number of Number of input List of input gates List of input basic 
inout gates basic events events 
GO • 3 0 GI, G20, G24 
GI + 2 0 G2, GI9 
G2 + 2 0 G3,G4 
G3 • 0 2 e9, elO 
G4 • 3 0 G5, GI5, GI6 
G5 + 2 I G6,GI4 e8 
G6 • I 2 G7 e5,e6 
G7 + I I G8 el2 
G8 • I I G9 e2 
G9 • 2 0 GIO, Gll 
GIO + 0 2 e3,e4 
GII + 2 0 Gl2, GI3 
GI2 • 0 2 el, e2 
GI3 • 0 2 e4,e7 
GI4 & 0 3 el8, el9, e20 
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GI5 + 0 2 e6, ell 
G\6 + I I Gl7 elO 
G\7 • I I GI8 el5 
GI8 + 0 2 el3, el4 
G\9 • 0 2 e22,e23 
G20 + 2 0 G21, G22 
G21 • 2 0 G25,G26 
G25 + 0 2 el7,el0 
G26 + 0 2 el6,el0 
G22 • 2 0 G23, G24 
G23 + I I GI7 el6 
G24 + 0 2 e24,e21 
where: 
,*, represents 'AND' logic; '&' represents 'Priority AND' logic; and '+' represents 'OR' logic. 
Table 8.1 Fault tree structure file (referring to figure 5.1) 
• Dependency File 
The corresponding dependency file for the system is shown in table 8.2 (refer to section 4.2 for 
an explanation of the contents of the last 4 columns for each type of dependency). 
Dependency Dependency Number 1 Number 2 List 1 List 2 
~roup number type 
I mtnc 2 I 5 and 8 
2 mtnc 3 I 18, 19 and 20 
3 sq 3 GJ4 18,19 and 20 
4 ie 2 G18 15 
5 test 3 4 1,4,7 
Table 8.2 Dependency file for the example fault tree 
• Basic Event File 
The basic event file, as is illustrated in section 4.4, for the example fault tree is shown in table 
8.3. 
Name of basic Failure Reliability Enabler Number of List of 
event model parameters dependency groups dependency 
involved groups 
el 3 0.0001,3,3 0 1 5 
e2 3 0.0006,3,2 0 0 
e3 2 0.0008,0.4 0 0 
e4 3 0.0005,2,3 0 1 5 
e5 2 0.0007,0.5 0 I 1 
e6 3 0.0001,4,6 0 0 
e7 3 0.0002,2.5,3 0 I 5 
e8 2 0.0005,0.4 0 I I 
e9 2 0.0004, 0.25 0 0 
elO 2 0.0003,0.2 0 0 
ell 3 0.0001,3,2 0 0 
el2 2 0.0004,0.1 0 0 
e13 2 0.0006,0.4 0 0 
el4 2 0.0008,0.5 0 0 
e15 3 0.0001,4,3 2 I 4 
el6 2 0.0002,0.2 0 0 
e17 2 0.0002,0.2 0 0 
el8 2 0.0003,0.4 0 2 2,3 
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e19 2 0.0004,0.4 0 2 2,3 
e20 2 0.0005,0.4 0 2 2,3 
e21 3 0.00008, 4, 6 0 0 
e22 2 0.0002,0.25 0 0 
e23 2 0.0002, 0.25 0 0 
e24 3 0.00006, 5, 6 0 0 
Table 8.3 BasIc event file 
8.4.2 Pre-processing 
After the error checking and the pre-processing of the information from the input files, a 
dependency serial list is established as is shown in figure 8.10. 
Dependency serial - I 
Dependency groups includ.ed - I 
Events involved - e5 and eS 
Dependency serial - 2 
!Dependency groups included - 2, 3 
Events involved- eIS, el9 and e20 
Dependency serial- 3 
Dependency groups included - 4 
Events involved-Gl8 and el5 
Figure S.I 0 Dependency serial list for the example fault tree (referring to table 8.2) 
Since the test dependency has been excluded from the dependency serial list, after the 
simplification, combination, modularization and. re-modularization processes, S modules 
(Module 600 I - Module 600S) are identified from the original fault tree structure as shown in 
figures 5.9 and 5.10. In module 600S test dependency exists between basic events el, e4 and e7. 
8.4.3 Quantification 
8.4.3.1 Preparation for Quantification 
• Conversion o/the Fault Tree Structure into BDD 
For each factor and module which contains no dependency serial, a BDD will be established 
based on the corresponding fault tree structure. According the algorithms presented in figure 8.6, 
the BDDs constructed for factors and modules are shown in figure 8.11: 
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BDD for module 6001 
BDD for module 6002 
BDD for module 6003 BDD for factor 3001 
BDD for module 6007 BDD for factor 3002 BDD for module 6004 
Figure 8.11 BDDs for factors and modules (referring to figure 5.9 and 5.10) 
• Markov Model Development 
For modules 6005, 6006 and 6008, the Markov method will be employed for quantification. 
Therefore, the Markov model needs to be established for each of these modules depending on 
which type of dependency is involved. 
From the dependency information given in table 5.8, module 6005 contains dependency serial 
number 2, which, as is indicated in the serial list in figure 8.1 0, includes both sequential and 
maintenance dependencies. According to the algorithms presented in figures 6.7 and 6.17, the 
corresponding Markov model is established for module 6005 as are represented by table 8.4 and 
table 8.5 together. 
State no. EI8 eI9 e20 Module State no. eI8 eI9 e20 Module 
state state 
STATE I 0-0 0-0 0-0 0 STATE 12 I-I 2-3 2-2 0 
STATE 2 I - I 0-0 0-0 0 STATE 13 2-2 I -I 2-3 0 
STATE 3 0-0 I - I 0-0 0 STATE 14 2-3 I -I 2-2 0 
STATE 4 0-0 0-0 I -I 0 STATE 15 2-2 2-3 I - I 0 
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STATES I-I 2-2 0-0 0 STATE 16 2-3 2-2 I-I 0 
STATE 6 I-I 0-0 2-2 0 STATE 17 0-0 1-2 2-1 0 
STATE 7 2-2 I-I 0-0 0 STATE 18 1-2 0-0 2-1 0 
STATE 8 0-0 I-I 2-2 0 STATE 19 1-2 2-1 0-0 0 
STATE 9 2-2 0-0 I-I 0 STATE 20 2-3 1-2 2-1 0 
STATE 10 0-0 2-2 I-I 0 STATE 21 1-2 2-3 2-1 0 
STATE 11 I-I 2-2 2-3 I STATE 22 1-2 2-1 2-3 0 
where the first state code of each event represents the component state (0 - working, I - failed 
revealed and 2 - queuing for repair); and the second state code represents the order of the 
component failure. 
Table 8.4 States in the Markov model of module 6005 
From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition 
rate rate rate 
State I State 2 AIS State 5 State II 1.,20 State 13 State 6 V19 
State I State 3 AI. State 6 State 4 VI' State 14 State 18 VI' 
State I State 4 A,. State 6 State 12 AI' State 15 State 5 V,. 
State 2 State I VI' State 7 State 2 VI. State 16 State 19 V,. 
State 2 State 5 AI. State 7 State 13 A,. State 17 State 20 AI, 
State 2 State 6 A,. State 8 State 14 AI, State 17 State 4 VI' 
State 3 State 7 AI, State 8 State 4 VI. State 18 State 4 VI' 
State 3 State I VI. State 9 State 15 AI. State 18 State 21 AI, 
State 3 State 8 A,. State 9 State 2 v,. State 19 State 3 VI' 
State 4 State 9 AI' State 10 State 16 AI, State 19 State 22 1.,20 
State 4 State 10 AI, State 10 State 3 v,. State 20 State 18 VI9 
State 4 State I v,. State II State 8 VI' State 21 State 17 VI' 
State 5 State 3 VI' State 12 State 17 VI' State 22 State 8 VI' 
Table 8.5 State transitions in the Markov model of module 6005 
Module 6006 involves the initiator-enabler dependency with module 6007 representing the 
initiating event and basic event el5 representing the enabling event. From the dependency file 
shown in table 8.2, it can be seen that repair policy 2 (only initiating events are rectified) is 
adopted. In the basic event file in table 8.3, it is indicated by the value of the 'Enabler' field that 
the enabling event el5 can still occur following the corresponding initiating event. Based on 
these characteristics, the Markov model, shown in figure 8.12, is developed for module 6006 
according to the algorithm presented in figure 6.24. The transition from state 5 to state I is 
caused by the rectification of module M6007 and basic event e 15 at the same time. In this case, 
the transition rate is consequently determined using the approximation method illustrated in 
section 6.3.1, which is obtained as I , i.e. 
max«M6007' <15) 
I . I . ( I I' eqUlva ent to mm UM6007, 
max(--,-) 
VM6007 VIS 
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State 1 .----.-
r:-:-:-:-:-::---,-,State 4 
6007 -I 
IS -3 
odule: 0 
r--L--,State 7 
6007 -I 
elS -I 
odule: 0 
",....,..,~::---,-,State S 
6007 -I 
odule: I 
6007 
Figure 8.12 The Markov model of module 6006 
In figure 8.12, although state S and state 7 feature the same combination of states ofM6007 and 
eIS, they are different states as the state of the module top event is different. In state S, the 
module top event is true because the initiating event M6007 occurs in state 3 in which the 
enabling event has occurred, whilst state 7 is generated from state 4 in which the initiating event 
occurs prior to the enabling event. 
Module 6008 was identified as the smallest module for the maintenance dependency represented 
by dependency group I in table 8.2. Due to the large size of the resulting Markov model (180 
system states and 1008 state transitions), representation of the states and transitions are contained 
in Appendix A, tables A.I and A.2 respectively. 
When the Markov models have been generated for each module which contains dependency 
relationship, the rate matrix will be established as is shown in figure 8.7 to facilitate the later 
quantification. 
8.4.3.2 The Quantification Process 
The lifetime of the example system is 6 years (i.e. 36Sx6x24 hours), and the time interval by 
which the quantification will be progressed (dt) is O.S hour. With the input of these variables, the 
quantification will be performed on the example fault tree through all the modules in the way 
illustrated in figure 8.13 according to the algorithm presented in figure 8.8. 
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Module: 6001 
---
--
---
---
---
Factor: 3001 
Module: 6002 
...... - .... 
Module: 6008 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Module: 6003 Module: 6005 
............ 
Factor: 3002 
Module: 6006 
Quantify _ markov(M6006) 
Module: 6007 
Quantify _bdd(M6003) Quantify _markov(M6005) 
Module: 6004 
QuantifL bdd(M6004) 
where: the real arrow represents the calling-for relationship between the parent function and its 
sub-function; the dotted-line arrow represents the data flow 
Figure 8.13 The quantification process through the modules (referring to figure 5.9 and 5.10) 
8.4.4 Output 
Information has been requested at monthly (24x30=720 hours) interval. 
8.4.4.1 System Reliability Predictions 
The charts shown in figure 8.14, 8.15 and 8.16 provide diagrammatic summaries of the system 
unavailability, unconditional failure intensity and expected number of system failures 
respectively as the time elapses. 
187 
System Unavailability 
3.50E-06 ,-----------------------------, 
3.00E-06 - -- ------
~ 2.50E-06 
:0 2.00E-06-~ 
.~ 1.50E-06 
.. 
c 
::::l 1.00E-06 
5.00E-07 
O.OOE+OO -'+-_'--~_~_---'-_ _'__L_~_~ _ _'__ _ _'__ _ _'___~~_._J 
o 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 
Time (months) 
Figure 8.14 System Unavailability over a period of6 years 
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Figure 8.15 System unconditional failure intensity over a period of 6 years 
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Figure 8.16 Expected number of system failures in 6 years 
From figures 8.14 and 8.15, it can be seen that the system unavailability and unconditional 
failure intensity follow a similar pattern. In figure 8.14, the system unavailability repeats the 
pattern of increasing and plummeting at a fixed interval of 6 months. Since the system 
unavailability can be expressed as Qsys(t) = QM6002(t)xQF3002(t), the pattern in the system 
unavailability is shaped by module 6002 and factor 3002. Figure 8.17 and 8.18 respectively give 
the failure probability of module 6002 and factor 3002 within the same period. 
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Figure 8.17 The unavailability of module 6002 over the period of 6 years 
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Figure 8.18 The unavailability of factor 3002 over the period of 6 years 
The pattern in the failure probability of factor 3002 is determined by the dormant failure 
characteristic of the components represented by basic events e21 and e24. According to equation 
7.15, the failure probability of components featuring the dormant failure will increase from zero 
from the point of time immediately following the last inspection until dropping back to zero at 
the next one. Since the inspection intervals for components e21 and e24 are both 6 months, this 
explains the pattern in the failure probability of factor 3002. The failure probability of module 
6002 also features a 6-month time cycle, which is partly due to the inspection interval of 2 
months and 6 months respectively assigned to components represented by basic events ell and 
e6. This differs from Factor 3002, as the failure probability of module 6002 increases over the 
inspection time period. With Module 6002 and Factor 3002 combined through the AND logic, it 
generates the pattern in the system unavailability illustrated in figure 8.14. 
In terms of the system unconditional failure intensity, it can be expressed as: wsys(t) = QM6002(t) 
xWFJ002(t) + QFJ002(t)xWM6002(t). Figure 8.19 and 8.20 respectively gives the unconditional failure 
intensity of module 6002 and factor 3002. It can be concluded that both QF3002(t), QM6002(t) and 
WM6002(t) are characterized by the continuous increase every 6 months. Therefore, although 
WFJ002(t) features a pattern of the continuous decrease over the 6 months cycle, the combined 
effect determines that as time elapses, the system unconditional failure intensity increases over 
the 6-months time cycle as is displayed in figure 8.15. 
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Figure 8.19 The unconditional failure intensity of module 6002 over the period of 6 years 
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Figure 8.20 The unconditional failure intensity of factor 3002 over the period of 6 years 
With regard to the expected number of system failures W,y,(O, T), the curve shown in figure 8.16 
indicates, as expected, that it continuously increases as the time elapses, which is determined by 
the definition Wsys(O, T) = ! W,y,(t)dt. A further investigation into figure 8.16 will reveal that 
within every 6 months since t=0, W,ys(O, t) increases at an increasing rate, which can be 
explained by the increasing W,ys(t) over the same period, whilst the rate of increase drops greatly 
at the beginning of each 6-month interval. 
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8.4.4.2 Importance Measures of Basic Events 
The criticality function of basic events e15, e18 and e19 at any time within 6 years is zero. It 
means that for component failures represented by these three basic events, there exists no critical 
state with regard to the combination of the states of other components. This is determined by the 
contribution that the corresponding component makes to the system failure. Basic event e 15 is an 
enabling event involved in the initiator-enabler dependency. Because the occurrence e15 
following the occurrence of the general initiating event gate G 18 will never result in the failure 
of module 6006, there is no state of module 6007 which will satisfy the definition of a critical 
state for e15. It is the same case with basic events e18 and e19. Due to the specific order of 
occurrence imposed by the sequential dependency, there exist no such critical state in which the 
occurrence of e 18 or e 19 will make module 6005 pass from working to failed. 
Also a comparison is carried out between the criticality function of the basic events at different 
points of time. The comparison is made between the basic event which are the top five in terms 
of the value of their criticality function, and illustrated in table 8.6. The criticality function of 
other basic events are of much smaller magnitude. 
~ Basic 18 months 36 months 54 months 72 months events 
EI3 2.3776E-05 3.5092E-05 5.1914E-05 7.6634E-05 
EI4 2.3776E-05 3.5092E-05 5.1914E-05 7.6634E-05 
E8 5.4467E-04 8.0411E-04 1.1898E-03 1.7565E-03 
E9 6.7915E-04 6.7889E-04 6.7850E-04 6.7793E-04 
EIO I.0925E-03 1.2675E-03 1.5275E-03 1.9097E-03 
.. Table 8.6 Companson ofcntIcahty functIon between basIc events 
8.4.5 Contrast with the Case Where Dependencies are Ignored 
In this section, the software is applied to the same example fault tree but assuming there is no 
dependency existing in the system. Then a comparison is carried out between the outputs of 
these two assessments. The effect on the system reliability prediction of failing to identify the 
dependency relationships is highlighted by the contrast. 
8.4.5.1 Outputs Assuming Independence 
Assuming that there is no dependency in the system, the simplification and modularization 
processes will turn the original fault tree structure into independent factors and modules as are 
shown in figure 8.21. 
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Figure 8.21 Factors and modules identified from the example fault tree with no dependencies 
Since there is no dependency, all factors and modules will be solved using the BDD. Figure 8.22, 
8.23 and 8.24 provides a comparison of system unavailability, system unconditional failure 
intensity and expected number of system failures between the two different situations. 
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Figure 8.22 Comparison of system unavailability 
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Figure 8.24 Comparison of expected number of system failures 
From figure 8.22, it can be seen that the system unavailability Qsys(t) based on the independence 
assumption follows the same pattern within each 6-month cycle as the situation where various 
dependency relationships are recognized. However, the system unavailability where 
independence is assumed significantly underestimates the more accurate assessment accounting 
for the dependencies. The maximum value of each cycle also increases as time elapses. This 
results in a continuously increasing gap in system unavailability between the two situations at the 
end of each 6-month cycle. 
The similar conclusion can be drawn when the comparison is carried out with regard to the 
system unconditional failure intensity wsys(t) in these two situations. Again assuming 
independence significantly underestimates the system failure intensity. 
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The gap between the two curves in figure 8.24 is explained by the difference between the 
average system unconditional failure intensity wsys(t) in these two situations. 
8.4.5.2 Comparison at Module/Factor Level 
The previous section has illustrated the influence that the dependency relationships existing in 
the system have on the system reliability assessment as well as the error which can stem from the 
failure to account for the dependencies during the assessment process. In this section, the 
comparison is extended to module/factor level to highlight the difference that each type of 
dependency relationship included in the example can make with regard to the reliability 
assessment. 
• Initiator-enabler Dependency 
Module 6006 in figure S.9 and Factor SOOS in figure 8.20 represent the same fault tree section. 
The initiator-enabler dependency is taken into account in solving M6006, but ignored in the 
solution of FSOOS. Figure 8.2S, 8.26 and 8.27 respectively illustrate the difference in the module 
unavailability, module unconditional failure intensity and expected number of module failures. 
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Figure 8.2S Illustration ofthe impact of initiator-enabler dependency on unavailability 
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Figure 8.26 Illustration of the impact of initiator-enabler dependency on unconditional failure 
intensity 
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Figure 8.27 Illustration ofthe impact of initiator-enabler dependency on expected number of 
failures 
The three-month cycle featured by both module unavailability Q(t) and unconditional failure 
intensity wet) in figures 8.25 and 8.26 are caused by the dormant failure of basic event elS with 
the inspectional interval of 3 months. It can be seen that by taking into account the initiator-
enabler dependency existing between the general initiating event represented by gate G 18 and 
the enabling event eiS, the module unavailability, unconditional failure intensity and expected 
number of failures are dramatically reduced. That is, the failure to account for the initiator-
enabler dependency may lead to a considerable over-estimation in the system unavailability. This 
is especially true when the initiator-enabler dependency exists at a high level in the system. 
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• Test Dependency 
The test dependency exists in module 6004 in figure 5.9. The exact counterpart which contains 
no dependency is module 7001 in figure 8.23. The three minimal cut sets for this module are 
e3.e1.e2, e4.e1.e2 and e4.e7.e2. Figures 8.28, 8.29 and 8.30 illustrate how the test dependency 
can influence the system reliability assessment. 
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Figure 8.28 Illustration of the impact of test dependency on unavailability 
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Figure 8.29 Illustration ofthe impact of test dependency on unconditional failure intensity 
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Figure 8.30 Illustration ofthe impact oftest dependency on expected number of failures 
The difference in the module unavailability between the dependent and independent situations 
mainly lies in the different patterns with regard to the time cycle. In figure 8.28, it can be seen 
that the system unavailability with no dependency considered, i.e. represented by series 1, 
fluctuates in a time cycle of 6 months. It can be noticed that in each cycle, the increase within the 
third month is much smaller than that during the second month. This can be attributed to the 
dormant failure represented by basic event e2 with an inspection interval of 2 months which can 
be found in every minimal cut set. The plummet immediately following the end of the third 
month is explained by the 3-month inspection interval assigned to components whose dormant 
failures are represented by basic events el, e4 and e7. When it reaches the end of the 6th month, 
the inspections are conducted on e2, el, e4 and e7 at the same time, which explains why the 
module unavailability takes a abrupt drop. The module unavailability represented by series 2 
takes a different pattern which features a time cycle of 12 months, as is displayed in figure 8.28. 
One difference lies in that the increase of the module unavailability during the 5th month on 
series 2 is much smaller than that on series 1. The reason for this is due to the extra mutual 
inspection conducted every 4 months on components represented by basic events el, e4 and e7. 
And this extra mutual inspection also explains why the module unavailability at the end of the 6th 
month on series 2 is significantly lower than that at the same point of time on series 1 (see 
equation 7.16). Another obvious difference lies in the big drop during the 9th month on series 2 
which is again caused by the extra mutual inspection coinciding with the inspection on e2. It can 
be noticed that this causes a significant gap at the end of the 9th month between the two situations. 
when it reaches the end of l2'h month, all inspections are conducted at the same time revealing 
all dormant failures and bring the module unavailability down. A new cycle then begins. From 
figure 8.30, it can be seen that the test dependency also causes a gap in the expected number of 
module failures. 
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• Sequential Dependency 
Module 6005 in figure 5.9 contains both a maintenance dependency and a sequential dependency. 
To gain an accurate and correct understanding of how these two types of relationship influence 
the reliability assessment individually, they should be investigated separately. An assessment is 
carried out on module 6005 for the same period of time assuming that there only exists the 
sequential dependency between the three basic events e18, el9 and e20. As is illustrated in 
figures 8.31, 8.32 and 8.33, a comparison is made with Factor 5002 in figure 8.23 to highlight 
the effect of sequential dependency. 
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Figure 8.31 Illustration of the impact of sequential dependency on unavailability 
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Figure 8.32 Illustration of the impact of sequential dependency on unconditional failure intensity 
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Figure 8.33 Illustration of the impact of sequential dependency on expected number offailures 
From these figures, it can be seen that the sequential dependency has a significant impact on the 
system reliability assessment as it results in a much smaller system unavailability, system 
unconditional failure intensity and expected number of system failures. This is ascribed to the 
strict occurrence order dictated by the sequential dependency . 
• Maintenance Dependency 
The assessment is carried out on Module 6005 assuming that only maintenance dependency is 
involved. Figures 8.34, 8.35 and 8.36 illustrates the differences in module unavailability, 
module unconditional failure intensity and expected number of failures from the situation where 
no dependency is taken into account. 
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Figure 8.34 Illustration of the impact of maintenance dependency on unavailability 
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Figure 8.35 Illustration of the impact of maintenance dependency on unconditional failure 
intensity 
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Figure 8.36 Illustration ofthe impact of maintenance dependency on expected number of failures 
The contrast made here is opposite to the case with regard to sequential dependency. From the 
above figures, it can be seen that maintenance dependency results in considerably larger values 
in the module reliability parameters. This is attributed to the fact that the maintenance 
dependency results in the increase in the mean time to repair of the relevant components, 
prolongs the components' actual down time and thus leads to the increases in the probability that 
the system resides in a failed state. The maintenance dependency can have a significant effect on 
the system reliability assessment, especially when the components involved make bigger 
contributions to the system failure. 
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Chapter 9. Dependency Modelling of Active-on-demand Systems 
In the previous chapter, the process of evaluating the reliability of continuously-running systems 
is described in detail and illustrated with an example. In this chapter, the system dependency 
modelling is investigated from the perspective of active-on-demand systems. The static-dynamic 
two-phase approach is proposed to enable a more efficient analysis of active-on-demand 
systems. A firewater deluge system is used to illustrate the whole process. 
9.1 Dynamic Fault Tree Method and Active-on-demand Systems 
Active-on-demand systems have been introduced in chapter 3 to illustrate the application of the 
dynamic fault tree method. The sprinkler system and the water deluge system in chapter 3 are 
both typical examples of this type of system, in fact, most safety/protective systems come into 
this category. Protection systems are fitted. on large and complex industrial systems, such as off-
shore oil platforms, nuclear power plants and chemical process plants, to prevent potentially 
hazardous incidents from developing into the catastrophe. For example, a fire accident on an oil 
platform, if not immediately mitigated, can escalate to an explosion which will claim many lives 
as well as damage to valuable assets. The difference of this type of system from the 
continuously-operating systems is that they reside in the inactive/standby state until the incident 
in question occurs and generates the demand for the safety/protective system to activate. This 
usually lessens the hazardous impact of the incident, and may require the safety/protective 
system to function for a certain period of time, during which the repair of failed elements 
commonly can't be carried out. Protection system failure during the required functioning time 
usually leads to the same consequence as being unable to respond in the first place. This means 
that most safety/protective systems have two failure modes: inactive failure and active failure. In 
terms of the assessment of the performance of the safety/protective systems, the two failure 
modes should be investigated separately to give the system unavailability and the system 
unreliability. The system unavailability Q,y,(t) gives the probability that the system is unable to 
activate at time t when the demand arises, whilst the system unreliability F,y,(TT) gives the 
probability that the system once started is unable to function through the required period oftime 
TT' 
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In chapter 3, the dynamic fault tree method has been introduced as a means of performing the 
evaluation of the active-on-demand systems. Its general process can be summarized as follows: 
Step 1. Identify different types of dependency existing in the system 
Step 2. Construct the dynamic fault tree according to the system failure logic using the 
dependency gate structures. 
Step 3. Calculate the system unavailability in terms of the failure characteristics of its 
components. 
Step 4. Identify the components which contribute to the system failure whilst active. 
Establish the initial states for the relevant components, calculate the initial state 
probabilities and develop the Markov model. Calculate the system uureliability based on 
the corresponding Markov model. 
However, as has been stated in section 3.2.3.2, the dynamic fault tree method has several 
significant disadvantages. In addition to its complex structure, the dynamic fault tree, in its 
current form, is unable to represent other types of dependency, such as the maintenance 
dependency, the test dependency and the revealing dependency. Component failures which are 
involved in these types of dependency may be well scattered around in the fault tree, and as such 
it can be very difficult to introduce new types of dependency gate structures to group these 
relevant basic events. Also, in addressing active-on-demand systems, the dynamic fault tree 
method investigates the two different system failure modes in one fault tree structure which does 
not provide a means to distinguish between the different contributions that component failures 
make to the distinct system failure modes. 
9.2 Static-Dynamic Two-Phase Approach 
9.2.1 Algorithm 
To overcome the shortcomings of the dynamic fault tree method, the static-dynamic two-phase 
approach is proposed. Its principle is to investigate the failure of active-on-demand systems from 
an explicit two-phase perspective. The system failure is divided into static failure and dynamic 
failure, which are considered separately and refer to the system failure to respond to the demand 
and the system failure to function through the required period of time respectively. Two 
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conventional fault tree structures, 'static-phase' fault tree and 'dynamic-phase' fault tree, are 
established to model the two different system failure modes respectively, and the solution of 
each of the fault trees gives the prediction on the system unavailability and unreliability 
respectively. In this way, the effect of the different failure modes of components can be 
distinguished and component failures need not be considered in the analysis of the phase during 
which they have no influence and are irrelevant. 
9.2.2 The Analysis Process 
The general process of applying the static-dynamic two-phase approach to the assessment of 
active-on-demand systems is illustrated in the flow chart shown in figure 9.1. 
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Figure 9.1 The general process of application of static-dynamic two-phase approach to active-on-
demand systems 
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9.2.3 Implementation of the General Process 
A program has been developed to implement the static·dynamic two-phase approach in the 
reliability assessment 0 f a ctive-on-demand systems within the dependency m odelling context. 
The following section describes how the implementation is realized in the program. 
9.2.3.1 System Information Input 
The assessment of active-on-demand systems requires inputs to define: system failure logic, the 
components' reliability parameters and the dependency relationships between components. In 
tenns of system failure logic, two 'fault tree structure files' need to be established, representing 
the static system failure and dynamic system failure. These two files will be established in the 
same way as is described in section 8.3.1. The components' reliability parameters are included in 
the 'basic event file'. The 'basic event file' used in the assessment of active-on-demand systems 
is different from the continuously-operating systems, and features a distinct structure. Some 
components can be regarded as passive since they are not actually 'running', and don't change 
the system state as the control components and pressure transmitters do. While for other 
components, there exist different phases throughout their service, during which they feature 
passive failures and active failures respectively. Usually the failure parameters also vary for 
these two different failure modes, which means two different basic events need to be introduced 
to distinguish the different failure modes. Apart from the different component failure modes, 
additional information is also required to identify in which system phase the component failure is 
relevant. The structure of the 'basic event file' used in the assessment of active-on-demand 
systems is displayed in table 9. 1. 
List of Basic Failure Number of 
event mode Relevant in Counterpart Failure Parameters Enabler dependency dependency 
represented phase failure event model group name groups 
numbers 
P: Passive S: Static 
... A: Active D: dynamic ... 
B:Both 
Table 9.1 The structure of 'basIC event file' for actIve-on-demand systems 
In terms of the dependency infonnation, as with continuously-operating systems, two 
dependency files are established to contain the normal dependency relationships and the 
functional dependency plus switching dependency relationships respectively. In addition to the 
information given in table 4.1 in section 4.2, for normal dependency file, an extra column 
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indicates in which system phase (static or dynamic) the dependency relationship in question is 
relevant. Functional dependency and switching dependency won't be relevant when the system 
resides in the inactive state, and only need considering when the system is functioning or when 
the system is going through the transition from inactive to active. 
9.2.3.2 Pre-processing 
This part of the process is similar to that in the assessment of continuously-operating systems 
(see section 8.2.2). Error checking is conducted to ensure the fault tree structure files, the basic 
event file and the dependency files are correctly related to each other. Two binary trees are 
constructed according to the fault tree structure files to represent the causes of system static and 
dynamic failures. Three basic event lists are formed respectively containing basic events which 
represent component failures relevant in only static system phase, dynamic system phase, or 
both. Two dependency information lists are established. One of them is established by extracting 
from the normal dependency file the dependency relationships which only need taking into 
account in the analysis of static system failure. The other contains the rest of dependency 
relationships included in the normal dependency file and all the functional and switching 
dependency relationships from the functional dependency file. Two dependency serial lists are 
formed, each based on the corresponding dependency information with the exception of the test 
dependency which are not considered. When extracting information from the functional 
dependency file, where gate events represent the functionally-controlling event, an expansion is 
carried out to express this intermediate gate event in terms of basic events which are linked to 
each other through OR logic. Each of these basic events will be the functionally-controlling 
event in a newly generated dependency relationship. For example, if an intermediate gate event, 
which consists of two basic events A and B related to each other through an OR logic (A+B), is 
involved in a functional dependency group as the functionally-controlling event, then this 
dependency relationship can be replaced by two new ones in which basic event A and basic 
event B are the functionally-controlling event against the same dependent component( s). 
Then the simplification, combination, modularization and re-modularization processes are 
conducted on the static-phase fault tree structure in exactly the same way described in section 
8.3.2. For the dynamic-phase fault tree, these processes will be implemented with extra factors 
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considered. The dynamic-phase fault tree structure investigates the causes of the dynamic system 
failure, which implies the system has activated successfully on demand. It is therefore necessary 
to consider the states that the components may reside in when the system starts to function. 
Components states must be such that the system is able to start. That is, basic events included in 
the dynamic-phase fault tree which represent component failures relevant to the system static 
failure must be grouped in the same module. During the simplification process, contraction, 
extraction and elimination is conducted in the same way as illustrated in chapter 5. But in terms 
ofthe factorization, factors should be composed of basic events which are either all related to the 
system static failure or all relevant in the system dynamic phase. During the following 
combination, modularization and re-modularization processes, basic events which represent 
component failures relevant to the system static failure are regarded as from a special 
'dependency group' separate from the dependency relationships identified in the normal 
dependency file. This special 'dependency group' will ensure that all component failures which 
are relevant to the static system failure are gathered in one module and thus can be considered 
together to determine the initial states from which the system activates. 
9.2.3.3 Quautificatiou 
The reliability assessment of active-on-demand systems is performed over a specified period of 
time, T. The time increment for the calculation, dt, is also required for the quantification process 
to progress. Both system unavailability Qsys(t) and system unreliability Fsys(Tr) are sought, the 
latter over the required period of operating time Tr. System unavailability and unreliability are 
solved in relation toe ach 0 ther according tot he failure logic represented by t he fault tree 0 f 
static failure and dynamic failure respectively. 
9.2.3.3.1 Calculation of System Unavailability Q,y,(t) 
The process of calculating the unavailability of active-on-demand systems is the same as is 
described in section 8.3.3. In the preparation stage, BDDs and Markov models are constructed 
for modules which feature no dependency serial number and modules which involve more than 
test dependency respectively. Quantification is then performed on each module in a bottom-up 
marmer to finally obtain the failure probability of the top event, i.e. the system unavailability. 
Given the frequency (Wi(t» of the event that the system is expected to suppress or mitigate, the 
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expected number of accidents (due to tbe system failure to start) during the assessment period T 
can be obtained as r Q,ys (t).wi(t)dt . 
9.2.3.3.2 Calculation of System Un reliability F,y,(Tr) 
The definition of system unreliability, Fsys(Tr), implies that the system has activated successfully 
at a particular point of time t. As described ealier, there exist two types of modules in the 
modularized dynamic-phase fault tree. One is the module which includes basic events solely 
relevant to the system dynamic failure. And the other is the module which includes basic events 
also related to the system static failure. Different quantification procedures are applied to these 
two types of modules . 
• System Dynamic Failure 
Components included in these types of module make no contribution to the system static failure, 
which implies that they won't fail during the system static phase. Therefore, for modules of this 
category, the quantification process is tbe same as in the system static phase. For modules which 
need to be addressed using tbe Markov method, the module starts with all components working 
with probability 1 . 
• General Failure Event 
Some components included in this type of module are related to the system static failure, which 
means that they are likely to fail during the system static phase and contribute to tbe system 
static failure. When the system activates, the system can do so from different initial states. The 
quantification of the module has to start with the identification of all the possible initial states 
defined by the components which are working and failed. This is achieved as follows: 
Step 1. Identify the initial system states which enables the system to activate. 
a) Identify basic events from tbe module which should be considered with regard to tbe initial 
states. Component failures included in the module which are not relevant to tbe static system 
failure are not considered. Basic events considered when determining the initial states must 
fulfil the condition that the basic event is related to a component whose either failure mode is 
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relevant in the system static phase. The relevant component information can be obtained 
from the basic event file. 
b) Include basic events from static-phase fault tree. Some basic events included in the static-
phase fault tree (but not in the dynamic-phase one) represent the failure of components which 
exist as the functionally-controlling part in corresponding functional and switching 
dependency relationships. They are relevant to the initial states for the system dynamic phase 
as their states determine if the functionally-dependent component is able to be activated. 
Basic events should be added to the list which represent the functionally-controlling 
components involved in any functional or switching dependency group with basic events 
from the existing list established in procedure a) as the functionally-dependent part. 
c) Trim the list. Basic events which satisfy the following conditions will be deleted from the 
list. 
Represents functionally-controlling component; AND 
Only one component is functionally dependent on it. 
The reason behind this procedure lies in that the state of the functionally-controlling 
component can be partly reflected by the state of the functionally-dependent component. For 
example, if component A is functionally dependent on component B, then when A is 
working or ready to start functioning, it implies that component B must be working as well. 
When A is failed unusable, it can be caused by the failure of A itself or the failure of B. In 
that case, the failure of component A and component B will be related to each other through 
an OR logic with regard to the system failure, the failed state of component A, whatever the 
cause, would be sufficient to decide the system state. What's more, by carrying out this 
trimming procedure, the size of the resulting Markov model can be reduced to its smallest 
form. 
d) Develop the list of initial states based on the chosen basic events. This process starts with the 
first initial state in which the state code of all basic events is set as '0' representing the 
component is working. New states are created by changing the state code of each basic event 
from '0' to '1' (representing the component failed) in turn to create new states from existing 
states. This process is then applied to new states until the development is completed when no 
new states are generated. When a new state is generated, it won't be added to the list if in this 
state the system is definitely failed and not able to start. 
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Step 2. Detennine the probabilities that the system starts from different initial states. 
Consider the general situation where n components are included in the m initial states. The state 
code of each component is denoted as Si: 
s, = { O. component i working 
I, component i failed 
j=1,2, ... ,fl 
q;(t) is the probability that component i is failed at time t, i.e. Si = 1. 
The initial state j is a function of the state codes of all the components: 
statej = Jj(SI, S2, ... , sn). 
~(t) is the probability of state j as an initial state at time t, which means that the system must be 
available in state j at time t: 
~{t) = P(the system is available in statej AND the components exist in 
their relevant states represented by state J) 
= P(the system is available I Jj{Sh S2, ... , Sn» 
X IT qi (I) x IT(1-qk(t» 
i k 
such that sI =1 such that Sk =0 
where all component states are independent 
9.1 
In equation 9.1, the first condition that 'the system is available in state j' must be explicitly 
accounted for. It must excludes all situations where in state j the system is failed due to the 
failure of the components which are not included for the consideration of the initial states. The 
sum of the initial state probabilities at time 1 is equal to the system availability at time I. 
When the probabilities of all initial states have been detennined, the appropriate quantification 
model for the module is established. 
Step 3. Establish the appropriate quantification model for the module. 
» Establish BDD for the corresponding module if there is no dependency relationship 
involved. 
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> Develop the Markov model based on the established initial states. 
a) Add basic events to the model which are included in the module as only relevant to the 
system dynamic failure. For each of the established initial states, the state codes of these 
added basic events are set as '0'. 
b) Develop the Markov model based on algorithms presented in chapter 6 according to the 
types of dependency involved. If it's the case that repair won't be carried out during the 
system dynamic phase, all states characterized by failed module state are absorbing, 
therefore no further development from these states is necessary. Also another technique is 
proposed aimed at reducing the size of the resulting Markov model. This technique is 
called 'No Further Influence'. The underlying algorithm is that in states where the 
module is working, components in the working state don't need to be considered to 
generate new system states if their failures are unlikely to make any further contribution 
to the module failure. For example, the module consists of three components linked 
through module failure logic (A+B).C. In the state with a combination {A: failed, B: 
working, C: working}, a transition caused by the failure of component B, which creates a 
new state as {A: failed, B: failed, C: working}, doesn't need to be included in the model 
because the failure of component B given component A has failed won't influence the 
failure conditions of the module failure. With the 'No Further Influence' technique, the 
size of the resulting Markov model can be dramatically reduced, which will greatly 
improve the efficiency of the quantification process. Before the development process 
starts, modules are established centring around each functionally-dependent event 
involved in functional or switching dependency relationships. The established modules 
include all the functionally-controlling events which are exclusive to the particular 
dependent component as well as the dependent event itself. When the module is failed, 
the dependent component is unusable or inaccessible. 
Step 4: Module quantification 
- Quantification in BDDs 
The system can start from any ofthe m initial states f;(s}, S2, ... , Sn), i = 1,2, ... , m. Starting from 
each different initial state will result in a different module unreliability. For each initial state 
f;(Sh S2, ... , Sn), a conditional module unreIiability Fi(Tr) is obtained where: 
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F,{Tr) = P(the module is unreliable over Tr I f,{st, S2, ••• , Sr,». 
where Tr is measured from the time of system activation 
The system unconditional unreliability is then obtained by: 
m 
Fsys(Tr) = L1';(T,).Q, 
;=1 
where Qi refers to the probability of initial state i at the time of system activation. 
9.2 
- Quantification in the Markov model: the quantification is carried out through the established 
rate matrix 
When repair is not available during the system dynamic phase, the system unreliability over T r, 
Fsys(Tr), is equal to the system unavailability at the end of Tr from the system activation time. 
Since it is assumed that the failure to function for the required period oftime Tr will bring about 
the same consequence as failure to activate, being unreliable also makes a contribution to the 
expected number of accidents by (F,y,(T,).w,(t)dt , where Fsys(Tr) stands for the system 
unreliability over Tr from the system activation time t. 
9.2.3.4 Calculation of Importance Measures 
9.2.3.4.1 Importance Measures in the System Static Phase 
The criticality function of each component Gi(q(t» is calculated as an indicator of the 
component's contribution to the system static failure. The algorithm applied for this is as 
illustrated in section 7.1.6. 
9.2.3.4.2 Importance Measures in the System Dynamic Phase 
- Importance Measure for Initiating Events 
In addition to the criticality function, the Barlow-Proschan measure of initiator importance (B-P 
measure) can also provide useful information indicating the contribution of each initiating event 
to the system failure. It is defined as the probability that initiating event i causes a system failure 
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during the interval given the system is unreliable over the interval [0, t). The B-P measure is 
expressed by: 
! {Q(li,q(u»-Q(Oi,q(u))}w,(u)du 
BP, = =-----------
I W(O,t) 9.3 
The numerator gives the expected number of system failures during the interval due to the 
occurrence of initiating event i and is weighted by the total number of system failures during the 
same interval. This indicates the contribution that the initiating event i makes to the system 
unreliability during [0, t). For active-on-demand systems, the period of time, TT, required for the 
system to effectively mitigate the incident is used as the time interval in equation 9.3. 
The Barlow-Proschan measure evaluates the importance of the individual initiating event over a 
certain period oftime. In this sense, it is a concept of time flow. To acquire an idea of how the 
failure of each individual component can contribute to the system failure as time elapses (i.e. at 
discrete points of time), the derivation of the numerator in equation 9.3 can be used, i.e. 
{Q(lp q(t» - Q(Oi,q(t»}wi(t) . 
When a B-P measure for the initiating event i is calculated in a Markov model, equation 9.3 can 
be transformed to enable a more efficient calculation. The transformation is carried out as 
follows: 
BP i = 
! G,(q(u».wi(u)du 
W(O,t) 
= ! G,(q(u».[l-Q,(u)]A,du 
W(O,t) 
!IQj(U).,1,idu 
=_.e...j ___ _ 
W(O,t) 9.4 
where in state j, the combination of the states of the other components form the critical 
state for the initiating event i, thus the occurrence of the event i (with the conditional 
failure rate Ai) will bring about the system failure. 
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- Imporlance Measure for Enabling Events 
For components whose failures can be defined as an enabling event, that is, the failure of the 
component can never immediately bring the system from working to failed state, the Barlow-
Proschan measure is zero as the criticality function of the enabling events is always zero. To 
correctly reflect the contribution that enabling events make to the system unreliability, an 
importance measure for enabling events is introduced. As is defined in [1], one measure of 
importance for the enabling event m at time I is expressed as: 
9.5 
where: 
- Wi(t) and wit) represent the failure frequency (unconditional failure intensity) of 
initiating event j and} at time t respectively. 
- Ei• k represents the event that a minimal cut set k containing the initiating event j occurs 
with event j removed 
- Ej,k represents the event that a minimal cut set k containing both the initiating event} 
mek 
and the enabling event m occurs with initiating event} removed 
- nm represents the number of initiating events which are included in the same minimal 
cut sets with the enabling event m 
- ni represents the total number of initiating events in the system 
The importance measure expressed in equation 9,5 represents a value at discrete points of time, 
To enable the measure to provide an indication of the contribution that each enabling event 
makes to the system unreliability in the dynamic phase of active-on-demand systems, the 
integration process is applied to both numerator and denominator in equation 9.5, This 
introduces the importance measure for the enabling event m in terms of the system unreliability 
over a certain period oftime T" This is shown in equation 9.6. 
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(~P{yE~:k }.W/t)dt 
(~P{VEI'k }W'(t}dt 9.6 
The importance measure for the enabling event in equation 9.6 is very similar to the Barlow-
Proschan measure in equation 9.3. As p{ VE/'k} is equal to the criticality function Gi(q(t}} of 
the initiating event i, the denominator in equation 9.6 actually represents the expected number of 
system failures W(O, T r}, same as in the Barlow-Proshan measure. Therefore, ifthe initiating 
event i and the enabling event m always appear together in the minimal cut sets, which means 
that the numerator in equation 9.6 is the same as that in equation 9.3 (i.e. I;P{UEj'k} = 
j=l j mek 
G/q(t}}}, the Barlow-Proschan measure for the initiating event i and the importance measure I! 
for the enabling event m will have the same value. 
If the Markov model is adopted for the system dynamic-phase analysis, a transformation of 
equation 9.6 is required to enable the calculation 0 fthe importance m easure for the enabling 
event without having to obtain the minimal cut sets. The transformation is shown in equation 9.7. 
9.7 
where: 
- '}."j represents the conditional failure rate of the initiating eventj 
- Qk(t} represents the probability of state k at time t in which the enabling event m has 
occurred, and the initiating eventj has not occurred, and the system state is a critical state 
for the initiating event j. 
- nm represents the number of initiating events j which is involved in the same initiator-
enabler dependency relationship with the enabling event m. 
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9.2.3.5 Output 
Three files are generated by the program to store the results of the reliability assessment carried 
out on the active-on-demand system. Two files are used to store the importance measures of 
relevant components respectively for the system static and dynamic phase. And the other file 
gives the predictions of system failures measured in both unavailability and unreliability. 
9.3 Application of the Static-dynamic Two-phase Approach to the Firewater Deluge System 
In this section, the firewater deluge system (FDS) fitted on an off-shore oil platform, which is a 
typical example of an active-on-demand system, is used to illustrate how the static-dynamic two-
phase approach can be applied. 
9.3.1 Description ofthe Firewater Deluge System 
The basic features of the system are shown in figure 9.2. Its function is to supply, on demand 
when a fire occurs, water and foam at a controlled pressure to a specific area on the platform 
protected by a deluge system. As such, the FDS is composed of a fire sensing system, a deluge 
skid, firewater pumps, associated equipment and ringmains and Aqueous Film-Forming Foam 
(AFFF) pumps, associated equipment and ringmains. Each subsystem is described in more detail 
in the following sections. 
9.3.1.1 The Fire Detection System and the Deluge System 
The fire detection system consists of three fire and smoke sensors, which will send signal to the 
Main Fire and Gas Panel (MFGP) when a fire occurs. The deluge valve set including all 
associated equipment is mounted on a fabricated steel framework called a skid. Skids are situated 
on the processing platform where an incident can occur and its associated equipment act to spray 
water onto the affected area. The deluge valve set is composed of three main elements: the main 
distribution line, a water closing circuit and a control air circuit. Upon receiving a signal from 
the Main Fire and Gas Panel, the solenoid valves (SV1I2) are de-energised and open thus 
releasing air pressure from the control air circuit. The air pressure drop allows the valmatic 
release valve to open, and water from the water closing circuit runs to drain. This causes the 
pressure on the deluge valve diaphragm to fall. When the pressure on the diaphragm has fallen 
sufficiently, the firewater main pressure acting on the underside of the deluge valve clack 
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overcomes the load imposed by the diaphragm, allowing water to flow into the distribution 
pipes, through the nozzles and onto the hazard. 
The deluge valve set is also fitted with an AFFF supply line. Instrument air pressure maintains 
the valmatic release valve and AFFF valve closed. When the air pressure drops in the control air 
circuit, due to the solenoid valves being de-energised (the same components as those used to 
activate the water deluge valve), the AFFF valve and valmatic release valve open 
simultaneously. As the water flows through the foam inductor in the main distribution line, foam 
concentrate is induced from the AFFF line via the foam proportion er. The solution of water and 
approximately 3% foam then feed into the distribution network, through the nozzles and onto the 
hazard. 
9.3.1.2 Firewater Supply and Distribution System 
The deluge systems are connected to a pressurized ringmain network. The ringmain pressure is 
maintained by a jockey pump drawing water from the sea. Falling pressure is detected by the 
pressure transmitters, which subsequently send a signal to the MFGP. In turn, the MFGP 
activates the firewater pumps to supply water direct from the sea at sufficient pressure to meet 
the deluge requirements. Pumps not needed remain in inactive standby. 
The fire pumps are arranged in two sets, each including two pumps. one set is powered by 
electric supplies from the main electric power plant. One electric supply serves as the standby 
power. The other set is powered by their own dedicated diesel engines. The diesels have a day 
tank sized for a 24 hour supply with a low-level alarm fitted. 
9.3.1.3 AFFF Supply and Distribution 
The foam concentrate is stored in a stainless steel tank and is distributed through a stainless steel 
ringmain network. The tank has a low level alarm fitted. The foam system is kept at 
approximately the same pressure as the firewater system by a continuously running air driven 
jockey pump. Two AFFF pumps are fitted, with one motor driven power supplied from the 
platform power plant, and the other diesel driven but separate from the diesel supply to the 
firewater diesel pumps. 
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Figure 9.2 The Firewater Deluge System 
When a fire is detected, the AFFF deluge valve opens and the pressure drops in the AFFF 
ringmain. The three pressure transmitters detect the pressure drop and send a signal to the AFFF 
control panel which activates the AFFF pump to supply the foam to the inductor nozzle. The 
pump not needed will remain in standby. 
Additional system features and assumptions: 
• The two electric firewater pumps and the electric AFFF pump are set as the duty pumps. 
• 2 out-of-4 firewater pressure sensors and 2-out-of-3 AFFF pressure sensors are required to 
work to effectively detect the faIling pressure. 
• The distribution line on each firewater pump is identical, including a filter, two isolation 
valves, one check valve, one test valve and one pressure relief valve. The distribution line on 
each AFFF pump is the same as that of the firewater pump except the filter. 
• System maintenance: 
Each element of the fire detection system (consisting of3 fire/smoke sensors), the 
firewater pressure sensing system (consisting of 4 pressure transmitters) and 
AFFF pressure sensing system (consisting of3 pressure sensors) is maintained by 
one engineer. 
The isolation valves lVI, IV2, IVI2 and Iv13 and check valve CVS as indicated 
in figure 9.2 are maintained by two engineers. 
The inductor nozzle, the strainer and the spray nozzle are maintained by one 
engineer. 
The water deluge valve, the AFFF deluge valve and the valmatic relief valve are 
maintained by one engineer. 
The two solenoid valves are maintained by one engineer. 
The two electric supplies to firewater electric pumps are maintained by one 
engineer. 
Each of the valve sets on the four firewater pump streams (consisting of one filter, 
two isolation valves and one check valve) is maintained by one engineer. 
The valve set on the AFFF electric pump stream (consisting of two isolation 
valves and one check valve) is maintained by one engineer. 
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The valve set on the AFFF diesel pump stream (consisting of two isolation valves 
and one check valve) plus the isolation valve IV14 (the isolation valve located on 
the output of the AFFF diesel tank) are maintained by one engineer. 
All the isolation valves are tested every 6 months. All the check valves and filters 
are tested every 2 months. Each pump stream is tested through the corresponding 
test valve every 3 months. 
• Human errors are ignored 
• The repair won't be carried out during the time the system is functioning 
• The isolation valves, check valves and deluge valves won't fail blocked when there is fluid 
flowing through them, i.e. the system has been activated. 
9.3.2 Reliability Assessment of the Firewater Deluge System 
9.3.2.1 System Failure Information 
9.3.2.1.1 Construction of Fault Trees 
• Static System Failure Fault Tree 
The top event of this fault tree is defined as 'Firewater Deluge System Fails to Activate on 
Demand'. This top event will occur if either the firewater or AFFF pump mechanism fails to 
activate. Failure of these functions can be attributed to two causes: the control subsystem fails to 
activate the pump systems OR the firewater or AFFF pump subsystem themselves fails to 
activate when the need is detected, as is indicated in figure 9.3. The fault tree representing the 
static system failure is developed for each of these sub-events in figure 9.3. 
The control subsystem fails to activate the firewater pumps 
The firewater pumps will not activate if the main fire and gas panel itself fails to send the start-
up signal or no pressure drop in the ringmain is detected. This occurs if the firewater pressure 
sensors fail to detect the falling pressure or the pressure doesn't drop in the firewater ringmain. 
The latter event will occur when the water deluge valve does not open or the tenninal 
distribution line is blocked. The water deluge valve cannot be opened either because the valve 
itself fails or because the pressure on the deluge valve diaphragm doesn't fall. The latter event 
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can be further traced down to the failures of fire sensing system, the solenoid valves or the 
valmatic relief valve. Table 9.2 gives a summary of the events considered. 
Notation Event description 
MPF Main fire and gas panel fails to send signal to firewater pumps 
WPSIF-WPS4F Firewater pressure sensors I - 4 fails to detect the pressure drop in the 
firewater ringmain 
IVI-IV2 Blockage of the locked open butterfly valves (Iso.vl - Iso.v2) 
!NB Blockage of inductor nozzle 
SB Blockage of strainer 
NB Blockage of spray nozzle 
WDV Firewater deluge valve (deluge vI) fails to open 
WVS Valmatic relief valve sticks closed on activation 
SVI-SV2 Solenoid activated valve fails to dump instrument air on receipt of the signal 
fromMFGP 
FSIF-FS3F Fire and smoke sensors fail to detect the fire 
Table 9.2 Events Involved In the faIlure to activate the firewater pumps 
The firewater pump system fails to activate 
When 3-out-of-4 firewater pump streams do not activate, the firewater pump subsystem fails on 
demand. For each firewater pump stream, activation will not occur when the pump fails or the 
associated pipework and valve distribution line is blocked. Events considered are listed in table 
9.3. 
Notation Event description 
EIF-E2F Electric firewater pump I or 2 fails in standby 
ESI-ES2 ElectriCJ>Ower supply to electric firewater pumps fails 
DIF-D2F Diesel f!rewater pump I or 2 fails in standby 
DS Diesel supply to diesel firewater pumps fails 
FBI-FB4 Filter I - filter 4 blocked 
IV3 -IVll Isolation valve 3 - isolation valve II blocked 
CVI-CV4 Check valve I - 4 blocked 
Table 9.3 Events Involved In the static faIlure of firewater pump subsystem 
The control subsystem fails to activate the AFFF pump 
The causes of failure to activate the AFFF pump system are similar to these discussed above 
with regard to the failure to activate the firewater pump system. Events considered here are given 
in table 9.4. 
Notation Event description 
APF AFFF panel fails to send signal to AFFF pumps 
APSIF-APS4F AFFF pressure sensors I - 3 fails to detect the pressure drop in the AFFF 
ringmain 
IVI2 Blockage of the locked open butterfly valve (Iso.vI2) 
CV5 Blockage of check valve 5 
!NB Blockage of inductor nozzle 
SB Blockage of strainer 
NB Blockage of spray nozzle 
ADV AFFF deluge valve (deluge v2) fails to open 
SVI-SV2 Solenoid activated valve fails to dump instrument air on receipt of the signal 
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fromMFGP 
FSIF - FS3F Fire and smoke sensors fail to detect the fire 
Table 9.4 Events involved in the failure of the control system to activate theAFFF pumps 
The AFFF pump system fails to activate 
The AFFF pump system fails to activate if there is insufficient foam in the AFFF tank or both the 
AFFF electric pump stream and the AFFF diesel pump stream fail in standby. Events considered 
regarding the failure of AFFF pump streams are given in table 9.5. 
Notation Event description 
AEF Electric AFFF pump fails in standby 
AES Electric power supply to electric AFFF pump fails 
ADF Diesel AFFF pump fails in standby 
ADS Diesel supply to diesel AFFF l'l'lllJl fails 
IVI3 - IVI8 /solation valve 13 - isolation valve 18 blocked 
CV6-CV7 Check valve 6 - 7 blocked 
INAF AFFF supply fails 
Table 9.5 Events relevant to the static failure of AFFF pump system 
Firewater Deluge System Fails to 
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Figure 9.3a Static-phase fault tree at top-event level 
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Figure 9.3c Static-phase fault tree for the failure of firewater pump streams 1 and 2 
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• Dynamic System Failure Fault Tree 
The top event of this fault tree is defined as 'Firewater Deluge System Fails to Function 
throughout the Required Period'. The top event occurs when either the firewater sub-system or 
the AFFF sub-system fails during the required functioning period. The direct cause of the 
dynamic failure of the firewater sub-system is identified as less than two firewater pump streams 
working. In order for the firewater pump stream to fail once activated can be ascribed to two 
causes: the pump fails or the pressure relief valve opens under normal pressure which means the 
water is delivered to the firewater ringmain at a pressure lower than required. The direct cause of 
the dynamic failure of the AFFF sub-system can be developed in a similar way. Events 
considered with regard to the dynamic failure of the firewater deluge system are given in table 
9.6. 
Notation Event description 
EID-E2D Electric firewater pump fails when functioning 
ES1-ES2 Electric power supply to electric firewater pumps fails 
DlD-D2D Diesel firewater pump fails when functioning 
DS Diesel supply to diesel firewater pumps fails 
AED Electric AFFF pump fails when functioning 
AES Electric power supply to electric AFFF pump fails 
ADD Diesel AFFF pump fails when functioning 
ADS Diesel supply to diesel AFFF pump fails 
PRV1-PRV6 Pressure relief valves 1 - 6 fails open under normal pressure 
INAF AFFF supply fails 
Table 9.6 Events considered as the direct causes to the dynamic failure of firewater deluge 
system 
The construction of the fault tree representing the dynamic system failure is accounts for the use 
of redundancy in the design of both firewater and AFFF sub-systems. The redundancy means 
that the system can activate with different starting configurations. For example, the system can 
start with two electric firewater pumps and one electric AFFF pump working whilst all the diesel 
pumps remain as standby. Alternatively it can start with two diesel firewater pumps and the 
diesel AFFF pump working because all electric pumps have already failed in standby. In the first 
situation, the Main Fire and Gas Panel, the firewater pressure sensing system, the AFFF control 
panel and the AFFF pressure sensing system can all contribute to the system failure since they 
would be required to start the standby pumps in the event that the duty pumps fail. However, in 
the second situation, the control sub-systems no longer contribute to the dynamic system failure. 
It is therefore very difficult to explicitly include the control sub-system failure in the fault tree 
structure representing the dynamic system failure. This is achieved by accounting for the failure 
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of control sub-systems by considering the switching dependency relationship existing between 
them and the standby pumps. The resulting fault tree which represents the dynamic system 
failure is displayed in figure 9.4. 
The AFFF pump streams 
fail during functioning 
The AFFF electric pump stream 
fails during functioning 
AFFF electric AFFF electric Pressure relief 
supply fails pump fails valve 5 fails 
The AFFF diesel pump stream 
fails during functioning 
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supply fails pump fails valve 6 fails 
Figure 9.4b Dynamic-phase fault tree for the failure of the AFFF system 
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during functioning during functioning 
J.. J.. 
r G38J I G391 
I 
I I I The electric I Electric Pressure I The electric I Electric 
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J.. pump 1 valve 1 ...-L pump 2 
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I 
--L ..l ....L 
--' ElD PRVl (E2D Electric Electric Electric Electric 
- -supply 1 supply 1 supply 1 supply 1 
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I 
I 
The firewater pump The firewater pump 
stream 3 fails stream 4 fails 
during functioning during functioning 
J.. I 
G40 l G4l1 
I I 
I I I I 
Pressure Firewater Diesel Pressure Firewater Diesel Pressure 
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valve 2 supply pump 1 valve 3 supply pump 2 valve 4 
fails fails fails fails fails fails fails 
..l ....L --L ..l J.. c§ J.. PRV2 (DS) (DlD PRV3 (DS) PRV4 
-
J.. .1 .1 ---L. Figure 9.4a Dynamic-phase fault tree for the failure of the firewater pump system 
30(ESl) (ES2) (ESl) (ES2) 
9.3.2.1.2 Dependency Files 
When establishing the dependency files, the static and dynamic system phase are investigated 
separately to identify any dependency relationships existing in the system . 
• Establishment of the normal dependency file 
Static phase: according to the functional characteristics of components included in the system 
and the system maintenance features, there exist two types of dependency relationship 
relevant to the static phase - maintenance dependency and test dependency. The latter is due 
to the inspections carried out on each pump stream. 
Dynamic phase: the s tandby dependency exists in the dynamic system phase between the 
electric firewater pumps and the diesel pumps in the form of a pooled spare, and also 
between the electric AFFF pump and the diesel AFFF pump. Since the repair won't be 
conducted during the dynamic phase, there a re no dependency relationships related to the 
repair process. This includes maintenance dependency, secondary failure dependency, test 
dependency and revealing dependency. 
Accordingly, the normal dependency file is established and shown in table 9.7 corresponding to 
the fault tree structures in figures 9.3 and 9.4. 
Dependency Dependency Number I Number 2 List I List 2 Relevancy in 
group number type which phase 
I mtnc 4 I WPSIF, Static 
WPS2F, 
WPS3F, 
WPS4F 
2 mtnc 3 I APSIF, Static 
APS2F, 
APS3F 
3 mtnc 3 I FSIF, FS2F, Static 
FS3F 
4 mtnc 5 2 lVI, IV2, Static 
IVI2, IVI3 
CV5 
5 mtnc 3 I INB, SB,NB Static 
6 mtnc 3 I WDV, WVS, Static 
ADV 
7 mtnc 2 I SVI, SV2 Static 
S mtnc 2 I ESI, ES2 Static 
9 mtnc 4 I FBI, IV3, Static 
IV4, CVI 
10 mtnc 4 I FB2, IV5, Static 
!V6,CV2 
11 mtnc 4 I FB3, IV7, Static 
!VS, CV3 
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12 mlnc 4 I FB4, IV9, Static 
IVIO, CV4 
13 mlnc 3 I IVI5, IVI6, Static 
CV6 
14 mlnc 4 I IVI4, IVI?, Static 
IVI8, CV? 
15 test 6 3 FBI, IV3, Static 
IV4, ElF, 
ESI, ES2 
16 test 6 3 FB2, IV5, Static 
IV6, E2F, 
ESI,ES2 
I? test 5 3 FB3, IV?, Static 
IV8, DlF, 
IV 11 
18 test 5 3 FB4, IV9, Static 
IV 10, D2F, 
IVll 
19 test 5 3 IVI3, IVI5, Static 
AES 
IV16, AEF 
20 test 5 3 IV13, IVI4, Static 
IVI?, IVI8, 
ADF 
21 stby 2 2 EID,E2D DID, Dynamic 
D2D 
22 stby I 1 AED ADD Dynamic 
Table 9.7 The nonnal dependency file for the firewater deluge system 
• Establishment of the functional dependency file 
It's evident that functional dependency exists between the electric power supplies and the 
electric pumps, and between the diesel supplies and the diesel pumps. Switching dependency 
exists between the firewater pumps and the main fire and gas panel, the firewater pressure 
sensing system plus the corresponding pump distribution lines. Similar dependencies exist 
between the AFFF pumps and the AFFF control panel, the AFFF pressure sensing system and 
the corresponding pump distribution lines. It should be noted that there is a special dependency 
relationship between the pump and the pressure relief valve on each pump stream. The pressure 
relief valve is assumed not to fail open when the pump stream is not activated. It therefore will 
not contribute to causes of the pump not activating successfully. It can however fail open under 
nonnal pressure, thus failing the functionality provided by the corresponding pump. Figure 9.5 
illustrates the different types of functional dependency by distinguishing effects in tenns of the 
states of the functionally-dependent component. 
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States of Functionally-
Dependent Component 
Transition from ~L---_..::S:...:W.:.:ic:;tc:.:;h:::in",g"--_--J 
Standby to Working --~r;;:::::::-:::::;~=::;-::-::-:7l 
Residing in Working 
state Limited Functional 
Figure 9.5 Illustration of different types of functional dependency 
Limited functional dependency implies that the functionally-controlling component will not fail 
when the functionally-dependent component resides in the inactive state. The dependency 
relationship between the pressure relief valve and the pump falls into this category. The limited 
functional dependency is denoted as 'ldfunc' in the functional dependency file. 
Table 9.8 gives the functional and switching dependency relationships existing in the system. 
Dependency grOUP number Dependency type Number 1 Number 2 List 1 List 2 
23 fune 1 2 GI3 EID,E2D 
24 fune 1 2 DS DID,D2D 
25 fune 1 1 AES AED 
26 fune 1 1 ADS ADD 
27 Idfune 1 1 PRVI EID 
28 Idfune 1 1 PRV2 E2D 
29 Idfune 1 1 PRV3 DID 
30 Idfune 1 1 PRV4 D2D 
31 Idfune 1 1 PRV5 AED 
32 Idfune 1 1 PRV6 ADD 
33 sweh 1 4 MPF EID, E2D, DID, D2D 
34 sweh 1 4 G5 EID, E2D, DID, D2D 
35 sweh 1 1 GI4 EID 
36 sweh 1 1 GI6 E2D 
37 sweh 1 1 GI9 DID 
38 sweh 1 1 G21 D2D 
39 sweh 1 2 JVl1 DlD,D2D 
40 sweh 1 1 G31 AED 
41 sweh 1 1 G34 ADD 
42 sweh I 1 IVI4 ADD 
43 sweh 1 2 APF AED,ADD 
44 sweh 1 2 G24 AED,ADD 
Table 9.8 The functional dependency file for the firewater deluge system 
9.3.2.1.3 Basic Event File 
For basic events included in the two fault tree structures shown in figure 9.3 and 9.4, the 
corresponding basic event file is shown in table 9.9, in the structure displayed in table 9.1. Since 
the initiator-enabler dependency does not exist in the system, the column 'enabler' is not 
included. 
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Basic Nwnber of List of 
event 
Failure mode Relevant in Connterpart Failure Parameters dependency dependency 
represented phase failure event model group 
name groups 
numbers 
WPSlF P B 
-
3 0.000004,5,3 1 1 
WPS2F P B 
- 3 0.000004, 5, 3 1 1 
WPS3F P B 
-
3 0.000004, 5, 3 1 1 
WPS4F P B - 3 0.000004,5,3 1 1 
IV1 P S 
-
3 0.0000014, 4, 1 4 6 
!V2 P S 
- 3 
0.0000014, 4, 1 4 6 
INB P S - 3 0.0000003, 4, 1 5 3 
SB P S 
-
3 0.0000003, 4, 1 5 3 
NB P S 
-
3 0.00000027,2, 1 5 3 
WDV P S - 3 0.0000025, 4, 1 6 3 
WVS P S - 3 0.000003, 6, 3 1 6 
SV1 P S 
-
3 0.00000083,8, 1 7 3 
SV2 P S - 3 0.00000083, 8, 1 7 3 
FS1F P S 
-
3 0.0000008, 8, 1 3 3 
FS2F P S - 3 0.0000008, 8, 1 3 3 
FS3F P S 
- 3 
0.0000008, 8, 1 3 3 
MPF P B - 1 0.0001, 0 0.00002 
ES1 P B 
-
3 0.000007, 3, 3 3 8, 15, 16 
ES2 P B 
-
3 0.000007,3,3 3 8, 15, 16 
ElF P S EID 3 0.000016, 10, 1 15 3 
E2F P S E2D 3 0.000016, 10, 1 16 3 
D1F P S DID 3 0.00005, 12,3 1 17 
D2F P S D2D 3 0.00005, 12,3 1 18 
DS P B - 1 0.0002, 0 0.000001 
FBI P B - 3 0.000015,2,2 2 9, 15 
FB2 P B 
-
3 0.000015,2,2 2 10,16 
FB3 P B - 3 0.000015,2,2 2 11, 17 
FB4 P B 
-
3 0.000015,2,2 2 12,18 
!V3 P B - 3 0.0000014, 4, 2 9, 15 6 
IV4 P B 
-
3 0.0000014, 4, 2 9, 15 6 
!V5 P B - 3 0.0000014, 4, 2 10,16 6 
IV6 P B 
-
3 0.0000014, 4, 2 10, 16 6 
IV7 P B - 3 0.0000014, 4, 2 11,17 6 
!V8 P B - 3 0.0000014, 4, 2 11,17 6 
IV9 P B 
-
3 0.0000014, 4, 2 12,18 6 
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IVIO P B 3 0.0000014, 4, 2 12, 18 - 6 
Nil P B 3 0.0000009, 5, 2 17, 18 
- 6 
CVI P B 3 0.0000018, 3, I 9 
- 2 
CV2 P B 3 0.0000018, 3, I 10 
- 2 
CV3 P B 3 0.0000018, 3, I 11 - 2 
CV4 P B - 3 0.0000018, 3, I 12 2 
APSIF P B - 3 0.0000025, 8, I 2 3 
APS2F P B 3 0.0000025, 8, I 2 
- 3 
APS3F P B 3 0.0000025, 8, I 2 
- 3 
APF P B - I 0.0001, 0 0.00002 
IVI2 P S 
-
3 0.0000022, 4, I 4 6 
CV5 P S 3 0.0000025, 3, I 4 
- 2 
ADV P S 
-
3 0.0000033, 4, I 6 3 
N13 P S 3 0.0000022, 4, I 4 
- 6 
INAF P B 
-
I 0.0001, 0 0.000003 
AES P B - 3 0.000007,3,3 I 19 
AEF P S AED 3 0.000016, 10, I 19 3 
ADF P S ADD 3 0.00005, 12,3 I 20 
ADS P B - I 0.0002, 0 0.000001 
IVI4 P B - 3 0.0000009, 5, 2 14,20 6 
IVI5 P B - 3 0.0000022, 4, 2 13, 19 6 
IVI6 P B 
-
3 0.0000022, 4, 2 13, 19 6 
IVI7 P B - 3 0.0000022, 4, 2 14,20 6 
IVI8 P B 3 0.0000022, 4, 2 14,20 
- 6 
CV6 P B - 3 0.0000018, 3, I 13 2 
CV7 P B - 3 0.0000018, 3, I 14 2 
EID A D ElF 2 0.00006 1 21 
E2D A D ElF 2 0.00006 1 21 
DID A D DlF 2 0.0001, 1 21 
D2D A D D2F 2 0.0001 1 21 
AED A D AEF 2 0.00006 1 22 
ADD A D ADF 2 0.0001 1 22 
PRVl P D - 2 0.0000016 0 
PRV2 P D 
-
2 0.0000016 0 
PRV3 P D 
-
2 0.0000016 0 
PRV4 P D - 2 0.0000016 0 
PRV5 P D 
-
2 0.0000016 0 
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I PRV6 I P I D I - I 2 I 0.0000016 I 0 
Table 9.9 The basic event file for the firewater deluge system 
9.3.2.2 Pre-processing 
• Information extraction from files 
A 'static-phase' dependency serial list is established by extracting and processing the 
information from the normal dependency file. Only dependency relationships other than the 
'test' dependency are relevant in the static phase. Given the information in table 9.7, each 
dependency serial in the 'static-phase' dependency serial list is corresponding to each of the 
dependency group numbers from 1 to 14. Normal dependency relationships existing during the 
system dynamic phase and the dependency groups from the functional dependency file form the 
dynamic-phase dependency information list. During this process, an extension is applied to the 
dependency group numbers 35, 36, 37, 38, 40 and 41 shown in table 9.8. New dependency 
groups are generated by breaking down the intermediate functionally-controlling events into 
their basic event descendants. Consequently, the dynamic-phase dependency information list will 
include the expanded functional and switching dependency relationships as are shown in table 
9.10. 
Dependeneygroupnuniber Dependency type Number I Number 2 List I List 2 
23 fune I 2 G13 EID, E2D 
24 fune I 2 DS DID,D2D 
25 fune I I AES AED 
26 fune I I ADS ADD 
27 Idfune I I PRVI EID 
28 Idfune I I PRV2 E2D 
29 Idfune I I PRV3 DID 
30 Idfune I I PRV4 D2D 
31 Idfune I I PRV5 AED 
32 Idfune I I PRV6 ADD 
33 sweh I 4 MPF EID, E2D, DID, D2D 
34 sweh I 4 G5 EID, E2D, DID, D2D 
35 sweh I I FBI EID 
36 sweh I I IV3 EID 
37 sweh I I IV4 EID 
38 sweh I I CVI EID 
39 sweh I I FB2 E2D 
40 sweh I I IV5 E2D 
41 sweh I I IV6 E2D 
42 sweh I I CV2 E2D 
43 sweh I I FB3 DID 
44 sweh I I IV7 DID 
45 sweh I I IV8 DID 
46 sweh I I CV3 DID 
47 sweh I I FB4 D2D 
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48 swch I I IV9 D2D 
49 swch I I IVIO D2D 
50 swch I I CV4 D2D 
51 swch I 2 IV 11 DID,D2D 
52 swch I I IVI5 AED 
53 swch I I IVI6 AED 
54 swch I I CV6 AED 
55 swch I I IVI7 ADD 
56 swch I I IVI8 ADD 
57 swch I I CV7 ADD 
58 swch I I IVI4 ADD 
59 swch I 2 APF AED,ADD 
60 swch I 2 G24 AED,ADD 
Table 9.10 Expanded functIOnal and sWItchmg dependency relationships in the firewater deluge 
system 
• The fault tree simplification 
The simplification, combination, modularization and re-modularization processes are conducted 
on the static-phase fault tree, which results in the 'static-phase' fault tree modules displayed in 
figure 9.6. 
Factors identified: 
IF811 
I 
Modules identified: 
~ M7019 
5004 
~ M7006 
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1 ~ 1 M7010 
I~I cAPSI~PS3i) 
M7012 
~ M7017 
~ck@ 
12821 M700' 
~ 
M7008 ~ M7009 
~1O 
~
M7015 12871 M70!6 
~ 
M7014 ~ M7011 
~ 
12861 M70IJ 
~ 
M7001 ~ M7002 
~ 
M7018 
122;'1 M7004 12[5'1 M7005 
~ 
Figure 9.6 Modules identified in the static-phase fault tree for the firewater deluge system 
In the dynamic-phase fault tree shown in figure 9.4, basic events ESI, ES2, EID, E2D, DS, 
DID, D2D, AES, AED, ADS, and ADD are all basic events relevant to static system failure, of 
which EID, E2D, DID, D2D, AED and ADD are related to static system failure through their 
static counterparts ElF, E2F, DIF, D2F, AEF and ADF. Basic events ESI and ES2 gathered 
under G 13 can be identified as a module, corresponding to module 700 I shown in figure 9.6. 
Based on the dependency information given in table 9.7 and table 9.8 and the principle discussed 
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in section 9.2.3.2, it can be concluded that the dynamic-phase fault tree as whole is the only 
module identified. It is assigned a module id M7020 with the structure displayed in figure 9.7. 
The firewater deluge system 
fails to function normally 
throughout the required period 
~ 
036 
I 
I 
The firewater subsystem fails to The AFFF pump streams INAF 
function through the required period fail during functioning 
A --L (043 'I ~ 
The AFFF electric pump The AFFF diesel pump stream 
stream fails during functioning fails during functioning 
J. ..L 
ii!4 rii15l 
_I L 
AFFF electric AFFF electric Pressure relief AFFF diesel AFFF diesel Pressure relief 
supply fails pump fails valve 5 fails supply fails 
~ 
(AES 
The firewater pump 
stream I fails during 
functionin 
M700 I Electric 
frrewate 
rpump 
I fails 
Pressure 
relief 
valve I 
fails 
~ 
The firewater pump 
stream I fails during 
functionin 
M700 I Electric Pressure 
frrewate relief 
r pump valve 2 
2 fails fails 
~ ~ 
PRV5 (ADS 
The firewater 
pump stream 3 
fails durin 
irewate Diesel 
r diesel firewate 
supply r pump 
fails I fails 
Pressure 
relief 
valve 3 
fails 
pump fails valve 6 fails 
cfo0 ~ 
-
The firewater 
pump stream 4 
fails durin 
irewate 
r diesel 
supply 
fails 
Diesel 
firewate 
rpump 
2 fails 
Pressure 
relief 
valve 4 
fails 
Figure 9.7 Simplified dynamic-phase fault tree structure for the firewater deluge system 
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9.3.2.3 Quantification 
For illustrative purposes, the reliability assessment of the FDS is to be performed over a period 
of 5 years. The numerical time increment, dt, is set as 0.5 hours. Assume that for the deluge 
system to effectively mitigate the fire incident, it is required to function continuously with 
sufficient supply for 6 hours. The frequency of the fire incident (Wfire) is set as 0.000001 per 
hour. 
9.3.2.3.1 System Unavailability Q.y.(t) 
• Preparation 
As shown in figure 9.6, modules M7006, M7012, M7014, M7015, and M7019 contain no 
dependency relationships other than the test dependency within them. For these modules, BDDs 
will be established to facilitate the quantification to obtain the module parameters during the 
system static phase. Modules M7001, M7002, M7003, M7004, M7005, M7007, M7008, M7009, 
M7010, M7011, M7013, M7016, M7017 and M7018 involve dependency relationships 
corresponding to the dependency group 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 1,7,3,2,13,14,4,5 and 6 respectively. 
A Markov model needs to be developed for each of these modules to enable reliability 
prediction. Figures B.l and B.2 in Appendix B respectively show the BDDs for modules M7006, 
M7012, M7014, M7015, and M7019, and reduced Markov models for modules M7001 and 
M7007-M7010. Tables B.1-B.3 in Appendix B display the Markov models constructed for 
modules M7011, M7017 and M7018. For other modules, the established Markov models are too 
big to reproduce and therefore not included. 
Components included in each of the modules M7007, M7008, M7009 and M7010 all feature the 
same failure parameters and have the same structural contribution to the module failure. As such 
a simplified Markov model can be constructed for these modules by employing the 'State 
Lumping' technique illustrated in chapter 3 . 
• Calculation of System Unavailability 
For the firewater deluge system, its unavailability at a specific point in time is obtained by 
investigating the reliability parameters of each module and factor displayed in figure 9.6. The 
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quantification is implemented on the established BDDs and Markov models In the way 
illustrated in chapter 7. 
9.3.2.3.2 System Unreliability F,y,(Tr) 
Module 7020 is the top module for the dynamic-phase fault tree. Some basic events included in 
the module are related to the system static-phase failure. According to the process described in 
section 9 .2.3.3.2, the unreliability 0 fthe firewater deluge system during its dynamic phase is 
obtained through the following steps. 
Step I. Identify the initial states from which the firewater deluge system is able to activate. 
a) Identify basic events from the dynamic-phase fault tree shown in figure 9.4 which should be 
considered when determining the initial states. Basic events EID, E2D, DS, DID, D2D, 
AES, AED, ADS, ADD, INAP and module M7001 are chosen as they are all related to 
component failures which contribute to the system static-phase failure. 
b) Basic events MPF, APF, FBI - FB4, IV3 - lVII, CVI - CV4, IVI4 - IV18, CV6 - CV7 
and modules M 7007 and M 7010 are also added to the list of initial component states to 
consider since they contribute to the system static failure and represent the functionally-
controlling components as are indicated in table 9.8. 
c) Basic events which fulfil the two conditions explained in step I(c) in section 9.2.3.3.2 will be 
deleted from the list. The basic events to be eliminated are AES, ADS, FB I - FB4, IV3 -
IVIO, CVI - CV4, IVI4 - IV18, CV6 - CV7. Consequently, the final list of events which 
need to be examined to establish the initial states from which the system may start is: EID, 
E2D, DS, DID, D2D, lVII, AED, ADD, !NAP, MPF, APF, M7001, M7007 and M701O. 
d) The full list of initial states, based on the chosen basic events, is developed according to the 
algorithm presented in step I(d) in section 9.2.3.3.2. There are 45 initial states from which 
the firewater deluge system is able to start. 
Step 2: The probabilities of all the initial states are then calculated at the time when the system is 
activated. The algorithm underlying the calculation is given in equation 9.1. In the calculation, 
the state code ofthe basic event should be considered to account for the implied condition of any 
other basic events related to this component. For example, when the state code of basic event 
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'BID' is '0', it means the pump El is ready to start, i.e. the pump has not failed in standby, 
which implies the state code of 'ElF' and basic events which represent the corresponding 
supporting components, such as FBI, IV3, IV4 and CVI should be '0' too. The conditional 
probability in equation 9.1 is calculated by breaking down the conditions into a hierarchical 
structure, as is shown in figure 9.8, according to the modularized structure of the static-phase 
fault tree shown in figure 9.6. 
Figure 9.8 Hierarchical structure of conditions regarding the system static failure (referring to 
figure 9.6) 
In terms of the calculation of the probability of system failure, conditional on the initial state 
(equation 9.1), the basic events which feature in a module assessed using a BDD are determined 
individually, as the joint probability can be calculated by mUltiplying independent probabilities. 
These events include DS, lVII, MPF, APF, INAF, AEF, ADF, M7007 and M701O. Basic events 
contained in a Markov model, such as ElF, E2F, DIF, D2F and M7001, have to be looked into 
as a group, the joint probability of several component conditions is derived by adding up the 
probability of the states in the Markov model in which the basic events are featured in the 
required state as in the condition list. 
Step 3: Establish the appropriate quantification model. Since standby dependency exists in the 
system dynamic phase, the dynamic failure of the firewater deluge system has to be tackled with 
the Markov method. 
a) A review is conducted on the dynamic-phase fault tree to see if any basic events should be 
added to the Markov model. For the firewater deluge system, basic events PRVI - PRV6 are 
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only relevant to the system dynamic failure, therefore they are not considered with regard to 
the initial states. They need to be taken into account during the process of quantification of 
the system dynamic failure probability. 
b) The state codes of the basic events defining each initial state are reviewed to ensure that they 
correctly account for any standby dependency involved in the system dynamic phase. For 
example, consider the initial state in which the state code of 'EID', 'E2D', 'DID' and 
'020' are all '0', which means the pumps are all ready to start. Since the two diesel pumps 
are set as standby, their state codes will be changed to '-I', which represents their standby 
state. Consequently, during the process of developing the Markov model, only three 
component state codes are used: '0' - working, 'I' - failed and '-I' - standby. 
c) The Markov model is re-modularized. As has been discussed in step a), basic events PRVI -
PRV6 need to be considered during the quantification process for the system dynamic phase. 
If they are directly included in the Markov model for module M7020, the size of the 
resulting model will increase dramatically by a factor of 26 in terms of the system states in 
the model. An alternative to overcome this is the to carry out the re-modularization within 
the top module M7020. The re-modularization is performed revolving around the basic 
events which are involved in functional or switching dependency relationships as the 
dependent element. Take for example the firewater electric pump E I represented by basic 
event 'EID', basic events PRVI, FBI, IV3, IV4 and CVI are the functionally-controlling 
elements exclusive to the basic event ElD as indicated in table 9.10. If pump El 
successfully activates when the system is called upon to function, it will contribute to the 
system unreliability by losing its functionality during operation. The loss of the functionality 
of pump El can be interpreted from two aspects: one is the failure of the pump itself; and the 
other is the failure of its functionally-controlling/supporting components which renders the 
pump to be unusable or inaccessible. According to figure 9.5, components which are 
involved in both general and limited functional dependency relationships as the 
controlling/supporting element have an influence on the corresponding dependent 
component during its active operation. According to table 9.10, it can therefore be 
determined that among the functionally-controlling/supporting events which are exclusive to 
pump El, basic event PRVI has an influence on the state of EID when pump El is 
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functioning. Correspondingly, a new module can be formed within module M7020 which 
consists of basic events PRVI and EID through the OR logic to model the loss of the 
functionality of pump E I during its operation due to the failure of the pump itself and the 
failure of the associated pressure relief valve. The same algorithm is followed to model the 
loss of the functionality of other pumps, represented by basic events E2D, DID, D2D, AED 
and ADD, during their active operation. Accordingly, six modules are established, shown in 
figure 9.9, to model the loss of the functionality of each pump during their operation 
respectively. 
ump El loses its functionali 
during operation 
ump El loses its functionali 
during operation 
Pump E2 loses its functionality 
during operation 
mp E2 loses its functionality 
during operation 
AFFF electric pump loses its 
functionality during operation 
AFFF diesel pump loses its 
functionality during operation 
Figure 9.9 Modules established to model pump failures during operation 
Another situation where pump failures may contribute to the system unreliability is that the 
standby pump fails in standby following the system activation, and thus cannot respond to 
maintain the system function when the duty pump fails. Take the AFFF pump system for 
example, if the system starts with the successful activation of AFFF electric pump, the 
failure of AFFF diesel pump in standby, represented by basic event ADF, will contribute to 
the system unreliabiIity given that the AFFF electric pump fails during the required 
functioning period of time. The pump failure in standby can also be ascribed to two causes: 
one is the standby failure of the pump itself or the failure of components required to enable 
the activation of the pump. According to figure 9.5, the state of components which are 
involved in both general functional and switching dependency relationships will determine if 
a successful activation is possible. Therefore, according to table 9.1 0, the loss of 
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functionality of the AFFF diesel pump during standby can be represented through a module 
which consists of basic events ADF, ADS, IVI7, IVI8, CV7 and IVI4. The same algoritlun 
is followed to model the loss of functionality of pumps 01 and 02 during standby. Three 
modules are established as shown in figure 9.10. 
Firewater pump DJ 
loses its functionality 
Firewater pump D2 
loses its functionality 
AFFF diesel pump 
loses its functionality 
Figure 9.1 0 Modules established to model pump failures in standby 
d) The 'No Further Influence' technique, presented in section 9.2.3.3.2 step 3(b) is applied to 
facilitate the generation of a smallest Markov model. This technique applies not only to 
basic events which are explicitly included in the dynamic-phase fault tree, but also to basic 
events which need to be taken into account in the dynamic-phase analysis, but are not 
included in the dynamic-phase fault tree. Such basic events are MPF, APF, !Vll, M7007 
and M7010. Take the basic event MPF for example, after the system has activated, the 
function of the Main Fire and Gas panel (represented by MPF) is to activate standby 
firewater pumps in the event that a working pump fails. When standby pumps have failed in 
standby prior to the failure of the main panel, the consequent failure of the Main Fire and 
Gas panel will not matter given the 'No Repair during Functioning' policy. That is, when no 
standby pumps are able to start, the failure of the Main Fire and Gas panel does not need to 
be considered. The same principle can be applied to basic events APF, IV 11, module M7007 
and module M7010. Due to the re-modularization and the implementation of the 'No Further 
Influence' technique, the size of the resulting Markov model for the system dynamic-phase 
analysis has been dramatically reduced from more than 30,000 states to 500 states despite 
there being nearly 20 events considered in this Markov model. 
Step 4: Quantification is implemented on the Markov model developed to assess the unreliability 
of the firewater deluge system over the required period T,. In terms of the modules established to 
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model the loss of functionality of pumps, they can be addressed with the BDD method. Figure 
9.11 illustrates how pump failure rates are determined through the quantification of modules, 
shown in figures 9.9 and 9.10, depending on the current state of the pumps. 
Pump El: failure during 
operation 
... , 
)nodelled by 
Pump DJ: failure during 
operation 
... 
, 
)nodelled by 
Pump D I: failure in standby 
DID: state code from -I to I 
... 
, 
modelled by 
, 
IV7 
Pump E2: failure during 
operation 
... 
, 
)nodelled by 
Pump D2: failure during 
operation 
... 
, 
)node lied by 
Pump D2: failure in standby 
D2D: state code from -I to I 
... , 
modelled by 
, 
, 
, 
~ m@ 
mm 
AFFF electric pump: failure during 
operation 
... -, 
modelled by 
, 
AFFF diesel pump: failure during 
operation 
.... 
, 
modelled by 
, 
AFFF diesel pump: failure in standby 
ADD: state code from -\ to \ 
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Figure 9.11 Modules modelling the failure of functionally dependent components 
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As repair is not conducted during the system dynamic phase, the quantification of the modules 
shown in figure 9.11 is achieved using the failure probability of each basic event prior to time t. 
This is equal to its unreliability during the period of time (0, t], which is obtained by (l-e -At), 
where t is measured from the time of system activation. 
9.3.2.3.3 Calculation ofImportance Measures 
• Calculation of the criticality function G;{q(t)) during the system static phase 
Special consideration needs to be given to the calculation of the criticality function within the 
Markov model which is reduced through the 'State-Lumping' technique. In modules M7007, 
M7008, M7009 and M701O, each state is identified by indicating the number of failed 
components, rather than a list of the states of basic events. Therefore, the algorithm presented in 
section 7.1.6 for calculating the criticality function within the Markov model is no longer 
directly applicable. In this case, a new algorithm is developed. 
Assume the reduced Markov model includes n components, of which m failures will result in the 
module failure (when m=l, this represents an OR logic; when m=n, this represents an AND gate; 
and when 1 <m<n, this represents the m-out-of-n voting logic). Therefore (n+ 1) states are 
contained in the Markov model as are shown in figure 9.12. 
State m State (m+ \) 
State \ nil. State 2 (n- I)iI. 
6888······ 
v v v v v v 
Figure 9.12 The general reduced Markov model 
The critical transition is the transition from state m to state m+ I, which brings the system from 
working to failed. Assume that component i is one of the n components included in the model, 
the criticality function of component i can be expressed as: 
Gi(q(t» = Qm(t).P{component i belongs to the working components given state m} + 
Qm+l(t).P{component i belongs to the failed components given state m+l} 
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where Qm(t) and Qm+J(t) stand for the probability of state m and m+1 at time t 
respectively 
Therefore, the criticality function of component i included in a reduced Markov model is 
obtained through: 
c·-m cm-I 
G;{q(t» = Qm(t). C'';-~I + Qm+J(t). C-:' 
• • 
n-m+l m 
= Qm(t). + Qm+J(t). - 9.S 
n n 
In this way, the criticality function of each specific component included in modules M7007, 
M700S, M7009 and M7010 can be obtained . 
• Calculation of importance measures during the system dynamic phase 
The calculation of the criticality function of each component which contributes to the system 
unreliability is based on the algorithm proposed in section 7.1.6. The Barlow-Proschan measure 
is also determined according to equation 904. 
9.3.2.4 Output 
Three output files are produced containing the results of the reliability analysis for the firewater 
deluge system. Tables BA, B.5 and B.6 in appendix B contain the system failure predictions and 
importance measures for each component during the system static and dynamic phases 
respectively. 
In table BA, the 'Unreliability' represents the likelihood that the system fails once activated at 
some point during the required operational time period of 6 hours. The system unreliability is 
obtained directly from the Markov analysis for the system dynamic-phase. The calculation of the 
initial state probabilities in the Markov model for the system dynamic-phase analysis accounts 
for the fact that the system has successfully activated at time t. 
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The 'Static Failure Intensity', denoted by wacc_s, refers to the frequency of the unmitigated fire 
incident due to the system being unavailable to respond at time t. That is, waccjt) = WfireXQsys(t). 
The 'Dynamic Failure Intensity', denoted by Wacc_d, refers to the frequency that the fire incident 
is unmitigated due to the system failing following the activation within the required period of 6 
hours. That is, wac,-2(t) = WfirexFsys(Tr), where Tr is measured from the system activation time t. 
From table B.4, it can be seen that Wacc_d is significantly smaller than wacc_s. By integrating wacc_, 
and wacc_ d respectively over the whole assessment period, we can get the expected number of 
fire accidents due to the system unavailability ( ! Waee _l(t)dt) and the expected number of fire 
accidents due to the system unreliability ( ! waee _ 2(t)dt). For the firewater deluge system, over 
the period of 5 years, the expected number of fire accidents due to the system being unavailable 
is 1.355263e-003, while the expected number of fire accidents due to the system being unreliable 
is 2.969246e-006, which altogether mean that the total expected number of fire accidents over 5 
years is 1.358232e-003. The expected number of fire accidents due to the system being 
unreliable makes a negligible contribution. 
Figure 9.13 illustrates how the system unavailability (non-conditional upon previous occurrences 
of a system failure) varies as the time elapses. 
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Figure 9.13 System unavailability over the period of 5 years 
From figure 9.13, it can be noticed that the system unavailability, when it passes the transient 
period, takes an obvious pattern featured by a time cycle of 6 months. There is an abrupt drop in 
the system unavailability at the turn of cycles. In each cycle, there is also a decrease in the 
249 
system unavailability after 3 months. All these patterns can be attributed to the fixed test 
intervals assigned to each dormant-failure component during the system static phase. For 
example, all filters and check valves are tested every 2 months. Therefore, after a short time into 
the 3,d and 5th month, all revealed failures will be eliminated which will reduce the system 
unavailability. Then the system unavailability will continue to rise till another round of tests are 
conducted. Since components which have a test interval of 2 months only account for a relatively 
small portion of all the components included in the system, the effect of their repair is not as 
significant as the repair of the components which are tested every 3 months. 
From table B.5, it can be noticed that basic events MPF, APF, INAP, INB, SB, NB, WDV, 
WVS, ADV, lVI, 1V2, IVI2, CV5 and IV13 all feature a very high and similar value in the 
criticality function in the system static-phase analysis. This is consistent with their significant 
contributions to the system static failure as are reflected in the system static-phase fault tree in 
figure 9.3. According to the system static-failure logic represent in the fault tree, the occurrence 
of any single event among them can result in the system static failure. It can also be noticed that 
basic events ElF, E2F, DIF, D2F, AEF and ADF feature a much smaller value of the criticality 
function in comparison with basic events discussed above, as is illustrated in figure 9.14. The 
difference can be explained by their less significant contributions to the system static failure as 
they are included in the system static-phase failure logic in minimal cut sets of lower order. 
Among these events, the criticality function values of ElF and DIF are smaller in comparison 
with other basic events. This can be ascribed to the 3-out-of-4 voting logic which governs the 
firewater pump failures with regard to their effect on the system failure. 
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Figure 9.14 Criticality function of some of basic events in the system static-phase analysis 
As the Barlow-Proschan measure of each basic event during the system dynamic phase features a 
time cycle of 6 months in terms of the time the system activates, only the first two time cycles 
are displayed in table B.6 for illustration. Basic events which are relevant during the system 
dynamic phase but not included in the table, such as WPSIF - WPS4F, APSIF - APS3F, FBI -
FB4, 1V3 -lVII, 1V14 -1V18, CVI - CV4, CV6 - CV7, MPF and APF, all feature a Barlow-
Proschan measure of '0' since they are enabling events. For example, the firewater pressure 
sensors, the Main Fire and Gas control panel, the AFFF pressure sensors and the AFFF panel all 
contribute the function to call upon the standby pumps when the duty pump fails. After the 
activation is implemented, the failure of these components does not have any effect on the 
functioning system. The filters, isolation valves and check valves can get blocked on the standby 
pump streams after the system activates, thus disabling the standby pump to activate. But due to 
the assumption that they won't get blocked after the standby pump activates, they also act as 
enabling events. Therefore, they make no direct contributions to the system dynamic failure, 
which means their Barlow-Proscan measure is zero. 
For those basic events listed in table B.6, their Barlow-Proschan measures at each starting time 
provides an indication of their direct contribution to the system dynamic failure. These are 
consistent with their contribution to the system dynamic-phase failure logic represented by the 
dynamic-phase fault tree. For example, in general, the basic event 'INAF' has a relatively high 
Barlow-Proschan importance measure as it is directly linked to the top event in the dynamic-
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phase fault tree through OR gate, which means it fonns a single order minimal cut set in the 
system dynamic-phase failure logic. Although the four firewater pumps and the two APFF 
pumps assume the parallel functions during the system dynamic phase, the Barlow-Proschan 
measure of the fonner group is much lower than that of the latter. This is again due to the voting 
logic between the firewater pumps. In other words, the use of pooled spares (the case for 
firewater pumps), other than the single spare (the case for APFF pumps), reduces the 
contribution that each component failure makes to the system failure. 
Also in table B.6, it can be noticed that the change in the Barlow-Proschan measure of basic 
event 'INAP' is the reverse reflection of the change in the system unavailability, while for other 
basic events included in table B.6, their B-P measures reflect the same pattern in system 
unavailability. This feature is illustrated in figure 9.15. This is related to the inspections carried 
out on the system during the system static phase since the calculation of the Barlow-Proschan 
measure accounts for the probability of a successful activation. Take basic event INAF for 
instance, for 'INAP' to be the direct cause of the system unreliability, both the firewater system 
and the APFF system must be available at the starting time as well as reliable during the dynamic 
phase. Therefore, the Barlow-Proschan measure of 'INAP' will take the same pattern as the 
system availability, i.e. opposite to the system unavailability. 
Comparison between B-P importance measures 
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Figure 9.15 Illustration of opposite patterns in the Barlow-Proschan importance measure 
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9.3.3 Review of Static-dynamic Two-phase Approach 
As is illustrated in the analysis of the firewater deluge system, in the static-dynamic two-phase 
approach, the system unavailability and unreliability are investigated separately through two 
fault trees which represent the system static and dynamic failure logic respectively. With this 
approach, the analyst can get a better understanding of which component failures are relevant in 
which system phase and how each component failure mode contributes to the system failure. It 
saves a lot of manual effort which would be required for the dynamic fault tree analysis as in the 
dynamic fault tree method, both system unavailability and unreliability are evaluated in the same 
fault tree structure, thus a lot of manual input is required to identify relevant component failures 
in terms ofthe system unavailability or unreliability. 
The establishment of the dependency file provides a systematic and flexible way to represent 
different types of dependency relationship existing in the system static and dynamic phases. The 
identification of switching dependency relationships enables the analysis to take into account the 
failure of functionally controlling/supporting components during the system dynamic phase 
when it is difficult to explicitly include them in the dynamic-phase fault tree structure as the 
system may enter the dynamic phase in numerous states. Combined with the pre-processing of 
the system static-phase and dynamic-phase fault trees, the static-dynamic two-phase approach 
delivers an efficient reliability analysis of active-on-demand systems as dependent component 
failures are investigated in the smallest possible fault tree sections resulting from the re-
modularization process. 
9.3.4 Comparison with Results Assuming Independence 
The quantification is carried out to obtain the system unavailability based on the assumption that 
all component failure events occur independently. That is, there exists no dependency 
relationship during the static phase for the firewater deluge system. 
9.3.4.1 Comparison of System Unavailability for Static Phase 
The comparison with the actual system unavailability is illustrated in figure 9.16. 
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Figure 9.16 Comparison of system unavailability 
In figure 9.16, it can be seen that the system unavailability under the independence assumption 
follows the same pattern as the system unavailability calculated accounting for the dependency. 
In these two situations, the value of the system unavailability at each discrete point of time is 
almost exactly the same as each other. This can be explained by investigating the effect that the 
maintenance dependency and the test dependency have on the system evaluation respectively. As 
is illustrated in section 8.4.5.2, the test dependency improves the system availability as it 
shortens the down time of relevant components by introducing extra common inspections. 
Alternatively, the maintenance dependency reduces the system availability as its existence means 
that the actual down time of relevant components is prolonged and thus the component failure 
probability increases. In the firewater deluge system, both the maintenance and test dependency 
exist during the system static phase. It happens that the effect ofthe test dependency is cancelled 
by that of the maintenance dependency so that the system unavailability by assuming 
independence does not show a significant difference from the accurate value where both 
maintenance and test dependency h ave been accounted for. An investigation is carried out to 
support the above argument by illustrating separately the effect of the maintenance dependency 
and test dependency on the evaluation of the firewater deluge system. 
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Figure 9.17 demonstrates the effect that the test dependency has on the evaluation of the system 
availability for the firewater deluge system. 
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Figure 9.17 Illustration of the effect of the test dependency 
In figure 9.17, it can be seen that the existence of the test dependency causes a difference in the 
value of the system unavailability during the last three months in each cycle of 6 months from 
the situation where no dependency is considered. Such a difference lies in the common 
inspections which brings about the test dependency. For example, without the common 
inspections, filters and check valves are tested every 2 months, and isolation valves are tested 
every 6 months. With the test dependency indicated in table 9.7, these components are now 
tested every 3 months as a group in addition to their individual inspections. It means that at the 
end of the first 3 months in each cycle the system unavailability will be reduced to a lower level 
by the common inspections conducted on relevant components. This explains why there is a gap 
between the two situations at the end of the forth, fifth and sixth month in each cycle. The impact 
of the test dependency is also reflected in the value of the expected number of unmitigated fire 
accidents due to the unavailability of the firewater deluge system. With the test dependency 
taken into account in the analysis, the expected number of fire accidents is obtained as 
1.227442e-003, compared with 1.354592e-003 with the independence assumption. 
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In contrast, figure 9.18 illustrates the impact of the maintenance dependency on the system 
unavailability through the comparison with the situation where no dependency is accounted for. 
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Figure 9.18 Illustration of the effect of the maintenance dependency 
In figure 9.18, it can be seen that the maintenance dependency results in a larger value of the 
system unavailability during the system static phase over the 5-year period of time. It also results 
in a larger value of the expected number of fire accidents as 1.478633e-003. 
9.3.4.2 Comparison of System Unreliability for Dynamic Phase 
Since the dependency is not considered, the BDD approach is adopted for the dynamic phase 
analysis. The fault tree, as shown in figure 9.19, is constructed to model the system dynamic 
failure assuming independence. To allow the fault tree structure to represent all possible 
situations, s tandby failures 0 f firewater p ump streams 3 and 4 and AFFF p ump stream 2 are 
considered. 
Simplification and modularization processes are conducted on the dynamic-phase fault tree in 
figure 9.19. The corresponding BDD is then established based on the modularized fault tree 
structure. Quantification is carried out on the BDD by applying equation 9.2. All different 
starting states in which the system can start the dynamic phase are identified in the static-phase 
analysis. The system unreliability is obtained for each different starting state. By taking into 
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account the probability of each starting state as in equation 9.2, the final system unreliability can 
then be obtained regardless in which state the system starts functioning. 
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Figure 9.20 displays the comparison in terms of the system unreliability between situations 
where dependency is taken into account and not. 
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Figure 9.20 Comparison of system unreliability 
It can be seen in figure 9.20 that although the system unreliability follows the similar pattern in 
the two different situations, there is a significant gap in the value of the system unreliability from 
the same starting point between the two situations. The value of system unreliability assuming 
independence is nearly twice the value with the dependency taken into consideration during the 
analysis. 
As the standby dependency is not accounted for, the alternation of the state of standby pumps 
cannot be represented. This results in that the standbyfailure probabilities of firewater diesel 
pumps and AFFF diesel pump are quantified over the whole system functioning period, such as 
qDlF, qD2F, and qADF, when actually they are only relevant prior to the time they get activated. 
The same problem exists with regard to the dynamic failure probabilities of these standby 
pumps, such as qDID, qD2D, and qADD. These basic events are also investigated over the whole 
system functioning period, when in fact they only need to be considered from the point they 
activate. 
What's more, as the functional dependency and switching dependency are ignored, the influence 
of some functionally controlling/supporting components are misinterpreted in the quantification 
process. For example, the pressure relief valve can only fail open when the pump stream is 
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functioning, which means its failure probability can only be calculated from the time the 
corresponding pump starts functioning. However, for the pressure relief valves fitted on standby 
firewater and AFFF diesel pump streams, this characteristic cannot be represented in the 
quantification process. Same as the dynamic failures of the standby pumps, the failure 
probability of these pressure relief valves are considered over the whole system functioning 
period. Similarly, when the switching dependency existing on each standby pump stream 
between isolation valves, check valves and the pump is ignored, the failure of these valves are 
concerned over the whole system functioning period, when they should only be considered as the 
contribution to the system unreliability during the time before the pump activates. 
All the above factors explain the gap existing between the two lines in figure 9.20. With the 
greater value of system unreliability based on the 'Independence' assumption, the expected 
number of fire accidents unmitigated due to the sy stem being unreliable 0 ver the period of 5 
years is 5.8791E-06. 
Another notable point with figure 9.20 is that the system unreliability has strictly taken a cycle of 
3 months over the 5-year period. As the system unreliability is partly dependent on the system 
availability at the time of activation, components which are required during both system static 
and dynamic phases would have influence on the system unreliability through their availability at 
the time of activation. Since most of these components feature an inspection interval of either 2 
or 3 months, this explains how the 3-month cycle comes into existence. Thus, with the 
identification of these components, the 3-month cycle can be determined in advance, which 
means that the calculation only needs to be carried out over the first 3 months. 
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Chapter 10. Review of Phased-mission System Analysis 
In previous chapters, techniques have been discussed and illustrated which are applied to the 
reliability assessment of continuously-running systems and active-on-demand systems. In this 
chapter, a different type of system, phased-mission system, is considered. Following a review of 
the currently available methods to assess this type of system in this chapter, a new technique is 
presented in the following chapter to perfonu the reliability assessment on phased-mission 
systems when dependency relationships between components exist. 
10.1 Introduction 
A system may be referred to as a Phased Mission, if its success depends on a sequential set of 
objectives operating over different time intervals, each of which fonus the different phase. 
During the execution of the phases in a mission, the system configuration, the system failure 
logic model or system failure characteristic changes to accomplish a different objective. For the 
mission to be a success, the system must operate successfully through each of the phases. The 
phases in a mission may be identified by: phase number, time interval, system configuration, 
tasks to be undertaken, perfonuance measures of interest, or maintenance policy. 
The operation of many systems feature the phased-mission characteristic. Examples of these 
systems include space vehicle operations, aircraft flights and ship operations. 
The reliability analysis of phased-mission systems involves complexity not encountered in that 
of single-phased systems, because the system failure logic changes from phase to phase, and 
component failures may be common to more than one of the phases. That is, whilst component 
failures can occur at any point during the mission, they may only contribute to system failure for 
some of the phases. A component may have failed in a phase in which its failure has no direct 
impact, but its failure will make a contribution to the system failure during a later phase. In this 
case, it may be that the transition from one phase to another is the critical event leading to 
mission failure. 
It is inappropriate to obtain the reliability of a mission by simply multiplying the individual 
phase re liabilities. This is due to the fact that the reliability of a particular phase is not only 
decided by the specific system failure logic model for this phase but is also dependent on the 
state in which the system resided at the end of the preceding phase. As a result, the phases of the 
mission are statistically dependent. It is also not appropriate to assume that each component is 
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functioning at the beginning of each phase. Therefore, an important problem in phased-mission 
analysis is to develop an appropriate approach to calculating, as efficiently as possible, the 
accurate value for the Mission Unreliability. Mission unreliability is defined as the probability 
that the system fails to function successfully through at least one phase of the mission. So far, a 
large amount of research has been carried out into phased-mission analysis, and methods have 
been proposed to address the mission unreliability and other related problems. These methods 
can be categorized as those appropriate for systems which are non-repairable or repairable over 
the mission duration, and are discussed separately in the following sections. For the illustrative 
purpose, a general phased-mission is introduced which contains m phases. For each phase j in the 
mission, it has a time duration of [fj.l, fj). 
10.2 Existing Methods for Phased-mission Systems 
10.2.1 Non-repairable Phased-mission Systems 
In a non-repairable phased-mission system, a component failure is permanent, i.e. the component 
will remain in the failed state once it fails during the mission. 
10.2.1.1 Transformation of a Multi-Phased Mission to an Equivalent Single-Phase Mission 
The earliest consideration of a phased-mission analysis was made by Esary and Ziehms [43] 
using fault tree analysis. One of the important outcomes of their research was to transform a 
multi-phased mission into an equivalent single-phase mission, which would allow the existing 
techniques to be applied to calculate the mission reliability. 
In a multi-phased mission, the performance of a component in a particular phase is dependent on 
its behaviour through previous phases. It will only be working in a phase if it has performed 
successfully through all preceding phases. Also, in a multi-phased mission where the repair is 
not possible, if a component is residing in the failed state in a phase, the component failure may 
have occurred in any of the phases up to and including the phase in question. Therefore, in the 
fault tree analysis for the phased-mission, the single event input representing the failure of 
component c in phase j will be replaced by an OR combination of the failure of component c in 
any phase up to and including phase j, shown in figure 10.1. 
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Component c is 
failed in phase j 
Figure 10.1 Component failure in fault tree for phase j in a multi-phased mission 
The individual phase configurations can then be joined in series to form a single system. The 
overall Mission Unreliability can then be represented in a single fault tree structure by 
combining the fault tree structures which model individual phase failures through an OR gate. A 
simple 3-phase-mission system is used, shown in figure 10.2, to illustrate such a transformation. 
--+--1 B I--+--
Phase I 
Phase 2 Phase 3 
Figure 10.2 Reliability network of a 3-phase-mission system 
The corresponding fault tree structures for each phase are shown in figure 10.3. 
Figure 10.3 Fault tree structure for individual phase failure 
By expanding each component failure in terms of its phase failures and combining the phase 
failure conditions, an equivalent single-phase fault tree structure can be established which 
represents the overall mission failure, as shown in figure 10.4. 
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Figure 10.4 Single-phase fault tree structure acquired for the system in figure 10.4 
10.2.1.1.1 Cut Set Cancellation 
Cut set cancellation is a technique which can be applied to phased-mission systems to simplify 
the system phase configurations prior to the transformation of the multi -phased mission to an 
equivalent single-phase mission. 
The rule for cut set cancellation is: 
A minimal cut set in a phase can be cancelled, i.e. omitted from the list of minimal cut 
sets for that phase, if it contains a minimal cut set of a later phase. 
The cut set cancellation won't affect the mission reliability/unreliability. If a minimal cut set 
exists in the system failure logic model for both phase j and k (j<k), its occurrence in phase j 
doesn't need to be considered since it will be accounted for in phase k with regard to the mission 
failure. 
The minimal cut sets for each phase of the system in figure 10.4 are: 
Phase 1: [A, B, Cl 
Phase 2: fAt, [B, Cl 
Phase 3: {A}, {B}, {c} 
Minimal cut set {A, B, C} in phase 1 can be eliminated since it contains minimal cut sets {A} 
and {B, C} from phase 2. In the same way, minimal cut sets for phase 2 can be both removed 
since they both contain minimal cut sets from phase 3. Therefore, only phase 3 needs to be 
considered with respect to the mission reliability. Correspondingly, the transformation based on 
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the simplified system configurations will produce the equivalent single-phase fault tree structure 
shown in figure 10.5. 
cS cS [] 
eb~@~® 
Figure 10.5 Single-phase fault tree structure after the cut set cancellation 
10.2.1.2 Approximation Techniques for Mission UnreIiability 
An important problem with phased-mission analysis is to calculate as efficiently as possible 
either the exact value or bounds for mission unreliability. For complex phased-mission systems, 
the calculation of the exact unreliability of a mission can be prohibitively expensive largely due 
to the number of minimal cut sets being adding to the analysis by the basic event transformation 
illustrated in figure 10.1. In this case, approximation techniques may be necessary, especially for 
systems containing a large number of components or a large number of phases. 
Approximation methods have been developed to estimate the system unreliability without the 
application of basic event transformation. Four such methods were given in Burdick et al [44] 
based on a review of the developments by Esary and Ziehms. These methods are: 
• Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion of Phase Unreliabilities (INEX) 
In this method, the minimal cut sets are obtained for each phase from the corresponding logic 
model. The unreliability of phase j, Q;, is calculated using the inclusion-exclusion expansion 
of the phase j minimal cut sets (equation 2.5) using unconditional basic event unreliabilities. 
The unconditional basic event reliability during phase j, Pc' is defined as the probability 
J 
that the corresponding component has functioned through the phases up to and including 
phase j, i.e. the component is working at the end of phase j. Pc can be derived through 
J 
equation 10. I. 
- j 
Pc} = P[xc(tj) = 0] = I1 Pcl forj = 1,2, ... , m 10.1 
i=1 
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where xc(t) represents the state of component c at time t with' l' indicating a failed state 
and '0' indicating a working state; Pc is the conditional basic event reliability on the , 
condition that the component is working at the start of phase i. 
An approximation for mission reliability, RlN-Ex, can be expressed by the product of the 
individual phase reliabilities Rj in equation 10.2 .. 
'" R IN-EX = IT Rj 10.2 
i",1 
An approximation of mission unreliability, RIN-Ex, can also be obtained by the sum of the 
individual phase unreliabilities R j using equation 10.3. 
_ m_ 
RIN-EX ::; LRj 
j=1 
• Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion with Cut Set Cancellation (INEX-CC) 
10.3 
This method is similar to the INEX method. The difference is that in this method mission cut 
set cancellation is carried out before Rj is calculated for each phase. In this case, the Rj 
obtained for each phase will in general be less than the Rj calculated in INEX method 
because there are fewer cut sets included in the logic model for each phase. 
• Minimal Cut Set Bound (MCB) 
In this method, minimal cut sets are obtained for each phase. The probability that minimal 
cut set Cj occurs during phasej, qc , is calculated using equation 10.4. 
/(j) 
NC;(jJ 
qc,,,, = IT P{c} 
c=1 
where P{c}: the probability of the occurrence of basic event c in cut set Cj ofphasej 
N c : the number of basic events included in minimal cut set C j of phase j 
I(j) 
10.4 
The reliability of phase j can then be estimated using the minimal cut set bound in equation 
10.5. 
where N cs : the number of minimal cut sets in phase j 
J 
10.5 
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qc : the probability of success of cut set Cj through phase j 
/(j) 
The approximation for the mission reliability using the minimal cut set bound, RMcB, and 
mission unreliability RMCB can then be obtained in the same way as in equations 10.2 and 
10.3. 
• Minimal Cut Set Bound with Cut Set Cancellation (MCB-CC) 
The MCB-CC method is stepwise identical to the MCB method except that mission cut set 
cancellation is implemented prior to any calculation. 
The following ordering, shown in equation 10.6, exists among the bounds obtained from the 
above approximations: 
{
RMCB-CC} 
RMlss ::; RINEX-CC::; _ ::; RMCB 
R INEX 
10.6 
No general comparison can be made between RINEX and RMCB-CC as the ordering of these values 
depends on the particular problem being solved. 
10.2.1.3 Laws of Boolean Phase Algebra 
Boolean Algebra has formed the foundation underlying fault tree analysis. A set of additional 
Boolean algebraic laws have been developed by Xue and Wang [45] to enable the dependency 
between different phases due to common component failures to be taken into account in the 
phased-mission analysis. In the Boolean phase algebra, a basic event A may be represented in 
the following way: 
AJ - Basic event A occurs during phase j, i.e. the failure only occurs during this 
particular phase. 
Am - Basic event A exists in phase j, i.e. the failure can occur in any of the 
previous phases i, .. . ,j-i or in phasej. 
Suppose phase k comes before phase j in a mission. The intersection and union concept rules can 
be applied to phased-missions by extending to events included in different phases, as are given in 
equation 10.7, 10.8 and 10.9. 
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k j 
= UA, UA, 
1;1 i=k+! 
j 
=A(k) UA, 
j",k+1 
j 
A(k) (') A(j) = A(k) (') {A(k) U A, } 
i=k+1 
=A(k) 
j 
A(k) u A(j) = A(k) u {A(k) U A, } 
j 
=A(k) UA, 
i=k+l 
=A(j) 
i=k+1 
10.7 
10.8 
10.9 
In the same way, for the system to be in a failed state in phase j, XOh system failure could have 
occurred in any phase up to and including phase j. This can be expressed in equation 10.1 O. 
X(j) =X/uX2 u ... uXj 10.10 
where X(j) is the event that the system is failed in phase j; 
Xi is the event that the system fails first during phase i 
NaJ 
Xj = U G(j) , where C'(j) represents the existence of cut set C, in phase j. 
1=1 
The mission unreliability can then be expressed in equation 10.11. 
RMISS = P[X(m)] 
= p(OXj) = p[O(tjc,(j))] 
)"=1 }=I 1=1 
10.11 
By applying the rules presented in equations 10.7 - 10.9, equation 10.11 automatically 
implements the cut set cancellation presented in section 10.2.1.1.1. 
Somani and Trivedi [46] present further methods for phased mission system reliability analysis 
based on Boolean algebraic methods and fault trees. Instead of transforming a multi-phased 
mission into an equivalent single-phase mission, the fault trees for different phases are solved 
individually. The probabilities of al\ possible combinations contributing to the mission failure 
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during individual phases are computed. However, this requires that information must be carried 
from phase to phase since phases are not independent and leads to lengthy calculations for 
situations where there are numerous phases or cut sets in each phase. This work is extended by 
Ma and Trivedi [47] in which the mission unreliability is obtained in the form of the sum of 
disjoint products using a computational algorithm and the algorithm is implemented using the 
SHARPE software package. 
10.2.1.4 Binary Decision Diagrams 
The methods which have been described in previous sections are all based on the identification 
of minimal cut sets of the phased-mission system (PMS) and need to obtain the sum of disjoint 
products explicitly, which can be computationally intensive. Zang et al [48] present a BDD-
based algorithm (PMS-BDD) for reliability analysis of phased-mission systems. This algorithm 
uses phase algebra to deal with the dependence across the phases, and a new BDD operation to 
incorporate the phase algebra. With this algorithm, the cancellation of common components 
among the phases can be combined within the process of BDD generation without additional 
operations, and the sum of disjoint products can be implicitly represented by the final BDD. The 
basic event transformation is carried out in PMS-BDD algorithm before the PMS-BDD is 
established. 
Let Fe denote the failure function for component C up to phase j; qc the failure function for 
J J 
component C in phase j given that component C is working at the start of phase j. Then the 
failure function for component C up to phasej can be expressed in equation 10.12. 
10.12 
The first term of equation 10.12 represents the probability that the component has already failed 
during the previous phases I, 2, ... , j-l. The second term represents the probability that the 
component has functioned through all the previous phases and fails in phase j. 
In the same way as for a single-phase mission, an ordering sequence is required to enable the 
construction of the BDD. In terms of the basic event transformation for each variable, Zang et al 
present two possible ordering schemes: 
• Forward Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO): The variables are ordered in the same 
pattern as the phase order, Cl, C2, ... , Cm. 
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• Backward Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO): The variables are ordered in the reverse 
pattern of the phase order, Cm, Cm_I. ___ , Cl_ 
Let i < j, and assume component C is relevant in both phase i and i- The ite structure for 
component C in phase i and i can then be respectively represented by E; and Ej _ 
E; = ite( C;, Gl, G2) 
E; = ite(C;, HI, H2) 
The logic operation (EEl: AND or OR) between E; and Ej can be represented by BDD 
manipulations as: 
Forward PDO: ite(C;, Gl, G2) $ ite(C;, HI, H2) = ite(C;, G 1 EElHI , G2EE1 Ej ) 
Backward PDO: ite(C;, Gl, 02) EEl ite(C;, HI, H2) = ite(C;, E; EElHI, G2EE1 H2) 
The ordering of variables is very important to the size of a BDD_ Methods may be implemented 
to select the most appropriate or efficient ordering sequence of variables in BDD_ Generally 
speaking, backward PDO will produce a smaller BDD and enable the cancellation of common 
components without requiring additional operations_ 
An algorithm is presented to construct a BDD for a phased-mission system: 
1_ Obtain the failure function for each variable using equation 10_12_ 
2_ Decide the ordering for the mission components using a heuristic method_ 
3_ Generate the BDD for each phase_ 
4_ Use phase algebra and the Backward PDO to combine the BDD for each phase using OR 
logic to obtain the final mission BDD 
5_ Calculate the mission unreliability from the mission BDD 
The limitations of Zang et aI's approach are identified by Dugan and Xing [49] _ The developed 
Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO) will be able to generate the correct PSM-BDD only given 
that the ordering scheme abides by the following rules: 
• Rule I: Ordering adopted in the generation of each single-phase BDD are consistent or 
the same for all the phases 
• Rule 2: Orderings of variables that belong to the same component but to different phases 
stay together, which is achieved by replacing each component indicator-variable with a 
set of variables which represent the component in each phase after ordering components 
using heuristics 
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10.2.1.5 Non-coherent Fault Tree Analysis 
For some phased-mission systems, failure in different phases will result in different 
consequences. It may then be necessary to establish the phase as well as mission failure 
probability. When not only the mission reliability parameters but also the individual phase 
reliability parameters are of concern, most methods which have been discussed in previous 
sections are limited by their inability to calculate the individual phase failure probabilities. If cut 
set cancellation is used, it makes it impossible to account for individual phases. To overcome this 
problem, a method is proposed by R. A. La Band and J. D. Andrews [50) which enables the 
failure probability of each phase to be determined in addition to the whole mission unreliability 
by combining the causes of success of previous phases with the causes of failure for the phase in 
question. 
The basic event transformation is carried out to reflect that the component being failed in phase j 
can be due to the failure which occurs in any phase up to and including phase j. The event that 
the system fails first in phase j is represented by the success of all the phases I to j-I, and the 
failure during phase j. In the fault tree analysis, the success of phase i is represented by a non-
coherent fault tree structure using NOT logic shown in figure 10.6. 
Mission failure 
occurs during 
phase I 
Mission failure 
hase' 
Mission failure 
occurs during 
phasej-I 
Failure conditions 
met in hase' 
Phase j fault tree 
incorporated with the 
basic event 
transformation 
Figure 10.6 Generalized phase fault tree structure 
Mission unreliability, RMISS, can then be obtained by summing up the probabilities of mission 
failure in individual phases as shown in equation 10.13. 
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_ m_ 
RMlss = LRi 10.13 
1=1 
where Ri is the probability that the mission fails first during phase i; m is the total 
number of phases included in the mission 
Since for mission failure in any particular phase, the possibility that the mission has already 
failed during previous phases has been ruled out by explicitly accounting for the mission success 
up to the current phase, equation 10.13 provides the correct and exact value of mission 
unreliability. 
This method allows for the evaluation of individual phase failures, and also accounts for the 
condition where components are known to have functioned to enable the system to function 
through previous phases. However, owing to the fact that minimal cut sets are not removed from 
earlier phases in the analysis, the fault tree can be complex and require significant effort to solve. 
The fault tree simplification techniques illustrated in section 5.3.2 can be applied to reduce the 
size of the fault tree structure. The Factorization operation however needs extra attention. Since 
NOT logic is included in the phase fault tree structure, for the primary basic events to be 
identified as factors, they must always occur together in one gate type, and their complements, if 
there are any, should always occur together in the opposite gate type by De Morgans' laws. For 
example, for basic events A and B to be qualified as factors, they should always be found as 
either A+B, A. B or A.B, A + B . 
Owing to the non-coherent nature of the fault trees, the combinations of basic events that lead to 
the individual phase failure are expressed as prime implicants. In addition to event Ci which 
represents the component failure during phase i, Cij is introduced to represent the event that the 
component fails at some time from the start of phase i to the end of phase j. This makes it 
possible to define a new algebra over the phases to manipulate the logic equations. The algebraic 
laws can be summarized as follows (i <j): 
Ai.Ai = Ai 
Ai.Aj = 0 
Ai.Aij = Ai 
AiA;=O 
A j + A;+I + ... + Aj = Aij 
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Therefore, if two implicant sets contain exactly the same components where all but one occur 
over the same time and the other represents the component failure in continuous phases, the two 
implicant sets may be combined in the way illustrated as follows: 
A/B/ __ A/B/2 
A2B2 
Having established the prime implicants for each phase, they many now be used to quantify the 
probability of phase and mission failure. The unreliability for each individual phase}, Rj, can be 
obtained using an simple inclusion-exclusion expansion for the prime implicants C; in the phase. 
The phase unreliability can also be obtained through the binary decision diagrams approach 
which stands as a better alternative to the quantification technique based on minimal cut 
sets/prime implicants. With the BDD approach, the fault tree structure for each phase in the 
mission is converted to a binary decision diagram. By summing up the probability of each 
disjoint path leading to terminal node' I' in the BDD, it will produce the exact value of phase 
unreliability, thus the exact value of mission unreliability through equation 10.13. This avoids 
the need to determine all phase prime implicants as an intermediate stage. 
10.2.1.6 The Markov Method 
The Markov method serves as an alternative to combinatorial techniques. There are two general 
approaches to the solution of multi-phased missions using Markov methods. One is to treat each 
phase individually, where the Markov model for each individual phase is solved separately and 
linked by a state probability vector. The other approach is to analyse the entire mission within a 
single Markov model. The latter approach is considered by Dugan [51] who presents a method to 
construct a single continuous-time discrete-space Markov model for phased mission systems 
where the state space is the size of the union of the components in each phase model. 
To combine the Markov model for each individual phase into a single mission Markov model, a 
multiplicative factor tP; is appended to each transition in phase i, as is shown in figure 10.7. The 
combined Markov chain has a state space defined by the union of the individual phase Markov 
models, and the state transitions in the combined Markov model are defined by the sum of 
corresponding phase transitions. 
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Figure 10.7 Combination of individual phase Markov models 
The combined Markov model may be solved using a standard numerical technique. In the 
solution, when the mission time has progressed into phase i (tj-t ~ t $tj), cPj is set to one, and all 
other <1'i (j#) are set to zero, thus removing any transitions that do not belong to the current 
phase. The state space does not change and rather than transforming the state probabilities, the 
state transitions change as the phase change. The initial conditions for the first phase are known, 
and the failure and success probability of each phase can be obtained using the Markov state 
probabilities at the end of each phase. The final state probability vector of each phase is passed 
directly to the following phase for further analysis. 
In the case that the components are not the same in each phase, a full Markov state listing is 
formed by including all components that contribute to the mission failure at some point. For each 
source state in the combined Markov model, the destination state corresponding to the failure of 
a component can be different in different phases, and so each component must be considered 
several times during the mission. A state in one phase that causes the system to fail is not 
necessarily a failure stated of the previous phases. However, if a system failure state is reached 
in phase i, it becomes absorbing for all later phases. The system states are then defined as 
'operational for all phases' or 'failed in phase i', where phase i is the first phase in which the 
system fails. Dugan also considers this method for systems with imperfect coverage. 
The approach provides an efficient representation of the multi-phased mission. The construction 
of a single model eliminates the problems faced across a phase boundary if the state-space of the 
phases are not the same. However, the single model has a state space defined by all components 
required in the mission regardless of their relevance in each individual phase. In some cases, a 
mission may require a large number of components that are not necessarily required through all 
phases. The resulting state space of the single model will become large and the set of differential 
equations will also increase in many cases, making the problem complex to solve or even 
intractable. 
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10.2.2 Repairable Phased-mission Systems 
The methods presented so far have only accounted for non-repairable phased-mission systems. In 
some practical situations, it may by possible for maintenance to be performed on a system. In 
this case, assessment techniques are required which are able to taken into consideration the repair 
process occurring during the mission phases. 
10.2.2.1 Combinatorial Approaches 
Somani [52] extended the work of Trivedi and Somani [46] and presented combinatorial 
approaches for the solution of repairable components in a multi-phased mission. The approach 
they presented considers the situation where a component can only be repaired if it is not 
required in a particular phase. When a component is required for the successful operation of a 
phase, repair cannot be initiated. Four possible cases are considered for the component in any 
phase: the component may begin in the working or failed state at the start of the phase, and may 
end in either the working or failed state at the end of the phase. Probabilities for each case are 
obtained based on the assumption that the component failure and repair times follow an 
exponential distribution. 
Another combinatorial approach is presented by Vaurio [53] who considers calculations for the 
system unavailability and failure intensity for each phase of the mission separately. This method 
does not model the dependencies that arise in the situation of repairable systems. The phase 
unavailability and failure intensity will be approximations. Also the phase calculations involved 
do not account for the outcome of previous phases. 
10.2.2.2 Markov Methods 
Phase algebra is no longer applicable when components can be repaired during a multi-phased 
mission. In such circumstances, combinatorial methods cannot adequately deal with problem 
solution as they do not account for when the repairs are made, which may be in a later phase than 
when the failure occurred. The Markov approach can provide a solution for repairable phased-
mission systems, and has been the focus of a substantial amount of research. 
Early investigations into the use of Markov methods to solve phased mission problems were 
carried out by Clarotti et al [54] who used a homogeneous model. This method establishes new 
initial conditions for the start of each phase, and requires the entire mission to be solved using 
phase Markov models with the same state space. 
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Homogeneous Markov models are also used to solve phased-mission systems where the phase 
durations are random variables [55, 56, 57]. Mura and Bondavalli [58] investigated situations 
where phases have a pre-determined time duration, but the next phase to be performed is chosen 
depending on the system state at the end of the current phase. A two-level analysis method of 
state-dependent phase sequences is presented by Mura and Bondavalli, in which the higher level 
method models the structure of the mission with regard to only the pattem of phases, and the 
lower level method models the configuration of the individual phases. A probabilistic phase 
transition model is constructed to represent the state dependencies between phases. Each lower-
level model is solved in the order of the phase sequences in the upper-level model, where the 
initial state probability vector for each phase is obtained by application of the appropriate 
transition model to the state probabilities at the end of the preceding phase. The upper-level 
model can then be solved to evaluate parameters of interest. 
A non-homogeneous Markov method is presented by Smotherman and Zemoudeh [59] to 
overcome the limitations of homogeneous Markov models. The approach is based on a single 
non-homogeneous Markov model in which the concept of state transition is extended to include 
globally-time-dependent phase changes. Phase change times are specified using non-overlapping 
distributions with phase duration functions that are zero outside assigned time intervals ordered 
according to the phase sequence. The generalized non-homogeneous Markov model is also able 
to model globally-time-dependent failure and repair rates. 
10.2.2.3 Minimal Markov Method 
Applying the Markov method to assess repairable phased-mission systems may produce an 
explosion in the model state space which is usually based on all components in the system. 
However, during some phases in the mission, only some of the components may be relevant to 
the system failure. This feature provides an option to reduce the model size by considering the 
phases individually and has resulted in the minimal Markov method [60]. 
For the minimal Markov method, the smallest possible Markov models are formed for each 
individual phase. The analysis carried out over each phase duration utilises a Markov model 
formed by considering only components which are functionally required in the particular phase i. 
To facilitate the modelling process, initially all components are considered and a full set of states 
for the total mission is produced. For each phase the model is reduced by considering only 
components relevant to that phase. Appropriate initial conditions are determined. Once the phase 
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model is analyzed, the results are expanded out again in terms of the full model to enable the 
calculation of the initial conditions for the immediately succeeding phases. The expansion of the 
reduced phase component state probabilities into the full state probabilities are realised by 
multiplying the reduced state probabilities with other excluded component availabilities and 
unavailabilities at the end of the phase. The probability that any component c which is not 
required in phase j being in failed state at the end of phase j is calculated through equation 10.14 
and 10.15 depending on whether it features a revealed or dormant failure. 
qc(tj) = Ite [1-e-(A,+u,)I'l 
A.e +ve 
10.14 
where in equation 10.15, kOe is the time when the last inspection is carried out on 
component c prior to the end of phase i, i.e. tj. 
Then the reduction process is carried out on the full Markov model at the beginning of the 
analysis for the succeeding phase j by removing components which are not required in the phase. 
Initial state probabilities in the minimal Markov model for phase j are obtained through the 
summation of the probabilities of all full states that contribute to each of the reduced states. This 
method leads to a sequence whereby the full model is reduced for the analysis of each phase and 
then expanded to give a full set of state probabilities following the phase analysis. Figure 10.8 
displays the algorithm underlying the minimal Markov method. 
I Develop the full I 
Markov model 
1" 
Set initial conditions Set these state 
with all components probabilities as '0' 
working 
-~ 
r 
Set phase I Calculate transition 
variable i = I failure probabilities = 
I LP success slales for phase i-I & 
Construct a reduced 
failed s/ales/or phase ltl-l) 
Markov model by Expand the model to full 
removing component states by including 
irrelevant to phase i I i= i+I I irrelevant components and make failed r according to equations 
system states 10.14 and 10.15 
absorbill!! 
1 ~ Calculate phase Mission Update initial state Solve the reliability and End of success probabilities for the Markov model unreliability mission? YE!! probabilil] 
reduced model for phase i F;= 'LPjailedsfatesCtj) =R; 
Ri = 'LPsuccesssfutesCtj) 
Figure 10.8 Algorithm for the minimal Markov method 
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An example phased-mission system is used to illustrate how the minimal Markov method 
applies. The system is composed of three components A, Band C, which all feature a revealed 
failure and are maintained throughout the mission. The system failure logic in each individual 
phase is shown in figure 10.9. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
• • • • 0 
A.B 
I1 
A.C 
12 
RC 
13 
Figure 10.9 Example phased-mission system 
The reliability analysis ofthis phased-mission system is carried out as follows: 
A full Markov model is constructed based on all components as shown in figure 10.10. 
State 4 
State 5 State 7 
Figure 10.10 The full Markov model for the system 
Assuming all components working at the start of the mission, the initial state probabilities for the 
full model are prO] = [1, 0, 0, ... , 0]. 
The analysis for each phase is carried out in turn. 
Phase 1 
Only components A and B are required in phase 1. A reduced Markov model is constructed for 
phase 1 as shown in figure 10.1 1 by combining the states I and 4, states 2 and 6, states 3 and 7 
and states 5 and 8 in the full model shown in figure 10.10. To distinguish from the states in the 
full model, the states in phase I model is attached with the sub-script' 1 '. 
279 
State 2, 
State 3, 
A-I 
B-1 
State 4, 
Figure 10.11 Minimal Markov model for phase I in example phased mission 
In the reduced model shown in figure 10.11, state 41 is the failed system state and therefore made 
absorbing. The initial state probabilities for phase 1 are also updated as P[O] = [1, 0, 0, 0]. 
Then the quantification is carried out on the reduced Markov model for phase 1. The probability 
of each state at the end of phase 1, i.e. tt, is obtained. Accordingly, the system failure probability 
during phase 1 is Q4, (tt) . 
Phase 1 ~ Phase 2 
In preparation for the analysis of phase 2, the phase 1 model is expanded back to the full states 
by the inclusion of component C as state 11 is expanded to states 1 and 4 in the full model, state 
21 is expanded to states 2 and 6 in the full model, state 31 is expanded to states 3 and 7 in the full 
model, and state 41 is expanded to states 5 and 8 in the full model. The probability of each state 
in the full model is the multiple of the original state probability in the phase 1 model and the 
availability/unavailability of component C at the end of phase 1. That is, 
Ql[ttl = Q" (tt) .[I-qC(tl)]; Q2[tl] = Q" (t,) .[I-qC(tl)]; 
Q3[ttl = Q3 (tt) .[I-QC(tl)]; Q4[tl] = Qt (tt) .QC(tl) , , 
QS[tl] = Q4, (tt) .[I-QC(tl)]; Q6[ttl = Q" (t,) .QC(tl) 
Q7[tl] = Q3, (t,) .QC(tl); Qs[ttl = Q4, (tt) .QC(tl) 
Among the 8 system states in the full model, the system fails if it arrives in states 5 and 8 during 
phase 1 (absorbing) and consequently as the mission will fail they should not be considered for 
phase 2 analysis. The system works in state 6 during phase 1 but fails in phase 2. Accordingly, 
the phase 1 to phase 2 transition failure probability is Q6(tl). Therefore, in forming the initial 
280 
state probabilities for phase 2, the probabilities of states 5, 6 and 8 at the end of phase I are set as 
'0', 
Phase 2 
Only components A and C are relevant during phase 2, so component B needs to be removed 
from the full model to form the minimal Markov model for phase 2. Accordingly, states 1 and 3, 
2 and 5,4 and 7 and states 6 and 8 in the full model are combined. The minimal Markov model 
for phase 2 is then constructed as shown in figure 10.12. State 42 is the failed system state and 
therefore made absorbing. 
State 2, 
State 3, 
A-I 
C-I 
State 4, 
Figure 10.12 Minimal Markov model for phase 2 in example phased-mission 
The initial state probabilities for phase 2 are then determined as P[tl] = [Ql(tl)+Q3(tl), Q2(tl), 
Q4(tl)+Q7(tl), 0]. The quantification on the Markov model in figure 10.12 produces the 
probability of each state at the end of phase 2, i.e. t2. System failure probability during phase 2 is 
obtained as Q4, (t,). 
Phase 2 -+ Phase 3: 
In preparation for the analysis of phase 3, the reduced Markov model for phase 2 is expanded 
back to full states by including component B. State b is expanded to states 1 and 3 in the full 
model, state 22 is expanded to states 2 and 5 in the full model, state 32 is expanded to states 4 and 
7 in the full model, and state 43 is expanded to states 6 and 8 in the full model. The probability of 
each state in the full model at the end of phase 2 is: 
Ql[t2] = Q" (t,) .[I-qB(t2)]; Q2[t2] = Q" (tJ .[I-qB(t2)]; 
Q3[t2] = Q" (t,) .QB(t2); Q4[t2] = Q3, (t,) .[I-QB(t2)] 
QS[t2] = Q" (t,) .QB(tI); Q6[t2] = Q4, (t,) . [1-QB(t2)] 
Q7[t2] = Q3, (t,) .QB(t2); QS[t2] = Q4, (t,) .QB(t2) 
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Among the 8 states in the full model, the system fails in states 6 and 8 during phase 2, and works 
in state 7 in phase 2 but fails in phase 3. Phase 2 to phase 3 transition failure probability is then 
obtained as Q7[t2]. Consequently, the system cannot reside in states 6, 7 and 8 at the start of 
phase 3 analysis and their state probabilities at the end of phase 2 are set as '0' in preparation for 
analysis of phase 3. 
Phase 3 
In phase 3, only components B and C are relevant. Component A is removed from the full model 
to form the minimal Markov model for phase 3. States 1 and 2, 3 and 5, 4 and 6 and states 7 and 
8 in the full model are combined. The minimal Markov model for phase 3 is shown in figure 
10.13. State 2, 
State 3, 
B-1 
C-I 
State 4, 
Figure 10.13 Minimal Markov model for phase 3 in example phased-mission 
The initial state probabilities for phase 3 are determined according to the full state probabilities 
at the end of phase 2 as P[t2] = P[QI[t2]+Q2[t2], Q3[t2]+QS[t2], Q4[t2], 0]. The quantification on 
the reduced Markov model for phase 3 produces the state probabilities at the end of phase 3, i.e. 
t3. As phase 3 is the last phase in the mission, the mission success probability is then obtained as 
the sum of the success state probabilities at the end of phase 3, i.e. RM1ss = 
QI, (t,) +Q" (t,) + Q3, (t3) . 
10.2.3 Review of Existing Solutions to Phased-mission Analysis 
Much research has been carried out to investigate the reliability of phased-mission systems. For 
non-repairable systems, significant advances include the basic event transformation, the 
transformation of the multi-phased mission into a single-phase mission, the cut set cancellation 
technique, approximation techniques, the development of phase algebra, the use of binary 
decision diagrams, non-coherent fault tree analysis methods which are able to produce the phase 
failure parameters and the Markov method. For phased-mission systems where component 
maintenance and repair is possible, combinatorial approaches are available which can provide 
the approximate value of mission unreliability. However, the main techniques used for the 
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solution of this type of problem are homogeneous and non-homogeneous Markov methods. 
These methods are aimed at capturing the repair process during the mission, the system state-
dependent behaviour, the random phase durations and mission time-dependent component failure 
and repair rates. The minimal Markov method provides an efficient alternative to the full Markov 
method. It is able to establish the smallest possible Markov model for each phase according to 
the specific phase failure logic and therefore avoids the state space explosion problem by which 
the applicability of the Markov method is significantly weakened. 
Little research has been undertaken into the solution of phased mission systems where 
component inter-dependence exists during phases in the mission. Dependencies could exist, for 
example, due to the use of standby components, sequential failures, the existence of initiating 
and enabling events and the maintenance dependency existing during the repair process. 
Therefore, a general method is required to account for the dependency relationships existing 
between components during the mission phases in order to produce the accurate mission 
unreliability parameters. This will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 11. Dependency Modelling in Phased-mission Systems 
11.1 Introduction 
In many multi-phased missions, the system may feature complex relationships which give rise to 
dependencies between individual components. To obtain an accurate prediction of the mission 
reliability, it is necessary to take the dependencies into account in the modelling. So far little 
research has been carried out on this aspect. In this chapter, a generic methodology is presented 
to perform the reliability assessment of phased-mission systems with inter-dependencies between 
components. The technique is also extended to consider phased-mission systems where the 
maintenance of components is possible during the mission. 
Assumptions 
Before the modelling approach is described, assumptions are given for the basic characteristics 
of the phased-mission system under investigation: 
a) The mission fails if the system fails during any phase. 
b) Phase transitions are instantaneous. 
c) Phase durations are pre-determined. 
d) Repair of components is possible during the mission whether the component failure 
contributes to the system failure or not in a specific phase. 
e) Components have constant failure rates. 
£) Both phase reliability and mission reliability predictions are of interest. 
11.2 Phased-mission Systems Involving Dependencies 
In this section, issues concerned with phased-mission systems featuring dependencies are 
highlighted to indicate the necessity 0 f developing a new m ethodology and what features the 
new methodology should achieve. These issues are: 
a). The existing techniques assume independence between components in the modelling of 
phased-mission systems. The new methodology must overcome this deficiency and incorporate 
the ability to model dependency relationships. 
b). Some phased-mission systems are non-repairable, some are fully repairable and other systems 
are partially-repairable where only some of the components can be maintained during the 
mission. For non-repairable systems, the 'basic event transformation' [43] is carried out to 
identify the phase in which components fail. However, for repairable or partially-repairable 
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systems, this technique is no longer appropriate. The new methodology must be able to account 
for the influence of component behaviour during previous phases and flexible enough to analyse 
different types of phased-mission systems. 
c). Modelling dependency relationships together with the repair process determines that the 
Markov method needs to be used in the analysis. This has the potential to result in state space 
explosion if the full Markov model is used. The minimal Markov method [60] is no longer 
applicable to overcome this as the expansion process assumes the independence between 
components not required in the phase. The new methodology should be a ble to deal with the 
dependency problem and at the same time solve the explosion problem. 
d). A phased-mission system can feature different maintenance characteristics during different 
phases. It might be the case that during some phases no maintenance can be carried out and the 
independence assumption can also hold. In this case, the Markov method would be an inefficient 
quantification tool, and other tools which are based on the independence assumption will be a 
better alternative. The new methodology should be able to utilise the most efficient analysis tool 
depending on the characteristics of each phase. 
e). In some phased-mission systems, dependency relationships are self-contained in independent 
subsystems. The analysis efficiency can be improved if the new methodology can identify these 
subsystems as independent modules through all the phases. 
f). When systems are non-repairable, some analysis techniques provide the causes of system 
failure for the mission, while other techniques can provide implicants for each individual phase 
failure. However, for repairable or partially-repairable systems, the phase algebra developed to 
produce the phase failure modes for non-repairable systems is no longer applicable. In the new 
methodology, it is necessary to obtain implicants for each phase failure which can take into 
account component behaviour during previous phases. 
g). The causes of system failure will change from phase to phase in a phased-mission. This can 
result in failure on transition to a phase. The phase transition failure is a different mechanism 
from the system failure which occurs during the phase at the time of a component failure. It is of 
interest to identify the conditions for phase transition failures and obtain the phase transition 
failure probabilities in addition to those which occur during the phase. 
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11.3 Generic Modified Phase Algebra Method 
Considering the issues discussed above, a generic modified phase algebra method has been 
developed. This will enable the dependency modelling of phased-mission systems to acquire 
system reliability measures. Before the method is described in detail, an overview of the 
algorithm underlying the modified phase algebra is provided in the following section. 
11.3.1 Repair Process and Phase Algebra 
One important problem in phased-mission system analysis is how to account for the component 
behaviour during previous phases in the current phase analysis. Several existing methods for 
non-repairable systems use a phase algebra [45, 46, 47, 50]. It assesses the current phase taking 
into account component failures during previous phases which once failed do not change state. 
The algebra is based on the 'basic event transformation' [43] which expresses that the existence 
of a component C in the failed state in phase j can be caused by the failure of component C 
during any phases from phase I to phase j. At the system level for each phase, the system failure 
is investigated considering component failures which occurred in the previous phases and the 
current phase using the basic event transformation. 
When maintenance is possible during the mission on some or all the components, the 
representation of phase algebra must be modified. The influence of the repair process is 
examined at two levels: basic event level and system level. 
At basic event level 
If a component C is repairable during the mission, then when investigating phase j, what really 
matters is the state of component C at the point that the mission proceeds into phase j and the 
behaviour of component C during phase j. As the phase transition is assumed to be 
instantaneous, the state of component C at the point of transition into the phase j is the state of 
component C at the end of phase j-I. The notation C(o is used to represent that component C is in 
a failed state at the end of phase i. It is not necessary to consider the history of failure and repair 
of component C during the phase. 
At system level 
The system failure in a phase j is investigated in a different way depending on whether 
maintenance is available for components whose functionality is relevant to the success of the 
phase. It is considered as follows: 
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a) No maintenance on components: in this case, once the component fails, it remains in the 
failed state throughout the mission. The system failure during the phase is investigated in 
the same way as for non-repairable phased-mission systems. The non-repairable basic 
event transformation is carried out on components whose functionality is relevant to the 
phase and accounts for the effect of component failures in previous phases. That is, that 
the component C is failed in phasej is expressed as Cl+C2+ ... +Cj • 
b) Maintenance is carried out on some or all of the phase-relevant components. The 
possibility of maintenance means that the state of the component can change one or more 
times during phase j. In this case, the non-repairable basic event transformation is no 
longer appropriate. A new way to account for component failures in previous phases 
needs to be established. This is achieved by investigating the system failure in each 
phase, j, from two perspectives. The first is that the system failure logic for phase j has 
been satisfied in previous phases, i.e. at the end of phase j-l the system is residing in a 
state in which the system failure logic for phase j is met. The second perspective is that 
the system successfully enters phase j and fails during phase j. With regard to the second 
situation, it must account for all the required phase failure conditions to exist at the same 
time where the component states can be continually changing. Since the mission 
terminates once the system fails during the phase, repair is not carried out and so the 
failed system state will remain till the end of the phase. Therefore, when considering if 
the system has failed during a certain phase, it is required to investigate the system state 
at the end of the phase, i.e. whether the combination of component states at the end of the 
phase satisfies the system failure logic for the phase. To illustrate this, a simple example 
is used. Assume that during a certain phase the system fails when both components A 
and B fail. Figure 11.1 displays the behaviour of components A and B during the phase. 
Component A 
ComponentB 
working 
failed 
working 1------, 
failed 
Start ofphasej 
Mode I 
End of phase j 
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Component A 
Component B 
working 
I failed 
-------
working 
failed __________ J 
Start ofphasej System 
fails 
Mode 2 
End ofphasej 
Figure 11.1 Different behaviour mode of the system 
In figure 11.1, mode 1 illustrates that although both components A and B have failed 
during the phase, the system does not fail as the components are not in the failed state at 
the same time, i.e. the system failure logic has never been met during the phase. 
However, in mode 2, the failure of component B following the failure of component A 
satisfies the system failure logic. Consequently, the mission terminates and since the 
components are not repaired the system remains in the failed state with components A 
and B both failed till the end of the phase. That is, in the example, the minimal cut set 
used to express the system failure during the phase j is AV).BV). In the example, it is 
demonstrated that when components are repairable during the phase, a way to judge 
whether the system fails during the phase is to investigate the system state at the end of 
the phase. 
A special situation arises which means that maintenance on the component is not always 
performed in all the phases. When the failure of a single component C is sufficient to bring about 
the system failure during phase j, the component C will not get repaired as once it fails, the 
mission terminates. In this case, component C is regarded as 'non-repairable' during phasej, and 
in this case the basic event transformation is carried out in the form: C(j.I)+Cj • 
11.3.2 General Process of Modified Phase Algebra Method 
This section describes the modified phase algebra method. For illustrative purposes, it is 
assumed that for each phase j in the mission, its time duration is defined as [fj_I, fj). (j = 1,2, ... ). 
The method is carried out through the following steps. 
Step 1: Acquire Comprehensive System Information. 
a). Establish the fault tree which represents the system failure for each individual phase. At this 
stage, component failures are included in each phase fault tree structure without the specification 
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of the phase number in which they fail. During this process, gates which appear in more than one 
phase fault tree are assigned the same label so that they can be identified as an independent 
module in the later modularization process. 
b). Establish the dependency infonnation for the phased-mission system. As different 
dependency relationships may exist among the same group of components during different 
phases, infonnation is specified for each dependency group to indicate the phase(s) during which 
this dependency relationship exists. 
c). Establish the basic event infonnation. For each basic event which represents a component 
failure, infonnation is required as to whether the maintenance can be carried out during the 
mission. Also infonnation is required on the component failure characteristics with regard to 
each phase from phase 1 to the last phase in which the component influences the system 
perfonnance. 
Step 2: Identify Modules. 
Independent modules are identified from the phase fault trees across all the phases. Sections 
identified as modules must be modules for each phase fault tree in which any of the components 
that the module contains appear. This is achieved in the following way: 
a). Construct a combined mission fault tree by grouping the phase fault trees as inputs to an OR 
logic gate. With this structure the factorization and modularization process can be carried out 
using one fault tree and one coherent process which avoids having to cross-reference between 
different phase fault trees. 
b). Identify modules and factors in the combined fault tree by following the pre-processing 
procedures described and illustrated in section 5.2. During the pre-processing, during the fault 
tree simplification stage, the contraction of the top event of any phase fault tree, i.e. the level 
immediately below the top event in the created combined fault tree, is not pennitted in order to 
keep the failure logic for each phase intact. 
c). W here appropriate, replace the basic events in the combined fault tree with the identified 
modules; and extract each individual phase fault tree from the combined fault tree structure by 
eliminating the top OR gate. 
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With this procedure, modules can then be identified across all the phases, and the smallest 
possible modules then identified for each dependency relationship in the system. This solves 
issue e) in section 11.2. 
Step 3: Phase Fault Tree Transfonnation. 
For each phase j, each basic event is expanded to account for the phases in which it can have 
failed (as discussed in section 11.3.1). Prior to the transfonnation, it must be detennined if, for 
the phase under investigation, maintenance can be perfonned on each component. If during 
phase j, a single failure of a component occurs which on its own will bring about the system 
failure, maintenance is not carried out on that component during phase j. Different approaches 
are taken for the phase fault tree transfonnation depending on whether the maintenance is carried 
out during the phase or not as it influences how the system failure during the phase is expressed 
through combination of individual component failures. These two situations are described below: 
a). No maintenance on relevant components during phase j: this includes situations where 
components are non-repairable during the whole mission or have restricted maintenance 
resulting from their single order contribution to the phase failure. For components which are 
non-repairable over the mission, the phase fault tree transfonnation is carried out by 
transfonning each relevant basic event to account for component failures which occur in all 
previous phases up to phase j. This is expressed in equation 11.1: 
C = Cl + ... +Cj_I+Cj 11.1 
where Cl represents that component C fails during phase i. 
For components which feature the restricted maintenance, the transfonnation only has to 
consider the state in which component C enters phasej, i.e. the state of component C at the end 
of phase j-l and the component behaviour during phase j. This is expressed in equation 11.2: 
C = C(i-I)+Cj 11.2 
In some cases, the component may feature restricted maintenance in successive phases from 
phase k to phasej. To represent this, the transfonnation is carried out as in equation 11.3: 
C = C(k_I)+Ck+ ... +Cj 11.3 
b). Maintenance is carried out on relevant components during phase j: in this circumstance, the 
two situations which result in system failure during a phase are investigated separately. The 
system either fails when the system failure logic for phase j has been satisfied at the end of phase 
290 
j-l OR the system failure logic for phase j is met during the phase. This latter condition is 
determined by examination of the component states at the end of phase j. To represent this, the 
phase fault tree transformation is carried out as illustrated in figure 11.2. 
System is unreliable 
in phasej 
~ 
I 
Failure logic for Failure logic for 
phase j is satisfied at phase j is satisfied 
the end of phase (j-l) during the phase 
Figure 11.2 Phase fault tree transformation with maintenance available during the phase 
The left input to the top event in figure 11.2 represents the phase transition failure which occurs 
as soon as the mission enters phase j. This intermediate event is developed from the original 
phase fault tree structure established in Step 1 by investigating the state of each relevant 
component at the end of phase (j-l), i.e. Cv.I)' 
When the component is non-repairable during the whole mission, the event Cv.l) can be further 
expanded into a series of basic events as: 
11.4 
Or when the component features restricted maintenance during phase j-l, the expansion is 
performed as: 
11.5 
The right input to the top event in figure 11.2 represents an in-phase failure. It is also developed 
based on the original phase fault tree structure by investigating the component states at the end 
of phase j, as the contribution that the failure of these components during phase j makes to the 
system unreliability during the phase is reflected by the state of the component at the end of 
phase j, i.e. C(j). When there is partial maintenance during phase j, i.e. only some of the required 
components are maintained, for those non-repairable, the basic event Cv) is further expanded in 
the same way as in equation 11.4. 
When a phase fault tree contains a module, it has to be established whether the module is 
repairable or not during the phase to determine how the phase fault tree transformation will be 
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perfonned. This does not simply depend on whether components included in the module are 
repairable. The module is treated as non-repairable during the phase when it satisfies one of the 
following conditions: 
All components included in the module are non-repairable during the mission; OR 
The failure of the module is sufficient to bring about the system failure in the phase. This 
is a similar case to the restricted maintenance of components from first-order minimal cut 
sets. 
The phase fault tree transfonnation process establishes a method which accounts for component 
failures which occurred in previous phases for both repairable and non-repairable components. 
Phase transition failures are clearly identified and integrated into the phase analysis. 
Step 4. Simplification of Transfonned Phase Fault Tree 
The phase fault tree transfonnation conducted in the previous step replaces the single component 
failure with a series of basic events adding complexity to the phase fault tree structure. 
Therefore, the contraction, extraction and elimination processes are carried out on each 
transfonned phase fault tree to take advantage of any simplification that can be achieved on the 
phase fault tree structure. 
Step 5: Establish the Mission BOO 
The mission BOO represents causes of system unreliability over the whole mission period by 
considering the system failure in each phase in turn. In the mission BOO the tenninal node 
which represents the system failure also indicates in which phase the system failure occurs. The 
tenninal node is labelled 1 [i], which means that the system fails during phase i. Consequently, by 
following the path which leads to a tenninal node 1 U] in a minimal mission BOO, the prime 
implicants for the system failure during each phase j can be obtained. The construction of the 
mission BOO is carried out through the following procedures: 
a). Oecide the basic event ordering for each phase fault tree: for a general approach, the modified 
left-right top-down method [16] can be used, where basic events are considered in the order from 
the top to the bottom I evel in the fault tree and from I eft t 0 right at the same I evel with the 
priority given to those with higher repeated appearances. An extra condition applies in that basic 
events which represent component failures in earlier phases are placed prior to basic events 
related to later phases in the ordering. 
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b). Produce the overall basic event ordering for the whole mission: this can be achieved by 
taking the orderings obtained for each phase fault tree and listing them one after the other in the 
order of the phases. For basic events which appear in the ordering more than once, their position 
is fixed by their first occurrence and later occurrences are deleted from the list. 
c). Construct the mission BOO according to the established overall basic event ordering. The 
process progresses through each phase in turn. The terminal node 1 [i] is added when it is 
determined that the system fails in phase i as a result of component failures included in the path. 
Figure 11.3 displays the algorithm for constructing the mission BOO given the pre-determined 
ordering. 
,......,,---., 
Set event 
order 
ariablej = I 
Consider event 
Ej from the basic 
event ordering 
Yes 
Add terminal 
node I ['1 to the 
left branch of Ej 
Consider the 
event Ej does not 
occur 
Develop the left 
>--'-:w...~ branch of the 
event Ej 
Develop the right 
branch of the 1---' 
event Ej 
No 
System will 
not fail 
during phase 
i 
Develop the right 
branch ofthe 
eventEj 
No 
phase i is the 
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event Es 
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exists 
Trace back to 
most immediate 
node Es with null 
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>-........ "'--+1 node '0' to the 
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Figure 11.3 The algorithm for constructing the mission BDO 
An example phased-mission system is used to illustrate the process of constructing the mission 
BOO. The system failure logic for each phase is listed as follows: 
Phase 1: A.B (no maintenance) 
Phase 2: A.C (no maintenance) 
With phase fault tree transformation: 
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Phase I: AI.BI 
Phase 2: (AI+A2).(CI+C2) 
The basic event ordering for each phase is obtained as: 
Basic event ordering for phase I: At, B I 
Basic event ordering for phase 2: At, Ct, A2, C2 
Obtain the overall mission ordering as: At, Bt, Ct, A2, C2 
The mission BDD is then established as shown in figure 11.4 according to the algorithm 
displayed in figure 11.3. 
Figure 11.4 Mission BDD for the example system 
Step 6: Obtain Disjoint Phase Failure Modes. 
The Boolean algebra representation of the system failure during phase i can be obtained by 
tracking paths in the mission BDD leading to the terminal node l[i]. 
Take for example the mission BDD in figure 11.4, the Boolean algebra representation for 
system failure in phase I is obtained by following paths leading to terminal node I [I] in the 
BDD, which results in: AI.BI. In the same way, four paths can be identified leading to the 
terminal node I [2], which produce the Boolean algebra representation for system failure in phase 
2 as AI.B) ,CI+AI.B).C) .C2+A) .CI.A2+A) .C).A2.C2' As the BDD in figure 11.4 is in its 
minimal form, the disjoint paths provide the prime implicants for system failure in each phase. 
The mission BDD provides an efficient way to obtain implicants for system failure in each 
individual phase without having to construct the non-coherent fault tree for each phase. 
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Step 7: Detennine the Quantification Technique for Each Phase 
As has been discussed in issue d) in section 11.2, the Markov method may not be the most 
appropriate quantification technique for each phase. In this step, a procedure is established to 
detennine the appropriate quantification method according to the specific characteristics of each 
phase: 
a). Identify component failures relevant to the phase under investigation from the corresponding 
phase fault tree. If a module is contained in the phase fault tree, it needs to be detennined 
whether the module can be quantified separately in the phase analysis. In general, a module can 
" 
be quantified separately if: 
The module is irrelevant to the system failure during phase j; OR 
The module is regarded as non-repairable during phase j as it is a single-order failure 
event (as detennined in Step 3); 
If a module cannot be quantified separately, the module has to be replaced with its basic event 
descendants during the quantification. 
b). Detennine the appropriate quantification model for the phase. 
when no statistical dependency exists between relevant component failures AND no 
repair is carried out on relevant components during the phase: the Markov method is not 
necessary and the disjoint paths established from the mission BDD can be used. 
Otherwise, the Markov method is used. 
Step 8: Simplify the Boolean Algebra Representations 
Reductions are perfonned on the B oolean algebra for system failure in each individual phase 
obtained from Step 6. To achieve this, the following procedures are implemented in turn: 
a). Delete events which do not need to be included in the analysis of the current phasej: assume 
phase m (m < j) is the most recent phase for which the Markov method is used as the 
quantification tool, then any events which are related to component failures prior to phase m are 
deleted as the probabilities of these events will have been taken into account in detennining the 
initial state probabilities for phase m and should not be accounted for in phasej. 
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b). Apply the following rules to the Boolean algebra representation for the current phase j: 
Ai.Ai+I ... Ak = A,k 
Aj + AI+! + ... + Ak = AI, k 
Ai.Ai+I ... Ak _, Ak = Ak 
Ai.Ai = Ai 
Ai.Ak = 0 
Ai,Ai,k =Ai 
AiAi = 0 
Ai Ai,k = Ai+ !,k 
A,k-I) Ak = (Ak 1A,k-1) )Ak-,) 
A,k-I) . Ak = (Ak 1A,k-1) ) Ak-,) 
A(k.I).A(k) = (A,k) lA,k-l) )Ak-,) 
A,k-I) .A(k) = (A,k) lA,k-l) ) ,A,k-I) 
A(k.I)' A,k) = (A,k) lA,k-l) )Ak-,) 
A,k-I) . A,k) = (A,k) lA,k-1) )Ak-,) 
11.5 
} 11.6 
11.7 
where the event Aj, k represents that component A fails during any phase between phase i 
and phase k inclusive (i < k 5,JJ, 
All the equations contained in the equation set 11.5 correspond to the situation where component 
A is non-repairable during the mission. The two equations included in equation set 11.6 are 
applicable when component A is repairable during the whole mission but features a restricted 
maintenance period during phase k. And equations contained in equation set 11.7 apply when 
component A is repairable during the whole mission. 
In terms of the equation set 11.6, the simplification of the algebra A,k-I) Ak can be carried out in 
another way as: A,k-I) Ak => Ak as the event Ak represents that component A fails during phase k, 
implying that component A enters phase k in a working state. This may lead to a problem during 
296 
the quantification process. For components which are non-repairable during the whole mission, a 
consistent probability density function I can be defined for the component over the whole 
mission, and thus the probability of event Ak can be easily obtained as t f(u )du . However, in 
the case where the component is maintained during the whole mission except phase k, it is very 
difficult to define a consistent probability density function for the component 0 ver the whole 
mission period. Consequently, to obtain the probability of ~k-l) .Ak, the following transformation 
is carried out: 
~k-1) Ak => Ak => (Ak I~k-l») Ak-I) 
where (Ak I~k-I») represents that component A fails during phase k with component A 
entering phase k in a working state. 
The probability density function for component A during phase k given that the component is 
working at the start of phase k can be defined separately. In the quantification process at the later 
stage, the probability of ~k-l) Ak can then be obtained as: 
11.8 
where fA, (I) is the probability density function of component A for phase k given that 
component A is working at the start of phase k. 
Accordingly, the probability of ~k-1) • Ak is then obtained as in equation 1 I .9. 
11.9 
In terms of the equation set 11.7, the transformation accounts for the initial conditions of 
component A in phase k when component A is maintained during the phase. To illustrate the 
influence, consider a single component A with two states: working and failed. The probability of 
the event ~k-I)Ak)' P(~k-I)Ak»)' is obtained by quantifying the Markov model over the time 
duration [Ik-I, Ik) with an initial state probability vector P[ working, failed (AND component A 
entered phase k failed)] = [0, P(~k-I»)]' while P(~k-l)Ak») is calculated over the same time 
1 It is assumed in this research that all component failures feature the exponential distribution. 
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duration with an initial state probability vector P[ working, failed (AND component A entered 
phasekworking)] =[I-P(~k_I»)'O]. 
c). Eliminate repeated Boolean algebra tenns which can result from the reduction procedures. 
Take for example the mission BDD in figure 11.4, the simplification of the phase algebra 
representation for phase 2 results In the simplified phase algebra as 
A}.BI .C}+A}.BI .C2+A2.C}+A2.C2. 
Step 9: Phase and Mission Unreliability Quantification 
The quantification process is carried out for each phase in turn to obtain the phase unreliability 
depending on which quantification method is adopted. 
a). when the BDD quantification is applied, the phase unreliability can be directly obtained by 
calculating the probability of the corresponding phase failure modes. The phase unreliability is 
then equal to the sum of the probabilities of all the phase failure modes represented by the 
Boolean algebra. 
Take for example the example phased-mission system used in step 5, 
Q[phase 1] = P[A}.Bd = r fAu)du . r fB(U)du 
Q[phase 2] = P[A}.BI .Cd + P[A}.BI .C2] + P[A2.C}] + P[A2.C2] 
11.10 
= r fAu)du .[1-r fB(U)du]. r fc(u)du + r fA (u)du .[1- r fB(U)du]. f.' fc(u)du 
+ f fAu)du. r fc(u)du + f.' fA (u)du . f.' fc(u)du 11.11 
b). when the Markov method is used for the quantification of the phase, the following procedures 
are implemented to enable the development of a minimal Markov model which can avoid the 
state-space explosion problem as well as correctly model the system behaviour during the phase. 
1). Determine which components need to be included in the Markov model to be constructed: 
components which are contained in the simplified phase algebra representation need to be 
included in the model for the purpose of determining the initial state probabilities. If a 
module is involved in the phase and cannot be quantified separately, all the basic event 
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descendants contained in the module also have to be explicitly included in the Markov 
model. 
2). Determine initial states and initial state probabilities for the Markov model. The initial 
states are states of the component in which it is possible for the system to start the current 
phase, and are used to generate the complete Markov model. These initial states are 
determined by the states in which the system was residing at the end of the preceding phase. 
With the simplified phase algebra representation derived from pervious steps, the analyst can 
identify possible system states at the end of the preceding phase by investigating events 
contained in each phase failure mode which are related to the preceding phase. Assume that 
component C is relevant during phase j, i.e. the current phase under investigation, and the kth 
term of the phase algebra expression for phase j failure contains the event C(j-I). This means 
that in the initial state developed from the kth algebra term, the state of component C is failed 
as indicated by C(j.I). In some cases, some phase failure modes do not contain any event 
which relates component C to the preceding phase. This means that component C can enter 
phase j in either the working or the failed state. As such, two initial states can be developed 
from this failure mode where the states of other components are as specified in the failure 
mode, while component C is working in one and failed in the other. Thus, by looking into 
each term in the phase algebra, an exhaustive list of initial states for phase j can be 
developed. 
Initial state probabilities can then b e determined according to the specific combination 0 f 
component states. A general rule applies as follows in calculating the initial state 
probabilities: 
- When the preceding phase j-t is quantified using the failure mode generated from the 
mission BDD, the probability of the initial state developed from the kth failure mode for 
phasej is obtained as: 
Q = 1) t: fc. (u)du 'I![t- t: fc, (U)duJ t1.12 
where, as indicated in the kth failure mode, component Cn is failed in phase j-t, 
represented by event Cn, and component Cs has worked through phase jot, 
represented by event Cs . 
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- When phase j-I is quantified using the Markov method, the probability for the initial 
state developed from the kth failure mode is calculated as: 
11.13 
m • 
, 
where Qm(tj-l} represents the probability of state m at the end of phase j-I, in 
which the combination of component states is consistent with that indicated in the 
kth failure mode for phase j; components Cn and Cs are required in phase j but not 
in phase j-I (thus will not be included in the Markov model for phase j-I), and as 
indicated in the kth failure mode, component Cn is failed at the end of phase j-I, 
and component Cs is functional at the end of phase j-1. 
In the process 0 f determining the initial state probabilities, attention needs to b e given to 
'Phase Transition Failure'. This concept is due to the change in the system configuration 
across different phases, and may result in situations where the system fails as soon as the 
mission progresses into phase j. In this case, the component failures have occurred during 
earlier phases, but the system does not show its impact until a certain phasej is reached. Such 
a mission failure is defined as the 'Transition Failure' for phase j. 
The transition failure for phase j (denoted by TRFj ) can be identified from the phase algebra 
representation for phase j. A failure mode term in the phase algebra represents a latent 
mission failure for phase j if the component failure events contained in the term are all 
related to previous phases. For example, consider the failure modes for phase 2 in the 
example phased-mission system in step 5, among the four phase algebra terms AI. B, .Cl, 
A,. B, .C2, A2.Cl and A2.C2, the first term represents a transition failure for phase 2 as 
component failure events contained in this term, Al and Cl, are both related to phase 1. 
The phase algebra term which represents a phase transition failure is not considered when 
establishing initial states for the Markov model for phase j as the system will not start phase j 
in such states. 
The calculation of the initial state probabilities becomes complex when some basic events 
contained in the phase algebra relate to component failures which are only relevant during 
some of the phases in the mission. For example if component C is not required until phase j, 
then the probability of component C being working or failed at the end of phase j-I can be 
determined from relevant component failure models dependent upon whether component C is 
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repairable or not. In the case that component C is non-repairable during the mission, the 
probability that it is failed at the end of phase j-l can be easily obtained as: 
Qdt;-Il = {i-' /c(u)du 11.14 
If component C is repairable during the mission, and assume its failure times are 
exponentiaIIy distributed, then the probability of component C being failed at the end of 
phase j-l can be obtained as in equation 11.15. 
Qdt;.I] = Ac .[I_e-(Ac+VC )fi-, ] (revealed failure) 
Ac +vc 
Qdt;.Il = l_e-Ac ·(twf,) (dormant failure) 11.15 
where t, is the time when the last inspection prior to t;-I is carried out on component C. 
3). Delete irrelevant basic events from the established initial states. Basic events which relate 
to components not required during phase j are deleted from the initial states so that a minimal 
Markov model can be constructed for phase j at a later stage. The reduction may need special 
attention during the quantification process conducted in a later phase. If component C is last 
relevant in phasej-l and now phase m (m > j) is considered, then component C would be 
excluded from the analysis of phase j, and will not have been included in the phase model 
from phase j to phase m-I. This means that for the analysis of phase m, the probability of 
component C being working or failed at the beginning of phase m has to be determined 
separately. Two situations are considered: 
First, component C is independent from other component failures throughout the whole 
mission: in this case, equation 11.15 can be applied to calculate the probability of component 
C being failed at the end of phase m-I . 
Second, component C is involved in dependency relationships during phases prior to phase j: 
this means that equation 11.15 is no longer applicable. Its failure probability can be derived 
as shown in equation 11.16. 
QC(tm_J)=Q[C(m_l)ICU)].Q[CV)]+Q[C(m_l)l C(j) ].Q[ CU) ] 11.16 
where the event C(j) represents that component C is failed at the start of phase j, i.e. Cv) = 
CU-I). 
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Equation 11.16 expresses the failure probability of component C at the end of phase m-I in 
terms of its failure probability at the start of phase j. This means that the influence of 
dependency relationships involving component C prior to phase j can be taken into account. 
In order to calculate the two conditional probabilities in equation 11.16, two cases are 
considered depending on whether component C is repairable or not during the mission: 
If component C is non-repairable: 
Q[C(m_dCVJ] = 1; 
Q[C(m-dC j )] = t fc(u)du 
j-I 
11.17 
wherefc(u)du is the probability density function defined for component C from the start 
ofphasej to the end of phase m-I withcomponentC working atthestartofphasej 
assuming its failure times are exponentially distributed. 
If component C is repairable: 
Q[C(m_dCU)] = Ac .[I_e-(Ac+uc!.(I.-,-lj -,)] (revealed failure) 
Ac+VC 
Q[C(m-d CU) ] = 1-e-Ac.(t.-,-',) (dormant failure) 11.18 
where Is is the time when the last inspection is carried out on component C prior to (m-I. 
Q[C(m_dCV)] can be obtained by quantifying a Markov model established for component 
C during the time duration [lj_l, Im) with an initial state probability [qc working = 0, qc failed = 
1]. 
Q[CV'] and Q[ CU) ] in equation 11.16 respectively stand for the probability that component 
C is failed or working at the start of phase} given that the system is able to start phasej. The 
sum of all initial state probabilities for phase} gives the probability that the system is able to 
start phase}. As such, Q[CV)] and Q[ CU) ] are obtained as: 
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Q[C{Ii] = PlC failed at t-l I system able to start phase)] 
= PlC failed at tj _,] 
P[ system able to start phase)] 
, 
LQJtj -,) 
= ;=1 
n 
LQk(tj -,) k-, 
11.19 
where n is the total number of initial states for phase); and s the number of initial states 
for phase) in which component C is failed; 
Q[ CU) ] = PlC working at t-l I system able to start phase)] 
= p[C working at tj _,] 
P[ system able to start phase)] 
= ;::1 11.20 
where n is the total number of initial states for phase); and p the number of initial states 
for phase) in which component C is working; 
Therefore, when a component C is deleted from the analysis of phase), Q[CV1] and Q[ C(j) ] 
are calculated and stored for later reference. Then when the analysis proceeds into phase m 
and component C has to be re-included in the analysis, Q[C(m_dCv)] and Q[C(m-l)l C(j) ] can 
be obtained according to equations 11.17 and 11.18. Together according to equation 11.16, 
the probability of component C working or failed at the start of phase m can then be derived 
without having to keep component C in the analysis of phases during which its functionality 
is not required. This enables the development of a minimal Markov model for each 
individual phase. 
4). Trim the list of established initial states. In the preceding procedure, components which 
are not required in the current phase are deleted from the initial states. When the only 
difference between two initial states is due to the state of deleted components, the deletion 
will result in same states. In this procedure, these same initial states wi11 be combined into 
one, and the probability of the combined initial state is equal to the sum of the individual 
ones. 
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5). Develop the minimal Markov model from the established initial states. When dependency 
relationships are involved in the current phase, the algorithm for the development of the 
Markov model for each type of dependency presented in Chapter 6 are referred to. Failed 
system states are absorbing in the development ofthe model. 
6). Carry out the quantification on the established Markov model. The phase unreliability is 
then obtained as: 
Q[phasej] = QLMFj + LQk(tj -) 11.21 
k 
where QLMF represents the probability of transition failure for phase j, which can be j 
obtained by calculating the probability of the corresponding phase algebra terms; and 
Qk(tj -) represents the probability of being in state k at the end of phase j which is a 
system failed state. 
Step 10. obtain the mission unreliability by summing up the phase failure probabilities. That is: 
RMISS = L Q[phase i] 11.22 
11.3.3 Importance Measures in Phased-mission Systems 
Importance measures provide an indicator of the contribution that a component failure makes to 
the mission failure in each individual phase. 
11.3.3.1 Phase Criticality Function Gi_/q(t» 
Assume phase j is the current phase under investigation; and component i is required during the 
phase. The criticality function for component i during phasej, denoted by Gi_j(q(t» , is obtained 
by different means depending on which type of model is used for the quantification of phase j. 
- when the BDD quantification is applied for phase j: the criticality function for component C 
during phase j is calculated directly referring to its the definition Gi(q(t» = Qsys(li) - Qsys(Oi) 
(equation 2.19) . That is: 
Gi J.(q(t»=P{system fails duringphasej I qi =1} -P{systemfailsduringphasejI qi =O} 
- j j 
11. 23 
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Since the criticality function G,_iq(t» is aimed at measuring the contribution of the component 
failure during phase j (which implies that the component enters phase j in a working state), the 
phase algebra terms are ignored which contain the component having failed during previous 
phases. Take for example the phased-mission system in figure 11.4: 
Phase 1: required components A and B with phase algebra AI.BI: 
GA_,(q(t» = .(fB(U)du (O::;t<tl) 
GB_,(q(t) = .(fiu)du (O::;t<tl) 
- -
Phase 2: required components A and C with phase algebra AI.B, .CI+AI.B, .C2+A2.CI+A2.C2: 
(where algebra terms AI. B, ,CI and AI. B, ,C2 are ignored as they both contain the basic event Al 
which means that component A has already failed during phase 1 and thus does not need to be 
considered with regard to its contribution to the system failure during phase 2). 
GC_2(q(t) = f fAu)du .[1- f fB(U)du]+ f fA (u)du (tl::; t < t2) , 
(where algebra terms AI. B, .CI and A2.CI are ignored as they both contain the basic event Cl and 
do not need to be considered regarding the contribution of component C to the system failure 
during phase 2). 
- when the Markov method is used for the quantification of phase j, the criticality function for 
component C is obtained in the same way as defined in equation 7.12. That is: 
G,_iq(t» = IQm(t)+ IQk(t) 11.24 
m k 
where in the Markov model for phase j, both states rn and k represent the critical state for 
component i. In state rn, component i is working, whilst in state k, component i is failed. 
11.3.3.2 Phase Criticality Measures 
The phase criticality function is an importance measure in its own right and indicates the 
susceptibility of the system to the failure of each component in each phase. For a system to fail, 
it needs to be in a critical condition for the ith component and also the component fails. If this 
contribution is then divided by the phase failure probability, it produces the proportion of times 
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that the failure of component i causes the phase failure, i.e. a relative measure of the contribution 
that component i makes to the phase failure. Two scenarios are considered [61]: 
1). For any phase the system can be in a critical state for a component i in phase j and 
then component i fails during the phase to bring about the system failure (In-phase 
Importance). OR 
2). The failure conditions for phasej 0 ccurred prior to phasej and the system failure 
occurs on transition to phasej (Transition Importance). For a component i to contribute to 
transition failure, the system is in a critical state for component i with respect to phase j 
in a phase prior to phase j and component i also fails prior to phase j. 
These two scenarios give rise to two measures of component importance for each phase. 
11.3.3.2.1 In-phase Criticality Measure Ij~j 
The in-phase criticality measure for component i in phase j, denoted by I(.j' is defined as in 
equation 11.25: 
G. j.q. /:. = 1- 'f 
,-J Q[phase j] 11.25 
Equation 11.25 gives the general definition of in-phase criticality measure and is applicable in 
phases where the BDD quantification is applied. When the analysis of phase j is performed using 
the Markov method, the in-phase criticality measure for component i can be calculated as 
expressed in equation 11.26: 
r IQm(u).:i;du 
I:. = -'-J-'-"m"'-l'--__ _ 
,-J Q[phase j] 11.26 
where n is the number of critical states for component i in the Markov model for phase j; 
and Aj is the conditional failure rate of component i. 
All parameters in equations 11.25 and 11.26 will have been obtained III the prevIOus 
quantification process. 
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11.3.3.2.2 Transition Criticality Measure Ii~j 
The transition criticality measure, denoted by Ii~ j' represents the contribution that the failure of 
component i during phases prior to phase} makes to the transition failure on entering phase}. By 
examining each failure mode for phase}, derived from the mission BDD, which represents a 
transition failure for phase}, information can be obtained on which component failures 
contribute to the transition failure on phase} and which components do not need to be considered 
with respect to the transition criticality measure. 
The transition criticality measure of component i is equal to zero if the failure of component i in 
phase k (k = I, 2, ... , }-1) makes no contribution to the transition failure for phase}. Only 
component failure events, which are contained in the phase transition failure modes for phase}, 
need to be considered for the transition criticality measure in phase}. 
The transition criticality function, denoted by Gi..j,k' is introduced to facilitate the calculation of 
the transition criticality measure for component i. The transition criticality function provides the 
importance of failure of component i during phase k (k <i) with respect to the transition failure 
on entering phase}. It is defined as in equation 11.27. 
GT = OQTRFj 
i-j,k 0 
qjk 
= Q TRF I component i fails in phase k - QTRF I component i functions through phase k j j 
11.27 
Correspondingly, the transition criticality measure for component i with respect to phase j is 
obtained as in equation 11.28. 
j-I ~ OQTRFj 
-.;;' G: 'k ,g, L.. " ·gi, 
",L..c:-.,-'-_"_'.,-' = k=) uqi, IT. = i-I 
'-I Q[phasej] Q[phase}] 11.28 
With the in-phase criticality measure and the transition criticality measure, the total importance 
contribution of failure of component i with respect to phase} is obtained as in equation 11.29. 
11.29 
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Take for example the mission BDD in figure 11.4, among the four failure modes for phase 2, 
AI.B,.CI+AI.B,.C2+A2,CI+A2,C2, the failure mode AI.B"CI represents a transition failure for 
phase 2. Phase 1 is the only phase prior to phase 2. Accordingly, the transition criticality function 
for components A, B and C are calculated as follows: 
G!_2., =0 
= qA .(I-qB) , , 
The transition criticality measure for each component can then be obtained according to equation 
11.28. 
11.3.3.3 Mission Importance Contribution 
The importance measures discussed so far are all a bout component failures with respect to a 
particular phase. A measure is introduced here to indicate the total contribution that the failure of 
component i makes to the whole mission failure [7]. Denoted by I i , this importance measure is 
defined in equation 11.30. 
" (G .. q. + ~GT 'k.q/ ) L... 1-) '} L... J-j, " 
:::: all phases j k=l 
QMISS 
11.30 
11.3.3.4 Fussell-Veseley Measure of Importance 
This measure is defined as the probability of the union of the minimal cut sets containing the 
failure of component i given that the system has failed. Putting it into the context of a phased-
mission, this measure can be obtained for each component i failure during each individual phase 
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j, denoted by Ii'-jV, the measure provides the contribution made by the prime implicants 
containing the failure of component i during phase j to the system failure during phase j. It is 
defined as equation 11.31: 
I F- V = P(Ukl;ekPIk-J) 
,-J Q[phase j] 11.31 
where Ph-j are pnme implicants for phase j failure which contain the failure of 
component i. 
When phase j is quantified using the BDD quantification method, Ph-j are equivalent to the 
phase failure modes which contain the failure of component i in phase j if the mission BDD is 
constructed in its minimal fonn. When phase j is quantified using the Markov method, the 
Fusse11-Veseleymeasure of importance is obtained as in equation 11.32: 
IQ. 
I:~V = _-,k~ __ 
,-} Q[phase j] 11.32 
where state k represents states in the Markov model for phase j in which the system is 
failed and component i fails in phase j. 
11.3.4 Summary of the Modified Phase Algebra Method 
With the process described above, the modified phase algebra method is able to account for the 
dependency relationships existing in phased-mission systems. Due to the construction of the 
mission BDD, all possible failure modes can be clearly identified for each phase failure (prime 
implicants can be extracted if the mission BDD is in its minimal fonn). Causes of phase 
transition failures can also be identified and their probabilities can be calculated separately. BDD 
quantification and the Markov method are applied to the phase analysis depending on whether 
maintenance is carried out during the phase or any dependency is involved. This improves the 
analysis efficiency compared with the conventional Markov method applied to repairable 
phased-mission systems. For each phase to which the Markov method applies, the minimal 
Markov model is established by removing non-required components. This also contributes to 
improving the analysis efficiency. hnportance measures can also be obtained to detennine the 
criticality and contribution of each component failure to the phase and mission failure. An 
example phased-mission system is given in Chapter 12to demonstrate how the modified phase 
algebra method is applied. 
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Chapter 12. Application of Modified Phase Algebra Approach 
12.1 Example Phased-mission System 
The 4-phase mission system is composed of components A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. Sub-system 
I consists of components B, C and D. Component C serves as the standby component for 
component B, component D activates C when B fails. Sub-system 2 consists of components F, G 
and H, and only when components F, G and H fail in this specific order, will the sub-system 2 
fail. Components A and E are required during phase I; components A and sub-system I are 
required during phase 2; sub-system 1 is required during phase 3; and components A and sub-
system 2 are required during phase 4. All components are repairable during the mission. Among 
them, each of sub-systems 1 and 2 is maintained by a single engineer. 
The system fails in each phase as illustrated in figure 12.1. For the mission to complete 
successfully, the system must function through each of the 4 phases over the time duration [0, t,), 
[t" t2), [t2, t3) and [t3, t4) respectively. 
12.2 Application Process 
12.2.1 Phase and Mission Un reliability 
Step I: Acquire System Information 
a). The fault trees representing the phase failure logic are shown in figure 12.1. 
Note: basic event CS represents the standby failure of component C; while basic event CF 
represents the active failure of component C. 
Figure 12.1 Phase fault trees for example system 
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b). Establish the dependency information for the system as displayed in table 12.1. In this 
phased-mission system, maintenance dependency exists between components B, C and D 
through phases 1,2 and 3, and also between components F, G and H through the whole mission. 
The sequential dependency exists between components F, G and H through the whole mission. 
During phases 2 and phase 3 in which the subsystem 1 is required, the standby dependency exists 
between basic events Band CF; and initiator-enabler dependency exists between basic events B 
and CS andD. 
Dep. group no. Dep. Type Number 1 Number List 1 List 2 Involved 
2 phases 
1 sdbyI 1 1 B CF 2,3 
2 i-e 
-
2 B CS 2,3 
3 i-e - 2 B D 2,3 
4 sq 
-
4 
-
F,G,H 1,2,3,4 
5 mine 3 1 B,CF,CS,D 
-
1,2,3 
6 mlnc 3 1 F,G,H 
-
1,2,3,4 
Table 12.1 Dependency mformatlOn for example phased-mIssIOn system 
c). Establish the basic event data as shown in table 12.2: 
Basic Relevant to Maintenance Failure Failure Dependency (Repairable or non- Enabler 
event name which phases 
repairable) model parameters groups 
Phase 2 AA 0 0 1 
Phase 2 AA,VA 0 0 2 A 1,2,4 Repairable Phase 
3 3 AA,'t'A,8A 0 0 
Phase 2 AA 0 0 4 
Phase 3 AB', TB, Sa 0 5 1 
B 2,3 Repairable Phase 2 AB, VB 0 1,2,3,5 2 
Phase 2 A.B, VB 0 1,2,3,5 3 
Phase 3 /...cs, tes, ecs 0 5 1 
CS 2,3 Repairable Phase 3 A. cs' 'tes, ecs 1 2,5 2 
Phase 3 A. cs, 'tes, ecs 1 2,5 3 
Phase 2 ACF, VCF 0 1,5 2 CF 2,3 Repairable Phase 
3 2 ACF, VCF 0 1,5 
Phase 3 Ao,to,80 0 5 I 
D 2,3 Repairable Phase 3 AD. 'to, So 2 3,5 2 
Phase 3 AD, 'to, 80 2 3,5 3 
E 1 Repairable Phase 2 AE 0 0 1 
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Phase 3 AF, 'rF, SF 0 4,6 1 
Phase 3 AF, 'rF, SF 0 4,6 2 F 4 Repairable Phase 
3 3 AF, 'tF, SF 0 4,6 
Phase 2 AF, VF 0 4,6 4· 
Phase 3 ,,-<>,'to,80 0 4,6 1 
Phase 3 Aa, 'to, ea 0 4,6 2 G 4 Repairable 
Phase 
3 3 Aa, TO, 80 0 4,6 
Phase 2 Ao,Va 0 4,6 4 
Phase 3 A.H, 'tH, eH 0 4,6 I 
Phase 3 AH,'tH,8H 0 4,6 2 H 4 Repairable 
Phase 
3 3 AH, 'tH, eH 0 4,6 
Phase 2 A.H, VH 0 4,6 4 
Table 12.2 The basIc event file for example phased-mIssIOn system 
Step 2: Identify Modules 
a). Construct a combined mission fault tree as shown in figure 12.2 by including individual phase 
fault trees as inputs to an OR gate. 
Figure 12.2 Combined fault tree for example phased-mission system 
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b). Identify modules by canying out the simplification and modularization processes on the 
combined mission fault tree structure. The contraction is not carried out on gates Gland G6 in 
figure 12.2 in order to reserve the structure of individual phase fault tree. Module Mlled by gate 
G3 and module M2 led by gate G7 are identified. 
c). Restore the phase fault tree structure, as shown in figure 12.3, where basic events are replaced 
with corresponding modules. 
Phase 1 r-:::'P=-ha-s-e -=-2' 
Failure Failure 
Phase 2 
Failure 
Phase 4 
Failure 
Figure 12.3 Modularized phase fault tree for example phased-mission system 
Step 3: Cany out the Phase Fault Tree Transformation 
Phase 1 
No maintenance is carried out on components A and E during phase 1 as the single failure of 
either of the two components is able to bring about the system failure. In this case, the phase 
fault tree transformation takes place through the basic event transformation: 
Phase 2 
A~AI 
E~EI 
During this phase, components A, B, C and D are all repairable. Module MI is also repairable as 
its single failure will not bring about the system failure. With the repair process, the system 
failure in phase 2 must be considered from two perspectives: 'failure conditions satisfied at the 
end of phase l' OR 'system fails during phase 2'. 
In terms of the first perspective, it means that both component A and module M 1 are failed at the 
end of phase I, i.e. A(I) AND Ml(1) respectively. Since component A is non-repairable during 
phase 1, A(I) is replaced by AI. For the second perspective, since maintenance is carried out on 
both component A and module MI during the phase, whether the system fails during phase 2 is 
judged by investigating the states of component A and module MI at the end of the phase, i.e. 
A(2) AND MI(2). The fault tree transformation for phase 2 is shown as follows: 
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Phase 3 
As the failure of module Ml is sufficient to bring about the system failure during phase 3, it is 
considered as non-repairable as a whole during the phase. The system fails in phase 3 either 
when module Ml is failed at the end of phase 2 or module Ml fails during phase 3. Accordingly, 
the phase transformation is carried out as: 
Ml ~ Ml(2)+ MiJ, 
Phase 4 
During the phase, either the failure of component A or module M2 is sufficient to bring about the 
system failure. Consequently, maintenance is not carried out on either component A or module 
M2 as a whole. The fault tree transformation is implemented through the basic event 
transformation as follows: 
A~A(3)+~, 
M2 ~ M2(3)+M24 
The transformed phase fault trees are shown in figure 12.4: 
1 
fi 
Phase 4 
Failure 
Figure 12.4 Transformed phase fault trees for example phased-mission system 
Step 4. Simplify Transformed Phase Fault Trees. 
In figure 12.4, in the fault tree for phase 4, basic events A(3), ~, M2(3) and M24 are contracted up 
to the level immediately below the top event. 
Step 5. Construct the Mission BOO 
a). Decide the basic event ordering for each phase 
Phase 1: AI, El 
Phase 2: AI, Ml(I)' A(2), Ml(2) 
Phase 3: Ml(2), M13 
Phase 4: A(3), M2(3), A4, M24 
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b). Establish the combined ordering: Al > El> MI(l) > A(2) > MI(2) > Mh > A(3) > M2(3) > A4 > 
M24 
c). Establish the mission BDD as shown in figure 12.5. 
Figure 12.5 Mission BDD for example phased-mission system 
Step 6: Obtain Disjoint Failure Modes for Each Phase 
By tracing the paths leading to the terminal nodes representing the system failure in a particular 
phase, the disjoint failure modes for each phase are obtained as follows in the form of Boolean 
algebra. 
Phase 4: + 
+ + 
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Step 7: Determine the Appropriate Phase Quantification Model 
Phase 1 
The BDD quantification method is adopted as maintenance is not carried out and events are 
independent. 
Phase 2 
The Markov method is employed as the maintenance is carried out during the phase and in 
addition statistical dependency exists between components B, C and D. 
Phase 3 
The Markov method is again employed for the quantification of this phase due to the statistical 
dependency between events and since maintenance is conducted on components B, C and D 
during the phase. 
Phase 4 
no maintenance is carried out during phase 4. As module M2 can be quantified separately and no 
statistical dependency exists between component A and module M2, the direct numerical 
solution is adopted to address the system unreliability during phase 4. 
Step 8: Simplify the Boolean Algebra Representations for Each Phase 
Phase I: Al + Al El 
Phase 2: El . (A(2) IAI ).AI .MI(2) 
Phase 3: 
a). as the Markov method is determined as the quantification model for phase 2, any events 
contained in the phase failure modes which relate to phase 1 are deleted, such as events Al and 
El· 
b). Equation 11.6 applies: 
Ml(2) .Mh = (MI3IMI(2) ).MI(2) 
The simplified phase failure modes for phase 3 is displayed as follows: 
A(2). (MI3IM1(2) ).Ml(2) + ~2) . (M13IMI(2) )MI(2) + ~2) .Ml(2) 
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Phase 4: 
a). as the Markov method is employed as the quantification method for phase 3, any events 
which relate to phase 1 or phase 2, such as A, , ~2)' ~2), E, and Ml(2) , are deleted from the 
phase failure modes. 
b). Equation 11.6 applies: 
The simplified phase failure modes for phase 4 is displayed as follows: 
+ Ml) . ~) .M2(3) + + 
Step 9: Perform the Phase and Mission Quantification 
Phase 1 
It is determined in step 7 that the BDD is the appropriate quantification method for phase 1. The 
phase failure probability is obtained through the sum of the probability of each phase failure 
mode. 
Q[phase 1] = {' fA, (u)du + [1- {' fA, (u)du]. {' fE, (u)du 
where fA (u) and fE (u) are probability density functions defined respectively for , , 
components A and E over the time duration [0, I,) given that both components A and E 
working at the start of the phase, i.e. 1=0. 
As both components A and E feature an exponential failure distribution during phase 1, then 
Q[phase 1] = (l_e-.t", )+e-.t", (l-e-.t",) 
Phase 2 
The Markov method is employed as the appropriate quantification method. The following 
procedures are taken to obtain the phase failure probability. 
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I). Determine basic events which need to be considered to establish initial states: by referring to 
the phase failure modes (Step 6) for phase 2, it can be determined that basic events A, E and 
module MI need to be included. Since module MI cannot be quantified separately during phase 
2, it is replaced by its basic event descendants. Therefore, basic events which need to be 
considered are: A, E, B, CS, D, CF 
2). Determine initial states and initial state probabilities: as is indicated in the phase failure mode 
for phase 2, as far as components A and E are concerned, the events AJ and E J indicate that the 
system enters phase 2 with both components A and E working. In terms of module M I, the phase 
failure mode does not contain any event which represents its state at the end of phase 1. This 
means that module MI can reside in any possible state when the system enters phase 2. 
Therefore, to obtain an exhaustive list of initial states for phase 2, module MI has to be modelled 
over phase I to determine what states it may reside at the end of phase I and corresponding state 
probabilities. 
Since the maintenance dependency exists within module MI during phase I, a Markov model is 
established to model module MI over the time duration [0, /\). The quantification is carried out 
on the established Markov model to determine the state probabilities at the end of phase 1. 
Tables 12.3 and 12.4 display the Markov model for module MI over phase 1. As basic event CF 
is not relevant during phase I, it is not considered. 
state no. B CS D CF M1, State no. B cs D CF M1, 
1 0 0 0 
-
0 19 3 0 1 
-
1 
2 3 0 0 
-
0 20 0 3 1 
-
0 
3 0 3 0 
-
0 21 1 3 3 
-
1 
4 0 0 3 - 0 22 1 2 3 - 1 
5 1 0 0 
-
0 23 1 2 2 - 1 
6 3 3 0 
-
1 24 1 3 2 
-
1 
7 3 0 3 - 1 25 2 1 0 - 1 
8 0 1 0 
-
0 26 3 1 3 - 1 
9 0 3 3 
-
0 27 3 1 2 
-
1 
10 0 0 1 - 0 28 2 0 1 - 1 
11 1 3 0 
-
1 29 3 3 1 - 1 
12 1 0 3 
-
1 30 0 2 1 
-
0 
13 1 2 0 
-
1 31 1 2 2 - 1 
14 3 3 3 - 1 32 2 1 3 - 1 
15 1 0 2 
-
1 33 2 1 2 - 1 
16 3 1 0 
-
1 34 2 3 1 - 1 
17 0 1 3 
-
0 35 2 2 1 - 1 
18 0 1 2 
-
0 36 3 2 1 - 1 
Table 12.3 states Included In the Markov model of module MI In phase 1\ 
1 State code '0' - working; code' l' - failed and revealed; code '2' - failed, revealed and queuing for repair; code 
'3' - failed and unrevealed. 
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From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate 
1 2 B 8 1 -CS 16 26 0 25 32 0 
1 3 CS 8 17 0 17 26 B 26 33 0 
1 4 0 9 14 B 17 4 -CS 26 7 -CS 
2 5 0 9 18 0 17 18 0 27 33 0 
2 6 CS 10 19 B 18 27 B 27 19 -CS 
2 7 0 10 20 CS 18 10 -CS 28 34 CS 
3 6 B 10 1 -0 19 28 0 28 5 -0 
3 8 0 11 3 -B 19 29 -CS 29 35 0 
3 9 0 11 13 0 19 2 -0 29 6 -0 
4 7 B 11 21 0 20 29 B 30 36 B 
4 9 CS 12 4 -B 20 30 0 30 8 -0 
4 10 0 12 21 CS 20 3 -0 31 18 -B 
5 1 -B 12 15 0 21 9 -B 32 12 -CS 
5 11 CS 13 8 -B 21 31 0 32 33 0 
5 12 0 13 22 0 22 17 -B 33 15 -CS 
6 13 0 14 23 0 22 31 0 34 35 0 
6 14 0 15 10 -B 23 18 -B 34 11 -0 
7 15 0 15 24 CS 24 20 -B 35 13 -0 
7 14 CS 16 25 0 24 31 0 36 35 0 
8 16 B 16 2 -CS 25 5 -CS 36 16 -0 
.. Note: the rate represented by the name of a baSIC event refers to Its condll!onal failure rate; the 
rate represented by '-' followed with the name of a basic event refers to its conditional repair 
rate. 
Table 12.4 State transitions in the Markov model for module Ml for phase 1 
Each state in table 12.3 is passed to phase 2 as the state of module Ml at the start of phase 2. In 
states where the component B is failed and both components C and D are functional, component 
C is switched on to replace component B as the system enters phase 2. Accordingly, the initial 
states for phase 2 are determined and displayed in table 12.5. 
Notes: 
State A E B CS 0 CF System State A E B CS 0 CF System 
No. No. 
1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 8 0 0 1 2 2 -1 0 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 -1 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 10 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 11 0 0 0 2 1 -1 0 
5 0 0 1 2 0 -1 0 12 0 0 2 1 2 -1 0 
6 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 13 0 0 2 2 1 -1 0 
7 0 0 0 1 2 -1 0 
when B is failed at the end of phase 1 and component C and D are both functional, 
component C will be activated by D as soon as the mission enters phase 2. 
If a component is repairable during phase j, inspection is always carried out on the 
component when the system enters phase j. 
Table 12.5 initial states for phase 2 
The relationship between the states of module Ml at the end of phase 1 and its initial states at the 
start of phase 2 are displayed in table 12.6. 
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State at the end of phase I Initial state at the start of phase 2 
(table 11.5) (table 11.7) 
I I 
2+5 2 
3+8 3 
4+ \0 4 
6 + 1\ + 13 5 
7+12+15 6 
9+17+18 7 
14+21 +22+23 +24+31 8 
16 + 25 9 
19 + 28 \0 
20+30 1\ 
26 + 27 + 32 + 33 12 
29 + 34 + 35 + 36 13 
Table 12.6 Relationship between states of module M1 at the end of phase 1 and the beginning of 
phase 2 
Then the initial state probabilities for phase 2 can be determined as follows: 
Ql(tl) = Ql(tl-).[l- l' fA, (u)du].[1- £' fE, (u)du] 
Q2(tl) = [Q2(tl- )+Qs(tl-)].[l- £' fA, (u)du ].[1- l' fE, (u)du] 
Q3(tl) = [Q3(tl-)+QS(tl-)].[1- l' fA, (u)du ].[1- £, fE, (u)du] 
where Qi(tl) represents the probability of the initial state i for phase 2; Q(tl-) represents 
the probability of state j at the end of phase 1; 
3). Delete irrelevant components from established initial states: component E is not required 
during phase 2 and therefore deleted from the initial states. As component E is not required for 
the rest of the mission, there is no need to obtain q FP' • 
4). Trim the initial state list: no repeated states result from the deletion of the basic event E. 
5). Develop the minimal Markov model for phase 2 from the refined initial states as shown in 
table 12.7 and 12.8. 
State A B CS D CF Mission State A B CS D CF Mission 
No. No. 
I 0 0 0 0 -I 0 30 I 2 I 0 -I I 
2 0 I 0 0 0 0 31 0 2 I 3 -I 0 
3 0 0 I 0 -I 0 32 I 2 0 I 0 0 
4 0 0 0 I -I 0 33 I 0 2 I -I 0 
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5 0 I 2 0 -I 0 34 I 2 I 2 -I I 
6 0 I 0 2 0 0 35 . I 2 2 I -I I 
7 0 0 I 2 -I 0 36 I 0 3 0 -I 0 
8 0 I 2 2 -I 0 37 I 0 0 3 -I 0 
9 0 2 I 0 -I 0 38 0 0 3 3 -I 0 
10 0 2 0 I 0 0 39 I I 0 3 0 0 
11 0 0 2 I -I 0 40 I I 0 0 2 I 
12 0 2 I 2 -I 0 41 0 I 0 3 2 0 
13 0 2 2 I -I 0 42 0 0 0 0 I 0 
14 I 0 0 0 -I 0 43 I 0 I 3 -I 0 
15 0 0 3 0 -I 0 44 I 0 3 I -I 0 
16 0 0 0 3 -I 0 45 I I 0 2 2 I 
17 I I 0 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 2 I 0 
18 0 I 0 3 0 0 47 I 2 0 I 2 I 
19 0 I 0 0 2 0 48 I 0 3 3 -I 0 
20 I 0 I 0 -I 0 49 I I 0 2 -I I 
21 0 0 I 3 -I 0 50 0 0 0 3 I 0 
22 I 0 0 I -I 0 51 I 0 0 0 I 0 
23 0 0 3 I -I 0 52 0 2 0 0 I 0 
24 I I 2 0 -I I 53 I 0 0 2 I 0 
25 0 I 2 3 -I 0 54 0 2 0 2 I 0 
26 I I 0 2 0 0 55 I 0 0 3 I 0 
27 0 I 0 2 2 0 56 I 2 0 0 I I 
28 I 0 I 2 -I 0 57 0 2 0 3 I 0 
29 I I 2 2 -I I 58 I 2 0 2 I I 
Table 12.7 The Markov model for phase 2 
From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate 
I 14 A 14 17 B 25 8 0 43 21 -A 
I 2 B 14 36 CS 26 6 -A 43 34 B 
1 15 CS 14 37 D 26 22 -B 43 37 -CS 
1 16 D 15 36 A 26 45 CF 43 28 0 
2 17 A 15 5 B 27 45 A 44 23 -A 
2 1 -B 15 3 0 27 46 -B 44 35 B 
2 18 D 15 38 D 28 7 -A 44 33 0 
2 19 CF 16 37 A 28 34 B 44 36 -D 
3 20 A 16 6 B 28 22 -CS 46 53 A 
3 9 B 16 38 CS 31 34 A 46 54 B 
3 1 -CS 16 4 0 31 18 -CS 46 4 -CF 
3 21 D 17 2 -A 31 12 0 48 38 -A 
4 22 A 17 14 -B 32 \0 -A 48 29 B 
4 10 B 17 39 D 32 17 -D 48 28 0 
4 23 CS 17 40 CF 32 47 CF 50 55 A 
4 1 -D 18 39 A 33 11 -A 50 54 B 
5 24 A 18 16 -B 33 35 B 50 46 0 
5 3 -B 18 6 0 33 20 -D 50 16 -CF 
5 25 D 18 41 CF 36 15 -A 51 42 -A 
6 26 A 19 40 A 36 24 B 51 56 B 
6 4 -B 19 42 -B 36 20 0 51 55 D 
6 27 CF 19 41 D 36 48 D 51 14 -CF 
7 28 A 20 3 A 37 16 -A 52 56 A 
7 12 B 20 30 B 37 49 B 52 57 D 
7 4 -CS 20 14 -CS 37 48 CS 52 2 -CF 
8 29 A 20 43 D 37 22 0 53 46 -A 
8 7 -B 21 43 A 38 48 A 53 58 B 
9 30 A 21 12 B 38 29 B 53 22 -CF 
9 2 -CS 21 16 -CS 38 7 0 54 58 A 
9 31 D 21 7 0 39 18 -A 54 6 -CF 
\0 32 A 22 4 -A 39 37 -B 55 50 -A 
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10 2 -D 22 32 B 39 26 0 55 58 B 
11 33 A 22 44 CS 39 45 CF 55 53 0 
11 13 B 22 14 -D 41 45 A 55 37 -CF 
11 3 -D 23 44 A 41 50 -B 57 58 A 
12 34 A 23 13 B 41 27 0 57 54 0 
12 6 -CS 23 11 0 42 51 A 57 18 -CF 
13 35 A 23 15 -D 42 52 B 
13 5 -D 25 29 A 42 50 D 
14 1 -A 25 21 -B 42 . 1 -CF 
.. Table 12.8 State transition In the Markov model for phase 2 
6). Carry out quantification on the established Markov model over the time duration [/1. (2): as no 
latent mission failure exists for phase 2, the failure probability for phase 2 is equal to the sum of 
the probability of failed states at the end of phase 2, i.e. 
Q[phase 2] = LQm(td 
m 
where state m includes states 24, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45, 47, 49, 56 and 58 in table 12.7. 
Phase 3 
The Markov method is employed for the phase quantification. 
I). Component A and module MI are contained in the failure modes for phase 3 and therefore 
are considered in establishing the initial states. 
2). Determine initial states and probabilities for phase 3. 
The first failure mode for phase 3, A(2). (MI3IMI(2) )MI(2) , indicates that component A is failed 
and module MI is working at the start of phase 3. States 14, 17,20,22,26,28,32,33,36,37, 
39, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54 and 56 in the Markov model for phase 2 (table 12.7) satisfy this 
condition and therefore are passed directly to phase 3 as the initial states. 
The second failure mode, ~2)' (MI3IMI(2) ) M 1(2) , indicates that both component A and module 
MI are working at the start of phase 3. States 1,2,3,4,6,7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18,21,23,38,42, 
46, and 51 in the Markov model for phase 2 (table 12.7) are those which meet the condition and 
therefore are passed directly to phase 3 as the initial states. 
The third phase failure mode, ~2) .MI(2), represents a transition failure for phase 3, since it does 
not contain any component failure event related to phase 3. States 5, 8, 9,12,13,19,25,27,31, 
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41,53, 55 and 58 in the Markov model for phase 2 (table 12.7) are states which are consistent 
with this failure mode. These states are not considered with respect to the establishment of initial 
states. 
Finally, the initial states for phase 3 are identified as shown in table 12.9. 
State A B CS D CF Mission State A B CS D CF Mission 
No. No. 
1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 9 1 0 0 0 -1 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 1 0 -1 0 11 1 0 1 0 -1 0 
4 0 0 0 1 -1 0 12 1 0 0 1 -1 0 
5 0 1 0 2 0 0 13 1 1 0 2 0 0 
6 0 0 1 2 -1 0 14 1 0 1 2 -1 0 
7 0 2 0 1 0 0 15 1 2 0 1 0 0 
8 0 0 2 1 -1 0 16 1 0 2 1 -1 0 
Note: If during phase 2, component C fails while running and remains in the failed state till the 
end of phase 2, i.e. the state code of basic event 'CF' is 'I' at the end of phase 2, then at the start 
of phase 3, it is regarded as the equivalent of the states in which component C has already failed 
in standby. 
Table 12.9 Initial states for phase 3 
Table 12.10 indicates the corresponding relationship between the initial states for phase 3 and the 
system states at the end of phase 2. 
States at the end of phase 2 
(table 12.7)" 
Initial states for phase 3 
(table 12.9) 
1 1 
2 2 
3,15,42 3 
4, 16 4 
6,18 5 
7,21,38,46,50 6 
10 7 
11,23 8 
14 9 
17 10 
20,36,51 11 
22, 37 12 
26,39 13 
28,43,48,53,55 14 
32 15 
33,44 16 
.. Table 12.10 Relationship between states at the end of phase 2 and Initial states for phase 3 
Initial state probabilities for phase 3 are then determined as follows: 
QI(t2) = QI (t2-) 
Q2(t2) = Q2(t2-) 
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Q20(t2) = QS3(t2-) + QSS(t2-) 
where Qi(/2) represents the initial state probability at the beginning of phase 3; and 0;(/2-) 
represents the state probability at the end of phase 2. 
3). Delete irrelevant components: component A is not required during phase 3, and therefore 
deleted from the Markov model. Since component A is required during phase 4, it is necessary to 
obtain the probability of component A being failed or working at the start of phase 4. This is 
achieved by following equation 11.16. 
According to equations 11.19 and 11.20, the probability of component A being failed or working 
at the start of phase 3 given that the system is able to start phase 3, i.e. Q[A(3)] and Q[ A(J)], are 
obtained as: 
,6 
L:Q,(/2) 
qA(J) = -,;;s;;c-~ __ 12.1 
L:Q.(t2) 
k=1 
12.2 
where states s, p, k correspond to states displayed in table 12.9 
4). Trim the established initial states: the deletion of basic event A results in repeated states such 
as states I and 9, states 2 and 10, states 3 and 11, states 4 and 12, states 5 and 13, states 6 and 14, 
states 7 and 15 and states 8 and 16 in table 12.9. These repeated states are combined and the 
initial probability of these combined states are the sum of the original initial probability of 
repeated states. The refined initial states for phase 3 are displayed in table 12.11. 
State B CS D CF Mission State B CS D CF Mission 
No. No. 
\ 0 0 0 -\ 0 5 \ 0 2 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 \ 2 -I 0 
3 0 \ 0 -\ 0 7 2 0 \ 0 0 
4 0 0 \ -\ 0 8 0 2 \ -\ 0 
... Table 12.11 Fmal list ofmltJal states for phase 3 
5). Develop the Markov model for phase 3 from the established initial states. See table 12.12 and 
12.13. 
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State B CS D CF Mission State B CS D CF Mission 
No. No. 
1 0 0 0 -1 0 12 1 0 0 2 1 
2 1 0 0 0 0 13 2 1 0 -1 1 
3 0 1 0 -1 0 14 0 1 3 -1 0 
4 0 0 1 -1 0 15 0 3 1 -1 0 
5 1 0 2 0 0 16 1 0 2 2 1 
6 0 1 2 -1 0 17 2 1 2 -1 1 
7 2 0 1 0 0 18 2 0 1 2 1 
8 0 2 1 -1 0 19 2 2 1 -1 1 
9 0 3 0 -1 0 20 1 2 0 -1 1 
10 0 0 3 -1 0 21 0 3 3 -1 0 
11 1 0 3 0 0 22 1 2 2 -1 1 
Table 12.12 States In the Markov model for phase 3 
From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate 
1 2 B 4 15 CS 9 20 B 14 10 -CS 
1 9 CS 4 1 -D 9 3 0 14 6 0 
1 10 D 5 4 -B 9 21 D 15 19 B 
2 1 -B 5 16 CF \0 5 B 15 8 0 
2 11 D 6 17 B \0 21 CS 15 9 -D 
2 12 CF 6 4 -CS \0 4 0 21 22 B 
3 13 B 7 2 -D 11 \0 -B 21 14 0 
3 1 -CS 7 18 CF 11 5 0 21 15 0 
3 14 D 8 19 B 11 16 CF 
4 7 B 8 3 -D 14 17 B 
.. Table 12.13 State transItIOns In the Markov model for phase 3 
6). Carry out quantification on the established minimal Markov model over the time duration [t2, 
t3). The system failure probability in phase 3 is obtained as follows: 
Q[phase 3] = QLMfj + LQk(t3-) 
k 
where QLMF, = LQm(t2-), in which Qm(t2-) is the probability of state m at the end of 
m 
phase 2 in which component A is working and module M 1 is failed; state k represents the 
failed system state in the Markov model for phase 3, i.e. states 12, 13, 16-20 and 22 in 
table 12.12. 
Phase 4 
The BDD is employed as the quantification method .. 
Among all the failure modes for phase 4, both M13 .A(3) and M13 . ~3) .M2(3) represent transition 
failures for phase 4 as neither of them contains component failure event during phase 4. The 
probability of each of the two failure modes is obtained by the product of the probability of each 
individual event contained in the failure mode. 
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The probability that module Ml is working at the end of phase 3, i.e. Q[MI3 ], can be obtained 
from the quantification for phase 3: 
PM!, = LQ,(t3-) 12.3 
, 
where state i represents the working state of module Ml at the end of phase 3, i.e. states 
1-11, 14, 15 and 21 in table 12.12. 
The probability of component A being failed at the end of phase 3 is calculated according to 
equation 11.16: 
12.4 
qAIl) and PAIl) have been obtained through equations 12.1 and 12.2 during the quantification 
process for phase 3. Assume that failure times of component A features an exponential 
distribution, then with a dormant failure during phase 3, the probability that component A is 
failed at the end of phase 3 given that it is working at the start of phase 3 can be obtained as: 
q Im = 1- e-'A(I,-t) , where 1 is the time of the last inspection on component A in phase 3. 
A(J) A 
The probability of component A being failed at the end of phase 3 given that component A is 
failed at the start of phase 3 can be obtained by quantifying the Markov model established to 
model the behaviour of component A over the time duration [12, (3) (Figure 12.6) with an initial 
probability [0, 0,1]. Thus, q Im = Q2(t3-)+Q3(t3-). In this way, q, and P-,- can be obtained. 
~)) A .. ~)) '"(3) 
State 1 working }----_+{ 
, 
, 
, 0: 
State 2 
Failed State 3 
under repair 
Figure 12.6 Markov model for component A during phase 3 
In terms of module M2, the probability of module M2 being failed at the end of phase 3 can be 
obtained by quantifying module M2 over the time duration [0, (3) as it is required in none of the 
previous phases. Due to the maintenance dependency and sequential dependency existing 
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between components F, G and H through the mission, the Markov method is employed. Tables 
12.14 and 12.15 display the Markov model established for module M2. 
State F G H M2 State F G H M2 State F G H M2 
No. No. No. 
1 0-0 0-0 0-0 0 21 3-2 3-1 3-3 0 41 3-2 1-1 3-3 0 
2 3-1 0-0 0-0 0 22 3-2 1-1 0-0 0 42 3-3 1-1 3-2 0 
3 0-0 3-1 0-0 0 23 0-0 I-I 3-2 0 43 1-3 2-1 2-2 0 
4 0-0 0-0 3-1 0 24 3-3 3-1 3-2 0 44 3-3 1-1 2-2 0 
5 1-1 0-0 0-0 0 25 0-0 1-1 2-2 0 45 1-2 3-3 2-1 0 
6 3-1 3-2 0-0 0 26 1-2 0-0 2-1 0 46 1-2 2-3 2-1 0 
7 3-1 0-0 3-2 0 27 3-2 3-3 3-1 0 47 1-3 2-2 2-1 0 
8 3-2 3-1 0-0 0 28 3-3 3-2 3-1 0 48 3-3 1-2 2-1 0 
9 0-0 1-1 0-0 0 29 0-0 1-2 2-1 0 49 2-2 0-0 1-1 0 
10 0-0 3-1 3-2 0 30 3-2 0-0 1-1 0 50 3-2 3-3 1-1 0 
11 3-2 0-0 3-1 0 31 0-0 3-2 I-I 0 51 3-3 3-2 1-1 0 
12 0-0 3-2 3-1 0 32 1-1 3-2 3-3 1 52 0-0 2-2 1-1 0 
13 0-0 0-0 1-1 0 33 1-1 3-3 3-2 0 53 2-2 1-1 3-3 0 
14 I-I 3-2 0-0 0 34 1-1 2-2 3-3 1 54 2-2 1-1 2-3 0 
15 1-1 0-0 3-2 0 35 1-1 2-2 2-3 1 55 2-3 1-1 2-2 0 
16 1-1 2-2 0-0 0 36 1-1 3-3 2-2 0 56 2-3 1-2 2-1 0 
17 3-1 3-2 3-3 1 37 1-1 2-3 2-2 0 57 2-2 3-3 1-1 0 
18 1-1 0-0 2-2 0 38 1-2 2-1 3-3 0 58 2-2 2-3 1-1 0 
19 3-1 3-3 3-2 0 39 1-2 2-1 2-3 0 59 2-3 2-2 1-1 0 
20 1-2 2-1 0-0 0 40 2-2 1-1 0-0 0 60 3-3 2-2 1-1 0 
Table 12.14 States In the Markov model for module M2 for first three phases 
From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate 
1 2 F 12 29 0 26 45 G 42 11 -G 
1 3 G 13 30 F 27 46 0 43 25 -F 
1 4 H 13 31 G 28 47 0 44 55 0 
2 5 0 13 1 -H 29 48 F 44 30 -G 
2 6 G 14 3 -F 29 13 -G 45 31 -F 
2 7 H 14 16 0 30 49 0 45 46 0 
3 8 F 14 32 H 30 50 G 46 29 -F 
3 9 0 15 4 -F 30 2 -H 47 29 -F 
3 10 H 15 33 G 31 51 F 48 56 0 
4 11 F 15 18 0 31 52 0 48 30 -G 
4 12 G 16 9 -F 31 3 -H 49 57 G 
4 13 0 16 34 H 32 10 -F 49 5 -H 
5 1 -F 17 35 0 32 35 0 50 58 0 
5 14 G 18 13 -F 33 12 -F 50 6 -H 
5 15 H 18 36 G 33 37 0 51 59 0 
6 16 0 19 37 0 34 23 -F 51 8 -H 
6 17 H 20 9 -F 34 35 0 52 60 F 
7 18 0 20 38 H 35 25 -F 52 9 -H 
7 19 G 21 39 0 36 31 -F 53 15 -G 
8 20 0 22 40 0 36 37 0 53 54 0 
8 21 H 22 2 -G 37 29 -F 54 18 -G 
9 22 F 22 41 H 38 23 -F 55 26 -G 
9 1 -G 23 42 F 38 39 0 56 26 -G 
9 23 H 23 4 -G 39 25 -F 57 58 0 
10 24 F 23 25 0 40 5 -G 57 14 -H 
\0 25 0 24 43 0 40 53 H 58 16 -H 
11 26 0 25 44 F 41 54 0 59 20 -H 
11 27 G 25 13 -G 41 7 -G 60 59 0 
12 28 F 26 13 -F 42 55 0 60 22 -H 
.. Table 12.15 State transItIons In the Markov model for module M2 for the first three phases 
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Then by quantifying the Markov model displayed above over the time duration [0, (3), the 
probability of module M2 being failed at the end of phase 3 can be obtained as: 
qM2", =qM2(t3-) = 2:0;(/3-) . 12.5 
i 
where state i represents the failed state of module M2, i.e. states 17, 32, 34 and 35 in 
table 12.14. 
Thus the probabilities of the two failure modes which represent transition failure for phase 4 are 
obtained. 
The probability of the other two failure modes, M13 . M2(3) . (A4IA(3) )'~3) and 
M13 . (A4IA(3) )Aw (M24IM2(3) ).M2(3), is obtained in a similar way by the product of the 
probability of each event contained in these two terms. 
For the failure mode M13 .M2(3).(A41~3»)'~3)' P;'", P",,, and PM2", have been respectively 
obtained through equations 12.3, 12.4 and 12.5. q ,-,-, i.e. the probability that component A A41~3) 
fails during phase 4 given that component A enters phase 4 working, is calculated using its 
probability density function over phase 4. Assume that failure times of component A features an 
exponential distribution, then: 
For the failure mode M13 .(A41~3»)Aw(M24IM2(3»)M2(3), the only unknown probability is 
q 1-' This can be obtained by quantifying module M2 independently over the time duration 
M24M2(l) 
[/3, (4). The working states of module M2 at the end of phase 3 form the initial states for module 
M2 at the start of phase 4. Tables 12.16 and 12.17 display the initial states of module M2 at the 
start of phase 4 and its relationship with the states of module M2 at the end of phase 3. 
State F G H M2 State F G H M2 State F G H M2 
No. No. No. 
I 0-0 0-0 0-0 0 9 1-2 0-0 2-1 0 17 2-2 0-0 I-I 0 
2 I-I 0-0 0-0 0 10 0-0 1-2 2-1 0 18 0-0 2-2 I-I 0 
3 0-0 I-I 0-0 0 11 I-I 2-3 2-2 0 19 2-2 I-I 2-3 0 
4 0-0 0-0 I-I 0 12 1-2 2-1 2-3 0 20 2-3 I-I 2-2 0 
5 I-I 2-2 0-0 0 13 2-2 I-I 0-0 0 21 2-3 1-2 2-1 0 
6 I-I 0-0 2-2 0 14 1-3 2-1 2-2 0 22 2-2 2-3 I-I 0 
7 1-2 2-1 0-0 0 IS 1-2 2-3 2-1 0 23 2-3 2-2 I-I 0 
8 0-0 I-I 2-2 0 16 1-3 2-2 2-1 0 
.. Table 12.16 Imhal states of module M2 at the start of phase 4 
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Initial states of module M2 for phase 4 Working states of module M2 at the end of phase 3 (table 12.14) 
I I 
2 2,5 
3 3,9 
4 4,13 
5 6,14,16 
6 7,15,18 
7 8,20 
8 10,23,25 
9 11,26 
10 12,29 
11 19,33,36,37 
12 21,38,39 
13 22,40 
14 24,43 
15 27,45,46 
16 28,47 
17 30,49 
18 31,52 
19 41,53,54 
20 42,44,55 
21 48,56 
22 50 57,58 
23 51,59,60 
... Table 12.17 Correspondlllg relatIOnshIp between IllltIal states of module M2 for phase 4 and Its 
states at the end of phase 3 
The Markov model is then established for module M2 over phase 4 as displayed in tables 12.18 
and 12.19. 
State F G H M2 State F G H M2 State F G H M2 
No. No. No. 
I 0-0 0-0 0-0 0 9 1-2 0-0 2-1 0 17 2-2 0-0 I-I 0 
2 I-I 0-0 0-0 0 10 0-0 1-2 2-1 0 18 0-0 2-2 I-I 0 
3 0-0 I-I 0-0 0 11 I-I 2-3 2-2 0 19 2-2 I-I 2-3 0 
4 0-0 0-0 I-I 0 12 1-2 2-1 2-3 0 20 2-3 I-I 2-2 0 
5 I-I 2-2 0-0 0 13 2-2 I-I 0-0 0 21 2-3 1-2 2-1 0 
6 I-I 0-0 2-2 0 14 1-3 2-1 2-2 0 22 2-2 2-3 I-I 0 
7 1-2 2-1 0-0 0 15 1-2 2-3 2-1 0 23 2-3 2-2 I-I 0 
8 0-0 I-I 2-2 0 16 1-3 2-2 2-1 0 24 I-I 2-2 2-3 I 
Table 12.18 States III the Markov model for module M2 durlllg phase 4 
From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate From To Rate 
I 2 F 4 18 G 9 4 -F 16 10 -F 
I 3 G 4 I -H 9 15 G 17 22 G 
I 4 H 5 3 -F 10 21 F 17 2 -H 
2 I -F 5 24 H 10 4 -G 18 23 F 
2 5 G 6 4 -F II 10 -F 18 3 -H 
2 6 H 6 11 G 12 8 -F 19 6 -G 
3 13 F 7 3 -F 13 2 -G 20 9 -G 
3 I -G 7 12 H 13 19 H 21 9 -G 
3 8 H 8 20 F 14 8 -F 22 5 -H 
4 17 F 8 4 -G 15 10 -F 23 7 -H 
.. Table 12.19 State transItIons III the Markov model for module M2 durmg phase 4 
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By accounting for the event M2(3) , the state probabilities in module M2 at the end of phase 3 are 
passed to corresponding initial states in module M2 at the start of phase 4. That is, referring to 
table 12.17: 
Q,(t3) = Q,(t3-) 
Q2(t3) = Q2(t3-) + Q5(t3-) 
Q23(t3) = Q5,(t3-) + Q59(t3-) + Q60(t3-) 
where Qj(t3) is the initial state probability of module M2 at the start of phase 4; Qj(t3-) is 
the state of probability of module M2 at the end of phase 3. 
Then the quantification of module M2 over phase 4 based on the pre-determined initial state 
probabilities will produce the probability Q[ (M2.IM2(3) ).M2(3) ]. 
With the probability of each failure mode obtained, the system failure probability in phase 4 is 
then obtained as: 
Q[phase 4] = Q[MI3 .A(3)] + Q[MI3 . ~3) .M2(3)] + 
Q[ MI3 .M2(3) .(A.I~3) )A3)] + 
Q[ MI3 . (A.I~3) }.~3)" (M2.IM2(3) ).M2(3) ] 
= (l-qMI, )·qA(3' + (I-qMI, ).(I-q",,, ).qM2(3' + (l-qMI, )·(I-qM2(3')· 
q",jA." .(I-q",,,) + (I-qMI, ).(I-qA.!",,, ).(I-q",,, )·qM2.!M2(3) .(1- qM2",) 
Step I O. Calculate the mission failure probability by summing up the system failure probability 
in each phase. That is, 
_ . 
RMISS = LQ[phase i] 
j=) 
12.2.2 Importance Measures 
Phase 1 
Components A and E are required during phase I. 
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• Phase Criticality Function Gi_l(q(t)) 
GA_I(q(t)) = (QphaseIiqA, = 1)-(QphaseIiqA, =0) 
=1-!fE(u)du (O;<:;t<tl) 
= e-A£I (0;<:; t < tl) 
GB_I(q(t)) = Gc_l(q(t)) = GD_I(q(t)) = 0 
GE_I(q(t)) = QphasellqE, =1)-(QphasedqE, =0) 
• Phase Criticality Measure k I 
Q[phase 1] Q[phase I] 
G = [1- ('fA(U)du]J'fE(U)dU = e-A"'.(I_e-A£I,) 
J = JP = E-I·qE, ,I, ,I, E-I E I 
- Q[phase I] Q[phase 1] Q[phase I] 
Phase 2 
Components A, B, C and D are required during phase 2. 
• Phase Criticality Function Gdq(t)) 
GA_2 (q(t)) = LQm(t)+ LQk(t) (tl;<:; t < t2) 
m k 
where state m represents states 5, 8, 9,12,13,19,25,27,31,41,52,54 and 57 in table 12.7; 
state k represents states 24, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45, 56 and 58 in table 12.7. 
GB_2 (q(t)) = LQm(t)+ LQk(t) (tl;<:; t < t2) 
m k 
where state m represents states 20, 28, 33, 36, 37, 38,43,44,48,51,53 and 55 in table 12.7; 
state k represents states 24, 29, 30, 34, 35, 49, 56 and 58 in table 12.7 
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GCS_2(q(t» = GD _2(q(t» = 0, as basic events CS and D are both enabling events. 
GCF_2(q(t» = LQm(t)+ LQ,(t) (t15,t<t2) 
m , 
where state m represents states 17,26,32 and 39 in table 12.7; state k represents states 40, 45 
and 47 in table 12.7 
GE_2(q(t» = GF_2(q(t» = GG_2(q(t» = GH_2(q(t» =0 
• Phase Criticality Measure /;.2 
J - JP -A-2 - A-2-
J - JP -B-2 - B-2-
f LQm(U)·,1,A,du 
m (m as same for GA_2(q(t») Q[phase 2] 
f LQm(U).,1,B,du 
m (m as same for GB_2(q(t») Q[phase 2] 
f'LQm(U).ACFdu 
JC_2 = J~F_2 = ' m (m as same for GCF_2(q(t») Q[phase 2] 
Phase 3 
Components B, C and D are required during phase 3. 
• Phase Criticality Function Gi_3(q(t» 
GA_3(q(t» = 0 
GB_3(q(t» = LQm(t)+ LQ,(t) (t25, t < t3), where state m represents states 3, 6,8,9,14, 
m , 
15 and 21, statekrepresentsstates 13, 17, 19,20 and 22 in table 12.12. 
GCS_3(q(t» = GD_3(q(t» = 0, as basic events CS and D are both enabling events during 
phase 3. 
GCF_3 (q(t» = LQm(t)+ LQ,(t) (t2 5, t < t3), where state m represents states 2,5,7 and 
m , 
11, state krepresents states 12, 16 and 18 in table 12.12. 
GE_J(q(t» = GF_J(q(t» = Go_J(q(t» = GH_J(q(t» = 0 
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• Phase Criticality Measure 1;.3 
I A_, = 0 
where: 
f' LQm(U).AB du , ' I P = m (m as same for GB_, (q(t») B-' Q[phase 3] 
L Qm (t2 ).AB, 
I~ ,= m , where state m represents the states in the Markov model for phase 
- Q[phase 3] 
2 where component A is working and the failure of component B will bring about the 
failure of module MI, i.e. states 3, 7,11, IS, 21, 23, 38, 42, 46 and SO in table 12.7 
le_, = I~F-' + I~F-' 
where: 
I p -CF-3 -
f' L Qm (u ).AeF du , ' 
m (m as same for GeF_, (q(t» ) Q[phase 3] 
L Qm (t2 ).A'CF, 
I~F _, = m , where state m represents states in the Markov model for phase 2 Q[phase 3] 
where component A is working and the active failure of component C will bring about 
the failure of module MI, i.e. states 2, 6, \0 and 18 in table 12.7 
I E_, = IF_, = 10 _, = IH _, = 0 
Phase 4 
Components A, F, G and H are required during phase 4. 
• Phase Criticality Function G;.4( q(t» 
GA_.(q(t» = Q[phase 41 qA IT = 1]- Q[phase 41q 1- = 0] 
4 ',l) A4 ~3) 
GF_.(q(t» = Go_.(q(t» = 0, as basic events F and G are both sequential failure events 
during phase 4 which have to occur prior to H . 
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where: 
GHIM2_4(q(t» = LQm(t)+ LQk(l) (13:"; t < 14), where state m represents state 5, and 
m k 
state k represents state 24 in table 12.18. 
GM2_4(q(t» =Q[phase41 qM21M"2 = 1]--Q[phase41 qM21M"2 = 0] 
4 (J) 4 (l) 
= (l-qMI )·{l-qA IT }.(I-q, ).(I-qM2 ) 
3 4 "(l) .. tJ) (3) 
• Phase Criticality Measure /;4 
I A_4 = 1:_4 + I~_4 
where: 
(1- q MI,).( 1- q M2(3').( 1- q "'" ).( 1- q M2,IMiW).[ 1-e-.!,(t,-I,) ] 
Q[phase 4] 
IT = {Q[ LMF4IqA13, = I]-Q[ LMF4 Iq"", = 0 ]}.qA,,, 
A-4 Q[phase 4] 
= (I-QMI,).(I-qM2,,,).q,,,,, 
Q[phase 4] 
I H-4 = I~_4 + I~_4 
where: 
f' Qm(U).AHdu GM24 ·qM2 
= ' . - '(m as same for GHIM2_4(q(t») 
qM2, Q[phase 4] 
Q[phase 4] 
= (1- qMI, ).( 1- qA,P;;; ).( 1- q",,,).( 1- qM2", ).qM2,. f Qm(U).AHdu 
Q[phase 4] 
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IT - IT T 
H-4 - HIM2-4· I M2-4 
= Qm(t
3
).,1,H • {Q[ LMF4 IqM2(J) = 1 ]-Q[ LMF4 IqM2(3) = 0 ]} .qM2(3) 
q M2(3) Q[phase 4] 
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Chapter 13. Dependency Modelling Using Binary Decision Diagrams 
13.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters provide an in-depth probe into how the Markov method can be applied to 
the reliability evaluation of different types of system which feature dependency relationships. To 
overcome the weakness of the Markov method resulting from the model size, an attempt is made 
in this chapter to explore the applicability of the BDD method in dependency modelling. A 
method is presented which integrates a Bayesian, conditional probability, approach in the binary 
decision diagram approach [62]. With the Bayesian analysis, some dependency relationships 
between components can be taken into account. In the traditional BDD analysis, the 
independence between component failures has always been assumed. 
With regard to the system dependency modelling using binary decision diagrams, the research 
has been focused on non-repairable systems. 
13.2 Dependency Modelling Using BDD for Non-repairable Systems 
Four types of dependency are relevant to non-repairable systems. These include standby 
dependency, stress-related dependency, initiator-enabler dependency and sequential failure 
dependency. Among these four types of dependency, the first two both represent the situation 
where the failure of some component is influenced by the functionality of another component; 
and the latter two types of dependency both represent the situation where the order of the 
occurrence of component failures has to be taken into account in the analysis. 
With the standby dependency, either cold-standby or warm-standby mode, the change in the 
failure rate of the standby component is initiated by the failure of the duty component. In terms 
oft he stress-related dependency, the failure 0 f a component will result in the increase in the 
working load of remaining components which in turn leads to a higher failure rate. 
For the initiator-enabler dependency and the sequential failure dependency, the failure process of 
each component is independent, although only when the component failures occur in a certain 
order, will the system fail. 
For non-repairable systems, the system performance is assessed by the prediction of the system 
unreliability over a certain period of time, [0, T). T is usually the period of time required for the 
system to achieve the completion of a specific task. For systems which contain no dependency, 
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the system failure probability, which is a function of individual component unreliability 
r fc(u)du, can be obtained through the quantification of the corresponding BDD . 
When r f(u)du has no closed form, an appropriate numerical integration technique [63] can be 
applied to obtain the approximated value of the integral at discrete time point. 
When there is no dependency relationship involved in the system, the numerical integration for 
the failure probability of each basic event is carried out separately over the same time duration 
[0, T). However, with the dependency relationships involved in the system, the quantification 
will not be as straightforward. 
The following sections describe how conditional probabilities can be used in the BDD approach 
to model each of the above dependency types to obtain the system unreliability. 
13.2.1 Dependency Modelling for Initiator-enabler Dependency 
The typical fault tree structure in which the initiator-enabler dependency lies is an output event 
with two input events linked to each other through an AND gate, as shown in figure 13.1. 
Output event 
Initiating event 
occurs 
Enabling event 
occurs 
Figure 13.1 Typical fault tree structure representing initiator-enabler dependency 
In figure 13.1, both the initiating event (I) and the enabling event (E) can be a single basic event 
or an intermediate event which can be further developed into combinations of basic events. 
Consider when both the initiating event and the enabling event are basic events, the 
corresponding BDD is established as in figure 13.2: 
Figure 13.2 BDD for i-e dependency 337 
The probability density functions fEet) and fAt) c an be established for the enabling event and 
initiating event respectively. These two variables are independent from each other, given that no 
repair is carried out. The failure probability of the enabling event E or initiating event lover any 
period of time [th t2) can be obtained as f' fE(u)du and f' h(u)du. 
I I 
The system will only fail when the enabling event E occurs prior to the initiating event I. If the 
enabling event occurs at time s, only if the initiating event occurs during [s, T), will the system 
fail. In the integral form, the system failure probability over the time duration [0, T) can then be 
expressed as: 
13.1 
which means that the enabling event occurs at any time s during [0, T) followed by the 
occurrence of the initiating event I during [s, T). 
If the occurrence times of the initiating and enabling events are both governed by the exponential 
distribution, the integral in equation 13.1 will have a closed form. In other cases, a numerical 
integration technique may be necessary to evaluate the integral. 
When either the initiating event (l) or the enabling event (E) is an intermediate event connecting 
a series of basic events through a set ofiogic gates, they can be quantified separately as modules 
and then substituted into an equation of the same form as equation 13.1. Let ME and MI denote 
modules representing causes of the enabling event and the initiating event respectively. Then the 
system failure probability F,y,(T) is obtained as: 
13.2 
This requires a process to obtain fM, (t) and fMf (t). 
In module ME, assume it contains basic events El, E2, ... , En, then: 
fME (t) .dt = P[module ME fails in time period It, t+dt)] 
• 
= L P[module ME has not failed prior to time t and fails in It, t+dt) due to 
i=l 
the failure of basic event E;J 
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For module ME to fail due to the failure of the basic event El in [t, t+dt), the module must be 
residing in a critical state for El at time t. Therefore, 
n 
fME (t) .dt = L GE, (t).fE, (t).dt . That is: 
j=1 
n 
fM.(t) = L G E, (t).fE, (t) 13.3 
;;1 
where G E, (t) is the criticality function for basic event El at time t, which can be obtained in the 
BDD for module ME as described in section 2.2.4.4. In the same way, fMf (t) can be obtained. 
When causes of the initiating event or the enabling event are developed as a module, the 
quantification is carried out on the BDD for the corresponding module to obtainfE(s) and/I(u). 
These are then substituted into equation 13.2 using a numerical integration scheme if the forms 
of the failure time distributions do not produce a closed form solution to the integral. 
An example system which features the initiator-enabler dependency is used to illustrate how the 
BDD approach addresses this type of dependency. 
Vaporizer 
Liquid 
butane 
Pump 
Trip loop 2 
Trip loop I 
Vent valve 
Figure 13.3 Vaporizer system 
In the simplified vaporizer system shown in figure 13.3, liquid is pumped from a tank into a 
butane vaporizer where it is heated to form a gas. In the event of a pump surge the pressure in the 
vaporizer exceeds the rating of the vaporizer tubes. To prevent the tubes from rupturing, safety 
systems have been incorporated at several locations on the inlet to the vaporizer, which will shut 
down the process on the pump surge. In total, three protective systems have been used: two trip 
loops which close a valve halting the butane flow and a vent valve which opens allowing the 
butane to return to the tank if the pressure exceeds the preset limit. There is no maintenance to be 
carried out during the time the system is working. 
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The fault tree for the top event 'Vaporizer coil ruptures under high pressure' is shown in figure 
13.4. 
Vaporizer coil ruptures 
under high pressure 
Figure 13.4 Fault tree for vaporizer system 
In figure 13.4, the basic event 'PS' represents the initiating event and the intermediate event 
represented by G 1 is the overall enabling event. The pre-processing of the fault tree structure in 
figure 13.4 will identify module Mlled by gate G 1. BDDs are established for the system and for 
module Ml respectively as in figure 13.5. 
1 F3 o 
1 
Figure 13.5 BDD for the system and module Ml 
Independent probability density functions exist for basic events PS, Tl, V, and T2, JPS(t),./Tl(t), 
fv(t) and fdt) respectively. 
Considering module MI. From equation 13.3: 
fMl(t) = Gn(t) . ./Tl(t)+Gv(t).fv(t)+Gdt)·fT2(t) 
where the criticality function for each basic event in module Ml is obtained as follows: 
Gn(t) = P[F2] = FT2(t).Fv(t) = {h2(U)du.{ fv(u)du 
Gv(t) = Fn (t).P[F3] = Fn(t).FT2(t) = {fT! (u)du .{ fT2(U)du 
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Gdt) = Fn(t).Fv(t) = ! fn(u)du. ! fv(u)du 
13.2.2 Dependency Modelling for Sequential Dependency 
The typical fault tree structure representing the sequential dependency is shown in figure 13.6, 
where there are n inputs which must occur in order and these inputs can be either basic events or 
gates. ( In this case, basic events are illustrated in the figure). 
Figure 13.6 Typical fault tree structure for sequential dependency 
The sequential failure event Ci can be either a single basic event or an intermediate event which 
it is assumed can be identified as an independent module. The BOO established for the fault tree 
in figure 13.6 is shown in figure 13.7. 
@ 
~ 
o 
Figure 13.7 BOO for sequential dependency 
For the output event to occur, the events must occur in the specified order. The system failure 
probability is expressed as in equation 13.4. 
Fsys(T)= r fc,(s,) (fC2 (S2) ... (/cn (sn)dsn···ds2ds, 13.4 
It must be noted that in establishing the corresponding BOO, the variable ordering must be the 
same as the specified order of occurrence. Initiator-enabler dependency can also be tackled in the 
same way as for sequential dependency since it can be regarded as a sequential dependency with 
two input events. In this case, the enabling event must be considered prior to the initiating event 
in the variable ordering. 
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13.2.3 Dependency Modelling for Standby Dependency 
It is in the warm-spare and cold-spare cases that a dependency anses between the duty 
component and the standby component. The dependency occurs since the failure rate of the 
standby component varies according to the state of the duty component. Take for example a 
simple system with redundancy in the design, in which component Cl is the duty component and 
C2 the standby activated when Cl fails. The system fails when both components fail. The system 
failure probability over the system functioning period [0, T) is Fsys(T). The failure probability of 
the duty component Cl can be obtained from r ICl (t)dt . For system failure it is then necessary 
to consider the standby component C2 which, in the case of a warm-spare or cold-spare, has no 
consistent probability density function that can be defined over the whole duration [0, T). 
Instead, two probability density functions are required to define the behaviour of C2 over [0, T). 
The first is concerned with C2 in its standby state, denoted by I C21:;(t) , and the other is 
concerned with C2 following its activation, denoted by ICZlx (t), where x refers to the failure of 
duty component Cl. Conditional probabilities are used to evaluate Fsys(T) in the form of integrals 
in the following form: 
Fsys(T) = r lCi(S) r I C21:;(u)duds + r IC1(S)[I-r I C21:;(u)du JJ ICZlx(t-s)dtds 13.5 
where the first term on the right-hand of the equation represents the situation that when 
C I fails, component C2 has already failed in the standby state. The second term 
represents the situation that component C2 has not failed in its standby but fails after its 
activation triggered by the failure of component Cl. When component C2 is 
characterized by a cold-standby, I C21:;(t) =0. 
The above example illustrates the basic algorithm of using conditional probabilities to evaluate 
the reliability of standby systems. The following section describes the generic process of 
extending the conditional probability approach using the binary decision diagram to the solution 
of standby systems. 
13.2.3.1 Generic Process 
Consider t he general case: n - m, where n duty components a re required to keep the system 
functioning; and m standby components are assigned (n>=l, m>=l). 
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Step I: establish the fault tree structure for the failure of the standby system. 
The system fails when (n-I) or less components are working. That is, among all the (n+m) 
components, when (n+m-(n-I », i.e. (m+ I) components have failed, the system fails. 
Two different failure modes are considered for the standby component: fails in standby and fails 
functioning. The general fault tree structure for the system failure (only considering the key 
components) is displayed in figure 13 .8. 
Duty 
component I 
fails 
System failure 
Duty Duty 
component 2 ...... component n 
fails fails 
Standby 
component I 
fails 
Standby 
component 1 
fails in standby 
Standby 
component 1 
fails functioning 
Standby 
component m 
fails 
Standby 
component I 
fails in standby 
Standby 
component I 
fails functioning 
Figure 13.8 The generic fault tree structure for standby dependency 
In the case of cold-standby, basic events SCiS which represent the standby failures do not need 
to be included in the fault tree. Different probability density functions can be established for each 
failure mode: fails functioning and fails in standby. 
In most standby systems, a controlling component is required to activate the standby component 
in the event that the duty component fails. Other supporting components are also required to 
enable the key component to achieve its functionality, such as a power supply and perhaps 
isolation or pressure relief valves depending on the system type. The failure of the controlling 
component and the supporting components are taken into consideration in the generic fault tree 
structure as shown in figure 13.9. 
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Duty 
subsystem 1 
fails 
Duty 
component 1 
fails 
functi nin 
Duty 
subsystem 2 
fails 
fun tionin 
System failure 
Duty 
subsystem n 
fails 
functi nin 
Standby 
subsystem 1 
fails to activate 
Standby 
subsystem 1 
fails 
Standby 
subsystem m 
fails 
Standby 
subsystem 1 fails 
functioning 
Controlling 
component 
fails 
Standby 
component 1 
fails in standby 
Standby 
component 1 
fails 
Supporting 
component 
n+ 1 fails 
c 
Figure 13.9 Complete Fault tree structure for standby systems with supporting components 
When n = I, i.e. only one duty component is required, the voting gate in the fault tree structure in 
figure 12.10 turns into an AND gate. 
Step 2: establish the required component dependency information and failure data. 
The dependency relationships are evident from the fault tree structure in figure 13.9. The basic 
event data required are the form and parameters of probability density functions for each 
component failure. fDCi(t), /sCiE{t), /sUi(t) feCt) and /sCis{t) are established to model the failure 
times of duty component DCi, the standby component (in active failure mode) SCiF, the 
supporting component SUi, the controlling component C and the standby component (in standby 
mode) SCiS. For the active failure of the standby component, i.e. SCiF, the time 'I' is measured 
from the time the component gets activated. 
Step 3: carry out the simplification and modularization process on the fault tree structure. 
In this process, the active failure of duty component or standby component (DC I, ... , DCn, 
SCIF, ... , SCmF) can be combined with its own functionally supporting component (SUI, ... , 
SUn+m) to form a module. 
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Step 4: construct the BDD based on the modularized fault tree structure, and the BDD for each 
identified module. 
In the process of constructing the BDD, an appropriate variable ordering is needed. An ordering 
is used which follows the time sequence of events. Although in the BDD the variable ordering 
does not need to follow the actual sequence of component failures, in this case it provides a 
structured approach by considering the active failure of the standby components after the duty 
component, controlling component and standby component failures. 
Another factor which may be considered in the process of establishing the variable ordering is 
the failure to activate the standby components (either due to the controlling component failure or 
the failure of the components in standby) and the failure of duty components. Two ways of 
ordering these failure events have been investigated. The first ordering considers the controlling 
component and standby component failures prior to the duty component failures. The second 
ordering considers these elements in the reverse order. Based on these two orderings, different 
binary decision diagrams will be generated, which will produce different collections of paths 
leading to system failure. To illustrate this, a simple standby system is introduced in figure 
13.10. 
,..----{Pl }--....., 
}----{P2 }----{ 
}----{P3 }---I 
L---{P4 )-_...J 
Figure 13.10 Example standby system 
In this system, four pumps PI, P2, P3 and P4 form a parallel system to provide water supply. 
Pumps PI and P2 are duty pumps, and pumps P3 and P4 are standby pumps which activate when 
pump 1 or pump 2 fails. The system fails when 3-out-of-4 supply streams are unavailable. The 
corresponding fault tree structure for the system failure is shown in figure 13.11. 
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Duty pump 1 Duty pump 2 
fails fails 
functioning functioning 
P2 
Standby pump Standby 
3 fails to component 3 
activate fails functioning 
Standby 
pump 4 fails 
Standby pump Standby 
4 fails to component 3 
activate fails functioning 
Figure 13.11 Fault tree structure for example standby system 
By adopting the first variable ordering, i.e. P3S>P4S>Pl>P2>P3F>P4F, the resulting BDD is 
shown in figure 13.12. 
Figure 13.12 BDD for the example system on variable ordering 1 
By following the second variable ordering, i.e., Pl>P2>P3S>P4S>P3F>P4F, the resulting BDD 
is shown in figure 13.13. 
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PI 
Figure 13.13 BDD for the example system on variable ordering 2 
Table 13.1 and figure 13.14 provides a comparison between the failure paths obtained from the 
twoBDDs. 
Path number Ordering I Ordering 2 
1 P3S.P4S.PI PI.P2.P3S 
2 P3S.P4S. PI .P2 PI.P2. P3S .P4S 
3 P3S. P4S .PI.P2 PI.P2. P3S. P4S .P3F 
4 P3S. P4S .PI. P2 .P4F PI.P2. P3S. P4S. P3F .P4F 
5 P3S. P4S. PI .P2.P4F PI. P2 .P3S.P4S 
6 P3S .P4S.PI.P2 PI. P2 .P3S. P4S .P4F 
7 P3S .P4S.PI. P2 .P3F PI.P2. P3S .P4S.P3F 
8 P3S .P4S. PI .P2.P3F PI. P2. P3S. P4S .P3F.P4F 
9 P3S. P4S .PI.P2.P3F PI.P2.P3S.P4S 
10 P3S. P4S .PI.P2. P3F .P4F PI .P2.P3S. P4S .P4F 
II P3S. P4S .PI. P2 .P3F.P4F PI .P2. P3S .P4S.P3F 
12 P3S. P4S. PI .P2.P3F.P4F PI .P2. P3S. P4S .P3F.P4F 
Table 13.1 Lists of paths III different BDDs for example system 
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Ordering I Ordering 2 
1 1 
2 2 
3 
~---,l/>.,-r-+'<--7 
11 11 
1 12 
Figure 13.14 Comparison between the paths in table 13.1 
Linked paths in figure 13.14 are the same in each ordering. The underlined paths do not appear 
in both orderings. 
The system failure probability would, of course, be the same whichever of the two different 
variable orderings was used. However, to maintain the consistency and enable a structured 
approach, variable ordering 1 is selected as it makes the mathematical logic model easier to 
interpret from the viewpoint of the engineering application. For example, when both pump 3 and 
pump 4 have failed in standby (P3S.P4S), the failure of pump 1 is sufficient to bring about the 
system failure without having to consider the state of pump 2. That is, P3S.P4S.Pl is better than 
P1.P2.P3S.P4S in the sense of actual representation. Also, when PI fails, pump 3 and pump 4 
will be investigated in turn to determine if either of them can be activated to replace pump 1. If 
neither of them is available (P3S.P4S), the failure of pump 1 will bring about the system failure 
(P3S.P4S.Pl). If pump 3 is not available (P3S) but pump 4 is available (P4S) and thus 
activated, the failure of pump 1 is not sufficient to bring about the system failure and state of 
pump 2 would be relevant (P3S. P4S .P1.P2). In contrast, the path P1.P2.P3S produced from the 
ordering 2 cannot reflect this process as in the real situation. 
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By referring to the general fault tree structure for typical standby systems shown in figure 13.10, 
component failures can be categorized into four groups as illustrated in table 13.2. 
Categories of component failures in Component failures included in the category 
standby systems 
1 Failures of duty components and corresponding supporting components 
(DCi, SU.l 
2 Active failures of standby components and corresponding supporting 
component (SClF, SUn+i) 
3 Failures of components required to activate the standbv components (C) 
4 Standby failure of standby components (SCiS) 
Table 13.2 Categones of component failures III standby systems 
The preferred variable ordering on which the BDD construction is based is category 3 > category 
4 > category 1 > categoty 2. In each category, the order between individual component failures is 
determined by the number of the appearances of the events in the fault tree. 
Step 5: obtain disjoint paths leading to the system failure (terminal node 'I') in the BDD, and 
divide the events contained in each path into 8 categories. Categories 1 - 4 represent the 
occurrence of a component failure as in categories 1 - 4 in table 13.2. Categories 5 - 8 are 
defined to represent the non-occurrence of the component failures of categories 1 - 4 
respectively. 
Step 6: calculate the probability of each path. 
In the calculation of the probability for each path, it is necessary to evaluate the correct form of 
the integral. Among the 8 categories of events contained in each path, the likelihood of events 
which belong to categories 5 and 7 can be quantified separately as they are both determined from 
a probability density function which is consistent over the whole time of system operation [0, T}, 
and as t hey represent the success 0 f a component 0 ver [0, T}, t hey are not dependent 0 n the 
condition of other components. 
Among the 4 categories of component failures, categories 1 and 2 (duty component and active 
standby component failures) are key failures. They feature similar characteristics to initiating 
events (they place a demand on other components to respond) as the system will never fail if 
these events do not occur. An integral is then established centring around these key component 
failures. Some paths in the BDD contain more than one key component failure. This means that 
more than one integral may be formed depending on the order of the occurrence of these key 
component failures. Take for example the system in figure 13.11. One failure path obtained from 
the BDD in figure 13.12 is P3S . P4S .Pl.P2.P3F as shown in table 13.1. As can be seen in this 
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path, three key component failures have occurred: PI, P2 and P3F. Between the three key 
component failures, four sequences can be identified as illustrated in figure 13.15. 
• 
<E- P3S has not 
occurred during 
rO, s) 
( 
• 
<E- P3S has not 
occurred during 
[0, s) 
( 
• 
<E- P3S has not 
occurred during 
rO, s) 
( 
• 
<E- P3S has not 
occurred during 
rO, s) 
( 
PI occurs at s 
• 
) 
P4S has not 
occurred during 
rO, u) 
PI occurs at s 
• 
) 
P4S has not 
occurred during 
[0, u) 
P2 occurs at s 
• 
) 
P4S has not 
occurred during 
rO, u) 
P2 occurs at s 
• 
) 
P4S has not 
occurred during 
rO, u) 
P2 occurs at u P3F occurs at t 
• • 
) 
Sequence 1 
P3F occurs at u P2 occurs at t 
• • 
) 
Sequence 2 
P I occurs at u P3F occurs at t 
• • 
) 
Sequence 3 
P3F occurs at u PI occurs att 
• • 
) 
Sequence 4 
Figure 13.15 Different sequences contained in the path 
For each sequence, an integral is established: 
Sequence I: r fPl(S)[I- r fp3S(X)dx] r fP2(U)[I- r fP4S(X)dx] [fp3(t-s)dtduds 
Sequence 2: r fPl(S)[I- r fp3S(x)dx ] r f p3 (u -S)[I-r fP4s(x)dx ] [ fP2(t)dtduds 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Sequence 3: 
Sequence 4: 
The path probability is equal to the sum of the probabilities of each sequence. It can be seen from 
the above example that to obtain the correct integral the key component failures must be 
investigated in association with the standby components to enable the different failure 
distributions of the standby components to be accounted for separately. To achieve this, a 
general algorithm is presented to identify all the possible sequences of key component failures 
contained in the path with respect to standby and controlling component failures. It also 
establishes the correct integral for each sequence. This is achieved in three stages described in 
procedures a), b) and c) below. 
Procedure a): a list structure is established indicating how the standby components and the 
controlling component react to each of the key component failures included in the path. Each 
node j in the list represents the combination of states of the controlling components and the 
standby components at the time when the jth key failure occurs. It also indicates the response of 
the standby component following activation triggered by this key failure. The underlying 
principle is whenever any key component failure occurs, the standby components are examined 
one by one to determine their availability to activate to replace the failed component. The 
process continues until a standby component is identified as available or all standby components 
have been investigated. To determine if a standby component is able to activate, it is required to 
establish the functionality or failure of the controlling/supporting components. Relevant events 
include the functionality or failure of the controlling component (categories 3 and 7), and the 
functionality or failure of components in standby (categories 4 and 8). Accordingly, the structure 
of each node in the list structure is defined as in figure 13.16. 
351 
For l" key component failure 
Events ea representing the failure to activate standby component 
(from categories 3 and 4) 
Events ec representing the success of the controlling 
component (from category 7) 
Event e, representing the non-occurrence of standby failures 
(from category 8) 
Event e,a representing the success of standby component 
fOllowing the activation (from category 6) 
FIgure 13.16 Node structure In the lIst 
The reason that event e,a is included in the node is that it cannot be quantified separately as its 
failure probability is dependent on the time since activation. By linking it with the key failure 
which results in the activation of the corresponding standby component, its likelihood can be 
obtained by evaluating the integral over the correct time duration. The algorithm for establishing 
the list is presented in figure 13.17. 
Path j with events categorized into 8 groups 
Establish_list(pathj) 
( 
defme integer num_key, count; 
defme pointer "head; f* pointing at the head node in the list "f 
num_key = total of number of events in categories I & 2 in path j; 
initialize head; 
head-ti=O; 
fore count = I; count <= num_key; count++) 
( defme pointer" new_node; 
} 
initialize new_node; 
new node----+i = count; 
whik(I" standby to last standby component) 
( if(has been activated in previous failures) 
continue; 
else 
( while(each corresponding functionally controlling/supporting component) 
( if\failed) 
} 
} 
} 
add to events ea; break; 
else 
add to event ec or ;:- ; 
if(jumped out of the loop) f" unable to activate "f 
continue; 
else 
( if(the standby component does not fail after the activation as indicated in the path) 
add to event e sa ; 
break; 
} 
Figure 13.17 The algorithm for establishing the list structure for each path 
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Procedure b): in this procedure, all the possible sequences of key component failures are 
identified. A general structure is defined to store all the sequences contained in the path. Assume 
that n key component failures are included in the path. Between the ;th and (;+ l)th key failures, 
the sequence is identified in the structure shown in figure 13 .18. 
lh key failure Nodell Node 21 ••• ~ 
.. !.......... .. .. ~.......... ...... rr .. '! .......... .. 
'" ... :::(f?) ~Ode "' ... :::~ ~Ode "' ... :::~ 
~ 21,., ~ ml,., 9' (i+l)th key failure 
(i+2)th key failure 
Figure 13.18 Sequence structure 
In the structure illustrated in figure 13.18, each node represents a key component failure, i.e. the 
event belonging to categories 1 or 2 in the path. Nodejk represents that the failure of component 
Cj occurs as the kth key failure. Each node has 3 pointers with one pointing at the next key 
component failure (solid vertical arrow), one pointing at the immediate preceding key failure 
(dotted vertical arrow), and the other pointing at the next possible component failure as this ;th 
key failure (horizontal arrow). Thus, between the ;th and (i+ l)th key failures, all possible 
sequences can be established as Node 1/ --+ Node 11/+1, Node I1 --+ Node 12/+1, ... , Node 1/ --+ 
Node Ik/+I, Node 2/ --+ Node 21/+1, Node 2/--+ Node 22/+1, ... , Node 2/ --+ Node 2k/+1, ... , Node 
m/ --+ Node m1i+1, Node ml --+ Node m2i+1, ... , Node m/ --+ Node mk/+I . By applying this 
sequence structure to account for all n key failures contained in the path, all possible sequences 
of all the key failures can be identified. 
In the process of establishing the sequence structure, all n key failures in the path are 
investigated one by one in the order from the first to the last. For the ;th key failure (i = 1, 2, ... , 
n), it needs first to identify which component failure can occur as this ;th key failure. Component 
failures which can occur as the key failure either come from duty component failures (from 
category 1) which have not been included in the sequence as previous key failures, or active 
failures of standby components (category 2) which have been activated by the first (i-I) failures 
in the sequence. Therefore, when i = 1, i.e. the first key failure is considered, the possible 
component failures can only be duty component failures as no standby component will have 
activated. To determine whether a standby component SCk has been activated and therefore is 
likely to fail as the ith key component failure (i > 1), one has to refer to the list structure 
established in procedure a) to see if this standby component has activated in the previous (i-I) 
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key failures. For example, if in the list structure, the node corresponding to the jth key failure (j < 
j) contains event se,s and SCk is the first available standby component to be activated, then the 
active failure of the standby component (SCkF) can then be accepted as the jth key failure. 
The algorithm for constructing the sequence structure for each path is shown in figure 13.19. 
lPathj with events categorized into 8 groups 
~defme structure sequence_node 
( defme variable e,; 
sequence_node *pl, *p2, *p3; 
INODE; 
* pi: pointing at next key failure; 
p2: pointing at other events for the failure; 
p3: pointing at the last key failure; 
*f 
Establish_sequence(pathj, list *h for pathj) 
( 
define variable count; 
define node structure NODE; 
NODE 'root; 
Initialize root; 
Root->p I =root->p2=root->p3=0; 
Count = 0; 
Identifyjailures(root, count, pathj, Oh); 
I 
dentify jailures(parent, count, pathj, list Oh) 
( 
NODE 'compare; 
while(each event k belonging to categories I or 2) 
( Compare=parent; 
While(compare!=NULL) 
( if( compare---+ek ~ event k) 
break; 
compare=compare---+p3 ; 
I 
if(compare==O) 
f* event k is not included in the sequence * f 
( defme variable add; 
add=O; 
if (event k belongs to category I) 
add=l; 
} 
else f' belonging to category 2 'f 
( Derme pointer 'comp; 
comp = oh; 
while(comp!=NULL) 
( If(comp---+i<=count)f' previous failures 'f 
If(the standby component gets activated 
in this key failure) 
Break; 
comp=compare4next; 
I 
if(comp!=O) 
add=l; 
I 
if(add) 
(NODE 'new_node; 
new _ node4 ek = event k; 
new _ node---+p I =0; 
new _ node---+p2=0; 
new _ node---+p3 =parent; 
If(parent---+pl ==0) 
Parent ---+p I =new _node; 
Else 
compare=parent---+p I; 
while(compare---+p2!=0) 
compare=compare->p2; 
compare---+p2=new _node; 
I 
I 
I 
compare=parent---+pl; 
while( compare!=O) 
(identifyjailures(compare, count+l, pathj, Oh); 
compare=compare---+p2; 
I 
Figure 13.19 Algorithm for constructing the sequence structure for each path 
Procedure c): is to calculate the probability of each sequence based on the list structure and 
sequence structure established in procedures a) and b). 
To illustrate how the integral is established for each sequence, the most simple situation is 
considered first, ~here n independent component failures occur. Of the n! sequences in which 
these n component failures can occur, one sequence is identified as Cl>C2> ... >Cn. This 
sequence probability over the time period [0, T) is then given in equation 13.6: 
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P[Sequence] = r fc,(s,) (fc,(s,) ... C fc.(s.)ds.ds'_I".ds,ds, 13.6 
where felt) is the probability density function for component failure Ck in the sequence. 
However, equation 13.6 is inappropriate when standby dependency is involved in the sequence. 
In this case, the probabilities of events which are included in the node (Figure 13.16) associated 
with each key component failure in the sequence, as well as the key component failure, need to 
be considered in relation to each other. Consider component failure ek as the k'h key failure in the 
sequence following the (k_l)th failure occurring at t=Sk.J, the probability that the kth failure occurs 
during the time period [Sk.h T), Pk(Sk-J, T), with other component states as indicated in the node 
corresponding to the kth failure, can be expressed in the integral form as: 
where: 
- fe, (t) is the probability density function for the kth key component failure ek; 
- elk) represents the standby failure event whose complement ;,- is included in the node 
(Figure 13.16) corresponding to the kth key failure; and [1-r fe,(k) (u)du ] gives the 
probability that the event elk) has not occurred by the time the kth failure ek occurs; 
- e,a(k) represents the active failure of the standby component following the activation 
with the complement e" included in the node corresponding to the kth key failure; and 
[1- 1: fe,,(k)(u-sk)du ] gives the probability that the standby component has not failed 
since its activation at t=Sk; 
- ea(k) represents the failure to activate the standby component as the event ea included in 
the node corresponding to the kth key failure, and n r fe,(k) (u)du gives the probability 
a 
that these failure events have occurred by the time the kth failure ek occurs at t=Sk; 
In equation 13.7, the probability density function fe,,(k)(t) for the active failure of the standby 
component is only applicable from the time it is activated, hence the time is adjusted to (U-Sk). In 
the same way, when the kth failure event ek is an active failure of a standby component, its 
probability density function also needs adjusting to fe, (Sk -ta), where ta i s the time that this 
standby component is activated. 
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The event e.(k) in equation 13.7 represents either the failure of the controlling component or the 
failure in standby of standby components. As the failure of the controlling component is always 
considered prior to the standby failures in the BDD construction (as dictated by the 
predetermined variable ordering), these two failure events will not be included in the same 
failure path, because when the controlling component is known to be failed, there is no need to 
investigate the availability of standby components. 
Event ec , which is also included in the node structure, is not considered in equation 13.7 as it 
represents the success of the controlling component through the system operation and thus can 
be quantified separately. 
As a whole, equation 13.7 gives the probability that the kth key failure occurs during the time 
period [Sk-J, T), and by the time the kth failure occurs, the controlling component or all standby 
components have failed (as in n r I.
o
(k)(u)du); or on its failure a standby component activates 
a 
(i.e. the standby component has not failed during [0, Sk) as in [1-r I.,(k) (u)du ]), and this 
standby component has not failed since its activation at Sk (as in [1- 1: I.
w
(k)(U -sk)du ]). 
When the event contained in the path is a module, the probability density function for the module 
is defined as: 
• 
!M(t) = L G" (F(t».I., (t) 13.8 
j=l 
where n is the number of components included in the module; f., (t) is the probability 
density function for basic event ei contained in the module; and G (F(t» is the 
., 
criticaIity function of basic event ei regarding the module at time t. 
Then the failure probability of a certain sequence of failures in the sequence structure can be 
obtained by substituting equation 13.7 into equation 13.6, with first key failure ek , occurring at 
SI during [0, T), 2nd ek2 occurring at S2 during [SI. T), ... , nth ekn occurring at Sn during [sn-I. T). 
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P[sequencej] = 
( f. .. (SI).[ 1- f 1.,(k1) (u)du l[l- [, 1.~(kl)(U -s,)du ll) f I..(kl)(u)du. 
[, f.., (S2).[I- r 1.,(k2)(u)du J.[ 1- (1. .. (k2)(U -s2)du lrr r 1..(k2)(u)du (. .. dsn ... ds, 13.9 
Q 
The path probability is then obtained as in equation 13.10: 
P[Path z1 = LP[Sequencej]. rr[l- (I..<t)dtl rr[l- (I.c (t)dt] 
J m k 
13.10 
where m and k respectively represent the number of events em and ec contained in the 
path which belong to categories 5 and 7 respectively. 
Step 7: obtain the system failure probability by summing up all the path probabilities. That is, 
Fsys(T) = LP[Path i] 13.11 
13.2.3.2 Application 
A safety system which features redundancy in its design is used to illustrate how the process 
described in the previous section is applied to evaluate the system reliability. The system is 
shown in figure 13.20. 
Pressure relief valve I 
r-----~Plr-----_Ckr----~ 
Pressure relief valve 2 
~----~P2r_----_{~------~ 
--------j ,.---------, 
, , 
, 'IV Pressure relief valve 3 
~----~P3r-----_Ckr----~ 
Pressure relief valve 4 
: -r-,--
!.. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ I 
Figure 13.20 Example safety system 
The system is composed of four pumps (PI - P4) as the key components to provide a water 
supply on demand. Pumps PI and P2 are pre-set duty pumps, and pumps P3 and P4 serve as the 
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warm-spare standby pumps. All four pumps are electric pumps, of which PI and P2 are powered 
by the electric supply I, and P3 and P4 by the electric supply 2. On each pump stream, a pressure 
relief valve is fitted to protect the pumps in the event that the line blocks. The pressure relief 
valve may fail open under normal pressure when the pump is operating, thus reducing the water 
supply. A controller is fitted in the system to detect the pressure drop in the outward distribution 
channel either due to the failure of the pump or the failure of the pressure relief valve in which 
case it activates the standby pumps P3 or P4. There is no maintenance carried out when the 
system is functioning. 
Step I: establish the fault tree structure. 
This is a 2-out-of-4 to function standby system which means that when 3-out-of-4 pumps fail, 
the system fails. The fault tree structure is constructed as shown in figure 13.21. 
pump 
stream I 
fails 
pump I Pressure Electric 
fails relief supply I 
valve I fails 
fails 
pump 
stream 2 
fails 
pump 2 Pressure Electric 
fails relief supply I 
valve 2 fails 
fails 
open 
pump stream 
3 fails to 
activate 
pump 
stream 3 
fails 
pump stream 
3 fails 
functioning 
pump 
stream 4 
fails 
pump 3 Electric Contrail 
fails in supply 2 er fails 
standby fails 
pump 3 fails Pressure Electric 
functioning relief supply 2 
valve 3 fails 
fails 
open 
V3 
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pump stream 
4 fails to 
activate 
pump 4 Electric Controll 
fails in supply 2 er fails 
standby fails 
pump stream 
4 fails 
functioning 
pump 4 fails Pressure Electric 
functioning relief supply 2 
val ve 3 fails 
fails 
Figure 13.21 Fault tree structure for example safety system 
Step 2: establish the component dependency information and failure data. As can be seen from 
the fault tree in figure 13.21, the standby dependency exists between basic events 'PI', 'P2' 
representing the failure of duty pumps and 'P3F', 'P4F' representing the active failure of standby 
pumps. fP1(t), fP2(t), !P3P(t), !P4P(t), !P3s(t), fP4s(t), fVl(t) - fvit), fe(t), fEl(t) and fElt) are 
established to define the failure times of relevant components. 
Step 3: simplification and modularization is carried out on the fault tree structure in figure 13.22. 
The following modules are obtained: 
MI =PI OR VI 
M3=P30R V3 
M2=P20R V2 
M4=P40RV4 
The modularized fault tree structure is shown in figure 13 .22. 
pump 
stream I 
fails 
Module Electric 
MI fails supply I 
fails 
pump 
stream 2 
fails 
Module Electric 
M2 fails supply I 
fails 
pump 
stream 3 
fails 
pump 3 Electric Controll Module 
fails in supply 2 er fails M3 fails 
standby fails 
pump 
stream 4 
fails 
pump 4 Electric Controll Module 
fails in supply 2 er fails M4 fails 
standby fails 
Figure 13.22 Modularized fault tree structure for example safety system 
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Step 4: construct BDDs for the modularized fault tree and identified modules. 
For the system BDD, the variable ordering is C > E2 > P3S > P4S > El > MI > M2 > M3 > M4. 
As the electric supply 2 is required for pump 3 or pump 4 to function and to activate, E2 is 
included in category 3 with regard to the variable ordering. This is because in terms of the 
standby components, the first consideration is always about whether they can activate in the first 
place. According to the variable ordering, the BDD for the system failure is shown in figure 
13.23. 
o 
Figure 13.23 BDD for the example safety system 
Step 5: obtain the paths leading to system failure in the system BDD, and divide the events 
contained in each path into the 8 categories as defined in table 13.2. Table 13.3 shows all BDD 
failure paths, and the number included in the bracket following each event represents the 
category number to which the event belongs. 
Path Paths expressed in categorized events Path Paths expressed in categorized events 
numbe numbe 
- - -C(3).EI(1) - -I 13 C (7). E2 (7).P3S(4). P4S (8). El (5). MI (5).M2(1).M4(2) 
2 C(3). El (5).MI(I) 14 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8).P4S(4).EI{I) 
3 C(3). El (5). MI (5).M2(1) 15 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8).P4S(4). El (5).MI (I).M2(1) 
4 C(7).E2(3).EI(I) 16 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8).P4S(4). El (5).MI(I). M2 (5).M3(2) 
5 C (7).E2(3). El (5).MI(I) 17 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8).P4S(4). El (5). MI (5).M2(1).M3(2) 
6 C(7).E2(3). EI(5).MI(5).M2(1) 18 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8).EI(I).M3(2) 
7 C(7). E2 (7).P3S(4).P4S(4).EI(I) 19 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8).EI(I). M3 (6).M4(2) 
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8 C(7). E2 (7).P3S(4).P4S(4). El (5).MI(l) 20 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8). El (5).MI(I).M2(I).M3(2) 
-
- - C(7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8). El (5).MI(l). 9 C (7). E2 (7).P3S(4).P4S(4). El (5). MI (5). 21 
-
M2(l) M2(l). M3 (6).M4(2) 
- - - C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8). El (5).MI(l). 10 C (7). E2 (7).P3S(4). P4S (8).EI(l) 22 
M2 (5).M3(2).M4(2) 
II C (7). E2 (7).P3S(4). P4S (8). El (5).MI(l). 23 C (7). E2 (7). P3S (8). P4S (8). El (5). MI (5). 
M2(l) M2(l ):M3(2).M4(2) 
12 C (7). E2 (7).P3S(4). P4S (8). El (5).MI(I). 
-
M2 (5).M4(2) 
Table 13.3 Paths WIth categonzed events In the BDD for example system 
Step 6: calculate the probability of each path. 
Procedure a): establish the list structure for each path. Take for example path 20 in table 13.3, its 
list structure is shown in figure 13.24. 
om key failure I" key failure 2"" key failure 3" key failure 
-
-.J 
- - -
C, E2 C, E2 -
P3S P4S -
- - -
- - Null 
Figure 13.24 List structure for path 20 in table 13.8 
As can be seen, the total number of key failures in this path is 3 CM1, M2, M3). When the first 
key failure occurs, the system examines each standby component in turn. As the controller C and 
the electric power supply E2 are both working and pump 3 has not failed in standby, pump 3 is 
activated. Then in the second key failure, as pump 3 has activated in response to previous 
failures, the availability of pump 4 is investigated. Again, as the controller C and the electric 
power supply E2 are both working and pump 4 has not failed in standby, pump 4 is activated. 
For the third failure, as both standby pumps have activated previously, no standby pump is 
available. 
Procedure b): Establish the sequence structure for each path by following the algorithm in figure 
13.18. The sequence structure for this path is shown in figure 13.25. 
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1" key failure 
Root node 
"f ______ _ 
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, 
, 
, " 
---
, ' 
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---
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, 
, 
, 
, " 
, ' ~
H H 
1
113
1 ~ 
Figure 13.25 Sequence structure for path 20 in table 13.8 
Four sequences of key component failures can be identified from the sequence structure in figure 
13.26 for path 20 as MI~M2~M3, MI~M3~M2, M2~MI~M3, M2~M3~MJ. 
Procedure c): Calculate the probability of each sequence in the path according to equation 13.8. 
Take for example path 20, the probability of each sequence expressed in the form of integral is 
obtained as follows: 
Sequence 1: MI, M2, M3 
P[sequence I] = 
f iMt(St)[I- r i P3S (x)dx J( iM2(S2)[I-r iP4S(X)dxJ [, i M3 (S3 -st)ds3ds2dst 
Sequence 2: MI, M3, M2 
P[sequence 2] = 
f iMt(St)[I- r i P3S (x)dx J( i M3 (S2 -St)[l-r iP4s(x)dx ] [, iM2(S3)ds3ds2dst 
Sequence 3: M2, MI, M3 
P [sequence 3] = 
f iM2(St)[I-r i P3S (x)dx J( i Mt (S2)[I- r ipdX)dxJ [, i M3 (S3 -st)ds3ds2dst 
Sequence 4: M2, M3, MI 
P[sequence 4] = 
( iM2(St)[I- r iP3S(x)dx ] ( iM3(S2 -St>[l-r iP4s(x)dxJ [, iMt(S3)ds3ds2dst 
where: 
iMl(t) = GPJ(F(t»fPJ(t) + GVJ(F(t»fVJ(t) 
= [l-F Vl(t)].fpl(t) + [l-F PJ(t)].fVl(t) 
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= [1- {fn(u)du ].fPl(t) + [1- {fp,(u)du ].fVl(t) 
fM2(t) = [1- {fV2(U)du J.fP2(t) + [1- {fP2(u)du J.fV2(t) 
fM3(t) = [1- {fv,(u)du ].fp3(t) + [1- {fp3(U)du ].fV3(t) 
fM4(t) = [1- {fV4(U)du J.fP4(t) + [1- {fP4(u)du ]·fV4(t) 
Then calculate the path probability according to equation 13.1 O. 
In path 20, events El, C and E2 belong to categories 5 and 7 and are quantified separately 
from events of other categories. According to equation 13.1 0: 
p[path20]=tp[sequence i].[l- f fE,(u)du ].[1- f fc(u)du ].[1- f fE2(U)du ] 
Step 7: calculate the system failure probability according to equation 13.11. 
23 
Fsys(T) = LP(Path i] 
i::l 
13.2.4 Dependency Modelling for Stress-related Dependency 
Systems which involve, what is here tenned, the stress-related dependency feature a parallel 
system structure with n sub-systems operating at the same time. I t is assumed that the output 
from the system required to satisfy the specific demand is at least m-out-of-n parallel subsystems 
functioning nonnally. The system therefore fails when k-out-of-n subsystems fail (where k = n-
m+ 1). The typical configuration of each subsystem is composed of one key component, which 
provides the essential system function, and passive supporting components, such as a power 
supply, pipework and valves etc., which enable the key component to function. Some of the 
supporting components can bel exclusive to the specific subsystem, while other supporting 
components may be common to more than one subsystem. 
The stress-related dependency arises when only p (m ::;, p < n) subsystems are functioning. The 
failure of the (n-p) subsystems means that the working load of the functioning part of the system 
will have to increase to meet the required output. This consequently puts extra loading on the 
working elements and increases their failure rates. The variable failure rates experienced by the 
key components mean that the failure probability of the key components cannot be modelled 
over the whole system functioning period [0, T) since its probability density function is 
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dependent upon the perfonnance of other components. For a k-out-of-n to fail parallel system, k 
probability density functions have to be defined for each key component corresponding to 
situations where 0, 1, ... , k-l subsystems have failed. Then with respect to the system failure, i.e. 
k subsystem failures, the failure probability of the key components is investigated over k separate 
periods of time [0, (1), [I], (2), ... , [h.]' T) using the appropriate probability density functions. The 
start of each of the periods of time is marked with the failure of another subsystem. 
The following section describes the general process of using a BDO to analyse parallel systems 
featuring the stress-related dependency. 
13.2.4.1 Generic Process 
A general parallel system is used to illustrate how the analysis proceeds using the BOO method. 
The system consists of n parallel subsystems and fails when k subsystems fail. 
Step 1: Represent the System Failure Logic. 
Establish the fault tree structure to represent the system failure. Figure 13.26 displays the fault 
tree representation for the failure of a parallel system with the general features described above 
for the stress-related dependency. 
Key 
component 1 
fails 
Exclusive 
Supporting 
component 
1 fails 
Common 
Supporting 
component 
Key Exclusive 
component n Supporting 
fails component 
n fails 
Common 
Supporting 
component 
where: the basic event SSj, represents the failure of the ith supporting component exclusive to 
the subsystem j; the basic event CSj _i represents the failure of the supporting component which is 
common to subsystemsj,j+l, ... , i. 
Figure 13.26 General fault tree structure for parallel system 
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Step 2: Establish Component Failure Data. 
Establish the dependency and basic event data for the developed fault tree. In the system, the 
stress-related dependency existing between the n key components gives rise to a statistical 
dependency. In terms of the stress-related dependency, information is required such as the total 
number of components involved, the name of the relevant basic events and the number of 
situations which need to be considered with respect to the probability density functions for each 
key component. In the general k-out-of-n system, k situations are considered where the number 
of failed subsystems increase from ° to k-l. 
The basic event data is also required to account for the influence of the stress-related 
dependency. For the basic event KCi (I ::; i ::; n) in figure 13.26, which represents the component 
failure involved in the stress-related dependency, k probability density functions f~c;(u), 
fic;(u) , ... , f:~:(u) are defined which correspond to situations where 0, 1, ... , k-l subsystems 
have failed respectively. 
Step 3: Fault Tree Modularisation 
Carry out the simplification and modularization process on the fault tree structure. In this 
process, the failure of key components (KC1, ... , KCn,) can be combined with its own 
functionally supporting component (SS 1;, ... , SSnj) to form a module. 
Step 4: System BDD Construction 
Construct the system BDD based on the modularized fault tree structure, and the BDDs for each 
identified module. The modified left-right top-down method is adopted to decide the variable 
ordering in the process of the BDD construction. 
Step 5: System Failure Mode Identification 
Identify all disjoint paths for the system BDD leading to the system failure (i.e. terminal node 
'1 '), and categorize the events contained in each path into 4 groups: category 1 includes events 
which represent key component failures or failure of modules which contain key components, 
i.e. failures involved in stress-related dependency; category 2 includes events which represent 
the failure of supporting components; category 3 and category 4 are similar to categories 1 and 2, 
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but contain the success of a component/module through the system functioning period, i.e. the 
non-occurrence of the corresponding events contained in categories 1 and 2 respectively. 
Step 6: Failure Mode Quantification 
System quantification requires the calculation of the probability of each path to a terminal '1' 
state on the BOO. In this process, the sequence of the component failures will need to be taken 
into account when events belonging to category 1 are included in the path. This is illustrated 
through a simple system which contains two parallel components PI and P2. The system fails 
when both of the components fail. The stress-related dependency exists between PI and P2 as 
the failure rate of either PI or P2 increases when the other component fails. The corresponding 
path identified from the BOO constructed for the system is Pl.P2. Both of the two events belong 
to category 1, and two sequences can be identified with respect to the occurrence of the two 
events as illustrated in figure 13.27. 
• 
PI fails at time s 
• 
<E---P2 does not fail __ 7) 
during [0, s) 
P2 fails at time s 
• • 
~l does not fail __ :;.) 
during [0, s) 
• 
P2 fails at time t during 
[s, T) at a higher rate 
Sequence I 
• 
PI fails at time t at 
a higher rate 
Sequence 2 
Figure 13.27 Two sequences of component failures in the simple parallel system 
• 
T 
• 
T 
The probability that the system fails with components PI and P2 failing in sequence I is given in 
equation 13.12: 
P[sequence 1] = (/:I(S)[I- 1/:2(U)du J[[ /~2(t-S)dtJdS 13.12 
In equation 13.12, the event that component P2 has not failed prior to PI has to be investigated 
separately from the event that component P2 fails after PI does. This is because no continuous 
probability density function can be defined for component P2 over the whole system operating 
duration [0, T). Instead, two probability density functions, /:2(U) and /~2(U), are defined for 
component P2, of which /:2(U) applies when both components are working and 
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[1-r t;2(U)dU] gives the probability that component P2 does not fail during [0, s), and t~2(U) 
applies when component PI has failed and r t~2(t-s)dt gives the conditional probability that 
component P2 fails following the failure of PI during [s, T). Since the probability density 
function t~2(U) is not applicable until component PI has failed, the time parameter is adjusted to 
(t-s). 
In the same way, the probability that the system fails with PI and P2 failing in sequence 2 is 
obtained in equation 13.13. 
P[sequence 2] = (t;2(S)[1- r t;,(u)du] [ r t;,(t-s)dt ]dS 13.13 
Finally, the path probability can be obtained as the sum of the two sequence probabilities. 
To determine the system failure probability, it is also necessary to account for the sequence of 
failure events in category 1 and category 2. Considering the general fault tree in figure 13.27, 
when events KCi and CSk-j (i ~ [k,j]) are both included in a BDD path, consideration needs to be 
given to the sequence of the occurrence of these two events. When the event CSk-j occurs prior to 
the event KCi, the probability density function which is used to obtain the failure probability of 
KCi would be different from when the sequence of occurrence is reversed. This is because the 
occurrence of the event CSk-j would result in the failure of (j-k+1) subsystems and consequently 
the moment when the event CSk-j occurs in relation to the event KCi will determine which 
probability density function for KCi would apply. 
When events belonging to category 3 are included in the path together with events of categories 
1 or 2, the probability of the path must be calculated considering all of the events at the same 
time to account for the dependency. Take for example the general fault tree in figure 13.27, 
assume that one path which occurs in the BDD is KC1.KC2 ..... KCi .. ... KC(k+ 1) (1 :s; i :s; k), 
which features the event KCi from category 3, and the other k events belonging to category 1. 
Considering the event KCi, whichever sequence is under investigation, the probability P[ KCi] 
cannot be obtained separately as the probability density function for KCi varies as the number 
of failed subsystems increases. The correct way to account for the event KCi in the sequence 
probability is to consider separate periods of time over which the number of subsystem failures is 
known. Consider the situation where the events occur in a sequence KC1>KC2> ... >KC(i-
1»KC(i+1» ... >KC(k+1) as illustrated in figure 13.28: 
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0 S, S, SkMl Sk T 
• • • • • • • 
KC! KC2 KCk KC(k+l) 
fails fails fails fails 
< ) < ) ( ) < ) 
KC2 - KC(k+!) workKC3 - KC(k+l) work KCi and KC(k+l) work KCiworks 
between [0, SI) between [SII S2) between [Sk.', Sk.') between [S1_h S1) 
Figure 13 .28 Illustration for equation 13.13 
In this sequence, the probability that the key component KCi does not fail during the system 
operation is evaluated over separate periods of time [Sj-I. Sj) (j = I, 2, ... , k as k component 
failures are required for the system to fail), which are determined by the moment when each key 
component failure KCj occurs. That is, the event KCi is considered over periods of time which 
represent that the component KCi does not fail prior to the first subsystem failure, KCi does not 
fail between the first and second subsystem failure, ... , does not fail between the (k-I )th and the 
kth subsystem failure. Accordingly, the sequence probability expressed in the integral form can 
be obtained in equation 13.14. 
P [sequence] = 
13.14 
In calculating the path probability, whichever sequence is under investigation, the events which 
belong to category 4 can always be quantified independently because a continuous probability 
density function can be defined for each of these events over the whole system operation 
duration [0, T). 
When the key component failure event is included in a module along with its supporting 
component failure events, the probability density function for the resulting module also varies as 
the number of failed subsystems increases. If a module Mj consists of key component failure 
event KCj and the event representing the failure of its supporting component SSj, then the 
probability density function for module Mj with ns subsystem having already failed (0 $ ns $ k-I) 
is obtained as shown in equation 13.15. 
f/:Q (t) = GKq(F(t)).[fKCj(t) I ns subsystems have failed] + 
Gss/F(t)).rlss/t) I ns subsystems have failed] 
= GKC}(F(t)).f;cit) + GS'ii(F(t)).f~(t) 
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= (1- {f~(U)du).f;c/t) + (1- {f;q(U)dU).!;.fi(t) 
= (1- {fssj(U)du).!:c/t) + (1- {f:c/u)du).!SSj(t) 13.15 
where G(F(t» is the criticality function for each component with respect to the failure of 
moduleMj. 
Consequently, to obtain the path probability, it requires an exhaustive list of all possible 
sequences of the events in the path. The probability for each sequence can then be calculated. 
The following procedures are used for the probability evaluation: 
Procedure (a): this procedure will judge whether the sequence of events needs to be considered. 
When events which belong to categories I and 3 are contained in the path, different sequences of 
event occurrence will need to be identified. 
Procedure (b): determines the path probability based on the outcome of procedure (a). 
If procedure (a) has identified that the sequence of failures is not important: the path only 
contains events representing supporting component failures in the system, such as SSji and CSj _i 
in figure 13.27, and none of the events is involved in the stress-related dependency. In this case, 
the path probability is given by the product of the probability of each individual event in the path 
as shown in equation 13 .16. 
P[Path] = I1QE,n[I-QEJ 
I j 
13.16 
where i and j represent the number of events which belong to categories 2 and 4 
respectively; and QE, = r fE, (u)du . 
If procedure (a) has identified the necessity to account for the event sequence: in this case, the 
path probability is equal to the sum of all sequence probabilities. To identify all the possible 
sequences contained in the path and obtain the correct probability for each sequence, the process 
continues with procedures (c) and (d). 
Procedure (c): A structure is defined to generate all the possible sequences contained in a 
specific path. The structure is constructed by considering events which belong to categories 1 
and 2. The algorithm underlying the construction of the structure is similar to that represented in 
figure 13.18. Each node represents an event included in the path which belongs to category 1 or 
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2. An additional piece of information is also included in each node which is the number of 
subsystem failures resulting from the specific component failure represented by the node. Each 
node has 3 pointers, one points at the next component failure in the sequence, one points at the 
immediately preceding component failure in the sequence, and the last one points at the 
component failure which can be an alternative to the current component failure and appear in the 
same place in the sequence. Assume that events Cl, C2, ... , Ck are events included in a path 
which belong to categories I and 2. Figure 13 .29 displays the sequence structure for this series of 
events. nI. n2, ... , ni, ... , nk contained in each node in the figure represent the number of 
subsystem failures resulting from each corresponding component failure event Cl, C2, ... , Ci, Ck 
respectively. 
----
---- --------
--.. -------
--.. ------
--- ----
--.. -------
--.. ----
Cl (nl) >--------------+(-- C2(n2) .. ~.~~-----~~k(nkD 
, 
"'~::_-_-_-_------- .. :4--- ___ _ 
........... --------
..--' ........ - ~.~---;~k (nki) 
-... ~ 
where the solid-line vertical pointer points at the next failure event in the sequence; the dotted-
line vertical pointer points at the immediately preceding event in the sequence; and the 
horizontal pointer points at an alternative failure in the same place in the sequence. 
Figure 13.29 Illustration of the sequence structure 
A situation may arise where the same subsystem failures can result from different component 
failures. For example, a component failure event Cj results in the failure of subsystems Sm, Sn 
and Sp, and another component failure Ci results in the failure of subsystems Sp, Sr and Sy. In this 
case, when events Cj and Ci are both included in a path for which the sequence structure needs to 
be constructed, the number nj or nl included in nodes Cj or Ci would need to be adjusted 
appropriately dependent upon which event appears later in the sequence. If the event Ci occurs 
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after Cj in the sequence, the value ofn/ will be set as '2' instead of'3' as the failure of subsystem 
Sp has already been accounted for when the event Cj occurs. 
Figure 13.30 shows the algorithm for constructing the sequence structure. 
Path P, including events El, E2 .... , Ej which belong to categories I or 2 
Node structure 
{ 
Event_name NE; No. of subsystem failures n,; 
Pointer pi, p2. p3; f* pi pointing at the next event in the sequence; p2 pointing at the alternative event in the 
sequence; p3 pointing at the preceding event in the sequence * f 
} 
Construct_sequences(Pi) new_node~NE = Ek; 
( Establish root node Root; new_node~n, = judging from fault tree; 
Root~NE = Null; new_node~pl = new_node~p2=0; 
Root~ns=O; new _ node~p3 = root; 
Root~pl = Root~p2 = Root~p3 = 0; If(head = = 0) 
Sub _ contstruct(Root, P,) head = new_node; 
Return(Root); root~pl = new_node; 
} end = new_node; 
else 
Sub _ construct(root, P,) end~p2 = new_node; 
{ Define pointer p _ wk; end = new_node; 
Define pointer head = 0, end = 0; } 
while( ... Ek ... ) f* I ,;, k ,;,j*f } 
(p_wk = root; If(head != 0) 
while(p_wk!=O) Sub _ construct(head, Pi); 
{ If(p_wk~NE = = Ek) p _ wk = root~p2; 
Break; while(p_wk!= 0) 
p_wk=p_wk~p3; ( Sub _ construct(p _ wk, Pi); 
} p_wk=p_wk~p2; 
If(p_wk = = 0) f* has not appeared in the sequence *f } 
{Establish new_node; } 
Figure 13.30 Algorithm for construct the sequence structure for stress-related dependency 
Procedure (d): evaluates the probability of each sequence using the sequence structure. The 
sequence probability is expressed in integral form using the appropriate probability density 
functions for the failure times of events contained in the sequence. In figure 13.30, assume that 
the event Ci contained in the first sequence (left-hand vertical branch) represents a component 
failure which is involved in the stress-related dependency, i.e. belonging to category I. It 
therefore features a varying probability density function dependent upon the number of 
subsystem failures. In the specific sequence, by tracing the upward pointer from node Ci to 
identify the preceding event in the sequence, , it can be seen that by the time the component Ci 
fails, (n,+n2+ ... +n/.,) subsystems have failed due to the occurrence of the failure events Cl, C2, 
... , Ci-I, and 1;"+"'+"'+"'-' (u) is the correct probability density function for component Ci to be 
used for this specific sequence. Also as the ith failure in the sequence, it means that component 
Ci has not failed when the previous (i-I) component failures occur. The non-occurrence of the 
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failure event needs to be accounted for at the time of the other failures as shown in equation 
13.14. 
The approach suggested above produces a sequence which contains only events which belong to 
categories 1 and 2. The process also needs to be able to account for events in category 3. 
Equation 12.14 displays how events belonging to category 3 are integrated with events of 
category 1 or 2. Assume that a path includes events Cl, C2, ... , Ck which belong to categories 1 
--- -- -
or 2, events El, E2, ... , Ej which belong to category 3 and DI, D2, ... , Dm which belong to 
category 4. For the specific sequence Cl~C2~ ... ~Ck, its probability can then be expressed in 
the integral fonn as in equation 13.17. 
P[sequence] = 
0[1-r fDP(u)du J. r f~I(SI)D[I-l' f~p(u)du HJ[I-l' f~(u)du ] 
r' 1 nk [ f' 1 ] nj [ f' 1 ] rT k-I J"fC2(S,-SI)p=3 1- ,fC/U-SI)du ·P=I 1- ,fE/U-SI)du · .. J,._/Ck (Sk-Sk_l) 
n[l- t/;/(U-Sk_l)du YSkdsk_I ... ds,dSI 
p:l 
13.17 
All sequence probabilities can then be obtained according to the algorithm underlying equation 
13.17. Finally, the probability for a specific path is obtained by adding up all sequence 
probabilities. 
Step 7: calculate the system failure probability according to equation 13.11. 
13.2.4.2 Application 
A parallel safety system which involves the stress-related dependency is used to illustrate how 
the generic process described above is applied to evaluate the system reliability. The system is 
shown in figure 13.31. 
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Pressure relief valve I 
.-----~Plr-----_D~----_. 
Pressure relief valve 2 
~----~P2~----~~r-----~ 
Pressure relief valve 3 
~----~P3r-----_D~----~ 
Pressure relief valve 4 
~----~P4~----~~r-----~ 
Figure 13.31 Example parallel safety system 
The system is composed of four pumps (PI - P4) as the key components to provide a water 
supply on demand. Pumps PI and P2 are electric powered and pumps P3 and P4 are powered by 
a diesel supply. On each pump stream, a pressure relief valve is fitted to protect the pumps in the 
event of line blockage. The pressure relief valve may fail open under normal pressure when the 
pump is operating, thus reducing the water supply. The system starts with all four pumps 
operating. When one or two streams fail, the work load on the pumps on the functioning streams 
will increase to ensure that the water supplied should still satisfy the demand. This results in 
higher failure rates of the pumps. The system fails when 3-out-of-4 streams fail. There is no 
maintenance carried out when the system is functioning. 
Step I: Develop the fault tree structure for the system shown in figure 13.31. Figure 13.32 
displays the fault tree representation of the system failure logic. 
pump 
stream I 
fails 
pump I Pressure Electric 
fails relief supply I 
valve I fails 
fails 
pump 
stream 2 
fails 
pump 2 Pressure Electric 
fails relief supply I 
valve 2 fails 
fails 
open 
V2 
pump 
stream 3 
fails 
pump 3 fails Pressure Electric 
functioning relief supply 2 
valve 3 fails 
fails 
open 
pump 
stream 4 
fails 
pump 3 fails Pressure Electric 
functioning relief supply 2 
valve 3 fails 
fails 
open 
Figure 13.32 Fault tree structure for the parallel system 
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Step 2: Establish the dependency and basic event infonnation required. 
Since the example system is a 3-out-of-4 to fail redundant system, 3 probability density 
functions, f:,(t), f~,(t) and fi.(t) (I :s; i :s; 4), have to be defined for pumps PI - P4 which are 
involved in the stress-related dependency. Each of the probability density functions corresponds 
to the three situations where all pumps are functioning (i.e. no pump has failed), one pump has 
failed and two pumps have failed. 
Step 3: carry out the simplification and modularization process on the fault tree structure. In this 
process, four modules are identified as: 
MI = PI + VI; M2 = P2 + V2; M3 = P3 + V3; M4 = P4 + V4. 
Step 4: construct the system BOO based on the modularized fault tree structure. Figure 13.33 
shows the BOO constructed on the variable ordering ES>OS>MI>M2>M3>M4. The left and 
right branch of each node correspond to 'I' and '0' respectively, representing the occurrence and 
non-occurrence of the event. 
o 
I 0 
Figure 13.33 BOO constructed for the parallel system 
Step 5: identify disjoint paths leading to the system failure from the BOO shown in figure 13.33. 
Categorization of the events contained in each path is also carried out in this step. Table 13.4 
displays all the paths of the BOO which cause the fault tree top event. The number in the bracket 
following each event is the category to which the event belongs. 
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Pathnumbe Paths exoressed in categorized events Pathnumbe Paths expressed in categorized events 
- -1 ES(2).OS(2) 6 ES (4). OS (4).MI (1).M2(I).M3(1) 
2 ES(2). OS (4).M3(1) 7 ES (4). OS (4).MI(I).M2(1). M3 (3).M4(1) 
- - - - -3 ES(2). OS (4). M3(3).M4(1) 8 ES(4). OS (4).MI(I). M2 (3).M3(1).M4(1 
4 ES (4).OS(2).MI(I) 9 ES(4). OS (4). MI (3).M2(1).M3(1).M4(1) 
- -5 ES(4).OS(2). MI (3).M2(1) 
Table 13.4 Identified paths resultmg m the system faIlure 
Step 6: calculate the probability of each path shown in table 13.4. Of the 9 paths in table 13.4, 
only path I does not include any event which belong to categories I or 3. This means that for 
path 1 the sequence of events does not need to be taken into consideration and its probability can 
be obtained according to equation 13.16 as: 
P[path I] = f fES(u)duJ fDS(u)du 
All other 8 paths contain events which belong to categories 1 or 3, and as such procedures (c) 
and (d) will be followed to identify all the possible sequences for each path and calculate the 
sequence probabilities. This is demonstrated considering paths 3 and 7 in table 13.4. 
In path 3, the event DS belongs to category 4 and therefore can be quantified separately. A 
sequence structure is constructed based on events ES and M4 as shown in figure 13.34. 
Figure 13.34 Sequence structure for path 3 in table 13.4 
The event M3 will be considered with respect to each component failure in both of the 
sequences shown in figure 13.34. The probability of the two sequences ES~M4 and M4~ES 
, 
are: 
P[sequence I] = f fEs(SI)[I- r f~3(U)du ].[1-r f~4(U)dU] J: f~4(S2 -SI) 
[1- f.' f~3(U-sI)du ]dS2dsl .[I- f fDS(U)du] 
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P[ sequence 2] = 
(f~4(SI)[I- rf~3(U)du Jr fES(S2)[I- r fit3(U-S1)duJdS2dsl .[I- (fDS(u)du J 
where: 
f~ill\t) = Gp3 (F(t)).fljl/2(t) + Gv3 (F(t)).fV3 (t) 
= [1- 1 f v3(U)du ].fljl/2(t) + [1- 1fl;1I2(U)du ].fV3(t) 
f~11\t) = Gp4 (F(t)).fl2 /2 (t) + Gv4 (F(t)).fv4(t) 
= [1-1 fV4(u)du ].fl;1I2(t) + [1- 1fl;1I2(U)du ].fV4(t) 
The probability of path 3 can then be obtained as: 
P[path 3] = P[sequence I] + P[sequence 2] 
For path 7, events ES and DS are quantified separately. The sequence structure based on 
events MI, M2 and M4 is shown in figure 13.35. 
Figure 13.35 Sequence structure for path 7 in table 13.4 
Six sequences are contained in the sequence structure in figure 13.35. Take for example 
sequence I, MI--+M2--+M4, its probability is: 
P[sequence I] = 
( f~I(SI)D[I-r f~(u)du JJ: fit2(S2 -SI)IJ[I-r f~(U-Sl)du J [, f~4(S3 -S2) 
[1- r:f~3(U-S2)duJdS3dS2dSl.[I- (fES(u)du].[I- (fDS(U)duJ 
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The probability for other sequences can be obtained according to the same algorithm, and the 
path probability can then be obtained. 
Step 7: obtain the system failure probability according to equation l3.l!. 
9 
Fsys(T) = .LP[Path i] 
;=1 
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Chapter 14. Conclusions and Further Work 
14.1 Summary 
Dependency relationships between components in a system render the fault tree analysis (FTA) 
and its efficient implementation, the BDD approach, inappropriate in predicting the system 
failure probability. Consequently, the Markov method is used to assess systems which involve 
dependencies. 
The applicability of the Markov analysis is restricted by the state-space explosion problem which 
may arise for large systems. To solve this problem, a process has been established where a fault 
tree is used to represent the system failure logic and the smallest independent sections (modules) 
which contain each dependency are identified and analysed by the best method. Thus, BDD and 
the Markov analysis are applied in a combined way to improve the analysis efficiency. The BDD 
method is applied to modules which contain no dependency, and the Markov analysis applied to 
modules in which dependencies exist. 
Different types of dependency which can arise in an engineering system assessment were 
identified in this research as below. Different algorithms for establishing a Markov model were 
also developed for each type of dependency. 
• Maintenance dependency 
• Standby dependency 
• Sequential dependency 
• Sequence-enforcing dependency 
• Secondary-failure dependency 
• Initiator-enabler dependency 
• Revealing dependency 
• Test dependency 
• Functional dependency 
• Switching dependency 
Three types of system were investigated in this research in the context of dependency modelling, 
the continuously-operating system, the active-on-demand system and the phased-mission system. 
For the analysis of continuously-operating systems, quantification is carried out over a specified 
period of time assuming that the system starts with all components operational. System 
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availability and failure intensity at specific time points can be obtained as well as the expected 
number of system failures. 
The analysis of active-on-demand systems, such as safety/protection systems, requires both the 
system availability and reliability to be evaluated. This type of system resides in a standby state 
during which time some component failures may still occur, and is required to react when a 
particular hazardous event happens. The static-dynamic two-phase approach has been developed 
for the analysis of active-on-demand systems. This approach identifies the causes of system 
unavailability and unreliability separately by developing fault trees for each type of failure. The 
system unavailability is obtained by quantifying the static-phase fault tree. To obtain the system 
unreliability, all possible states are identified from which the system is able to activate, and the 
quantification is carried out over the dynamic phase using the Markov method. 
For phased-mission systems, a modified phase algebra method was developed to enable the 
analysis of both non-repairable and repairable systems which involve dependencies. A mission 
BDD is constructed and failure modes for each phase can be derived. Depending on whether 
dependency exists or the repair is carried out during the phase, it is determined whether the BDD 
approach or the Markov method applies to the phase analysis. The system failure probability in 
each phase as well as the mission unreliability are obtained. 
A further attempt to improve the efficiency of dependency modelling was carried out in this 
research by investigating the use of BDD in assessing non-repairable systems involving 
dependencies. Four types of dependency were studied: the initiator-enabler dependency, the 
sequential dependency, the standby dependency, and the stress-related dependency. General 
processes have been established for each type of dependency to carry out the quantification. 
Figure 14.\ provides a complete picture of the thesis by highlighting the connection between 
each chapter as well as the contribution in each chapter. 
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Figure 14.1 Illustration of the thesis structure and contributions 
14.2 Conclusions 
• The identification of smallest dependency modules proves to be effective in improving 
the efficiency as well as applicability of the Markov analysis for large systems. 
• Typical types of dependency are identified and their characteristics are captured in the 
process of constructing the Markov model 
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• For the active-on-demand systems, the static-dynamic two-phase approach distinguishes 
between different causes to the system failure in standby and in operation, and enables 
the calculation of both system unavailability and unreliability. 
• For phased-mission systems, the modified phase algebra method identifies each possible 
failure mode for each individual phase throughout the mission BDD. The Markov 
analysis applies when dependencies or repair are involved in the phase, otherwise, the 
BDD approach applies. This improves the analysis efficiency. 
• For non-repairable systems involving dependencies, the BDD approach offers an 
alternative to the Markov method. It is able to account for dependency relationships 
through the integral representation of system failure probability. 
14.3 Further Work 
• To look into how the BDD approach can be applied to repairable systems involving 
dependencies 
• To write program codes to enable the quantification of non-repairable systems with 
dependencies using the BDD approach; and compare the efficiency of the approach with 
the Markov method 
• To carry out the comparison between the Markov method and the Bayesian Belief 
Network (BBN) with respect to dealing with dependencies 
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Appendix A Markov Model for Module in Chapter 8 
Module Module 
State no. M6005 e8 M6003 e5 e6 ell State State no. M6005 e8 M6003 e5 e6 ell State 
STATE I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 STATE 91 0 I 0 0 I 3 I 
STATE 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 STATE 92 0 I 0 0 I 1 1 
STATE 3 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 STATE 93 0 I 0 0 3 I I 
STATE 4 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 STATE 94 0 2 I I 3 0 I 
STATE 5 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 STATE 95 0 2 I I 0 3 I 
STATE 6 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 STATE 96 0 0 I I I 0 I 
STATE? 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 STATE9? 0 0 I I 3 3 I 
STATE 8 I I 0 0 0 0 0 STATE 98 0 0 I I 0 I 0 
STATE 9 I 0 I 0 0 0 0 STATE 99 0 0 I 0 I 3 0 
STATE 10 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 STATE lOO 0 0 I 0 1 I 0 
STATE 11 I 0 0 0 3 0 I STATE 101 0 0 I 0 3 I 0 
STATE 12 I 0 0 0 0 3 I STATE \02 0 2 0 I I 0 I 
STATE 13 0 I I 0 0 0 0 STATE \03 0 2 0 I 3 3 I 
STATE 14 0 I 0 2 0 0 0 STATE \04 0 2 0 I 0 I I 
STATE 15 0 I 0 0 3 0 I STATE \05 0 0 0 I I 3 0 
STATE 16 0 I 0 0 0 3 I STATE 106 0 0 0 I I I 0 
STATE I? 0 0 I I 0 0 0 STATE \O? 0 0 0 I 3 I 0 
STATE 18 0 0 I 0 3 0 0 STATE 108 I I I 2 3 0 I 
STATE 19 0 0 I 0 0 3 0 STATE \09 I I I 2 0 3 I 
STATE 20 0 2 0 I 0 0 0 STATE lIO I I I 0 I 0 I 
STATE 21 0 0 0 I 3 0 0 STATE 111 I I I 0 3 3 I 
STATE 22 0 0 0 I 0 3 0 STATE 112 I I I 0 0 I I 
STATE 23 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 STATE 113 I I 0 2 I 0 I 
STATE 24 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 STATE 114 I I 0 2 3 3 I 
STATE 25 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 STATE 115 I I 0 2 0 I I 
STATE 26 I I I 0 0 0 0 STATE 116 I I 0 0 I 3 I 
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STATE 27 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 STATE 117 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
STATE 28 1 1 0 0 3 0 1 STATE 118 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 
STATE 29 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 STATE 119 1 2 1 1 3 0 1 
STATE 30 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 STATE 120 1 2 1 1 0 3 1 
STATE 31 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 STATE 121 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
STATE 32 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 STATE 122 1 0 1 1 3 3 1 
STATE 33 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 STATE 123 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
STATE 34 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 STATE 124 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 
STATE 35 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 STATE 125 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
STATE 36 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 STATE 126 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 
STATE 37 1 0 0 0 3 3 1 STATE 127 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 
STATE 38 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 STATE 128 1 2 0 1 3 3 1 
STATE 39 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 STATE 129 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 
STATE 40 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 STATE 130 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 
STATE 41 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 STATE 131 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
STATE 42 0 1 0 2 3 0 1 STATE 132 1 0 0 1 3 1 1 
STATE 43 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 STATE 133 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 
STATE 44 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 STATE 134 0 1 1 2 3 3 1 
STATE 45 0 1 0 0 3 3 1 STATE 135 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 
STATE 46 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 STATE 136 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 
STATE 47 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 STATE 137 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
STATE 48 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 STATE 138 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 
STATE 49 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 STATE 139 0 1 0 2 1 3 1 
STATE 50 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 STATE 140 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
STATE 51 0 0 1 0 3 3 0 STATE 141 0 1 0 2 3 1 1 
STATE 52 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 STATE 142 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 
STATE 53 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 STATE 143 0 2 1 1 3 3 1 
STATE 54 0 2 0 1 0 3 1 STATE 144 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 
STATE 55 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 STATE 145 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 
STATE 56 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 STATE 146 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
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STATE 57 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 STATE 147 0 0 I I 3 I I 
STATE 58 0 0 0 0 I 3 0 STATE 148 0 2 0 I I 3 I 
STATE 59 0 0 0 0 I I 0 STATE 149 0 2 0 I I I I 
STATE 60 0 0 0 0 3 I 0 STATE 150 0 2 0 I 3 I I 
STATE 61 I I I 2 0 0 0 STATE 151 I I I 2 I 0 I 
STATE 62 I I I 0 3 0 I STATE 152 I I I 2 3 3 I 
STATE 63 I I I 0 0 3 I STATE 153 I I I 2 0 I I 
STATE 64 I I 0 2 3 0 I STATE 154 I I I 0 I 3 I 
STATE 65 I I 0 2 0 3 I STATE 155 I I I 0 I I I 
STATE 66 I I 0 0 I 0 I STATE 156 I I I 0 3 I I 
STATE 67 I I 0 0 3 3 I STATE 157 I I 0 2 I 3 I 
STATE 68 I I 0 0 0 I I STATE 158 I I 0 2 I I I 
STATE 69 I 2 I I 0 0 0 STATE 159 I I 0 2 3 I I 
STATE 70 I 0 I I 3 0 I STATE 160 I 2 I I I 0 I 
STATE 71 I 0 I I 0 3 I STATE 161 I 2 I I 3 3 I 
STATE 72 I 0 I 0 I 0 I STATE 162 I 2 I I 0 I I 
STATE 73 I 0 I 0 3 3 I STATE 163 I 0 I I I 3 I 
STATE 74 I 0 I 0 0 I I STATE 164 I 0 I I I I I 
STATE 75 I 2 0 I 3 0 I STATE 165 I 0 I I 3 I I 
STATE 76 I 2 0 I 0 3 I STATE 166 I 2 0 I I 3 I 
STATE 77 I 0 0 I I 0 I STATE 167 I 2 0 I I I I 
STATE 78 I 0 0 I 3 3 I STATE 168 I 2 0 I 3 I I 
STATE 79 I 0 0 I 0 I I STATE 169 0 I I 2 I 3 I 
STATE 80 I 0 0 0 I 3 I STATE 170 0 I I 2 I I I 
STATE 81 I 0 0 0 I I I STATE 171 0 I I 2 3 I I 
STATE 82 I 0 0 0 3 I I STATE 172 0 2 I I I 3 I 
STATE 83 0 I I 2 3 0 I STATE 173 0 2 I I I I I 
STATE 84 0 I I 2 0 3 I STATE 174 0 2 I I 3 I I 
STATE 85 0 I I 0 I 0 I STATE 175 I I I 2 I 3 I 
STATE 86 0 I I 0 3 3 I STATE 176 I I I 2 I I I 
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STATE 87 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 STATE 177 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
STATE 88 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 STATE 178 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 
STATE 89 0 1 0 2 3 3 1 STATE 179 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
STATE 90 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 STATE 180 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 
Table A.I States In the Markov model of module 6008 
From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition 
rate rate rate rate rate 
State 1 State 2 6005 State 35 State 71 6003 State 70 State 121 0 State 106 State 146 6003 State 142 State 172 11 
State 1 State 3 8 State 35 State 12 -5 State 70 State 122 11 State 106 State 59 -5 State 143 State 161 6005 
State 1 State 4 6003 State 35 State 78 6 State 71 State 49 -6005 State 106 State 57 -6 State 143 State 103 -6003 
State 1 State 5 5 State 35 State 79 0 State 71 State 120 8 State 106 State 55 -11 State 143 State 86 -5 
State 1 State 6 6 State 36 State 23 -6005 State 71 State 35 -6003 State 107 State 132 6005 State 143 State 173 0 
State 1 State 7 11 State 36 State 66 8 State 71 State 32 -5 State 107 State 150 8 State 143 State 174 0 
State 2 State 1 -6005 State 36 State 72 6003 State 71 State 122 6 State 107 State 147 6003 State 144 State 162 6005 
State 2 State 8 8 State 36 State 77 5 State 71 State 123 0 State 107 State 60 -5 State 144 State 104 -6003 
State 2 State 9 6003 State 36 State 2 -6 State 72 State 50 -6005 State 107 State 106 0 State 144 State 87 -5 
State 2 State 10 5 State 36 State 80 11 State 72 State 110 8 State 107 State 21 -11 State 144 State 174 6 
State 2 State 11 6 State 37 State 24 -6005 State 72 State 36 -6003 State 108 State 83 -6005 State 144 State 47 -11 
State 2 State 12 11 State 37 State 67 8 State 72 State 121 5 State 108 State 70 -8 State 145 State 163 6005 
State 3 State 8 6005 State 37 State 73 6003 State 72 State 9 -6 State 108 State 64 -6003 State 145 State 172 8 
State 3 State 1 -8 State 37 State 78 5 State 72 State 124 11 State 108 State 151 0 State 145 State 105 -6003 
State 3 State 13 6003 State 37 State 81 0 State 73 State 51 -6005 State 108 State 152 11 State 145 State 99 -5 
State 3 State 14 5 State 37 State 82 0 State 73 State III 8 State 109 State 84 -6005 State 145 State 49 -6 
State3 State 15 6 State 38 State 25 -6005 State 73 State 37 -6003 State 109 State 71 -8 State 145 State 146 0 
State 3 State 16 11 State 38 State 68 8 State 73 State 122 5 State 109 State 65 -6003 State 146 State 164 6005 
State 4 State 9 6005 State 38 State 74 6003 State 73 State 125 0 State 109 State 152 6 State 146 State 173 8 
State 4 State 13 8 State 38 State 79 5 State 73 State 126 0 State 109 State 153 0 State 146 State 106 -6003 
State 4 State 1 -6003 State 38 State 82 6 State 74 State 52 -6005 State 110 State 85 -6005 State 146 State 100 -5 
State 4 State 17 5 State 38 State 2 -11 State 74 State 112 8 State 110 State 72 -8 State 146 State 98 -6 
State 4 State 18 6 State 39 State 61 6005 State 74 State 38 -6003 State 110 State 66 -6003 State 146 State 96 -11 
State 4 State 19 11 State 39 State 17 -8 State 74 State 123 5 State 110 State 151 5 State 147 State 165 6005 
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State 5 State 10 6005 State 39 State 14 -6003 State 74 State 126 6 State 110 State 26 -6 State 147 State 174 8 
State 5 State 20 8 State 39 State 83 6 State 74 State 9 -11 State 110 State 154 11 State 147 State 107 -6003 
State 5 State 17 6003 State 39 State 84 11 State 75 State 53 -6005 State III State 86 -6005 State 147 State 101 -5 
State 5 State 1 -5 State 40 State 62 6005 State 75 State 119 6003 State 111 State 73 -8 State 147 State 146 0 
State 5 State 21 6 State 40 State 18 -8 State 75 State 28 -5 State III State 67 -6003 State 147 State 48 -11 
State 5 State 22 11 State 40 State 15 -6003 State 75 State 127 0 State III State 152 5 State 148 State 166 6005 
State 6 State 11 6005 State 40 State 83 5 State 75 State 128 11 State 111 State 155 0 State 148 State 172 6003 
State 6 State 15 8 State 40 State 85 0 State 76 State 54 -6005 State 111 State 156 0 State 148 State 91 -5 
State 6 State 18 6003 State 40 State 86 11 State 76 State 120 6003 State 112 State 87 -6005 State 148 State 54 -6 
State 6 State 21 5 State 41 State 63 6005 State 76 State 29 -5 State 112 State 74 -8 State 148 State 149 0 
State 6 State 23 0 State 41 State 19 -8 State 76 State 128 6 State 112 State 68 -6003 State 149 State 167 6005 
State 6 State 24 11 State 41 State 16 -6003 State 76 State 129 0 State 112 State 153 5 State 149 State 173 6003 
State 7 State 12 6005 State 41 State 84 5 State 77 State 55 -6005 State 112 State 156 6 State 149 State 92 -5 
State 7 State 16 8 State 41 State 86 6 State 77 State 127 8 State 112 State 26 -11 State 149 State 104 -6 
State 7 State 19 6003 State 41 State 87 0 State 77 State 121 6003 State 113 State 88 -6005 State 149 State 102 -11 
State 7 State 22 5 State 42 State 64 6005 State 77 State 36 -5 State 113 State 77 -8 State 150 State 168 6005 
State 7 State 24 6 State 42 State 21 -8 State 77 State 10 -6 State 113 State 151 6003 State 150 State 174 6003 
State 7 State 25 0 State 42 State 83 6003 State 77 State 130 11 State 113 State 27 -6 State 150 State 93 -5 
State 8 State 3 -6005 State 42 State 88 0 State 78 State 56 -6005 State 113 State 157 11 State 150 State 149 0 
State 8 State 2 -8 State 42 State 89 11 . State 78 State 128 8 State 114 State 89 -6005 State 150 State 53 -11 
State 8 State 26 6003 State 43 State 65 6005 State 78 State 122 6003 State 114 State 78 -8 State 151 State 133 -6005 
State 8 State 27 5 State 43 State 22 -8 State 78 State 37 -5 State 114 State 152 6003 State 151 State 121 -8 
State 8 State 28 6 State 43 State 84 6003 State 78 State 131 0 State 114 State 158 0 State 151 State 113 -6003 
State 8 State 29 11 State 43 State 89 6 State 78 State 132 0 State 114 State 159 0 State 151 State 61 -6 
State 9 State 4 -6005 State 43 State 90 0 State 79 State 57 -6005 State 115 State 90 -6005 State 151 State 175 11 
State 9 State 26 8 State 44 State 66 6005 State 79 State 129 8 State 115 State 79 -8 State 152 State 134 -6005 
State 9 State 2 -6003 State 44 State 23 -8 State 79 State 123 6003 State 115 State 153 6003 State 152 State 122 -8 
State 9 State 30 5 State 44 State 85 6003 State 79 State 38 -5 State 115 State 159 6 State 152 State 114 -6003 
State 9 State 31 6 State 44 State 88 5 State 79 State 132 6 State 115 State 27 -11 State 152 State 176 0 
State 9 State 32 11 State 44 State 3 -6 State 79 State 10 -11 State 116 State 91 -6005 State 152 State 177 0 
State 10 State 5 -6005 State 44 State 91 11 State 80 State 58 -6005 State 116 State 80 -8 State 153 State 135 -6005 
State 10 State 33 8 State 45 State 67 6005 State 80 State 116 8 State 116 State 154 6003 State 153 State 123 -8 
State 10 State 30 6003 State 45 State 24 -8 State 80 State 124 6003 State 116 State 157 5 State 153 State 115 -6003 
State 10 State 2 -5 State 45 State 86 6003 State 80 State 130 5 State 116 State 29 -6 State 153 State 177 6 
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State 10 State 34 6 State 45 State 89 5 State 80 State 12 -6 State 116 State 117 0 State 153 State 61 -11 
State 10 State 35 11 State 45 State 92 0 State 80 State 81 0 State 117 State 92 -6005 State 154 State 136 -6005 
State 11 State 6 -6005 State 45 State 93 0 State 81 State 59 -6005 State 117 State 81 -8 State 154 State 124 -8 
State 11 State 28 8 State 46 State 68 6005 State 81 State 117 8 State 117 State 155 6003 State 154 State 116 -6003 
State 11 State 31 6003 State 46 State 25 -8 State 81 State 125 6003 State 117 State 158 5 State 154 State 175 5 
State 11 State 34 5 State 46 State 87 6003 State 81 State 131 5 State 117 State 68 -6 State 154 State 63 -6 
State II State 36 0 State 46 State 90 5 State 81 State 38 -6 State 117 State 66 -11 State 154 State 155 0 
State 11 State 37 II State 46 State 93 6 State 81 State 36 -11 State 118 State 93 -6005 State 155 State 137 -6005 
State 12 State 7 -6005 State 46 State 3 -11 State 82 State 60 -6005 State 118 State 82 -8 State 155 State 125 -8 
State 12 State 29 8 State 47 State 69 6005 State 82 State 118 8 State 118 State 156 6003 State 155 State 117 -6003 
State 12 State 32 6003 State 47 State 20 -6003 State 82 State 126 6003 State 118 State 159 5 State 155 State 176 5 
State 12 State 35 5 State 47 State 13 -5 State 82 State 132 5 State 118 State 117 0 State 155 State 112 -6 
State 12 State 37 6 State 47 State 94 6 State 82 State 81 0 State 118 State 28 -11 State 155 State 110 -11 
State 12 State 38 0 State 47 State 95 11 State 82 State 11 -11 State 119 State 94 -6005 State 156 State 138 -6005 
State 13 State 26 6005 State 48 State 70 6005 State 83 State 108 6005 State 119 State 75 -6003 State 156 State 126 -8 
State 13 State 4 -8 State 48 State 94 8 State 83 State 48 -8 State 119 State 62 -5 State 156 State 118 -6003 
State 13 State 3 -6003 State 48 State 21 -6003 State 83 State 42 -6003 State 119 State 160 0 State 156 State 177 5 
State 13 State 39 5 State 48 State 18 -5 State 83 State 133 0 State 119 State 161 11 State 156 State 155 0 
State 13 State 40 6 State 48 State 96 0 State 83 State 134 11 State 120 State 95 -6005 State 156 State 62 -11 
State 13 State 41 11 State 48 State 97 11 State 84 State 109 6005 State 120 State 76 -6003 State 157 State 139 -6005 
State 14 State 27 6005 State 49 State 71 6005 State 84 State 49 -8 State 120 State 63 -5 State 157 State 130 -8 
State 14 State 5 -8 State 49 State 95 8 State 84 State 43 -6003 State 120 State 161 6 State 157 State 175 6003 
State 14 State 39 6003 State 49 State 22 -6003 State 84 State 134 6 State 120 State 162 0 State 157 State 65 -6 
State 14 State 42 6 State 49 State 19 -5 State 84 State 135 0 State 121 State 96 -6005 State 157 State 158 0 
State 14 State 43 11 State 49 State 97 6 State 85 State 1 \0 6005 State 121 State 160 8 State 158 State 140 -6005 
State 15 State 28 6005 State 49 State 98 0 State 85 State 50 -8 State 121 State 77 -6003 State 158 State 131 -8 
State 15 State 6 -8 State 50 State 72 6005 State 85 State 44 -6003 State 121 State 72 -5 State 158 State 176 6003 
State 15 State 40 6003 State 50 State 85 8 State 85 State 133 5 State 121 State 30 -6 State 158 State 115 -6 
State 15 State 42 5 State 50 State 23 -6003 State 85 State 13 -6 State 121 State 163 11 State 158 State 113 -11 
State 15 State 44 0 State 50 State 96 5 State 85 State 136 11 State 122 State 97 -6005 State 159 State 141 -6005 
State 15 State 45 11 State 50 State 4 -6 State 86 State 111 6005 State 122 State 161 8 State 159 State 132 -8 
State 16 State 29 6005 State 50 State 99 11 State 86 State 51 -8 State 122 State 78 -6003 State 159 State 177 6003 
State 16 State 7 -8 State 51 State 73 6005 State 86 State 45 -6003 State 122 State 73 -5 State 159 State 158 0 
State 16 State 41 6003 State 51 State 86 8 State 86 State 134 5 State 122 State 164 0 State 159 State 64 -11 
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State 16 State 43 5 State 51 State 24 -6003 State 86 State 137 0 State 122 State 165 0 State 160 State 142 -6005 
State 16 State 45 6 State 51 State 97 5 State 86 State 138 0 State 123 State 98 -6005 State 160 State 127 -6003 
State 16 State 46 0 State 51 State lOO 0 State 87 State 112 6005 State 123 State 162 8 State 160 State 110 -5 
State 17 State 30 6005 State 51 State 101 0 State 87 State 52 -8 State 123 State 79 -6003 State 160 State 69 -6 
State 17 State 47 8 State 52 State 74 6005 State 87 State 46 -6003 State 123 State 74 -5 State 160 State 178 11 
State 17 State 5 -6003 State 52 State 87 8 State 87 State 135 5 State 123 State 165 6 State 161 State 143 -6005 
State 17 State 4 -5 State 52 State 25 -6003 State 87 State 138 6 State 123 State 30 -11 State 161 State 128 -6003 
State 17 State 48 6 State 52 State 98 5 State 87 State 13 -11 State 124 State 99 -6005 State 161 State 111 -5 
State 17 State 49 11 State 52 State 101 6 State 88 State 113 6005 State 124 State 154 8 State 161 State 179 0 
State 18 State 31 6005 State 52 State 4 -11 State 88 State 55 -8 State 124 State 80 -6003 State 161 State 180 0 
State 18 State 40 8 State 53 State 75 6005 State 88 State 133 6003 State 124 State 163 5 State 162 State 144 -6005 
State 18 State 6 -6003 State 53 State 94 6003 State 88 State 14 -6 State 124 State 32 -6 State 162 State 129 -6003 
State 18 State 48 5 State 53 State 15 -5 State 88 State 139 11 State 124 State 125 0 State 162 State 112 -5 
State 18 State 50 0 State 53 State 102 0 State 89 State 114 6005 State 125 State 100 -6005 State 162 State 180 6 
State 18 State 51 11 State 53 State 103 11 State 89 State 56 -8 State 125 State 155 8 State 162 State 69 -11 
State 19 State 32 6005 State 54 State 76 6005 State 89 State 134 6003 State 125 State 81 -6003 State 163 State 145 -6005 
State 19 State 41 8 State 54 State 95 6003 State 89 State 140 0 State 125 State 164 5 State 163 State 178 8 
State 19 State 7 -6003 State 54 State 16 -5 State 89 State 141 0 State 125 State 74 -6 State 163 State 130 -6003 
State 19 State 49 5 State 54 State 103 6 State 90 State 115 6005 State 125 State 72 -11 State 163 State 124 -5 
State 19 State 51 6 State 54 State 104 0 State 90 State 57 -8 State 126 State 101 -6005 State 163 State 71 -6 
State 19 State 52 0 State 55 State 77 6005 State 90 State 135 6003 State 126 State 156 8 State 163 State 164 0 
State 20 State 33 6005 State 55 State 102 8 State 90 State 141 6 State 126 State 82 -6003 State 164 State 146 -6005 
State 20 State 47 6003 State 55 State 96 6003 State 90 State 14 -11 State 126 State 165 5 State 164 State 179 8 
State 20 State 3 -5 State 55 State 23 -5 State 91 State 116 6005 State 126 State 125 0 State 164 State 131 -6003 
State 20 State 53 6 State 55 State 5 -6 State 91 State 58 -8 State 126 State 31 -11 State 164 State 125 -5 
State 20 State 54 11 State 55 State 105 11 State 91 State 136 6003 State 127 State 102 -6005 State 164 State 123 -6 
State 21 State 34 6005 State 56 State 78 6005 State 91 State 139 5 State 127 State 160 6003 State 164 State 121 -11 
State 21 State 53 8 State 56 State 103 8 State 91 State 16 -6 State 127 State 66 -5 State 165 State 147 -6005 
State 21 State 48 6003 State 56 State 97 6003 State 91 State 92 0 State 127 State 33 -6 State 165 State 180 8 
State 21 State 6 -5 State 56 State 24 -5 State 92 State 117 6005 State 127 State 166 11 State 165 State 132 -6003 
State 21 State 55 0 State 56 State 106 0 State 92 State 59 -8 State 128 State 103 -6005 State 165 State 126 -5 
State 21 State 56 11 State 56 State 107 0 State 92 State 137 6003 State 128 State 161 6003 State 165 State 164 0 
State 22 State 35 6005 State 57 State 79 6005 State 92 State 140 5 State 128 State 67 -5 State 165 State 70 -11 
State 22 State 54 8 State 57 State 104 8 State 92 State 46 -6 State 128 State 167 0 State 166 State 148 -6005 
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State 22 State 49 6003 State 57 State 98 6003 State 92 State 44 -11 State 128 State 168 0 State 166 State 178 6003 
State 22 State 7 -5 State 57 State 25 -5 State 93 State 118 6005 State 129 State 104 -6005 State 166 State 116 -5 
State 22 State 56 6 State 57 State 107 6 State 93 State 60 -8 State 129 State 162 6003 State 166 State 76 -6 
State 22 State 57 0 State 57 State 5 -11 State 93 State 138 6003 State 129 State 68 -5 State 166 State 167 0 
State 23 State 36 6005 State 58 State 80 6005 State 93 State 141 5 State 129 State 168 6 State 167 State 149 -6005 
State 23 State 44 8 State 58 State 91 8 State 93 State 92 0 State 129 State 33 -11 State 167 State 179 6003 
State 23 State 50 6003 State 58 State 99 6003 State 93 State 15 -11 State 130 State 105 -6005 State 167 State 117 -5 
State 23 State 55 5 State 58 State 105 5 State 94 State 119 6005 State 130 State 166 8 State 167 State 129 -6 
State 23 State I -6 State 58 State 7 -6 State 94 State 53 -6003 State 130 State 163 6003 State 167 State 127 -11 
State 23 State 58 11 State 58 State 59 0 State 94 State 40 -5 State 130 State 80 -5 State 168 State 150 -6005 
State 24 State 37 6005 State 59 State 81 6005 State 94 State 142 0 State 130 State 35 -6 State 168 State 180 6003 
State 24 State 45 8 State 59 State 92 8 State 94 State 143 11 State 130 State 131 0 State 168 State 118 -5 
State 24 State 51 6003 State 59 State 100 6003 State 95 State 120 6005 State 131 State 106 -6005 State 168 State 167 0 
State 24 State 56 5 State 59 State 106 5 State 95 State 54 -6003 State 131 State 167 8 State 168 State 75 -11 
State 24 State 59 0 State 59 State 25 -6 State 95 State 41 -5 State 131 State 164 6003 State 169 State 175 6005 
State 24 State 60 0 State 59 State 23 -11 State 95 State 143 6 State 131 State 81 -5 State 169 State 145 -8 
State 25 State 38 6005 State 60 State 82 6005 State 95 State 144 0 State 131 State 79 -6 State 169 State 139 -6003 
State 25 State 46 8 State 60 State 93 8 State 96 State 121 6005 State 131 State 77 -11 State 169 State 84 -6 
State 25 State 52 6003 State 60 State 101 6003 State 96 State 142 8 State 132 State 107 -6005 State 169 State 170 0 
State 25 State 57 5 State 60 State 107 5 State 96 State 55 -6003 State 132 State 168 8 State 170 State 176 6005 
State 25 State 60 6 State 60 State 59 0 State 96 State 50 -5 State 132 State 165 6003 State 170 State 146 -8 
State 25 State 1 -11 State 60 State 6 -11 State 96 State 17 -6 State 132 State 82 -5 State 170 State 140 -6003 
State 26 State 13 -6005 State 61 State 39 -6005 State 96 State 145 11 State 132 State 131 0 State 170 State 135 -6 
State 26 State 9 -8 State 61 State 30 -8 State 97 State 122 6005 State 132 State 34 -11 State 170 State 133 -11 
State 26 State 8 -6003 State 61 State 27 -6003 State 97 State 143 8 State 133 State 151 6005 State 171 State 177 6005 
State 26 State 61 5 State 61 State 108 6 State 97 State 56 -6003 State 133 State 96 -8 State 171 State 147 -8 
State 26 State 62 6 State 61 State 109 11 State 97 State 51 -5 State 133 State 88 -6003 State 171 State 141 -6003 
State 26 State 63 II State 62 State 40 -6005 State 97 State 146 0 State 133 State 39 -6 State 171 State 170 0 
State 27 State 14 -6005 State 62 State 31 -8 State 97 State 147 0 State 133 State 169 11 State 171 State 83 -11 
State 27 State 10 -8 State 62 State 28 -6003 State 98 State 123 6005 State 134 State 152 6005 State 172 State 178 6005 
State 27 State 61 6003 State 62 State 108 5 State 98 State 144 8 State 134 State 97 -8 State 172 State 148 -6003 
State 27 State 64 6 State 62 State 110 0 State 98 State 57 -6003 State 134 State 89 -6003 State 172 State 136 -5 
State 27 State 65 11 State 62 State III 11 State 98 State 52 -5 State 134 State 170 0 State 172 State 95 -6 
State 28 State 15 -6005 State 63 State 41 -6005 State 98 State 147 6 State 134 State 171 0 State 172 State 173 0 
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State 28 State II -8 State 63 State 32 -8 State 98 State 17 -1\ State 135 State 153 6005 State 173 State 179 6005 
State 28 State 62 6003 State 63 State 29 -6003 State 99 State 124 6005 State 135 State 98 -8 State 173 State 149 -6003 
State 28 State 64 5 State 63 State 109 5 State 99 State 136 8 State 135 State 90 -6003 State 173 State 137 -5 
State 28 State 66 0 State 63 State III 6 State 99 State 58 -6003 State 135 State 171 6 State 173 State 144 -6 
State 28 State 67 11 State 63 State 112 0 State 99 State 145 5 State 135 State 39 -11 State 173 State 142 -11 
State 29 State 16 -6005 State 64 State 42 -6005 State 99 State 19 -6 State 136 State 154 6005 State 174 State 180 6005 
State 29 State 12 -8 State 64 State 34 -8 State 99 State 100 0 State 136 State 99 -8 State 174 State 150 -6003 
State 29 State 63 6003 State 64 State 108 6003 State lOO State 125 6005 State 136 State 91 -6003 State 174 State 138 -5 
State 29 State 65 5 State 64 State 1\3 0 State lOO State 137 8 State 136 State 169 5 State 174 State 173 0 
State 29 State 67 6 State 64 State 1\4 1\ State 100 State 59 -6003 State 136 State 41 -6 State 174 State 94 -1\ 
State 29 State 68 0 State 65 State 43 -6005 State 100 State 146 5 State 136 State 137 0 State 175 State 169 -6005 
State 30 State 17 -6005 State 65 State 35 -8 State lOO State 52 -6 State 137 State 155 6005 State 175 State 163 -8 
State 30 State 69 8 State 65 State 109 6003 State lOO State 50 -1\ State 137 State lOO -8 State 175 State 157 -6003 
State 30 State 10 -6003 State 65 State 1\4 6 State 101 State 126 6005 State 137 State 92 -6003 State 175 State 109 -6 
State 30 State 9 -5 State 65 State 115 0 State 101 State 138 8 State 137 State 170 5 State 175 State 176 0 
State 30 State 70 6 State 66 State 44 -6005 State 101 State 60 -6003 State 137 State 87 -6 State 176 State 170 -6005 
State 30 State 71 1\ State 66 State 36 -8 State 101 State 147 5 State 137 State 85 -1\ State 176 State 164 -8 
State 31 State 18 -6005 State 66 State 110 6003 State 101 State lOO 0 State 138 State 156 6005 State 176 State 158 -6003 
State 31 State 62 8 State 66 State 113 5 State 101 State 18 -1\ State 138 State 101 -8 State 176 State 153 -6 
State 31 State 11 -6003 State 66 State 8 -6 State 102 State 127 6005 State 138 State 93 -6003 State 176 State 151 -11 
State 31 State 70 5 State 66 State 116 11 State 102 State 142 6003 State 138 State 171 5 State 177 State 171 -6005 
State 31 State 72 0 State 67 State 45 -6005 State 102 State 44 -5 State 138 State 137 0 State 177 State 165 -8 
State 31 State 73 11 State 67 State 37 -8 State 102 State 20 -6 State 138 State 40 -1\ State 177 State 159 -6003 
State 32 State 19 -6005 State 67 State 1\ I 6003 State 102 State 148 II State 139 State 157 6005 State 177 State 176 0 
State 32 State 63 8 State 67 State 1\4 5 State 103 State 128 6005 State 139 State 105 -8 State 177 State 108 -11 
State 32 State 12 -6003 State 67 State 1\ 7 0 State 103 State 143 6003 State 139 State 169 6003 State 178 State 172 -6005 
State 32 State 71 5 State 67 State 1\8 0 State 103 State 45 -5 State 139 State 43 -6 State 178 State 166 -6003 
State 32 State 73 6 State 68 State 46 -6005 State 103 State 149 0 State 139 State 140 0 State 178 State 154 -5 
State 32 State 74 0 State 68 State 38 -8 State 103 State 150 0 State 140 State 158 6005 State 178 State 120 -6 
State 33 State 20 -6005 State 68 State 112 6003 State 104 State 129 6005 State 140 State 106 -8 State 178 State 179 0 
State 33 State 69 6003 State 68 State 115 5 State 104 State 144 6003 State 140 State 170 6003 State 179 State 173 -6005 
State 33 State 8 -5 State 68 State 118 6 State 104 State 46 -5 State 140 State 90 -6 State 179 State 167 -6003 
State 33 State 75 6 State 68 State 8 -11 State 104 State 150 6 State 140 State 88 -1\ State 179 State 155 -5 
State 33 State 76 II State 69 State 47 -6005 State 104 State 20 -1\ State 141 State 159 6005 State 179 State 162 -6 
395 
State 34 State 21 -6005 State 69 State 33 -6003 State 105 State 130 6005 State 141 State 107 -8 State 179 State 160 -11 
State 34 State 75 8 State 69 State 26 -5 State 105 State 148 8 State 141 State 171 6003 State 180 State 174 -6005 
State 34 State 70 6003 State 69 State 119 6 State \05 State 145 6003 State 141 State 140 0 State 180 State 168 -6003 
State 34 State 11 -5 State 69 State 120 11 State \05 State 58 -5 State 141 State 42 -11 State 180 State 156 -5 
State 34 State 77 0 State 70 State 48 -6005 State 105 State 22 -6 State 142 State 160 6005 State 180 State 179 0 
State 34 State 78 11 State 70 State 119 8 State \05 State \06 0 State 142 State 102 -6003 State 180 State 119 -11 
State 35 State 22 -6005 State 70 State 34 -6003 State \06 State 131 6005 State 142 State 85 -5 
State 35 State 76 8 State 70 State 31 -5 State 106 State 149 8 State 142 State 47 -6 
. . . . .. Note: the transItIon rate represented by the name of basIc event stands for the correspondmg conditIonal failure rate; the transitIOn rate represented by 
'-' followed by the basic event name stands for the condition repair rate. 
Table A.2 State transitions in the Markov model of module 6008 
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Appendix B Quantification Models for Modules in Chapter 9 
BDD for module 7012 
BDD for module 7014 
BDD for module 7006 
1 0 
BDD for module 7015 
BDD for module 7019 
Figure B.l BDD for modules containing no dependency relationship (referring to figure 9.6) 
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Figure B.2 Reduced Markov models for module 7001, 7007 -7010 
State no. IVI5 IVI6 CV6 Module State State no. !V15 IVI6 CV6 Module State State no. IVI5 IVI6 CV6 Module State 
STATE I 0 0 0 0 STATE 13 I 2 0 I STATE 25 I 3 2 I 
STATE 2 3 0 0 I STATE 14 3 3 3 I STATE 26 2 0 I I 
STATE 3 0 3 0 I STATE 15 I 0 2 I STATE 27 2 I 0 I 
STATE 4 0 0 3 I STATE 16 3 0 I I STATE 28 3 I 3 I 
STATE 5 I 0 0 I STATE 17 3 I 0 I STATE 29 3 I 2 I 
STATE 6 3 3 0 I STATE 18 0 I 3 I STATE 30 0 2 I I 
STATE 7 3 0 3 I STATE 19 0 I 2 I STATE 31 2 2 I I 
STATE 8 0 I 0 I STATE 20 0 3 I I STATE 32 2 3 I I 
STATE 9 0 3 3 I STATE 21 I 3 3 I STATE 33 2 I 3 I 
STATE 10 0 0 I I STATE 22 I 2 3 I STATE 34 2 I 2 I 
STATE 11 I 3 0 I STATE 23 I 2 2 1 STATE 35 3 2 1 1 
STATE 12 I 0 3 1 STATE 24 3 3 1 1 
Table B.l States mcluded m the Markov model for module 7011 (refemng to figure 9.6) 
From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition 
rate rate rate rate 
STATE I STATE 2 IVI5 STATE 8 STATE I -!V16 STATE 16 STATE 24 IVI6 STATE 25 STATE 20 -IVI5 
STATE I STATE 3 IVI6 STATE 8 STATE 18 CV6 STATE 16 STATE 2 -CV6 STATE 25 STATE 23 0 
STATE I STATE 4 CV6 STATE 9 STATE 14 !V15 STATE 17 STATE 27 0 STATE 26 STATE 32 IVI6 
STATE 2 STATE 5 0 STATE 9 STATE 19 0 STATE 17 STATE 2 -IVI6 STATE 26 STATE 5 -CV6 
STATE 2 STATE 6 IVI6 STATE 9 STATE 20 0 STATE 17 STATE 28 CV6 STATE 27 STATE 5 -IVI6 
STATE 2 STATE 7 CV6 STATE \0 STATE 16 IVI5 STATE 18 STATE 28 IVI5 STATE 27 STATE 33 CV6 
STATE 3 STATE 6 IVI5 STATE \0 STATE 20 IVI6 STATE 18 STATE 4 -IVI6 STATE 28 STATE 34 0 
STATE 3 STATE 8 0 STATE 10 STATE 1 -CV6 STATE 18 STATE 19 0 STATE 28 STATE 7 -IVI6 
STATE 3 STATE 9 CV6 STATE 11 STATE 3 -IVI5 STATE 19 STATE 29 IVI5 STATE 28 STATE 29 0 
STATE 4 STATE 7 IVI5 STATE 11 STATE 13 0 STATE 19 STATE 10 -IVI6 STATE 29 STATE 34 0 
STATE 4 STATE 9 IVI6 STATE 11 STATE 21 CV6 STATE 20 STATE 24 IVI5 STATE 29 STATE 16 -IVI6 
STATE 4 STATE 10 0 STATE 12 STATE 4 -IVI5 STATE 20 STATE 30 0 STATE 30 STATE 35 IVI5 
STATE 5 STATE I -IVI5 STATE 12 STATE 21 IVI6 STATE 20 STATE 3 -CV6 STATE 30 STATE 8 -CV6 
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STATE 5 STATE 11 IVI6 STATE 12 STATE 15 0 STATE 21 STATE 9 -IVI5 STATE 31 STATE 13 -CV6 
STATE 5 STATE 12 CV6 STATE 13 STATE 8 -IVI5 STATE 21 STATE 23 0 STATE 32 STATE 31 0 
STATE 6 STATE 13 0 STATE 13 STATE 22 CV6 STATE 21 STATE 25 0 STATE 32 STATE 11 -CV6 
STATE 6 STATE 14 CV6 STATE 14 STATE 23 0 STATE 22 STATE 18 -IVI5 STATE 33 STATE 12 -IVI6 
STATE 7 STATE 15 0 STATE 14 STATE 24 0 STATE 22 STATE 23 0 STATE 33 STATE 34 0 
STATE 7 STATE 14 IVI6 STATE 15 STATE 10 -IVI5 STATE 23 STATE 19 -IVI5 STATE 34 STATE 15 -IVI6 
STATE 7 STATE 16 0 STATE 15 STATE 25 IVI6 STATE 24 STATE 31 0 STATE 35 STATE 31 0 
STATE 8 STATE 17 IVI5 STATE 16 STATE 26 0 STATE 24 STATE 6 -CV6 STATE 35 STATE 17 -CV6 
.. Table B.2 State transItIons mcluded m the Markov model for module 7011 (refemng to figure 9.6) 
The states included in the Markov model for module 7017 and 70 IS are identical to the states included in the Markov model for module 7011. The state 
transitions included in the Markov model for these two modules are identical to each other since basic events included in the modules all have same 
inspection interval. State transitions included in the Markov model for these two modules are displayed in table B.S. 
From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition From To Transition 
rate rate fate rate 
STATE I STATE 2 INB STATE 8 STATE I -SB STATE 16 STATE 26 NB STATE 25 STATE 31 NB 
STATE I STATE 3 SB STATE 8 STATE 17 NB STATE 17 STATE 26 INB STATE 26 STATE 32 0 
STATE I STATE 4 NB STATE 9 STATE 14 INB STATE 17 STATE 4 -SB STATE 26 STATE 7 -SB 
STATE 2 STATES 0 STATE 9 STATE 18 0 STATE 17 STATE 18 0 STATE 27 STATE 32 0 
STATE 2 STATE 6 SB STATE 10 STATE 19 INB STATE 18 STATE 27 !NB STATE 27 STATE 19 -SB 
STATE 2 STATE 7 NB STATE 10 STATE 20 SB STATE 18 STATE 10 -SB STATE 28 STATE 33 SB 
STATE 3 STATE 6 INB STATE 10 STATE I -NB STATE 19 STATE 28 0 STATE 28 STATES -NB 
STATE 3 STATE 8 0 STATE 11 STATE 3 -INB STATE 19 STATE 29 SB STATE 29 STATE 34 0 
STATE 3 STATE 9 NB STATE 11 STATE 13 0 STATE 19 STATE 2 -NB STATE 29 STATE 6 -NB 
STATE 4 STATE 7 INB STATE 11 STATE 21 NB STATE 20 STATE 29 INB STATE 30 STATE 35 INB 
STATE 4 STATE 9 SB STATE 12 STATE 4 -INB STATE 20 STATE 30 0 STATE 30 STATE 8 -NB 
STATE 4 STATE 10 0 STATE 12 STATE 21 SB STATE 20 STATE 3 -NB STATE 31 STATE 12 -SB 
STATE 5 STATE I -INB STATE 12 STATE IS 0 STATE 21 STATE 9 -INB STATE 31 STATE 32 0 
STATES STATE 11 SB STATE 13 STATE 8 -INB STATE 21 STATE 23 0 STATE 32 STATE 15 -SB 
STATES STATE 12 NB STATE 13 STATE 22 NB STATE 22 STATE 17 -INB STATE 33 STATE 34 0 
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STATE 6 STATE 13 0 STATE 14 STATE 23 0 STATE 22 STATE 23 0 STATE 33 STATE II -NB 
STATE 6 STATE 14 NB STATE 15 STATE 10 -INB STATE 23 STATE 18 -INB STATE 34 STATE 13 -NB 
STATE 7 STATE 15 0 STATE 15 STATE 24 SB STATE 24 STATE 20 -INB STATE 35 STATE 34 0 
STATE 7 STATE 14 SB STATE 16 STATE 25 0 STATE 24 STATE 23 0 STATE 35 STATE 16 -NB 
STATE 8 STATE 16 INB STATE 16 STATE 2 -SB STATE 25 STATE 5 -SB 
Note: basIc events INB, SB, and NB III table B.8 correspond to basIc events WDV, WVS and ADV respec!1vely III module 7018. 
Table B.3 State transitions included in the Markov model for module 7017 (referring to figure 9.6) 
TIME UNAVAILABILITY UNRELIABILITY CONDITIONAL STATIC FAILURE DYNAMIC FAILURE 
(in month) QSys(t) Fsys(Tr) UNRELIABILITY INTENSITY (waee s) INTENSITY (wacc d) 
0 2.9997E-04 1.8235E-05 1.8240E-05 2.9997E-I0 1.8235E-11 
1 1.5204E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2160E-05 1.5204E-08 4.1519E-11 
2 3.2424E-02 6.7737E-05 7.0007E-05 3.2424E-08 6.7737E-11 
3 4.6416E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0071E-04 4.6416E-08 9.603IE-11 
4 3.3363E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2952E-05 3.3363E-08 4.1519E-ll 
5 4.6391E-02 6.7737E-05 7.1032E-05 4.6391E-08 6.7737E-11 
6 6.6182E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0284E-04 6.6182E-08 9.603IE-11 
7 1.5213E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2160E-05 1.5213E-08 4.1519E-11 
8 3.2479E-02 6.7737E-05 7.0010E-05 3.2479E-08 6.7737E-11 
9 4.6464E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0071E-04 4.6464E-08 9.6031E-ll 
10 3.3405E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2954E-05 3.3405E-08 4.1519E-ll 
11 4.6434E-02 6.7737E-05 7.1035E-05 4.6434E-08 6.7737E-ll 
12 6.6310E-02 9.603IE-05 1.0285E-04 6.63IOE-08 9.6031E-ll 
13 1.5223E-02 4.1519E-05 4.216IE-05 1.5223E-08 4.1519E-ll 
14 3.2536E-02 6.7737E-05 7.0015E-05 3.2536E-08 6.7737E-ll 
15 4.6514E-02 9.603IE-05 1.0072E-04 4.6514E-08 9.6031E-ll 
16 3.3449E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2956E-05 3.3449E-08 4.1519E-ll 
17 4.6478E-02 6.7737E-05 7.1038E-05 4.6478E-08 6.7737E-ll 
18 6.6444E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0287E-04 6.6444E-08 9.6031E-ll 
19 1.5234E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2161E-05 1.5234E-08 4.1519E-11 
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20 3.2597E-02 6.7737E-05 7.0019E-05 3.2597E-OS 6.7737E-ll 
21 4.6566E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0072E-04 4.6566E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
22 3.3496E-02 4.l519E-05 4.295SE-05 3.3496E-OS 4.l519E-ll 
23 4.6525E-02 6.7737E-05 7.l042E-05 4.6525E-OS 6.7737E-ll 
24 6.65S6E-02 9.603lE-05 1.02SSE-04 6.65S6E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
25 1.5245E-02 4.l519E-05 4.216lE-05 l.5245E-OS 4.l519E-ll 
26 3.2661E-02 6.7737E-05 7.0024E-05 3.2661E-OS 6.7737E-ll 
27 4.6620E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0073E-04 4.6620E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
2S 3.3545E-02 4.l519E-05 4.2960E-05 3.3545E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
29 4.6573E-02 6.7736E-05 7.l045E-05 4.6573E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
30 6.6734E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0290E-04 6.6734E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
31 1.5256E-02 4.l519E-05 4.2 1 62E-05 1.5256E-OS 4.l519E-ll 
32 3.2729E-02 6.7736E-05 7.002SE-05 3.2729E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
33 4.6676E-02 9.603lE-05 1.0073E-04 4.6676E-OS 9.603 lE-I 1 
34 3.359SE-02 4.l519E-05 4.2962E-05 3.359SE-OS 4.l519E-ll 
35 4.6624E-02 6.7736E-05 7.1049E-05 4.6624E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
36 6.6S90E-02 9.6031E-05 l.029lE-04 6.6S90E-OS 9.603lE-ll 
37 l.5269E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2162E-05 1.5269E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
3S 3.2S00E-02 6.7736E-05 7.0034E-05 3.2S00E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
39 4.6735E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0074E-04 4.6735E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
40 3.3653E-02 4.l519E-05 4.2965E-05 3.3653E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
41 4.6677E-02 6.7736E-05 7.l053E-05 4.6677E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
42 6.7054E-02 9.6031E-05 1.0293E-04 6.7054E-OS 9.6031E-ll 
43 l.52S1E-02 4.1 519E-05 4.2163E-05 1.52S1E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
44 3.2S75E-02 6.7736E-05 7.0039E-05 3.2S75E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
45 4.6796E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0075E-04 4.6796E-OS 9.6030E-ll 
46 3.3713E-02 4.l519E-05 4.2967E-05 3.3713E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
47 4.6733E-02 6.7736E-05 7.1057E-05 4.6733E-OS 6.7736E-ll 
4S 6.7227E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0295E-04 6.7227E-OS 9.6030E-ll 
49 1.5294E-02 4.l519E-05 4.2 1 64E-05 l.5294E-OS 4.1519E-ll 
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50 3.2954E-02 6.7736E-05 7.0045E-05 3.2954E-08 6.7736E-11 
51 4.6860E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0075E-04 4.6860E-08 9.6030E-ll 
52 3.3776E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2970E-05 3.3776E-08 4.1519E-11 
53 4.6791E-02 6.7736E-05 7.1061E-05 4.6791E-08 6.7736E-ll 
54 6.7409E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0297E-04 6.7409E-08 9.6030E-ll 
55 1.5308E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2164E-05 1.5308E-08 4.1519E-11 
56 3.3038E-02 6.7736E-05 7.0051E-05 3.3038E-08 6.7736E-11 
57 4.6927E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0076E-04 4.6927E-08 9.6030E-ll 
58 3.3843E-02 4.1519E-05 4.2973E-05 3.3843E-08 4.1519E-11 
59 4.6852E-02 6.7736E-05 7.1066E-05 4.6852E-08 6.7736E-11 
60 6.7601E-02 9.6030E-05 1.0299E-04 6.7601E-08 9.6030E-ll 
Table B.4 failure predictIOns for firewater deluge system 
Basic Time Criticality Basic Time Criticality Basic Time Criticality Basic Time Criticality 
event I (months) Function event I (months) Function event I (months) Function event (months) Function 
0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 1.9994E-04 0 1.9994E-04 
10 8.2974E-02 10 8.2937E-02 10 4.9601E-02 10 4.9923E-02 
20 9.7992E-02 20 9.7885E-02 20 7.4374E-02 20 7.5344E-02 
IV 11 30 1.2960E-Ol DS 30 1.2938E-OI AES 30 1.1137E-OI AEF 30 1.1355E-Ol 
40 9.3192E-02 40 9.315IE-02 40 4.9588E-02 40 4.99IOE-02 
50 1.0713E-Ol 50 1.0702E-Ol 50 7.4346E-02 50 7.5316E-02 
60 1.4074E-Ol 60 1.4050E-Ol 60 1.1126E-Ol 60 1.1345E-Ol 
0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 9.9980E-Ol 0 O.OOOOE+OO 
10 2.9784E-02 10 2.8736E-02 10 9.6669E-Ol 10 6.2907E-04 
20 3.9550E-02 20 3.6810E-02 MPF 20 9.6750E-Ol 20 1.7863E-03 
ADF 30 6.3 I 22E-02 ADS 30 5.6672E-02 APF 30 9.3336E-Ol ESl 30 3.5500E-03 INAF ES2 
40 2.9776E-02 40 2.8729E-02 40 9.6644E-OI 40 6.7605E-04 
50 3.9535E-02 50 3.6796E-02 50 9.6714E-01 50 1.8637E-03 
60 6.3064E-02 60 5.6619E-02 60 9.3249E-OI 60 3.6813E-03 
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0 1.9994E-04 0 1.9994E-04 0 1.9994E-04 0 O.OOOOE+OO 
10 1.0543E-02 10 1.0360E-02 10 1.0345E-02 10 7.2262E-03 
20 2.0488E-02 IV3 20 2.009IE-02 20 2.0102E-02 20 I.2092E-02 FBI 30 3.9009E-02 IV4 30 3.8407E-02 CVI 30 3.8274E-02 FB3 30 2.2850E-02 FB2 IV5 CV2 FB4 
40 1.4550E-02 IV6 40 1.4296E-02 40 1.4276E-02 40 1.0389E-02 
50 2.6748E-02 50 2.6230E-02 50 2.6245E-02 50 1.6418E-02 
60 5.0513E-02 60 4.9734E-02 60 4.9562E-02 60 3.0693E-02 
0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 1.9994E-04 0 O.OOOOE+OO 
10 7.1004E-03 10 7.0902E-03 10 9.9890E-03 10 7.0159E-03 
IV7 20 1.1858E-02 20 1.1865E-02 20 1.8592E-02 20 1.1524E-02 IV8 30 2.2498E-02 CV3 30 2.2420E-02 ElF 30 3.3853E-02 DIF 30 2. 134IE-02 IV9 CV4 E2F D2F 
IVIO 40 1.0208E-02 40 1.0193E-02 40 1.1684E-02 40 8.5492E-03 
50 1.6100E-02 50 1.6 I 09E-02 50 2.0584E-02 50 l.3268E-02 
60 3.0219E-02 60 3.0115E-02 60 3.7098E-02 60 2.4259E-02 
0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 
10 2.378IE-05 10 5.771OE-04 10 1.1 I 22E-03 10 3.4667E-03 
WPSIF 20 9.4788E-05 20 1.1541E-03 FSIF 20 2.2237E-03 APSIF 20 6.915IE-03 WPS2F 30 2.0453E-04 SVI 30 1.6686E-03 FS2F 30 3.2142E-03 APS2F 30 9.9715E-03 WPS3F SV2 
WPS4F 40 2.3775E-05 40 5.7693E-04 FS3F 40 1.1119E-03 APS3F 40 3.4658E-03 
50 9.4753E-05 50 1.1537E-03 50 2.2229E-03 50 6.9125E-03 
60 2.0434E-04 60 1.6670E-03 60 3.2112E-03 60 9.9622E-03 
0 1.9994E-04 0 1.9994E-04 0 O.OOOOE+OO 0 O.OOOOE+OO 
10 4.9665E-02 10 4.9479E-02 10 2.8805E-02 10 2.8913E-02 
IVI5 20 7.386IE-02 20 7.3819E-02 20 3.6850E-02 IVI7 20 3.6919E-02 30 1.1 074E-0 I CV6 30 1.0998E-OI IVI4 30 5.688IE-02 30 5.7202E-02 IVI6 IVI8 
40 4.9652E-02 40 4.9467E-02 40 2.8798E-02 40 2.8906E-02 
50 7.3834E-02 50 7.379IE-02 50 3.6836E-02 50 3.6905E-02 
60 1.1064E-OI 60 1.0988E-OI 60 5.6828E-02 60 5.7148E-02 
CV7 0 O.OOOOE+OO IVI 0 9.9970E-OI IV12 0 9.9970E-OI CV5 0 9.9970E-OI 
10 2.8805E-02 IV2 10 9.7076E-OI IV 13 10 9.7300E-OI 10 9.7034E-OI 
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20 3.6898E-02 20 9.7012E-Ol 20 9.7124E-Ol 20 9.7166E-Ol 
30 5.6807E-02 30 9.3994E-Ol 30 9.4319E-Ol 30 9.3764E-Ol 
40 2.8798E-02 40 9.7180E-Ol 40 9.7404E-Ol 40 9.7138E-Ol 
50 3.6884E-02 50 9.71 04E-0 1 50 9.7216E-Ol 50 9.7258E-Ol 
60 5.6755E-02 60 9.4033E-Ol 60 9.4358E-Ol 60 9.3803E-Ol 
0 9.9970E-Ol 0 9.9970E-Ol 0 9.9970E-Ol 0 9.9970E-Ol 
10 9.6765E-Ol 10 9.6763E-Ol 10 9.6834E-Ol 10 9.6868E-Ol 
INB 
20 9.6952E-Ol 20 9.6948E-Ol 20 9.7089E-Ol 20 9.7159E-Ol 
30 9.3633E-Ol NB 30 9.3627E-Ol WDV 30 9.3832E-Ol WVS 30 9.3933E-Ol SB 
40 9.7023E-Ol 40 9.7021E-Ol 40 9.6808E-Ol 40 9.6843E-Ol 
50 9.7199E-Ol 50 9.7195E-Ol 50 9.7053E-Ol 50 9.7123E-Ol 
60 9.3819E-Ol 60 9.3813E-Ol 60 9.3744E-Ol 60 9.3846E-Ol 
ADV 0 9.9970E-Ol ADV 20 9.7201E-Ol ADV 40 9.6864E-Ol ADV 60 9.3906E-Ol 
10 9.6889E-Ol 30 9.3994E-Ol 50 9.7165E-Ol 
.. Table B.5 Cnttcahty functton of each component durmg the stattc-phase of the firewater deluge system m chapter 9 
~ Basic events Time 0 ESl ElD PRVl DS DlD PRV3 D2D PRV4 AED AES PRV5 ADD ADS PRV6 INAF activation ES2 E2D PRV2 
3.2400E 1.2976E 3.4602E 1.2140£ 4.5522E 7.9169E 4.6156E 8.0271£ 4.6161E 5.3854E 1.2309E 6.2165E 6.7584E 1.0811E 9.8554E 
0 -08 -03 -05 -04 -Of -08 -Of -08 -03 -04 -04 -03 -05 -04 -01 
3.5431E 1.8089E 4.8238E 3.3315£ 1.2156E 2.1141£ 1.2159E 2.1146£ 3.0441E 3.5515E 8.1176E 1.4920E 1.6220E 2.5947E 4.3262E 
1 -04 -02 -O~ -03 -O~ -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
8.2504E 4.0300E 1.0747E 3.9802E 2.7326E 4.7523E 2.7329E 4.7528E 3.6095E 4.2110E 9.6252E 1.7375E 1.8890E 3.0218E 2.6467E 
2 -04 -02 -03 -03 -02 -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
1.2464E 5.9484E 1.5862E 4.1114E 4.0062E 6.9672E 4.0064E 6.9677E 3.7004£ 4.3171E 9.8677E 1.7559E 1.9090E 3.0538E 1.861OE 
3 -03 -02 -03 -03 -02 -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
3.5419E 1.8089E 4.8238E 3.3315E 1.2156E 2.1141E 1.2159E 2.1146E 3.0441E 3.5515E 8.1176£ 1.4920E 1.6220E 2.5947E 4.3262E 
4 -04 -02 -04 -03 -02 -O~ -02 -O~ -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
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8.2481E 4.0300E 1.0747£ 3.9802E 2.7326E 4.7523£ 2.7329£ 4.7528E 3.6095£ 4.2110E 9.6252£ 1.7375E 1.8890£ 3.0218£ 2.6467E 
5 -04 -02 -03 -03 -02 -O~ -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
1.2460E 5.9484E 1.5862£ 4.1114£ 4.0062E 6.9672£ 4.0064£ 6.9677£ 3.7004£ 4.3171E 9.8677£ 1.7559E 1.9090£ 3.0538£ 1.8610E 
6 -03 -02 -03 -03 -02 -O~ -02 -O~ -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
3.5411E 1.8089E 4.8238£ 3.3315£ 1.2156E 2.1141£ 1.2159£ 2.1146£ 3.0441£ 3.5515E 8.1176£ 1.4920E 1.6220£ 2.5947£ 4.3262E 
7 -04 -02 -O~ -03 -02 -O~ -02 ·O~ -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
8.2462E 4.0300E 1.0747£ 3.9802E 2.7326E 4.7523£ 2.7329£ 4.7528E 3.6095£ 4.2110E 9.6253£ 1.7375E 1.8890£ 3.0218E 2.6467E 
8 -04 -02 -03 -03 -02 -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
1.2458E 5.9484E 1.5862£ 4.1114E 4.0062E 6.9672E 4.0064£ 6.9677E 3.7004£ 4.3171E 9.8677£ 1.7559E 1.9090E 3.0538E 1.8611E 
9 -03 -02 -03 -03 -02 -O~ -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
3.5403E 1.8089E 4.8238E 3.3315E 1.2156E 2.1141E 1.2159£ 2.1146E 3.0441£ 3.5515E 8.1176£ 1.4920E 1.6220£ 2.5947E 4.3262E 
10 -04 -02 -04 -03 -02 -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
8.2444E 4.0300E 1.0747£ 3.9802E 2.7326E 4.7523E 2.7329£ 4.7528E 3.6095E 4.211OE 9.6253E 1.7375E 1.8890E 3.0218E 2.6467E 
11 -04 -02 -03 -03 -02 -04 -02 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
1.2455E 5.9484E 1.5862£ 4.1114E 4.0062E 6.9672E 4.0064£ 6.9677E 3.7004£ 4.3171E 9.8677E 1.7559E 1.9090E 3.0538£ 1.8611E 
12 -03 -02 -03 -03 -02 -04 -01 -04 -01 -02 -03 -01 -03 -03 -01 
Table B.6 Barlow-Proschan Importance measure for dynamic-phase analysIs of the firewater deluge system In chapter 9 
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